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This edited volume contains a selection of papers that are an outgrowth of
the Third International Conference on Game Theory and Management with a few
additional contributed papers. These papers present an outlook of the current de-
velopment of the theory of games and its applications to management and various
domains, in particular, energy, the environment and economics.
The International Conference on Game Theory and Management, a three day
conference, was held in St. Petersburg, Russia in June 24-26, 2009. The conference
was organized by Graduate School of Management St. Petersburg University in col-
laboration with The International Society of Dynamic Games (Russian Chapter)
and Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes SPU within the frame-
work of a National Priority Project in Education. More than 100 participants from
22 countries had an opportunity to hear state-of-the-art presentations on a wide
range of game-theoretic models, both theory and management applications.
Plenary lectures covered diﬀerent areas of games and management applications.
They had been delivered by Professor Reinhard Selten, Bonn University (Germany),
Nobel Prize Winner in Economics in 1994; Professor Pierre Bernhard, University
of Nice-Soﬁa Antipolis, INRIA (France); Professor Dmitry Novikov, Institute of
Control Sciences, RAS (Russia); Professor Myrna Wooders, Vanderbilt University
(USA). The importance of strategic behavior in the human and social world is in-
creasingly recognized in theory and practice. As a result, game theory has emerged
as a fundamental instrument in pure and applied research. The discipline of game
theory studies decision making in an interactive environment. It draws on math-
ematics, statistics, operations research, engineering, biology, economics, political
science and other subjects. In canonical form, a game obtains when an individual
pursues an objective(s) in a situation in which other individuals concurrently pursue
other (possibly conﬂicting, possibly overlapping) objectives and in the same time
the objectives cannot be reached by individual actions of one decision maker. The
problem is then to determine each individual’s optimal decision, how these decisions
interact to produce equilibria, and the properties of such outcomes. The foundations
of game theory were laid some sixty years ago by von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944).
Theoretical research and applications in games are proceeding apace, in ar-
eas ranging from aircraft and missile control to inventory management, market
development, natural resources extraction, competition policy, negotiation tech-
niques, macroeconomic and environmental planning, capital accumulation and in-
vestment. In all these areas, game theory is perhaps the most sophisticated and
fertile paradigm applied mathematics can oﬀer to study and analyze decision mak-
ing under real world conditions.
The papers presented at this Third International Conference on Game Theory
and Management certainly reﬂect both the maturity and the vitality of modern
day game theory and management science in general, and of dynamic games, in
particular. The maturity can be seen from the sophistication of the theorems, proofs,7
methods and numerical algorithms contained in the most of the papers in these
contributions. The vitality is manifested by the range of new ideas, new applications,
the growing number of young researchers and the expanding world wide coverage
of research centers and institutes from whence the contributions originated.
The contributions demonstrate that GTM2009 oﬀers an interactive program on
a wide range of latest developments in game theory and management. It includes
recent advances in topics with high future potential and exiting developments in
classical ﬁelds.
We thank Anna Tur from the Faculty of Applied Mathematics (SPU) for dis-
playing extreme patience and typesetting the manuscript.
Editors, Leon A. Petrosyan and Nikolay A. ZenkevichA New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems
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Abstract As is known, there is no rule satisfying Adittivity on the com-
plete domain of bankruptcy problems. This paper explores some Partial-
Adittivity properties in this context. We determine that Adittivity restricted
to bankruptcy problems which in some way keep the conﬂictivity of the cred-
itors’ claims ﬁxed is compatible with certain bankruptcy rules. Our main
result is that the proposed Adittivity property, together with two quite com-
pelling axioms, Anonymity and Continuity, identify the Minimal Overlap
rule, introduced by O’Neill (1982).
Keywords: Bankruptcy problems; Additivity; Minimal Overlap rule.
1. Introduction
The analysis of bankruptcy problems can be considered a simple and robust tool
to model how agents should be rationed. In these situations, each agent in a group
asks for a quantity of a perfectly divisible good, known as an endowment, but the
amount available is not enough to satisfy all the agents’ demands.
The literature proposes two approaches to analyzing how to solve bankruptcy
problems. The ﬁrst is the normative approach, which proposes particular solutions
arising from axiomatic bases that are ’Equity Principles’. The study by Thomson
(2003) provides a good overview of the main results following this methodology. The
second approach is based on an interpretation of bankruptcy problems as (trans-
ferable utility) cooperative games (referred to henceforth as TU games). This for-
mulation, introduced by O’Neill (1982), has been used to justify, among others, the
Random Arrival rule, due to the fact that it corresponds to the Shapley value of
the associated TU game, and the use of the Talmudic rule, as it coincides with the
Nucleolus of the related TU game (Aumann and Mashler (1985)).
Starting from this link, this paper analyzes ’additivity-like’ properties of bankrup-
tcy problems. In this regard, it should be noted that Additivity has played a cen-
tral role in TU games. The Shapley value, the distinctive normative argument of
which is Additivity, has been applied to a great many ﬁelds, such as cost allocation,
social networks, water issues, biology, reliability theory and belief formation (see
Moretti and Patrone (2008)).
Additivity states that, given two problems, the sum of their solutions should
coincide with the solution of the problem generated by aggregating the two initialA New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 9
ones. In that sense, it is worth noting that although the link between TU games
and bankruptcy problems as mentioned previously is clear, there are serious dif-
ﬁculties in translating Additivity from the ﬁrst model to the second one. This is
because the sum of the TU games associated with diﬀerent bankruptcy problems
does not, in general, correspond to the TU game induced by the sum of the con-
sidered bankruptcy problems. We have therefore explored the direct application of
Additivity to bankruptcy problems. It is well-known that there is no bankruptcy so-
lution satisfying Additivity, as Berganti˜ nos and M´ endez-Naya (2001) point out. The
reason for this incompatibility is very simple: Additivity allows extremely diﬀerent
bankruptcy problems to be added, making it a very demanding property. This is
why we deal with restricted forms of Additivity, in order to analyze, from within
the complete domain of bankruptcy problems, the possibility of ﬁnding additive
bankruptcy rules when the problems to be added share certain common character-
istics.
Our main contribution, based on what we call Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additiv-
ity, is that not only are there bankruptcy rules satisfying some kind of Additivity,
but also that, if restricted to anonymous and continuous solutions, just one qualiﬁes:
the Minimal Overlap bankruptcy rule (O’Neill (1982)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2. presents bankruptcy
problems, their interpretation in terms of TU games and the connections between
these two models. Section 3. introduces the concept of Additivity and presents some
impossibility results. Section 4. provides our main result, an axiomatic characteri-
zation of the Minimal Overlap bankruptcy rule based on a property of ’restricted
additivity’. Finally, the technical proofs are included in the Appendix.
2. Bankruptcy Problems and Bankruptcy Games
This section presents bankruptcy problems, their interpretationas cooperativegames
and certain connections between the two models.
2.1. Bankruptcy Problems and Rules
A bankruptcy problem (or simply ap r o b l e m ) can be formally described by a







E is known as the endowment. It represents the quantity of the perfectly divisible
good that should be distributed among the agents in N = {1,...,i,...,n},a l s o
called creditors. Each agent i ∈Nhas a claim ci on the endowment. As the
condition (1) reﬂects that agents’ rights could be incompatible, rationing is needed.
Let C denote the set of all problems,
C =
 
(E,c) ∈ IR + × IR
n






For notational convenience, we denote by CE the set of problems in which at least
one claim is equal to or greater than the endowment,
CE =
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For any subclass of problems C∗ ⊆C ,w ed e n o t eb yCO
∗ the problems subclass in C∗
with increasingly ordered claims,
CO
∗ = {(E,c) ∈C ∗ : ci ≤ cj for each pair i,jsuch that i ≤ j}.
Deﬁnition 1. A bankruptcy rule (or simply ar u l e ) is a function ϕ : C→IR
n
+,
such that for each problem C =( E,c) ∈C ,
(a)
 n
i=1 ϕi(E,c)=E,( Eﬃciency)a n d
(b)0 ≤ ϕi (E,c) ≤ ci for each creditor i (Non-Negativity and Claims Boundedness).
As a consequence of Eﬃciency, Non-Negativity and Claims Boundedness to-
gether, any rule places a lower bound on each creditor i’s award, her minimal right,
mi. This property is called Respect of Minimal Rights and states that for each
(E,c) ∈C ,a n de a c hi ∈ N,












Among the bankruptcy solutions proposed in the literature, the Proportional,
Constrained Equal Awards, Constrained Equal Losses and Talmud rules have all
occupied prominent positions (see Thomson (2003)).
We now introduce the Minimal Overlap and Random Arrival rules.
Informally speaking, the Minimal Overlap rule (O’Neill (1982)) chooses the
awards vector that minimizes the ’extent of conﬂict’ over each available unit. This
solution can be considered a generalization of the Ibn Ezra’s rule1, which is only
deﬁned as CE.
We present the deﬁnition of the Minimal Overlap rule provided by Alcalde et
al. (2008), which is based on a result of Chun and Thomson (2005).
Deﬁnition 2. With the Minimal Overlap rule,
ϕmo : CO → IR
n
+,






n − j +1
+m a x{ci − t,0}, (2)
where c0 =0 ,a n d
(a) t = E if E ≤ cn,o r
(b)o t h e r w i s e ,t is the unique solution of the equation
n  
k=1
max{ck − t,0} = E − t,
1 Anoter way of extending the Ibn Ezra’s proposal, called the Generalized Ibn Ezra ban-
ruptcy rule, is provided by Alcalde et al. (2005). They apply recursivity and impose that
the general principle from which it is inspired remains ﬁxed.A New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 11
Remark 1. To extend Deﬁnition 2 to C, let us note that, for each (E,c)i nC\C
O
there is a permutation2 π such that (E,π(c)) is in CO. Hence,
ϕmo (E,c)=π−1 [ϕmo (E,π(c))].
To introduce the Random Arrival rule, imagine creditors arriving one at a time,
who are then compensated fully until the money runs out. Of course, the resulting
awards vector depends on the order in which the creditors arrive. To remove the
unfairness associated with a particular order, take the arithmetic average over all
orders of arrival of the awards vectors calculated in this way (O’Neill (1982)).




















For two-creditors problems, both the Minimal Overlap and the Random Ar-
rival rules coincide with the Contested Garment rule. This fact was pointed out by
Aumann and Mashler (1985). However, these rules are not the only ones general-
izing the Contested Garment principle to n-creditors problems, as this also applies
to the Talmud (see Aumann and Mashler (1985)) and the Adjusted Proportional
rules (see Curiel et al. (1988)).
2.2. TU Games and Bankruptcy
Here we brieﬂy present the general context of cooperative TU games.
A TU game involving a set of agents N is a pair (N,V), where V :2 N → IR is
a function associating a real number with each subset of agents, or coalition, S ⊆N.
V (S) is commonly called the value of coalition S and denotes the total payoﬀ that
agents in S can guarantee themselves through cooperation, so that, V (∅)=0 . It
is often assumed that (N,V)i ssuperadditive, that is, for any pair of coalitions
S,T ⊂Nsuch that S ∩ T = ∅,V (S ∪ T) ≥ V (S)+V (T), so that there is an
incentive for the grand coalition N to form.
A single-valued solution for TU games is a function which, for each TU game,
selects a division of the value of the grand coalition among the agents. Let G be a
family of TU games referring to a ﬁxed set of agents, for example N.
Deﬁnition 4. A TU value (or simply a value) is a function γ : G→ IR
n, such




2 Given a set of agents N,w ed e n o t eb yΠ
N the class of bijections from N into itself, and
by π an element in Π
N. Throughout the rest of the paper, and abusing notation, π (c)
will denote the claims vector obtained by applying permutation π to its components,
i.e. the i-th component for π (c)i scj whenever j = π (i).12 Jos´ e Alcalde, Mar´ ıa del Carmen Marco-Gil, Jos´ eA .S i l v a
Let us remark that Condition 3 incorporates both Feasibility and Pareto Op-
timality. Feasibility requires that the members of the grand coalition can actually
achieve the selected share, whereas Pareto Optimality establishes that they cannot
achieve more. Usually, Individual Rationality is also required, which means that
none of the agents can receive less than the amount that they can ensure for them-
selves, for each i ∈N, γi(N,V) ≥ V ({i}).
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) and the Nucleolus (Smeidler (1969)) are the
best known and most extensively explored values in the literature. A joint analysis
of them can be found in Arin (2008).
O’Neill (1982) proposed a way of associating a game with each problem. His
advice was to associate with each coalition the part of the endowment, if any,
that remains after paying the debts that the bankrupted party contracted with
all creditors outside this coalition. Given a bankruptcy problem C =( E,c), we
denote by (N,V C) the TU game that it induces, called a TU-bankruptcy game,
the characteristic function of which, VC :2 N → IR, associates with each coalition









GC will denote the class of TU-bankruptcy games.
The previous link, between problems and TU games, could make it possible to
translate some of the solutions, properties and results relative to values for TU
games into bankruptcy theory and vice versa.
Concerning connections between solutions, two natural questions arise.
Firstly, given a value γ, might we interpret it as a rule simply by identifying, for
each C =( E,c), ϕ(C)w i t hγ(N,VC)? It is relatively straightforward to verify that
av a l u eγ is a bankruptcy rule if and only if γ satisﬁes Individual Rationality.
Secondly, given a rule ϕ, is there a value γ such that for any bankruptcy problem
C =( E,c),ϕ (C)=γ(N,VC)? Curiel et al. (1988) showed that a rule ϕ is a value for
TU-bankruptcy games if and only if ϕ satisﬁes Invariance under Claims Truncation.
This means that it ignores the part of each claim that is above the endowment,
ϕ(E,c)=ϕ(E,cE), where cE
i =m i n {ci,E} is interpreted as the part of E claimed
by creditor i, given that he cannot claim more than the available quantity.
There is a natural way to establish wether a rule and a value share a similar
spirit. It could be said that a rule ϕ corresponds to a value γ if, for each problem,
the recommendation made by ϕ coincides with the recommendation made by γ
when applied to the induced TU game. O’Neill (1982) established that the Random
Arrival rule corresponds to the Shapley value. Aumann and Mashler (1985) showed
that the Talmud rule corresponds to the Nucleolus. Other correspondence results
are summarized in Thomson (2003).
In a similar way, a property for bankruptcy problems could be deﬁned using
the straight application of some appealing or natural requirement for TU games.
The main question would be: is the ’essence’ of a property unchanged in its move
from TU games to bankruptcy problems? If ’essence’ is understood as meaning and
reasonableness, several situations can be found. What follows are some examples.
It is obvious that Pareto Optimality keeps its full ’essence’. Individual Rationality
corresponds to Respect of Minimal Rights, so its meaning changes. Note that the
translation of the interpretation of Individual Rationality would be Non-Negativity,A New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 13
whereas Respect of Minimal Rights is a consequence of Eﬃciency, Non-Negativity
and Claim Boundedness together. Nevertheless, both properties would in our opin-
ion have a similar rank in a scale measuring reasonableness. Translation Invariance3
loses its ’essence’ absolutely, although there has been some attempt to retrieve it by
restricting its translation. In this regard, Minimal Rights First4, the interpretation
of which stems from its being a particular kind of composition, can be seen as the
application of Translation Invariance when only allowing origin changes by using
the minimal rights vector. Therefore, even though its meaning has been changed,
some reasonableness has been retained.
The next section points out the diﬃculties when translating Additivity from TU
games to bankruptcy problems, and lays the foundations for studying this property
for bankruptcy problems in greater detail.
3. Some Results Relating to Additivity
The Shapley value has been one of the most studied and oft-used solution concepts
for TU games as both a normative and a descriptive tool (see Moretti and Patrone
(2008)). Together with two quite compelling properties, the main argument used
by Shapley (1953) to justify his proposal is the Additivity axiom, which states that
is irrelevant that opposing players in two remote games evaluate their expectations
either in both games independently or by establishing a package deal. In this sec-
tion we formally present the notion of Additivity for TU games, and analyze its
translation to bankruptcy problems.




where (V + V  )(S)=V (S)+V  (S) for all S ⊆ N.
Given that the Random Arrival rule corresponds to the Shapley value, one could
expect to distinguish the Random Arrival rule by means of the translation of TU-
Additivity to bankruptcy problems. Nevertheless the following example points out
certain diﬃculties in establishing such a link.
Example 1. Let us consider C =( 4 .5;(4,4,4)) and C  =( 1 5 .5;(2,6,11)). It can be
veriﬁed that VC ({2})=VC ({3})=0 ,VC  ({2})=2 .5a n dVC  ({3})=7 .5. We
now have C + C  = (20;(6,10,15)), VC+C  ({2})=0a n dVC+C  ({3})=4 .B u t
(VC + VC )({2})=2 .5a n d( VC + VC )({3})=7 .5. The TU game (N,VC + VC )
does not therefore correspond to the bankruptcy problem C + C .
3 Translation Invariance imposes that origin changes do not aﬀect the recommended share
in a TU game, for each n-dimensional vector a =( a1,...., an),γ (N,W)=γ(N,V)−a,
where for each S ⊆N,W(S)=V (S) −
 
i∈Sai.
4 Minimal Rights First demands that the awards vector is equivalently obtained: (i) di-
rectly, or (ii) by ﬁrst assigning to each agent his minimal right, adjusting claims down
by these amounts, and ﬁnally, applying the bankruptcy rule to divide the remainder, for




mi(E,c),c− m(E,c)).14 Jos´ e Alcalde, Mar´ ıa del Carmen Marco-Gil, Jos´ eA .S i l v a
Another possibility for requiring Additivity in bankruptcy problems, given the
negative ﬁndings presented above, is to apply such a concept directly on the context
to hand.
C-Additivity: for all pairs of bankruptcy problems in C, C =( E,c)a n dC  =






Unfortunately, no rule satisﬁes C-Additivity, which is acknowledged by Thomson
(2003). The following example from Berganti˜ nos and M´ endez-Naya (2001) provides
this impossibility result.
Example 2. Let ϕ a C-Additive rule and suppose that
ϕ(10,(5,15)) = (10 − x,x).
If we take any y  = x, 5 ≤ y ≤ 10 by C-Additivity we have that
ϕ(10,(5,15)) = ϕ(y,(0,15)) + ϕ(10 − y,(5,0)) = (10 − y,y)
and
(10 − y,y)  =( 1 0− x,x).
The fact that C-Additivity is a very strong requirement in bankruptcy problems
is not very surprising, since the amount that a creditor gets in a problem is very
sensitive to the value of her claim relative to both the endowment and the other
creditors’ claims, which could be interpreted as her power relative to her opponents.
However, C-Additivity allows great diﬀerences, in this sense, among bankruptcy
problems. To avoid these diﬃculties, Berganti˜ nos and M´ endez-Naya (2001) analyze
C-Additivity in a restricted domain of problems, in which (i) the order of the cred-
itors’ claims is ﬁxed and (ii) there is always at least one creditor claiming the total
endowment. They identify Ibn Ezra’s rule by means of C-Additivity in this context.
However, although condition (i) could be quite suitable, the domain is quite narrow,
as problems fulﬁlling condition (ii) are unusual.
Our approach is diﬀerent. We consider the possibility of ﬁnding a notion of ’par-
tial additivity’ that could be satisﬁed across the complete domain of bankruptcy
problems, by some rules. To achieve this, we impose certain conditions on the prob-
lems to be added which in some way reﬂect the power of similar creditors. In par-
ticular, we consider two conditions regarding the problems to be added. Firstly, the
position of any creditor is the same in both problems, when creditors are ranked on
the basis of their claims; secondly, the position of any creditor’s claim, with regard
to the endowment, does not reverse from one problem to the other. Formally,
Fixed Relative Position Claims Additivity: For each pair of problems in C,
C =( E,c)a n dC  =( E ,c  ), such that
(i) for all i,j ∈N,i = j, (ci − cj)(c 
i − c 
j) ≥ 0a n d







Note that in Example 2 the two conditions above, (i) and (ii), are not met.
However, the following example unfortunately shows that no rule satisﬁes this kindA New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 15
of Additivity together with Anonymity, a generally accepted property that requires
each agent’s award to be independent of her name (see Section 4. for a formal
deﬁnition).
Example 3. Let us suppose that there is an anonymous bankruptcy rule satisfying
Fixed Relative Position Claims Additivity,s a yϕ. Thus, on the one hand
ϕ1(20,(6,10,11)) = ϕ1(14,(5,5,5))+ ϕ1(6,(1,5,6)) ≥ 14/3,
and on the other
ϕ1(20,(6,10,11)) = ϕ1(6,(4,4,4)) + ϕ1(14,(2,6,7)) =⇒
2 ≤ ϕ1(20,(6,10,11)) ≤ 4
which obviously implies that ϕ is not a rule.
The above example shows that there are some central characteristics that have
a decisive aﬀect on the endowment distribution in a problem, and that, up to now,
they have not been considered when adding them up. Thus, the question to be
carefully explored is how to deﬁne the similarity of creditors’ power in order to
impose Additivity.
4. Partial Additivity and the Minimal Overlap Rule
In this section we introduce an additional condition on bankruptcy problems to
require Additivity. We show that not only is it possible to ﬁnd rules that satisfy the
proposed concept of ’partial additivity’, but also that, if restricted to anonymous
and continuous rules, just one rule qualiﬁes: the Minimal Overlap rule.
In order to introduce the notion of the individually conﬂictive claim, consider
the following scenario.
Given a problem, say (E,c), and an agent, say i, the worst situation for agents
other than i is that agent i is, as much as possible, served ﬁrst. Let us suppose
that once this is done, the remaining amount, max{0,E− ci}, could be shared
among the rest of the agents so that none of them would be missing a part of
their claim which is strictly less than agent i’s claim. No opponent would then have
’reasonable’ arguments for fully reclaiming individually what agent i has already
received. Therefore, there would be a part of agent i’s claim that could not be
objected to by anyone. In this case, we say that there is a part of agent i’s claim
which is not individually conﬂictive. Such a claim is considered to be partially
indisputable.
Deﬁnition 5. Given a problem in C, C =( E,c) we say that the i-th agent’s claim,
ci,i spartially indisputable in (E,c) if and only if
∃(γ1,γ 2,..,γn) with γi =0and
 
j =iγj =m a x {0,E− ci} : ∀j  = i,cj − γj <c i.
To illustrate the idea of partial indisputableness, consider the following situation.
Example 4. Let C =( 6 ; ( 2 ,4,5)). c3 is partially indisputable in this problem, as
there is nobody claiming as much as agent 3 does. Now, if agent 2 were served ﬁrst,
the remaining amount, 2, could be given to agent 3. Once this were done, both16 Jos´ e Alcalde, Mar´ ıa del Carmen Marco-Gil, Jos´ eA .S i l v a
agents 1 and 3 would be missing a part of their claims, 2 and 3 respectively, which
is strictly less than agent 2’s claim, which is 4. Therefore, neither agent 1 nor agent
3 would have a strong reason for reclaiming the total amount received by agent 2.
Thus, c2 is also partially indisputable. Finally, the remaining amount when agent
1 is served ﬁrst is 4, while it is necessary to have an amount greater than 5 for
sharing between agents 2 and 3, so they miss a part of their claims less than agent
2’s claim. Therefore, c1 is not partially indisputable
The following ’partial’ Additivity that we introduce forces the quality of partial
indisputableness of the creditors’ claims not to change in the problems that will
be added up. Otherwise, situations could exist where any unit claimed by an agent
would be conﬂictive in the complete bankruptcy problem, whereas some of them
would not, by regarding the problem separately. Formally,
Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity: For all pairs of problems in C, C =( E,c)
and C  =( E ,c  ), such that
(a) for all i  = j, (ci − cj)(c 
i − c 
j) ≥ 0,
(b) for all i ∈N, (E − ci)(E  − c 
i) ≥ 0a n d
(c) for all i ∈N,c i is partially indisputable ⇐⇒ c 
i is partially indisputable,
ϕ(E + E ,c+ c )=ϕ(E,c)+ϕ(E ,c  )
Remark 2. To understand the coverage of Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity,
note that in the subclass of problems CE, this property can be applied to any
pair of problems in C, C =( E,c)a n dC  =( E ,c  ), for which the claims order is
preserved, that is for all i  = j, (ci − cj)(c 
i − c 
j) ≥ 0, with cn  = cn−1 ⇔ c 
n  = c 
n−1.
Our next result not only shows that Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity,c a nb e
fulﬁlled but also that this property distinguishes the Minimal Overlap Rule.B e f o r e
this, however, we formally present certain standard properties that we will also
impose.
The ﬁrst axiom states that each agent’s award is independent of her name.
Anonymity5: For each bankruptcy problem in C, B =( E,c), and any permuta-
tion π,
π [ϕ(E,c)] = ϕ(E,π(c)).
The next axiom requires that small changes in a bankruptcy problem do not
cause big changes in the agents’ awards.
Continuity: For each sequence of bankruptcy problems in C, {(En,c n)}n=1,..,∞,
that converges to a problem (E,c) ∈C , i.e. limn→∞ (En,c n)=( E,c),
ϕ(E,c) = limn→∞ϕ(En,c n).
We can establish the next result.
5 The characterization result that we are going to provide is also true if Anonymity is
weakened to Equal Tratment of Equals, that is, for each (E,c) ∈Band each {i,j}⊆N,
if ci = cj then ϕi(E,c)=ϕj(E,c). We use Anonynity instead of Equal Treatment of
Equals because we think that the advantages of doing so, concerning the simpliﬁcation of
the notation in the proofs, are fairly signiﬁcant and moreover, Anonymity is a generally
accepted property in our context, that is, bankruptcy problems with no priorities.A New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 17
Theorem 1. A rule satisﬁes Anonymity, Continuity and Fixed Individual Conﬂict
Additivity if, and only if, it is the Minimal Overlap rule.
The axioms used in Theorem 1 are independent. In particular, the Constrained
Equal Awards rule is anonymous, continuous and does not satisfy Fixed Individ-
ual Conﬂict Additivity. The family of asymmetric minimal overlap rules, known as
Weighted Minimal Overlap rules (see Alcalde et al. (2008) for a formal deﬁnition)
satisfy Continuity and Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity but not Anonymity.F i -
nally, let β be a rule that recommends Ibn Ezra’s proposal for any problem in C,
C =( E,c) whenever maxi∈N{ci}≥E. Otherwise, let P ⊆Nthe set of agents with
claims that are partially indisputable in (E,c), then for any i ∈N,
βi(E,c)=
 
0, for all i ∈N\ P
CELi(E,({0}i∈N\P,{ci}i∈P) for all i ∈ P ,
where CEL denotes the Equal Losses rule.
Therefore, β satisﬁes Anonymity and Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity but
not Continuity.
To conclude, it should be noted that Theorem 1 states that it is possible to ﬁnd
additive rules for bankruptcy problems. The diﬃculty comes from how to establish
which bankruptcy problems could be added in order not to distort the allocation
process. Our solution comes from considering problems with agents that have the
same ’power’, the interpretation of which is as follows: (i) the position of an agent’s
claim with regard to the endowment, (ii) the ranking of an agent’s claim relative to
the other claims and (iii) the quality of an agent’s claim regarding indisputableness.
Under these circumstances, the Minimal Overlap rule is selected.
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Appendix
This appendix provides the proof of Theorem 1.
We assume, WLOG, that c is increasingly ordered i.e., ci ≤ cj whenever i<j .
We ﬁrst provide a result establishing that, under Continuity, Fixed Individual
Conﬂict Additivity implies Invariance under Claims Truncation.
Proposition 1. Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity and Continuity imply Invari-
ance under Claims Truncation
Proof. Let ϕ be a rule satisfying Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity and Continu-
ity.L e tC =( E,c)w i t hE<m a x i∈N {ci} and E>0. Let S ⊂Nbe the subset of
agents claiming zero. Let us consider the following two cases.
Case 1: cn = cn−118 Jos´ e Alcalde, Mar´ ıa del Carmen Marco-Gil, Jos´ eA .S i l v a














































Now, by considering the limit when r goes to inﬁnitum in the previous equation












Case 2: cn  = cn−1















































{ci}i∈N\S ,maxi∈N\S∪{n} {ci − E},2(cn − cn−1)
 
.
Now, by considering the limit when r goes to inﬁnitum in the previous equation












Proof of Theorem 1
Firstly, it is straightforward to verify that the Minimal Overlap rule satisﬁes
Anonymity, Continuity and Fixed Individual Conﬂict Additivity.
Now, let ϕ be a rule satisfying these axioms. Given a problem (E,c) ∈B ,l e tu s
consider the following two cases:
Case 1: E ≤ cn.






Let us denote P 1 = cE
1 ,f o r1<i≤ n, P i = cE
i − cE
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n−i+1 if j ≥ i




































n  = cE
n−1.
Let q (j) denote the cardinality of the set
 
i ≤ j : P i  =0
 
.B yFixed Individual
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Now, by considering the limit when r goes to inﬁnity in the previous equation















6 Throughout this proof, and for notational convenience, we will consider c0 =0 .20 Jos´ e Alcalde, Mar´ ıa del Carmen Marco-Gil, Jos´ eA .S i l v a







Case 2: E>c n.
In such a case, there is a unique t,0≤ t<c n such that
 n
j=1 max{0,c j − t} =
E − t.L e tk be the unique agent such that ck − t>0, and ck−1 − t ≤ 0. Thus, the
claim of the j-th agent is partially indisputable in (E,c) only for all j ≥ k.


























ci − t −
1





where r ∈ IN is such that
1
r
< min{E − t,(n − k +1 )( ck − t)}.
Now, by considering the limit when r goes to inﬁnity in the equation [4] and Con-






E − t,c − ct 
.
Observe that the problem (t,ct) was analyzed in case 1 above. Therefore, for








n − i +1
. (6)
Moreover, note that for agent h we have that














E − t,c − ct 
= c − ct (7)





n − i +1
+m a x{0,c h − t} = ϕmo
h (E,c).A New Prospect of Additivity in Bankruptcy Problems 21
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Abstract It is considered the problem connected with the combinatorial
metric approach to the notion of solution of matrix games. According to
this approach it is searched a matrix B that possesses equilibrium and is
the closest to the given matrix A in the sense of some metric d(A,B). In
the case when d(A,B) is the number of pairs (i,j) such that aij  = bij it is
established some properties of the quantity maxA minB d(A,B).
Keywords: matrix game, equilibrium situation, metrics, combinatorial ap-
proach.
1. If a matrix game A =( aij),i∈ I = {1,2,...,n},j ∈ J = {1,2,...,m},h a sa
saddle point, i.e. a pair (p,q) ∈ I ×J exists, such that apj ≤ apq ≤ aiq for any (i,j),
then for the players the best solution will be to choose a strategy p and q corre-
spondingly. (We note, that here a player, which chooses a ﬁrst index, is minimizing
and the one choosing the second index is maximizing). Essentially, the theory of
matrix games starts from reviewing a situation, when a game has no saddle point.
Classical approach, which was proposed by J. von Neumann, consists in expending
the initial game, expanding sets of pure strategies introducing mixed strategies -
probabilistic distributions on the sets I and J (Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).
This approach came out to be very fruitful and resulted in development of mathe-
matics to branch domain (Karlin, 1959; Vorobyov, 1970; Petrosyan and Zenkevich,
1996). (Review of the latest literary is in (Prasad, 2004)).
In this note we are going to discuss the metrical approach to the theory of matrix
games, that does not rest on upon mixed strategies and seems to be a new one.
Let the matrix game A =( aij) not have saddle point. If parties are not repeated
in the game, then mixed strategies wouldn’t be eﬀective. If players are categorical
with rules of the game, so there is no way to change the payoﬀ matrix A, then it is
impossible to recommend them any decision. Moreover it is actually not desirable
to give recommendations. Indeed if one considers as an sample the simplest game
with (2 ×2) matrix, a11 = a22 =1 ,a 12 = a21 = −1, then any recommendation to a
player may lead him to loss.
Let’s now imagine a situation, when sides should somehow come to a solution
(agreement, consensus etc.) for that they agree to introduce changes to the matrix
A or may be inﬂuenced or enforced after all to such decision. This kind of situation
simulates a process of negotiations among t w oc o n ﬂ i c t i n gp a r t i es. Let’s consider,
that the players under certain imperatives, possibly through intermediaries, agree to
change the payoﬀ matrix A in order to get a matrix with a situation of equilibrium.
This can be interpreted as the outcome of the negotiations, which lead to signature
of an agreement. In this case search for a solution of the game will move to the
following plane of question: how to accomplish a transition of the payoﬀ matrix
from one not possessing a saddle another with a saddle.On the Metric Approach in the Theory of Matrix Games 23
It seems natural, that such transition should be accomplished in accordance
with ”principle of economy” i.e. by minimizing eﬀorts for this operation. Here it is
proposed to estimate the level of change of payoﬀ matrix by a metrics on the set
Mmn(X)o fa l l( m×n) – matrices with elements belonging to a given set of reals (of
a ordered set in general). Thereby it is considered, that the elements of the matrix
A have to be in the range of X.
Now let’s give examples of such metrics with relevant interpretations.
1. d(A,B)=card{(i,j)|aij  = bij} – a number of diﬀerent elements of matrices
A,B (Azamov, 1998; Azamov, 2004). In according with this metrics in the transition
from the initial game to a game with saddle a task will be to minimize a number
of elements of payoﬀ matrix underlying to be changed. At the same time, there are
no restrictions on the quantity and quality of such elements. One can say that this
metrics models a situation, when players are made to agree to change the payoﬀ
matrix. Particularly if the payoﬀ matrices should binary i.e. the set X contains only
two numbers as usual X = {0, 1} then only one of the players would made to agree
with changes. It may seems that such a situation is unnatural. However, it occurs
not seldom in real life, when one of the players or intermediate side is able to dictate
”condition of the game”.
2. d(A,B)=m a x( card{(i,j)|aij >b ij},card{(i,j)|aij <b ij}). This metric dif-
fers from the previous as it provides more equality to the players.
3. d(A,B)= A − B  –a n ym e t r i c si nt h es e tMnm(X), for example, a met-
rics deﬁned by the norm  A  =m a x i,j |aij|. Obviously, the previous examples are
particular cases of such metrics.
Through the last example one can notice, that possible metrics may be inﬁnitely
various. Moreover, in principle instead of metric it is possible to take as a base of
approach optional functions, which somehow allow to estimate the proximity of a
given matrix without saddle to matrix with saddle. Such problem in many ways is
similar to a selection of a utility function (Luce and Raiﬀa, 1961).
In the remaining part of the article it will be studied in more detail one of purely
mathematical problems appearing in the approach having been considered. At the
same time we limit ourselves with the metric only from the ﬁrst example.
2. Let W be a non empty subset of the set of real numbers R. Denote by
Mm,n(W) the set of all matrices A =( aij) such that aij ∈ W, i =1 ,...,m;j =
1,...,n. We say that the matrix A =( aij) has an equilibrium situation (p,q), if
for all i =1 ,...,m,j =1 ,...,n the conditions api ≤ apq ≤ ajq hold. And the
number apq is called the value of the corresponding matrix game. By Sm,n denote
the family of all matrices A ∈ Mm,n(R) having equilibrium situation. By deﬁnition,
put Sm,n(W)=Mm,n(W) ∩ Sm,n.L e td be a metric on Mm,n(R)a n dl e tu sg i v e n
a matrix game with A ∈ Mm,n(R).
We set
σm,n(W,A)= m i n
B∈Sm,n
d(A,B). (1)
Quantity (1) is one of the main objects of study in considered approach. Obvi-
ously, the value σm,n(W,) is between 0 and the quantity




d(A,B). (2)24 Abdulla A. Azamov
The following particular case having clear interpretation will be investigated in
the rest of the paper.
3. Suppose A =( aij),B=( bij) ∈ Mm,n(W) and deﬁne d(A,B)a st h en u m b e r
of all pairs (i,j) such that aij  = bij. It is clear that d is a metric on the set Mm,n(W).
Note that quantity (2) can be characterized in the following way: any matrix can be
converted to the matrix with equilibrium situation by changing at most s elements
and σm,n(W) is the least value of such s.
It can easily be checked that s = σm,n(R). It is readily seen that σm,n(R) ≤ µ−1,
where µ =m i n {m,n}. It was shown earlier (Azamov, 1998) that if W = R, then this
estimation is not improvable: σm,n(R)=µ−1. In the present paper it is investigated
the case, when W is an arbitrary non empty subset of R. F i r s tn o t et h a ta r g u m e n t s
of the paper (Azamov, 1998) imply the following statement.
Theorem 1. If W contains not less than µ diﬀerent elements, then σm,n(W)=
µ − 1.
Further in connection with theorem 1 we consider the case, when W contains
exactly l + 1 elements, where 2 ≤ l +1≤ µ − 1. Since for the considered problem
important thing is the linear relation between elements of matrices, without loss of
generality it can be assumed that W = Zl+1 = {0,1,...,l}. In addition taking into




mnl + m2nl−1 + ... + mln
nl + mnl−1 + ... + ml
 
. (3)
Proof. Denote by ρ the right-hand side of (3). We’ll prove that if A is an arbitrary
matrix of the family Mm,n(Zl+1), then it can be obtained a matrix with equilib-
rium situation by changing at most ρ elements of the matrix A. To this end let us
introduce the following notation. Let si(x) be the number of elements of the matrix
A =( aij)o nt h eith row and equal x, cj(x) be the number of elements of the matrix
A on the jth column and equal x, and k(x) be the number of elements of the matrix
A equal x.
The following property implies the inequality (3).
Property T. There exist x ∈ Zl+1 and pair (i,j) such that
cj(0) + cj(1) + ... + cj(x − 1) + si(x +1 )+... + si(l − 1) + si(l) ≤ ρ. (4)
Suppose Property T to hold. We change the elements x+1,...,l−1a n dl of the
ith row to any number of Zl+1 less then x, for example to 0, after then we change
the elements 0,1,...,x − 1o ft h ejth column to any number of Zl+1 more then x,
for example to l. Now all elements of the ith row does’nt exceed x and all elements
of the jth column are greater than x. So for the new matrix the element on the
intersection of ith row and jth column exactly equals x and pair (i,j) is equilibrium
situation. Here the number of changed elements is equal to the expression on the
left-hand side of the (4) and, consequently, does’nt exceed ρ. It means that the
estimation (3) is true.
Now we’ll prove Property T. Assume the converse. Then there exists a matrix
A ∈ Mm,n(Zl+1) such that for all x ∈ Zl+1,i=1 ,...,m,j =1 ,...,n, we haveOn the Metric Approach in the Theory of Matrix Games 25
cj(0) + cj(1) + ... + cj(x − 1) + si(x +1 )+... + si(l − 1) + si(l) ≥ ρ +1 . (5)
Summing these relations over all (i,j), we get
mk(0) + mk(1) + ... + mk(x − 1) + nk(x +1 )+...
... + nk(l − 1) + nk(l) ≥ mn(ρ +1 ) . (6)
Next, multiplying both sides of (6) by ml−xnx and summing over x and then





















































which contradicts the deﬁnition of ρ. This completes the proof.





ml + ml−1n + ... + nl
 
,
then it is clear that ρ ≤ m − 1. In addition ρ = m − 1i fnl ≥ ml+1.






Proof. It follows from theorem 2 that σm,m (Zl+1) ≤ [lm/(l +1 ) ]. To prove the
converse we consider a special matrix Am[l] ∈ Mm(Zl+1) with the ﬁrst row (or
column no matter) having the form
0,1,...,l,0,1,...,l,...,0,1,...,l,0,1,...,r,
where the group 0,1,...,l repeats k times, and k and r quotient and remainder






,m= k(l +1 )+r, r ∈{ 0,1,...,l}. (7)26 Abdulla A. Azamov
Each following row of the matrix Am[l] is obtained from the previous one by
cyclic changing the position of the ﬁrst element to the last position. Thus Am[l]i s
a circulant matrix composed of numbers (7). This yields that its columns coincide
with its corresponding rows. We’ll show that for converting the matrix Am[l]t oA∗
having a equilibrium situation it is necessary to change not less than s =[ lm/(l+1)]
elements of it. Indeed, let (i,j) be a equilibrium situation and v = aij value of the
game.
The case, when r =0 . This implies that s = lm/(l +1 )=kl. Then all elements
v +1 ,v+2 ,...,l on the nth row of the matrix Am[l] must be changed by numbers
not exceed by v (for example by zeros). Each of the numbers v +1 ,v+2 ,...,l on
the ith row repeats k times. Similarly, on the jth column all elements 0,1,...,v −1
must be changed by numbers not less than v (for example by l). Hence passing on
from the matrix Am[l]t ot h em a t r i xA∗ it is necessary (evidently, suﬃcient as well)
to change k(l − v)+kv = kl = s elements.
The case, when 1 ≤ r ≤ v−1. In this case it is necessary again to change k(l−v)
elements on the ith row. As to ith column, elements of it equal 0,1,...,v−1m u s tb e
changed by numbers not less then v. Only this time elements 0,1,...,r are repeated
k+1 times and elements r+1,...,v−1 are repeated k times. Whence it is necessary
to change all together
k(l − v)+( k +1 ) ( r +1 )+k(v − 1 − r)=kl+ r +1
elements. It is readily seen that kl+r+1≥ lm/(l+1)allthemorekl+r+1≥ s.
The cases, when r = v and r>vare examined in the same way. This completes


















,r= m − kq.
Consider the chain of the length m and consisting of q ’1’s and p zeros
1,1,...,1
      
q
,0,0,...,0
      
q
,...,0,0,...,0
      
q
,0,...,0
      
r
(8)
Let A be m×n-matrix the ﬁrst column of that coincides with the chain (8) and
each other column is obtained from the previous one by moving q elements from
below upward. For example the second column is obtained by transposing the chain
0,0,...,0
      
q
,1,1,...,1
      
q
,...,0,0,...,0
      
q
,0,...,0
      
r
(9)
Thus each column of the matrix contains exactly q ’1’s. We’ll count ’1’s on rows.
To this end we change the ﬂat matrix to cylindric one such that rows became the
element of the cylinder and columns became circular sections parallel to the base
of the cylinder. Then each section is obtained from previous one rotating it by the
angle 2π
q and the number of rotations equals n. If we project the cylinder on its
base, then it is clear that elements of the matrix A fall on on the vertexes of regularOn the Metric Approach in the Theory of Matrix Games 27









’1’s, where t is remainder when we divide nq by m. From
























Thus by the construction each column of the matrix A contains exactly p zeros
and by what has been proved each row of the A contains at least p ’1’s. It follows
that A cannot be converted to the matrix having equilibrium situation by changing
less than p elements, so σm,n(Z2) ≥ p. Invers inequality is a special case of Theorem
2.
4. Unfortunately it turns out the estimation (3) is not exact in the general case.
To show that we give improvement the estimation (3) in the case l =3 .
Theorem 2 suggests the conjecture about what right-hand side of the relation (3)
coincides with σm,n(Zl+1) (Azamov, 2004). Theorem 3 (related on the case n = m)
a n dT h e o r e m4( r e l a t e do nt h ec a s el = 1) conﬁrm as if this conjecture was true.
Also it is easily shown that relation (3) occurs at l = n =3 . In reality for l =3
inequality (3) can be strict.







n2 + nm + m2 >
n2m + nm2
n2 + nm + m2. (10)
Then σn,m(Z3) doesn’t exceed v∗ − 1.
Proof. We assign s = v∗ −1 and show that for any matrix A ∈ Mm,n(Z3)i tc a nb e
obtained a matrix with equilibrium situation by changing at most s elements of A.
If there is a column of the matrix A containing not less than n−s ’2’s or a row
containing not less than m − s ’0’s, then our claim is evident: to obtain the matrix
with equilibrium situation it is suﬃcient to change all the rest entries of the column
by ’2’s (such entries does not exceed s) for the ﬁrst case and all the non zero entries
of the row by ’0’s (such entries also does not exceed s) for the second case.
Thus we can assume that each column of the matrix A contains at most n − v∗
’2’s and each row contains at most m − v∗ ’0’s. Consequently the total number of
entries of the matrix A equal 2 doesn’t exceed m(n−v∗) and the number of entries
















then m(n − v∗)=kn + r, where r ∈{ 0,1,...,n − 1}. It can easily be checked
that k ≤ v∗.
Then at least one row of the matrix A contains at most k ’2’s. To be deﬁnite,
assume that it is the ith row. We’ll show that there exists a column denoted by j
in the sequel and containing at most s−k zeros. Indeed, in the converse case there28 Abdulla A. Azamov
are at least s−k +1=v∗ −k zeros in each column, so that the number of all zeros
is not less than m(v∗ − k).
In this case it must be fulﬁlled the condition
m(v∗ − k) ≤ m(n − v∗). (12)
However this condition contradicts the deﬁnition of v∗. Actually substituting
(11) for k in (12), we get inverse inequality to (10)
H e n c ew eh a v eas i t u a t i o n :t h e r ea r ea tm o s tk ’2’s in the ith row and at most
s − k ’0’s in the jth column. We change ’2’s of the ith row to ’1’s and ’0’s of the
jth column to ’1’s. In this case, ﬁrst the total number of changes doesn’t exceed s,
secondly the pair (i,j) is an equilibrium situation. This completes the proof.
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Abstract We consider a number of ﬁrms who sell a non diﬀerentiated prod-
uct through periodic subscriptions. Firms select price and advertising strate-
gies maximizing their proﬁts and buyers behave diﬀerently according to their
status: new buyer or renewer. A discrete dynamic game is proposed together
with a numerical alghorithm based on the simulated annealing technique.
Keywords: Price and advertising models, Marketing models, Dynamic games,
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1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a number I of ﬁrms (e.g. publishers) who sell a non dif-
ferentiated product (e.g. a journal) through periodic subscriptions.
The sales process is considered discrete in time. A customer pays at time t the price
pi,t−1 to one of the producers i and receives θ items at times t,t+1,...,t−1+θ.I t
makes sense that everyone subscribes at most one product.The potential customers
are convinced to subscribe through advertising performed by ﬁrms.
Moreover previous subscribers inﬂuence potential adopters transmitting their expe-
rience (interpersonal contacts) and buyers react also to the prices. Firms select price
and advertising strategies maximizing the present values of their proﬁts and buyers
behave diﬀerently according to their status: new buyer or renewer. The adopters
dynamics is described by a system of diﬀerence equations of order θ.
As usual we consider quadratic advertising costs to model decreasing returns.
In Section 3 a two stages game is considered: two symmetric ﬁrms compete and
the game is explicitly solved by backward induction. In this section the advertising
performed by one ﬁrm increases also the sales of the other one.
In Section 3 we discuss a simple example in which the advertising performed by
one ﬁrm increases the sales of itself but decreases the sales of the competitor. The
one stage case is solved explicitly while the two stage game is studied through a
numerical example.
Section 4 contains the body of the paper: the price-advertising multistage, mul-
tiplayers game is proposed and feedback equilibria are characterized by means of
the Bellman equations. Finally a numerical alghorithm is proposed based on the
simulated annealing technique and a numerical experiment is showed.
2. A two stages symmetric duopoly
In this section we consider two ﬁrms who sell a non diﬀerentiated product (e.g. a
journal) through periodic subscriptions to a population of N potential subscribers.
At time t = 0, the ﬁrm i, i =1 ,2 launches an advertising campaign whose cost is30 Luigi De Cesare, Andrea Di Liddo
caγ2
i0. As a consequence yi1 individuals pay the subscription fee at the time t =1
and at the same time they receive one item of the product i.
Therefore at the time t = 1 the population is divided into two classes: subscribers
x1 = y11 + y21 and potential adopters N − x1.
Moreover at the time t = 1 the two ﬁrms spend an amount caγ2
i1 to advertise their
product further.
At the time t =2af r a c t i o nyi2 of potential adopters N − x1 and a fraction zi2 of
previous subscribers buy the product i.
Each ﬁrm chooses the advertising expenditure to maximize the net present value of
its proﬁts.
A dynamic discrete game arises and we compute the Nash equilibria by backward
induction.
The subscribers dynamics is given by
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
y11 = 1
2(βγ10 +( 1− β)γ20)N
y21 = 1
2((1 − β)γ10 + βγ20)N
x1 = y11 + y21
and ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
y12 = 1
2(βγ11 +( 1− β)γ21)(N − x1)
y22 = 1
2((1 − β)γ11 + βγ21)(N − x1)
z12 = σ(λy11 +( 1− λ)y21)
z22 = σ((1 − λ)y21 + λy11)
We assume that 0 ≤ γij ≤ 1,i =1 ,2,j =0 ,1. β ∈]1
2,1[ is the advertising
eﬃciency; σλ is the renewal rate while σ(1 − λ) is the cross renewal rate, where
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.








L11 =( 1− cp)(y12 + z12) − caγ2
11
L21 =( 1− cp)(y22 + z22) − caγ2
21
Here cp is the production cost of a unit of the item (the same for both ﬁrms) and
we assume that customers pay 1 euro for one subscription.
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Note that γ∗
11 = γ∗
21 is increasing with respect to the eﬃciency parameter β and
with respect to the total number of potential adopters N −x1; it is decreasing with
respect to the unit advertising cost ca and the unit production cost cp.
At time t = 0 the two ﬁrms foresee the last stage equilibrium and choose adver-
tising to maximize their two stage payoﬀ. The game has the unique Nash equilibrium
γ∗
10 = γ∗





αβN (αβN(β − 2) + 2(σ +1 ) )
N2α2β2(β − 2) + 4
  
Let us illustrate this result through the following numerical example.
Assume that N = 1000, β =0 .6, cp =0 ,ca = 500, λ =0 .8.













⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






1i f σ ≥
14
75
Note that the optimal advertising eﬀort at time t = 0 is increasing with respect
to the rate of renewals σ.
3. A symmetric one stage non linear game
In the previous section we assumed that the advertising performed by the ﬁrm i
increases the sales of both ﬁrms i and j, although with a diﬀerent intensity.
In this section we discuss a simple example in which the advertising performed by
the ﬁrm i increases the sales of itself but decreases the sales of the competitor j.
We solve explicitly the one stage case and discuss the two stage game through a
numerical example.
3.1. The one stage game
At time t = 0, the ﬁrm i, i =1 ,2 launches an advertising campaign whose cost is
caγ2
i . As a consequence yi individuals pay the subscription fee at the time t =1
and at the same time they receive one item of the product i.
Therefore at the time t = 1 the population is divided into two classes: subscribers
x1 = y1 + y2 and potential adopters N − x1.
Each ﬁrm chooses the advertising expenditure to maximize the net present value of
its proﬁts.






2 (βγ1 +( 1− β)γ2)N
y2 =
(1+γ2−γ1)
2 ((1 − β)γ1 + βγ2)N32 Luigi De Cesare, Andrea Di Liddo







L1 =( 1− cp)y1 − caγ2
1
L2 =( 1− cp)y22 − caγ2
2
L1 and L2 are second degree polynomial with respect to γ1 and γ2 so that we can















⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
















then the game has other two further
Nash equilibria,
γ∗





3.2. The two stages game
In this section we use the same notations of Section 2 to discuss the two stages
game assuming that the advertising performed by the ﬁrm i increases the sales of
itself but decreases the sales of the competitor j.
As a consequence the dynamics of subscriptions is now given by
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
y11 =
(1+γ10−γ20)
2 (βγ10 +( 1− β)γ20)N
y21 =
(1+γ20−γ10)
2 ((1 − β)γ10 + βγ20)N
x1 = y11 + y21
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
y12 =
(1+γ11−γ21)
2 (βγ11 +( 1− β)γ21)(N − x1)
y22 =
(1+γ21−γ11)
2 ((1 − β)γ11 + βγ21)(N − x1)
z12 = σ(λy11 +( 1− λ)y21)
z22 = σ((1 − λ)y11 + λy21)
As in the Section 2 the two ﬁrms choose advertising expenditure to maximize their
proﬁts.Marketing Strategies for Periodic Subscriptions 33
We cannot obtain an explicit solution by we illustrate a numerical example
solved by backward induction.
Assume that N = 1000, β =0 .6, cp =0 ,ca = 500, λ =0 .8.






At time t = 0 the two ﬁrms foresee the last stage equilibrium and choose advertising
to maximize their two stage payoﬀ.
Since γ∗
11 = γ∗
21 are rational functions of x1, it is not possible to compute explic-








the solution of ﬁrst order conditions if σ<
10
29
1i f σ ≥
10
29
4. The multistage price and advertising oligopoly model
From experience gained in the previous sections we can more eﬀectively introduce
a more general model in which the price of the products are no longer given exoge-
nously.
4.1. The subscriptions dynamics
Let us consider a number of ﬁrms I (e.g. a publishers) who sell a non diﬀeren-
tiated product (e.g. a journal) through periodic subscriptions. The sales process
is considered discrete in time and we assume that decisions are taken at time
t ∈{ 0,1,...,T −1},w h e r eT ∈ IN. Let θ be the length of a subscription. A customer
pays at time t the price pi,t−1 to one of the producers i and receives θ items at times
t,t +1 ,...,t − 1+θ. It makes sense that everyone subscribes at most one product.
The potential customers are convinced to subscribe through advertising performed
by ﬁrms. Moreover previous subscribers inﬂuence potential adopters transmitting
their experience (interpersonal contacts) and buyers react also to the prices. In this
framework ﬁrms compete selecting price and advertising strategies maximizing the
present values of their net earnings and buyers behave diﬀerently according to their
status: new buyer or renewer. We assume that the total population of potential
subscribers, denoted by N, is constant in time. We deﬁne the following classes:
– yi,t number of new subscribers of the i-product at time t,
– zi,t number of subscription renewals of the i-product at time t,
– xi,t total number of subscribers of the i- p r o d u c ta tt i m et,
– wi,t total number of subscriptions of the i-product at time interval [t,t +1 ] ,
– xt =
 I
i=1 xi,t total number of subscribers at time t.
Let us denote by γi,t, the quantities (normalized to one) of the advertising performed
at time t by ﬁrm i. The eﬀectiveness of the advertising is measured through a func-
tion gi which we assume is increasing and concave in its arguments to incorporate34 Luigi De Cesare, Andrea Di Liddo
decreasing advertising returns. Furthermore people are convinced to buy the prod-
uct through interpersonal contacts with previous adopters (word-of-mouth). This
eﬀect is modelled by parameter ki,j which represents the eﬀect of word-of-mouth to
convince a non adopter to buy the product i due to the interpersonal contacts be-
tween adopters of the product j with the non adopters, i,j =1 ,...,I. We assume
that reaction to prices is modelled by a price-response function qi(p1,t,...,p I,t)
which is increasing with respect to pj,t, j  = i.
Following the Bass model (Bass, 1969), we assume that new subscribers dynam-
ics is given by





ki,jxj,t + gi(γ1,t,...,γ I,t)
⎞
⎠(N − xt)
We assume that a part λi ≤ 1 of the expired subscriptions of the product i
are renewed. Moreover the coeﬃcient λi depends on the current price pi,t and the
advertising level γi,t. The total number of subscription renewals of the i-product at
time t is:
zi,t+1 = λi(pi,t,γ i,t)wi,t+1−θ.
Hence the total number of subscriptions at time interval [t,t +1 ]o fi-product is
wi,t+1 = yi,t+1 + zi,t+1.
while the total number of subscribers at time t is:
xi,t+1 = xi,t + wi,t+1 − wi,t+1−θ.
Finally the adopters dynamics is described by the following system of diﬀerence
equations
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
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with the initial conditions
xi,0 =0 ,i =1 ,...,I
wi,−(θ−1) = wi,−(θ−2) = .... = wi,0 =0 ,i =1 ,...,I.
Furthermore, we suppose that the per unit advertising cost, the unit production
cost, the discount factor remain constant during all the time horizon and we denote
them by ci,a, ci,p and r, respectively. As usual we consider quadratic advertising
costs to model decreasing returns.
We assume that buyers pay the subscription in advance, thus the proﬁt of the












⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




e−r(t+1)xi,t+1 if θ ≥ 2
0i f θ =1 .
The term Φi(T) is due to the production costs for the remaining subscribers at the
end of the planning period.
4.2. The multistage game
We are interested in ﬁnding an I-tuple of strategies {(pi,.,γ i,.) ∈ [0,+∞[T×[0,1]T,i=
1,...,I} that constitute a feedback Nash equilibrium of an I-personT-stage discrete-
time inﬁnite dynamic game.
The adopter dynamics is given by a system of diﬀerence equations with a (θ−1)-
delay in the state variable w. This system can be reduced to a ﬁrst order diﬀerence

















Let Yi,t =( xi,t,w i,t,ρ 1
i,t,...,ρ
θ−1
i,t ) the vector of state variables at time t for the
i-ﬁrm and ξi,t =( pi,t,γ i,t) the strategies of the i-ﬁrm at time t. We rewrite the
state equations as
Yi,t+1 = fi(Yt,ξ 1,t,...,ξ I,t)
where fi can be easily obtained substituting dummy variables ρi in (1) and Yt =
(Y1,t,...,Y I,t). In this form the adopter dynamics is a ﬁrst order diﬀerence system36 Luigi De Cesare, Andrea Di Liddo
with (θ +1 ) I state variables. For the sake of simplicity, we put the discount factor
r = 0. We observe that the i-ﬁrm proﬁt at stage t<Tis




Ψi(Yt,ξ 1,t,...,ξ i−1,t,p,γ,ξ i+1,t,...,ξ I,t): =






ki,jxj,t + gi(γ1,t,...,γ i−1,t,γ,γ i+1,t,...γ I,t)
⎞
⎠(N − xt)
then from (1) we have
gi,t(Yt,ξ 1,t,...,ξ i−1,t,p,γ,ξ i+1,t,...,ξ I,t)=
= p(Ψi + λiρ
θ−1
i,t ) − ci,p(xi,t + Ψi − (1 − λi)ρ
θ−1
i,t ) − ci,aγ2
Applying standard results (see Basar and Oldser, 1999) for feedback Nash equilib-
ria, we have that a set of strategies (ξ∗
1,t,...,ξ∗
I,t),t =0 ,...,T − 1 is a feedback
Nash equilibrium if and only if there exist functions
Vi,t :I R
(θ+1)I  → IR i =1 ,...,I
such that the following recursive relations are satisﬁed:
Vi,T(Y )=−Φi(T) i =1 ,...,I

























The value functions also provide the Nash equilibrium proﬁt for all ﬁrms.
Due to the non linearity of state equations and a general form of proﬁt functions,
it is very diﬃcult to derive analytical information from previous relations.
Therefore a numerical solution of Nash equilibrium can be obtained implementing
an iterative algorithm. For simplicity we consider the case of two players. First of
all we build a mesh of the state space which is a subset of IR
2(θ+1).
For each stage, going downward from T−1 to 0, and at every mesh-node, we perform
the following steps:
1. Choose an initial value ξ0
i for control parameters of ﬁrm i =1 .
2. Execute the following steps ...
2.1 Compute the best reaction, ξ
k+1
2 ,o fﬁ r mi = 2, if the ﬁrm 1 play ξk
1.
2.2 Compute the best reaction, ξ
k+1
1 ,o fﬁ r mi = 1, if the ﬁrm 2 play ξ
k+1
2 .
... repeat step 2.1 and 2.2 until suitable tolerance is reached.Marketing Strategies for Periodic Subscriptions 37










− c1,p(x1 + Ψ1(Y,p,γ,ξk
2)











− ci,p(x2 + Ψ2(Y,p,γ,ξk
1)
−(1 − λ2)ρ2) − ci,aγ2 + V2,n+1(f1(Y,ξk
1,p,γ),f 2(Y,ξk
1),p,γ)
To compute the global maximum at every stage, the simulated annealing algo-
rithm can be used (see Kirkpatrick et al., 1983). This is an heuristic method for
global optimization which requires no particular assumptions on objective function
(i.e. convexity).
It is known that the existence of a Nash equilibrium is still an open problem. If
multiple equilibria exist then the numerical method ﬁnds only one of them. Also
the convergence of previous iterative method remains an open problem.
We assume that the price-response function q1(p1,p 2)f o rt h eﬁ r s tp r o d u c ti si n -
creasing with respect to p2 and that it is decreasing with respect to p1.F u r t h e r m o r e
0 ≤ q1(p1,p 2) ≤ 1. The analogous properties hold for the price-response function q2
of the second product. We choose price-response functions as follows
 
q1(p1,p 2)=e x p ( −α1p1)ϕ1(p2 − p1)
q2(p1,p 2)=e x p ( −α2p2)ϕ2(p1 − p2)
where αi are positive constants and ϕi are increasing functions. So, potential con-
sumers react to the price of the product they are going to buy but also they react to




















Moreover we choose linear advertising eﬀectiveness functions gi
 
g1(γ1,γ 2)=a1,1γ1 + a1,2γ2
g2(γ1,γ 2)=a2,1γ1 + a2,2γ2
where ai,j are positive constants. We assume that coeﬃcients λi are constant.
The following ﬁgures illustrate a numerical experiment obtained by the tech-
niques described above and using the values of the parameters given in Table 1.38 Luigi De Cesare, Andrea Di Liddo
Table1. Simulation n. 1
αi λi ci,p ci,a ki,1 ki,2 ai,1 ai,2
ﬁrm 1 0.5 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.050 0.002 0.30 0.05
ﬁrm 2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.001 0.040 0.05 0.30
Figure1. Simulation n.1: Advertising-price strategiesMarketing Strategies for Periodic Subscriptions 39
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nealing. Science, Vol. 220, No. 4598, 671–680.A Dynamic Algorithm for Computing Multiweighted Shapley
Values of Cooperative TU Games
Irinel Dragan
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Abstract In an earlier paper of the author, (Dragan, 1994), the Multi-
weighted Shapley Values have been introduced as linear operators on the
space of TU games, which satisfy the eﬃciency and the dummy player
axioms. This is the class of values, which for diﬀerent systems of weights
includes among others, the Shapley Value, the Weighted Shapley Value,
the Random Order Values, the Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors, the Owen coalition
structure values, etc. An early dynamic algorithm for computing the Shap-
ley Value is due to late M. Maschler (1982). This algorithm is building a
sequence of allocations, corresponding to a sequence of games, ending with
the Shapley Value, corresponding to the null game. In the present work, we
show a similar algorithm for computing the Multiweighted Shapley Values.
The algorithm is illustrated by applying it to a MWSV which is neither
a Harsanyi payoﬀ vector, nor a Random Order Value. As the algorithm is
using results from our earlier paper, to make the paper self contained, the
basic deﬁnitions and notations are given in the ﬁrst section, while the char-
acterizations of the MWSVs are further given in the second section and
the algorithm is presented in the last section. Notice that in fact our algo-
rithm contains a class of algorithms, in which by taking various systems of
weights, the algorithm will compute diﬀerent values. In this class, the well
known weights of the Shapley Value will generate the Maschler algorithm
for computing the value.
Keywords: Standard and Unanimity bases, linearity, eﬃciency, dummy
player axiom, Multiweighted Shapley Values.
1. Introduction
Let N be a ﬁnite set, the set of players, |N| = n, and GN be the space of cooperative
TU games with the set of players N. This space GN has a standard basis and also
a very popular basis, the unanimity basis, used by L.S.Shapley (1953a) in deriving
a formula, for his well known solution for the cooperative TU games. Denote by
D = {DS ∈ GN : S ⊆ N,S  = ∅}, the standard basis, where the basic games are
DS(T)=1 , for T = S, and DS(T)=0 , otherwise; denote by U = {US ∈ GN :
S ⊆ N,S  = ∅},the unanimity basis, where US(T)=1 ,∀T ⊇ S, and US(T)=0 ,

















s−tv(T), ∀S ⊆ N,S  = ∅, (2)A Dynamic Algorithm for Computing Multiweighted Shapley Values 41
where v(S)i sc a l l e dt h ew o r t ho fv for coalition S, and the number ∆v(S) is called
the (Harsanyi) dividend of v for coalition S. These relationships will be used later for
deriving from the properties of a value relative to one representation the properties
relative to the other representation. Of course, (2) can be written in matrix form as
v = M∆, and ∆ = M
−1v, (3)
where v and ∆ are 2n − 1 dimensional vectors of the components in the two bases
and M is the Mobius matrix of vectors of the unanimity basis. From (2) follows
that for any player i and all coalitions T containing i, we have
v(T) − v(T −{ i]) =
 
S⊆T−{i
∆v(S ∪{ i}), (4)
equalities to be used for characterizing any dummy player i in terms of the dividends
of the coalitions containing the player.
A value Φ is an operator from GN to Rn, where for the game v ∈ GN the
components Φi(v),∀i ∈ N, are the wins of players in the game. The value Φ is a
linear value,i fw eh a v eΦ(αv + βw)=αΦ(v)+βΦ(w), for all real numbers α and
β, and all games v ∈ GN and w ∈ GN. If Φ is a linear operator and v ∈ GN, then








respectively, where both Γ and Λ are n x( 2 n −1) matrices with γS
i = Φi(DS), and
λS
i = Φi(US), for all i ∈ N and S ⊆ N,S  = ∅. Of course, we have Λ = ΓM and
Γ = ΛM−1. By using terms of Linear Algebra, it is clear that Γ and Λ are matrix
representations of the linear operator Φ relative to the bases D and U, respectively.
They allow the computation of Φ when the game is given in coalitional form, or
in dividend form. Let us take the following
Example 1. Consider a game in coalitional form v ∈ G{1,2,3} and a linear operator







[v(1,2) − v(2)] −
1
4










[v(1,2) − v(1)] +
3
8










[v(1,3) − v(1)] +
3
8




The matrix representations are obtained as follows: we collect the coeﬃcients of


















































































A basic idea in the following is that the properties of the linear operator can be
translated into properties of the matrix representations. To obtain such properties
we should be able ﬁrst to characterize a linear operator depending on a set of
weights, that will be called a MWSV, by a system of algebraic conditions. This will
allow us to discover for example whether or not, the above operator is a MWSV.
Then, we shall use the same conditions to obtain similar results for classes of well
known values. The following deﬁnitions give well known concepts. A player i is a
dummy player in v ∈ GN, if we have v(S)−v(S −{i})=v({i}), for all coalitions S
containing player i. A linear operator Φ has the dummy player property if for any
dummy player i we have the equality Φi(v)=v({i}). Further, the linear operator
Φ is eﬃcient if we have the equality
 
i∈N
Φi(v)=v(N). In the next section, we
give characterizations of linear operators satisfying the eﬃciency axiom, then those
satisfying the dummy player axiom and by putting these results together we get a
characterization of linear operators satisfying both axioms, that is MWSVs. This
will be done for games in dividend form; then, for games in coalitional form we
shall translate the results obtained for the dividend form, by using the relationships
between the components in the two bases.
2. Multiweighted Shapley Values.
There are already many papers devoted to the axiomatization of Shapley Value and
the values obtained by removing some axiom from the group of axioms character-
izing the Shapley Value. The list of our references is not an exhaustive list of them,
however in the list, the paper by Weber (1998) is doing quite an extensive job. What
we shall be trying to do is to remove the symmetry axiom, and obtain explicit ex-
pressions of the corresponding values, for dividend form games and coalitional form
games; we shall call this value a Multiweighted Shapley Value, brieﬂy MWSV. After
that, in the next section we shall be deriving an algorithm for computing this value.
The paper by Naumova (2005) does also eliminate the symmetry, but is replacing
also the other ones by axioms connected to consistency.
Deﬁnition 1. A linear operator from GN to Rn is a Multiweighted Shapley Value
if it has the dummy player property and it is eﬃcient.
This deﬁnition is suggested by the fact that a Multiweighted Shapley Value, or
MWSV, is a generalization of the Shapley Value.
Theorem 1. Al i n e a ro p e r a t o rΦ : GN → Rn has the dummy player property, if
and only if we have
λS
i =0 ,∀i/ ∈ S,∀S ⊆ N,S  = ∅,λ
{i}
i =1 ,∀i ∈ N, (6)
where for all S ⊆ N,S  = ∅, we denoted λS
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Proof. If Φ has the dummy player property, then taking into account that in the
game US ∈ GN any player i/ ∈ S is a dummy, we have λS
i = Φi(US)=US({i})=0 ,
that is we got the ﬁrst equalities (6); in U{i} the player i is also a dummy, so that
we have λ
{i}
i = U{i}({i})=1 , hence (6) hold. To prove the converse, we should
notice that a player i is a dummy player in a game v ∈ GN if and only if we have
∆v(S)=0 ,∀S ⊆ N,i / ∈ S, ∆v({i})=v({i}),∀i ∈ N. (7)
Now, if (6) hold, then for any game v ∈ GN in the sum of the second formula
(5) we have only terms for coalitions S containing the player i;i fi is a dummy, the
sum reduces to Φi(v)=λ
{i}
i ∆v({i}), from which by (6) we obtain Φi(v)=v({i}),
that is v has the dummy player property.    
Corollary 2. Al i n e a ro p e r a t o rΦ : GN → Rn has the dummy player property if
and only if for each coalition S with |S|  =1 , there exist numbers λS
i ,∀i ∈ S, such





i ∆v(S),∀i ∈ N. (8)
Theorem 3. Al i n e a ro p e r a t o rΦ : GN → Rn is eﬃcient if and only if the sum of
entries in each column of the matrix Λ equals one.






















where the hypothesis and the second formula (1) have been used for S = N; hence
Φ is eﬃcient.    
From Deﬁnition 1, Theorems 1 and 3, it follows a characterization of Multi-
weighted Shapley Values:
Theorem 4. Al i n e a ro p e r a t o rΦ : GN → Rn is a Multiweighted Shapley Value
if and only if its matrix representation Λ relative to the unanimity basis in GN
satisﬁes for all coalitions S ⊆ N, S  = ∅, the equalities
λS




i =1 . (10)
In this case, Φ can be represented by (8), where the coeﬃcients should satisfy the
second conditions (10).
Note that the operator considered in Example 1, where the matrix Λ has been
computed, satisﬁes the conditions (10), hence it is a MWSV. Similary, we get the
following:44 Irinel Dragan
Corollary 5. The Shapley Value, the Weighted Shapley Value, the Owen coali-
tional structure value and the Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors, are MWSV’s.
Proof. The Shapley Value is obtained in (5) for λS
i = 1
|S|,∀i ∈ S, and λS
i =0
otherwise (see (Owen, 1995)), hence (10) hold. The Weighted Shapley Value (1953b)






i =0 , otherwise, (see (Kalai et al., 1987), and (Vasiliev, 2007)), so that (10)
are holding. The Owen coalitional structure value is deﬁned in (5) as follows: let
{S1,...,Sm} be an ordered partition of N; for any coalition S,d e n o t eb yJ(S)={j ∈
{1,...,m} : S∩Sj  = ∅}, that is the set of indices of those blocks which contain players
in S. Then, we take λS
i = |J(S)|/|S ∩ Sj|,∀i ∈ S∩Sj, and λS
i =0 , otherwise. Note
that after using an axiomatic approach to deﬁne a coalition structure value, to show
its uniqueness Owen has computed the i−th component Φi(US), and he got exactly
the just mentioned values of λ s, (Owen, 1977). Obviously, the conditions (10) are
satisﬁed. The Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors are deﬁned in (5) by weights which beside
(10) satisfy λS
i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ S, (see (Harsanyi, 1963), and (Vasiliev et al., 1980, and
2002)). Therefore, they are MWSVs; the same is true for the Random order values
(see (Weber, 1988), and (Derks et al., 2006)).    
Note that the operator considered above in Example 1 does not belong to any
of the classes of values discussed in Corollary 5, but it is a MWSV. Note also that
the Aumann-Dreze coalitional value is not a MWSV, (see (Aumann et al., 1974)).
Indeed, for a partition {S1,...,Sm} of N, this value is obtained by taking in (5) the
weights λS
i = 1
|S|,i fS ⊆ Sj for some j and i ∈ S, and λS
i = 0 otherwise, so that if
S is not included in any block, we get λS
i =0 ,∀i ∈ N, and the last conditions (10)
do not hold.
Note that we characterized the MWSVs by an explicit formula, (8), in case of
a game given in dividend form. Now, we intend to do the same in case of a game
in coalitional form. Obviously, we shall be using the relationships between the div-
idend form and the coalitional form shown in (2) and (3). To get such a result we
need the following
Lemma 6. Let Φ : GN → Rn be a linear operator, and denote
γS = Φ(DS),λ S = Φ(US), ∀S ⊆ N,S  = ∅, (11)
where the games DS ∈ GN form the standard basis, and the games US ∈ GN form
















i ,∀i ∈ N. (12)
Proof. This follows easily from (1).    
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Theorem 7. The matrix representation Λ of a linear operator Φ relative to the
unanimity basis U for GN satisﬁes
(a) λ
S





i =1 , ∀S ⊆ N,S  = ∅, (13)












j )=1 ∀S ⊆ N,S  = ∅, (14)
where we use for convenience γ∅
i = −γ
{i}
i ,∀i ∈ N.
Proof. For any pair i and S, with i ∈ S, from (13)(a) we have that λT
i =0f o ra l l
coalitions T ⊇ S −{ i} which do not satisfy T ⊇ S, because i/ ∈ T; hence by the
second formula (12), we get (14) (a). On the other hand, from (13)(b) and the ﬁrst
formulas (12), we get (14)(b). Conversely, (11) and (14)(b), imply (13)(b). Also,
notice that if i/ ∈ S, then for each coalition T ⊇ S and contains i, the coalition
T −{ i} is including S, either. Therefore, if i/ ∈ S then we can pair all terms of








(14)(a) shows that (13)(a) holds.    
F r o mT h e o r e m s4a n d7f o l l o w s :
Theorem 8. Al i n e a ro p e r a t o rΦ : GN → Rn is a Multiweighted Shapley Value
if and only if its matrix representation Γ relative to the standard basis in GN,
satisﬁes (14).






i [v(S) − v(S −{ i})],∀i ∈ N. (15)
Note that (15) do not contain γS
i with i/ ∈ S, and this is also true for (14)(b). Note
also that (14)(b) are equivalent to Weber’s conditions (Weber, 1988, Thm 11), so
that our theorem 8 is essentially Weber’s result obtained in a diﬀerent way.
In our earlier paper (Dragan, 1994), we considered MWSVs with monotonicity
properties, in order to make connections with Weber’s Random Order Values, or
Harsanyi payoﬀ vectors. It was proved that the Random Order Values are the
MWSVs with γS
i ≥ 0,∀i ∈ S, in (15), As the computational algorithm to be given
below works for any MWSV, it works also for Ramdom Order Values. Of course,
a reader who has studied the Weber’s paper may wonder whether, or not, in our
paper the MWSVs with monotonicity properties have been studied. The above men-
tioned paper contains the answer. Note that the operator considered in Example
1 does not satisfy such conditions, hence it is not a Random Order Value. In fact,
it is easy to see that this operator is not monotonic, because for the monotonic46 Irinel Dragan




4, not all components are nonnegative.
3. An algorithm for computing the Multiweighted Shapley Values
Consider a game v ∈ GN and an nx(2n − 1) matrix Λ satisfying the conditions
(10) of Theorem 4. This matrix deﬁnes a MWSV by formula (8), if the game is in
dividend form, or the matrix Γ = ΛM−1 and formula (15) deﬁne a MWSV if the
game is in coalitional form. The algorithm needs the matrix Λ even though the TU
game is in coalitional form; obviously, if Γ is available, then Λ = ΓM. If v is the
null game, then Φ(v)=0 . Otherwise, there is a coalition S for which v(S)  =0 , and
the following iterative procedure can start. We assume that all coalitions of sizes
smaller than |S| have zero worth. Initially, x1 =0∈ Rn, and v1 = v ∈ GN. Suppose
that in step k ≥ 1 we have an allocation xk ∈ Rn and a game vk ∈ GN available.
The step k is asking for the computation of the allocation and game to be needed













Obviously, the sequences obtained depend on the sequence of coalitions selected;
however, we have the following result:
Theorem 9. For any sequence of coalitions {Sk} in any step k we have
x
k + Φ(v
k)=Φ(v),k =1 ,2,... (17)
Proof. For k =1 , as x1 =0a n dv1 = v, (17) holds. Assume that (17) holds for
all k =1 ,...,p; then, from (16), the induction assumption, the linearity of Φ, and
Φ(USk)=λS
k
, it follows that (17) holds for k = p +1 , hence (17) holds for any
value of k.    
Note that by Theorem 9 the procedure stops if vk+1 =0 , and in this case we
have xk+1 = Φ(v), that is the MWSV has been computed. The algorithm is justiﬁed
by the convergence theorem:
Theorem 10. For any sequence of coalitions in which a coalition Sk with vk(Sk)  =
0 is introduced only if vk(S)=0for all coalitions with |S|≤
 
 Sk 
 −1, the algorithm
described by formulas (16) converges to Φ(v) in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Proof. Notice that by the second formulas (16), the worth of coalitions with a
smaller size than Sk, as well as those for which the worth has been made equal to
zero in the previous steps, is kept equal to zero. Also, we get vk+1(Sk)=0 . As




be exhausted in a ﬁnite number of steps and the algorithm will go to coalitions of
higher sizes. In a ﬁnite number of steps the coalitions of all sizes will be exhausted.
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Example 2. Return to the constant sum game and the operator already considered
in Example 1, for which we computed the matrix Λ. By using the iterative procedure
described by formulas (16) we compute this operator for our game in four steps
shown in the following auto explanatory table
v
k






3 12 13 23 123
1 1, 2 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 1 0
2 1, 3 1 1/2 1/2 0 0 1 -1
3 2 , 3 1 1 100 0- 2
4 1, 2, 3 -1/2 3/4 3/4 0 0 0 0
where Φ(v)i so nt h el a s tr o w .
Remarks:
a) The MWSV can be deﬁned by two axioms only, the linearity and the carrier
axiom, because for a linear operator the dummy player and the eﬃciency axioms
together are equivalent to the carrier axiom (Dragan, 1994),
b) A quasi-value is a random order value (Gilboa et al., 1991), so that the algorithm
described above can be used for the computation of quasi-values. In fact, it could
also be used for the computation of Semivalues (Dubey et al., 1981) and Least
Square Values, (Ruiz et al., 1998), because each of them is a Shapley Value as
it has been recently proved by the author (Dragan, 2005).
c) Notice that for the weights of the Shapley Value, substituted in the ﬁrst formulas
(16) we shall obtain the formulas given by Maschler in his algorithm for com-
puting the Shapley Value (1982); it follows that our algorithm is an extension
of Maschler’s algorithm to Multiweighted Shapley Values.
d) Naumova (2005) discussed also values for TU games without the symmetry
axiom, but used a set of axioms diﬀerent than the ones considered above.
Aknowledgement. This paper is published as a reminder of the work done by
late Michael Maschler, who attended its presentation and intended to contribute,
by extending the algorithm for computing the values of Nontransferable utilities
games.
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Abstract The situation, in which an enormous risk is insured by a number
of insurance companies, is modeled through a cooperative TU game, the so-
called co-insurance game, ﬁrst introduced in Fragnelli and Marina (2004).
In this paper we show that a co-insurance game possesses several interesting
properties that allow to study the nonemptiness and the structure of the
core and to construct an eﬃcient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
Keywords: cooperative game, insurance, core, nucleolus
Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation (2000): 91A12, 91A40, 91B30
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1. Introduction
In many practical situations the risks are too large to be insured by only one com-
pany, for example environmentalpollution risk. As a result, severalinsurance compa-
nies share the liability and premium. In such a risk sharing situation two important
practical questions arise: which premium the insurance companies have to charge
and how should the companies split the risk and the premium keeping themselves
as much competitive as possible and at the same time obtaining a fair division? In
Fragnelli and Marina (2004) the problem is approached from a game theoretic point
of view through the construction of a cooperative game, the so-called co-insurance
game. In this paper we study the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the
nucleolus of the co-insurance game subject to the premium value. If the premium is
large enough, the core is empty. If the premium meets a critical upper bound, the
nonemptiness of the core, being a single allocation composed of player’s marginal
  The research of Theo Driessen, Ilya Katsev, and Anna Khmelnitskaya was supported by
NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Research) grant NL-RF 047.017.017.
The research of Ilya Katsev was also supported by RFBR (Russian Foundation for Basic
Research) grant 09-06-00155. The research was partially done during Anna Khmelnit-
skaya 2008 research stay at the Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science
(TiLPS, Tilburg University) whose hospitality and support are appreciated as well.50 Theo S.H.Driessen, Vito Fragnelli, Ilya V.Katsev, Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
contributions, turns out to be equivalent to the so-called 1-convexity property of
the co-insurance game. Moreover, if nonemptiness applies, the co-insurance game
inherits the 1-convexity property while lowering the premium till a critical lower
bound induced by the individual evaluations of the enormous risk. In addition, 1-
convexity of the co-insurance game yields the linearity of the nucleolus which, in
particular, appears to be a linear function of the variable premium. If 1-convexity
does not apply, then for the premium below another critical number we present an
eﬃcient algorithm for computing the nucleolus.
The interest to the class of co-insurance games is not only because they re-
ﬂect the well deﬁned actual economic situations but also it is determined by the
fact that any arbitrary nonnegative monotonic cooperative game may be repre-
sented in the form of a co-insurance game. This allows to glance into the na-
ture of a nonnegative monotonic game from another angle and by that to dis-
cover its new properties and peculiarities. Further, a co-insurance game appears
to be a very natural extension of the well-known bankruptcy game introduced by
Aumann and Maschler (1985). Besides, the study of 1-convex/1-concave TU games
possessing a nonempty core and for which the nucleolus is linear was initiated by
Driessen and Tijs (1983) and Driessen (1985), but until recently appealing abstract
and practical examples of these classes of games were missing. The ﬁrst practical
example of a 1-concave game, the so-called library cost game, and the 1-concave
complementary unanimity basis for the entire space of TU games were introduced
in Drioessen, Khmelnitskaya, and Sales (2005). A co-insurance game under some
conditions provides a new practical example of a 1-convex game. Moreover, in this
paper we also show that a bankruptcy game is not only convex but 1-convex as well
when the estate is suﬃciently large comparatively to the given claims.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic deﬁnitions and notation are given
in Sect. 2.. Sect. 3. studies the nonemptiness and the structure of the core and the
nucleolus of a co-insurance game with respect to the premium value. In Sect. 4. an
algorithm for computing the nucleolus is introduced.
2. Preliminaries
Recall some deﬁnitions and notation. A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU game) is a pair  N,v ,w h e r eN = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set of n ≥ 2p l a y e r sa n d
v:2 N → IR is a characteristic function, deﬁned on the power set of N, satisfying
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N)o fs players is called a coalition,a n dt h e
associated real number v(S)r e p r e s e n t st h eworth of the coalition S;i np a r t i c u l a r ,
N is call a grand coalition. The set of all games with a ﬁxed player set N is denoted
by GN and it can be naturally identiﬁed with the Euclidean space IR
2
n−1.F o r
simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we write v instead of  N,v 
when referring to a game. A value is an operator ξ: GN → IR
n that assigns to any
game v ∈G N a vector ξ(v) ∈ IR
n;t h er e a ln u m b e rξi(v)r e p r e s e n t st h epayoﬀ to the
player i in the game v. A payoﬀ vector x ∈ IR
n is said to be eﬃcient in the game
v,i fx(N)=v(N). Given a game v,t h esubgame v|T with the player set T ⊆ N,
T  = ∅, is a game deﬁned by v|T(S)=v(S) for all S ⊆ T. A game v is nonnegative
if v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊆ N. A game v is monotonic if v(S) ≤ v(T) for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N.
For the cardinality of a given set A we use a standard notation |A| along with lower
case letters like n = |N|, m = |M|, nk = |Nk|, and so on. We also use standard
notation x(S)=
 
i∈S xi and xS = {xi}i∈S, for all x ∈ IR
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The imputation set of a game v ∈G N is deﬁned as a set of eﬃcient and individ-
ually rational payoﬀ vectors
I(v)={x ∈ IR
n | x(N)=v(N),x i ≥ v(i), for all i ∈ N},





The core (Gillies, 1953) of a game v ∈G N is deﬁned as a set of eﬃcient payoﬀ
vectors that are not dominated by any coalition, i.e.,
C(v)={x ∈ IR
n | x(N)=v(N),x (S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
A game v ∈G N is balanced if C(v)  = ∅.
For any game v ∈G N,t h eexcess of a coalition S ⊆ N with respect to a vector
x ∈ IR
n is given by
ev(S,x)=v(S) − x(S).
The nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969) is a value deﬁned as a minimizer of the lex-
icographic ordering of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈G N
arranged in weakly decreasing order of their magnitude over the imputation set
I(v).
The prenucleolus is a value deﬁned as a minimizer of the lexicographic ordering
of components of the excess vector of a given game v ∈G N arranged in weakly
decreasing order of their magnitude over the preimputation set I∗(v).
For a game v ∈G N with a nonempty core the nucleolus ν(v) belongs to C(v).
For a game v ∈G N we consider the vector mv ∈ IR
n of marginal contributions
to the grand coalition, the so-called marginal worth vector, deﬁned as
mv
i = v(N) − v(N\{i}), for all i ∈ N,







i − v(S),S ⊆ N,S  = ∅,
0,S = ∅,
i.e., the gap vector measures for every S ⊆ N the total coalitional surplus of
marginal contributions to the grand coalition over its worth. In fact, gv(S)=
−ev(S,mv), with ev(S,mv) being th excess vector of S in game v at payoﬀ vec-
tor x = mv.
It is easy to check that in any game v ∈G N, the vector mv relates to the core
being an upper bound in that xi ≤ mv
i, for any x ∈ C(v)a n da l li ∈ N.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
the condition v(N) ≤
 
i∈N mv
i is a necessary (but not suﬃcient) condition for
nonemptiness of the core of the arbitrary game v, i.e., a strictly negative gap of the
grand coalition gv(N) < 0 implies C(v)=∅.
A game v ∈G N is convex if for all i ∈ N and all S ⊆ T ⊆ N\{i},
v(S ∪{ i}) − v(S) ≤ v(T ∪{ i}) − v(T), (1)
or equivalently, if for all S,T ⊆ N,
v(S)+v(T) ≤ v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T).
Any convex game has a nonempty core (Shapley, 1971).52 Theo S.H.Driessen, Vito Fragnelli, Ilya V.Katsev, Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
Proposition 1. For every convex game v ∈G N it holds that
gv(N) ≥ 0, and gv(N) ≥ gv(S), for all S ⊆ N.
Proof. The inequality gv(N) ≥ 0 follows directly from the nonemptiness of the core
of any convex game.


























Therefore, applying successively n − s times the inequality (1), we obtain that for
all S ⊆ N, gv(N) − gv(S) ≥ 0.    
A game v ∈G N is 1-convex if
0 ≤ gv(N) ≤ gv(S), for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅. (2)
As it is shown in Driessen and Tijs (1983) and Driessen (1985), every 1-convex
game has a nonempty core. In a 1-convex game v, for every eﬃcient vector x ∈ IR
n,
the inequalities xi ≤ mv
i, for all i ∈ N,g u a r a n t e et h a tx ∈ C(v). In particular, the
characterizing property of a 1-convex game is that the replacement of any single
coordinate mv
i in the vector mv by the amount of v(N) − mv(N\i) places the
resultant vector ¯ mv(i)={¯ mv





i − gv(N),j= i,
mv
j,j  = i,
for all j ∈ N,
into the core C(v). Moreover, in a 1-convex game the set of vectors {¯ mv(i)}i∈N
creates a set of extreme points of the core which in turn coincides with their convex
hull, i.e., C(v)=co({¯ mv(i)}i∈N). Besides, the nucleolus ν(v) occupies the central






, for all i ∈ N. (3)
So, the nucleolus coincides with the equal allocation of nonseparable contribution
the amount of gv(N) over the players, or in other terms, every player according
to nucleolus gets its marginal contribution to the grand coalition minus an equal
share in the gap gv(N) of the grand coalition. That presents a special advantage
of the class of 1-convex games because the nucleolus, deﬁned as a solution to a
lexicographical optimization problem that in general is diﬃcult to compute, for
1-convex games appears to be linear and thus simple to determine.
By deﬁnition of 1-convexity (2) and from Proposition 1 we easily obtain
Proposition 2. A convex game v ∈G N is 1-convex, if and only if
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In the next section we study the so-called co-insurance game that appears to
be closely related to the well-known bankruptcy game. For a bankruptcy prob-
lem (E;d) given by an estate E ∈ IR + and a vector of claims d ∈ IR
n
+ assuming
that the total claim of the creditors is greater than the remaining estate, i.e.,
d(N)=
 
i∈N di >E , the corresponding bankruptcy game vE;d ∈G N is deﬁned
in Aumann and Maschler (1985) by
vE;d(S)=m a x {0,E− d(N\S)}, for all S ⊆ N. (4)
To conclude this section recall a few extra deﬁnitions that will be used below.
A set of coalitions B⊂2N\{N} is called a set of balanced coalitions, if positive
numbers λS, S ∈Bexist such that
 
S∈B: S i
λS =1 , for all i ∈ N.
Ap l a y e ri is a veto-player in the game v ∈G N,i fv(S)=0 ,f o re v e r yS ⊆ N \i.
A game v ∈G N is a veto-rich game if it has at least one veto-player.
For a game v ∈G N, a coalition S ⊆ N, S  = ∅, and an eﬃcient payoﬀ vector
x ∈ IR
n,t h eDavis-Maschler reduced game with respect to S and x is the game






v(N) − x(N\S),T = S,
maxQ⊆N\S
 
v(T ∪ Q) − x(Q)
 
, otherwise,
for all T ⊆ S.
3. Co-insurance Game and Its Core
Consider the problem in which a risk is evaluated too much heavy for a single
insurance company, but it can be insured by the ﬁnite set N of companies that
share a given risk R and premium Π. First, it is assumed that every company i ∈ N
expresses the valuation of a random variable R through a real-valued nonnegative
functional Hi(R) such that Hi(0)=0, for all i∈N. For any nonempty subset S ⊆ N
of companies, let A(S)={X ∈ IR
S |
 
i∈S Xi = R} represents the (non-empty) set
of feasible decompositions of the given risk R. Second, by hypothesis, it is supposed,
for every S ⊆ N, S  = ∅,, that an optimal decomposition of the risk exists, so that
minX∈A(S)
 
i∈S Hi(Xi): =P(S) is well-deﬁned. Here the real-valued set function
P can be seen as the evaluation of the optimal decomposition of the risk R by the
companies in coalition S as a whole.
To determine the evaluation function P may result in general not an easy task.
However, under some reasonable assumptions borrowed from real-life applications
it turns out that P can be easily computed for all coalitions. For instance, in case
of constant quotas, when it is supposed that for each insurable risk R, for every








speciﬁed by a priori given quotas qi>0, i∈N,
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where H is some a priori ﬁxed convex function, the evaluation function P for every














If insurance companies evaluate a risk R according to the variance principle, i.e.,
Hi(R)=E(R)+aiVa r (R),a i > 0, for all i ∈ N,
where E(R)a n dVa r (R) denote the expectation and variance of a random variable
R, then we are in case of constant quotas when the corresponding quotas may be
obtained as qi =
a(N)






(cf. Deprez and Gerber (1985),
Fragnelli and Marina (2004)). Later on we do not discuss the construction of the
evaluation function P. The only important in what follows is that P is nonnegative
and non-increasing, i.e., for all ∅  = S ⊆ T ⊆ N,0≤P(T) ≤P(S).
For a given premium Π a n da ne v a l u a t i o nf u n c t i o nP:2 N → IR, Fragnelli and
Marina (2004) deﬁne the associated co-insurance game vΠ,P ∈G N as following
vΠ,P(S)=
 
max{0,Π−P(S)},S ⊆ N,S  = ∅,
0,S = ∅. (5)
By deﬁnition, the co-insurance game vΠ,P is nonnegative and since P is non-
increasing it easily follows that v is monotonic, i.e., for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N,0≤
vΠ,P(S) ≤ vΠ,P(T).
Notice that the well-known bankruptcy game (4) presents an example of the
co-insurance game (5). Indeed, if for each insurance company i ∈ N there exists
aﬁ x e d” c l a i m ”di ≥ 0 such that P(S)=
 
i∈N\S di, for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅,t h e n
the co-insurance game reduces to the bankruptcy game with the estate equal to
the premium Π. This particular evaluation function P is nonnegative and non-
increasing,P(N)=0.
In the framework of the co-insurance game, we consider the evaluation function
P being ﬁxed, while the premium Π as a variable quantity varying from small up
to suﬃciently large amounts. In order to avoid trivial situations, let the premium
Π be large enough so that Π>P(N). The following results are already proved in
Fragnelli and Marina (2004):
• If the premium Π is small enough in that Π ≤maxi∈N P(N\{i}), then the co-
insurance game vΠ,P is balanced since the core C(vΠ,P) contains the eﬃcient
allocation ξ={ξi}i∈N,w h e r eξi∗ =vΠ,P(N)f o rs o m ei∗∈argmaxi∈N P(N\{i}),
and ξi=0 for all i =i∗.






+ P(N), then C(vΠ,P)=∅.
• For all Π ≤ ¯ αP, under the hypothesis of reduced concavity of function P:
P(S)−P(S∪{i}) ≥P(N\{i})−P(N), for all S   N and every i ∈ N\S, (6)
C(vΠ,P)  = ∅.
To ensure strictly positive worth vΠ,P(S) > 0 for every coalition S ⊆ N, S  = ∅,
we suppose that the premium Π is strictly bounded from below by the critical
number αP =m a x i∈N P({i}). For all Π ≥ αP,w eh a v e
m
vΠ,P
i = vΠ,P(N) − vΠ,P(N\{i})=P(N\{i})−P(N), for all i ∈ N, (7)A Game Theoretic Approach to Co-Insurance Situations 55












+ P(S) − Π. (8)
In what follows we distinguish the two cases ¯ αP ≥ αP and ¯ αP <α P.
Notice that in the bankruptcy setting, ¯ αP =
 
i∈N di and αP =
 
i∈N di −
mini∈N di, i.e., it always holds that αP ≤ ¯ αP.
First consider the case ¯ αP ≥αP. It turns out that in this case the nonemptiness
of the core C(vΠ,P)f o rΠ =¯ αP is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance
game v¯ αP,P.
Theorem 1. Let ¯ αP ≥ αP, then the following equivalences hold:
(i) the co-insurance game v¯ αP,P is balanced;
(ii) the core C(v¯ αP,P) is a singleton and coincides with the marginal worth vector
mv¯ αP,P;







, for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅;( 9 )
(iv) the co-insurance game v¯ αP,P is 1-convex.








By hypothesis ¯ αP ≥ αP, therefore, applying the last equality to Π =¯ αP,w eo b t a i n
that
g
v¯ αP,P(N)=0 . (10)
Since for any game v ∈G N, the marginal worth vector mv provides upper bound for
the core, a game v with zero gap gv(N) = 0 can possess at most one core allocation
coinciding with mv,w h i c hi smv¯ αP,P in case of the co-insurance game v¯ αP,P.N e x t












+P(N)−P(S), ∀S⊆N, S =∅, (11)





i ≥ ¯ αP −P(S)=v¯ αP,P(S), for all S ⊆ N,S  = ∅.
Whence it follows that the marginal worth vector mv¯ αP,P ∈ C(v¯ αP,P), if and only if
the evaluation function P satisﬁes the 1-concavity condition (9). Moreover, because
of (8), the inequality (11) is equivalent to
gv¯ αP,P(N) ≤ gv¯ αP,P(S), for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅,
which together with equality (10) is equivalent to 1-convexity of the co-insurance
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Remark 1. Notice that our 1-concavity condition (9) is weaker then the condition
of reduced concavity (6) used in Fragnelli and Marina (2004).
Theorem 2. If for some ﬁxed premium Π∗ ≥ αP, the co-insurance game vΠ∗,P is
1-convex, then for every premium Π, αP ≤ Π ≤ Π∗, the corresponding co-insurance
game vΠ,P is 1-convex as well.
Proof. For all Π ≥ αP, due to (8) it holds that for every S ⊆ N, S  = ∅,t h e
gap gvΠ,P(S) is a decreasing linear function of the variable Π, while the diﬀerence
gvΠ,P(S)−gvΠ,P(N) is constant for all Π. Whence, it follows that if for some ﬁxed
premium Π∗ ≥ αP the co-insurance game vΠ∗,P is 1-convex, i.e., for all S ⊆ N,
S  = ∅, the inequality (2) holds, then this inequality remains valid for all premium
αP ≤ Π ≤ Π∗, i.e., all games vΠ,P appear to be 1-convex as well.    
The next theorem follows easily from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Let ¯ αP ≥ αP. If the evaluation function P satisﬁes the 1-concavity
condition (9), then for any premium αP ≤ Π ≤ ¯ αP,
(i) the corresponding co-insurance game vΠ,P is 1-convex;
(ii) the core C(vΠ,P)  = ∅;
(iii) the nucleolus ν(vΠ,P) is the barycenter of the core C(vΠ,P) and is given by
νi(vΠ,P)=P(N\{i})−P(N)+
Π − ¯ αP
n
, for all i ∈ N. (12)
Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows directly from Theorem 1 and Theorem 2. Next,
recall already mentioned above results obtained in Driessen and Tijs (1983) and
Driessen (1985), stating that every 1-convex game has a nonempty core and its
nucleolus being the barycenter of the core is given by the formula (3). These facts,
together with (7) and (8), complete the proof.    
In words, the third statement of Theorem 3 means that the nucleolus of these
co-insurance games is a linear function of the variable premium such that each incre-
mental premium is shared equally among the insurance companies. Geometrically,
the nucleoli payoﬀs follow a straight line to end up at the marginal worth vector
yielding payoﬀ P(N\{i})−P(N)t op l a y e ri ∈ N.
Remark 2. The statement of Theorem 3 remains in force if the 1-concavity con-
dition (9) for the evaluation function P is replaced by any one of the equivalent
conditions given by Theorem 1, in particular if C(v¯ αP,P)  = ∅ or if the co-insurance
game v¯ αP,P is 1-convex.
Remark 3. Formula (12) for nucleolus of a co-insurance game can be derived alter-
natively using the method for computing the nucleolus of the so-called compromise
stable game introduced in Quant et al. (2005). Indeed, it is not diﬃcult to check
that every 1-convex game appears to be compromise stable.
Remark 4. In the bankruptcy setting Theorem 3 expresses the fact that the nu-
cleolus provides equal losses to all creditors (insurance companies) with respect to
their individual claims, if estate (premium) varies between
 
i∈N di−mini∈N di and  
i∈N di, which agrees well with the Talmud rule for bankruptcy situations studied
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Consider now the case ¯ αP <α P. In this case, even if the co-insurance game
v¯ αP,P is 1-convex, for the co-insurance game vΠ,P corresponding to the premium
Π<¯ αP the 1-convexity may be lost immediately while lowering the premium. This
happens due to the fact that the co-insurance worth of at least one coalition turns
out to be at zero level. For instance, consider the following example.
Example 1. Let the evaluation function P for 3 insurance companies be given by
P({1})=5 ,P({2})=4 ,P({3})=3 ,P({1,2})=P({1,3})=P({2,3}) = 2, and
P({1,2,3})=1.In this case, 4=¯ αP <α P =5.
• If the premium Π = 4, then the co-insurance game v4,P:
v4,P({1})=v4,P({2})=0,v4,P({3})=1,v4,P({12})=v4,P({13})=v4,P({23})=
2, v4,P({123})=3,
is a 1-convex game with the minimal for a 1-convex game gap gv4,P({123})=0
and, therefore, with the unique core allocation mv4,P =(1,1,1).
• If the premium Π = 3, then the co-insurance game v3,P:
v3,P({1})=v3,P({2})=v3,P({3})=0,v3,P({12})=v3,P({13})=v3,P({23})=1,
v3,P({123})=2,
is a symmetric 1-convex and convex, since the gap gv3,P(S)=1 is constant for
all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅, while its core C(v3,P) is the triangle with three extreme
points (1,1,0), (1,0,1), (0,1,1).
• For any premium 2 ≤ Π<3, the corresponding co-insurance game vΠ,P is zero-
normalized and symmetric: vΠ,P(i)=0, vΠ,P(ij)=Π −2, vΠ,P(123)=Π −1.
However, the 1-convexity fails because the gap of singletons is strictly less than
the gap of N: gvΠ,P(i)=1< 4 − Π=gvΠ,P(123).
4. Algorithms for Computing Nucleolus
It is easy to compute the nucleolus of a co-insurance game when it is a linear function
of a given premium as it is stated by Theorem 3. In this section we introduce
a comparatively simple algorithm that allows to compute the nucleolus of a co-
insurance game also in cases when it is nonlinear in the premium. To do that, we
uncover ﬁrst the relation between the class of co-insurance games, in particular
bankruptcy games, and the class of Davis-Maschler reduced games of monotonic
veto-rich games obtained by deleting a veto-player with respect to the nucleolus.
Second, we provide an algorithm for computing the nucleolus for games of the latter
class.
In what follows by Gm
N we denote the class of all monotonic games with a player
set N.L e tN0 := N ∪{ 0} and n0 = n + 1. Consider the class Gm
N0 of monotonic
veto-rich games with a player set N0 and the player 0 being a veto-player. Besides,
we consider the class G
+
N0 of nonnegative veto-rich games with a player set N0 and
the player 0 being a veto-player, that satisﬁes also the property v0(N0) ≥ v0(S), for
all S ⊆ N0. It is easy to see that Gm
N0 ⊂G
+
N0. Deﬁne RN as a class of veto-removed
games v ∈G N that are the Davis-Maschler reduced games of games v0 ∈G m
N0
obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the nucleolus payoﬀ. As it
was already shown in Arin and Feltkamp (1997), for every veto-rich game from the
class G
+
N0 the core is nonempty and the nucleolus payoﬀ to a veto-player is larger
than or equal to that of the other players. From where it easily follows that every
veto-removed game is balanced because the Davis-Maschler reduced game inherits
the core property and, moreover, in every nontrivial veto-rich game v0 ∈G
+
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nucleolus payoﬀ to a veto-player ν0(v0) > 0 since in any nontrivial game v0 ∈G
+
N0
the worth of the grand coalition v0(N0) > 0.
Some extra notation. With every game v∈G
+







0,S    0,
v(S\{0}),S   0, for all S ⊆ N0. (13)
For every veto-rich game v0 ∈G
+
N0 let ν0 denote the nucleolus payoﬀ ν0(v0)t ot h e
veto-player 0 in v0. Besides, for a game v ∈G N and a ∈ IR + we deﬁne the game
v−a∈GN as follows
v
−a(S)=m a x {0,v(S) − a}, for all S ⊆ N. (14)
Below for the facilitation of reading for any set of players M containing the veto-
player 0, any coalition S0⊆M with subindex 0 is assumed to contain the veto-player
0, and it is supposed that for any S0 ⊆ M holds the equality s0=|S0|=s+1, where
s=|S0 ∩ M\{0}|. Furthermore, for any game w ∈G M, for every S   M we deﬁne






m−s+1 ,S  = ∅,
w(M)
m ,S = ∅.
(15)
For M   0, we deﬁne also a number κ∗(w)=min
S M





Theorem 4. It holds that
(i) every game v∈RN can be presented in the form of a co-insurance game vΠ,P ∈
GN;
(ii) if vΠ∗,P ∈R N, then for every premium Π ≤ Π∗, vΠ,P ∈R N as well;
(iii) for every evaluation functionP:2 N →IR, for every premium Π,
Π ≤ Π∗ = P(N)+n min
S N
P(S) −P(N)
n − s +1
, (16)
the co-insurance game vΠ,P ∈RN.
Proof. (i). Consider v ∈R N. By deﬁnition of RN there exists v0 ∈G m
N0 such that
v is the Davis-Maschler reduced game derived from v0 by deleting the veto-player







v0(N ∪{ 0}) − ν0,S = N,
max{v0(S),v0(S ∪{ 0})−ν0}=max{0,v0(S ∪{ 0})−ν0},S  N,S =∅.
Take some positive k>
v
0(N∪{0})
ν0 − 1a n ds e t
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P(S)=( k +1 ) ν0 − v
0(S ∪{ 0}), for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅.
Whence
v(S)=m a x {0,Π−P(S)}, for all S ⊆ N, S  = ∅.
(ii). Recall ﬁrst that every co-insurance game is monotonic and, moreover, for
any co-insurance game vΠ,P, for any a ∈ IR +, the game v
−a
Π,P is also a co-insurance
game with the premium equal to Π −a, i.e, v
−a
Π,P = vΠ−a,P. Therefore in view of (i)
proved above, for proving (ii) it is suﬃcient to show that if for certain game v ∈G m
N
it holds that v−a ∈R N for some a ∈ IR +,t h e nv−b ∈R N for all b ∈ IR +, a<b .
Moreover, notice that it is enough to prove that v−b ∈R N only for a<b≤ v(N)
since due to (14), it holds v−b ≡ 0 ∈R N for all b ≥ v(N).
Consider now a game v ∈G m
N together with its associated veto-rich game v0 ∈
Gm
N0. From (13) and already mentioned above statement of Arin and Feltkamp (1997)
concerning the nucleolus payoﬀ to a veto-player, it follows easily that
v(N)
n+1 ≤ ν0 ≤
v(N). Set a := ν0. It is not diﬃcult to see that v−a ∈G N is the Davis-Maschler
reduced game of the game v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 with respect to
the nucleolus payoﬀ a. So, by deﬁnition of RN, v−a ∈R N. Recall that if a = v(N),
v−a ≡ 0 ∈R N.
Next, we show that if a<v (N), then for all b, a ≤ b ≤ v(N), also v−b ∈R N.
The above procedure of constructing a veto-removed game may be applied to any
monotonic game, in particular to the just obtained monotonic game v−a ∈R N.
Doing that, we get another monotonic game, say v−a
1
∈R N,w i t ha1 = a +
ν0(v−a) >awhen a<v (N). We show ﬁrst that v−b ∈R N for all a ≤ b ≤ a1.
Consider 0 ≤ c ≤ a and apply the above procedure for all monotonic games v−c ∈
GN.F o rc =0w es t a r tw i t hv and obtain the monotonic game v−a ∈R N.F o r
c = a we start with v−a and obtain the monotonic game v−a
1
∈R N. Due to the
continuity of the nucleolus we obtain all v−b while c varies between 0 and a. Hence
v−b ∈R N for all a ≤ b ≤ a1.











n+1 , any number a≤b≤v(N) can be reached by not more than
b−a
v(N)−b(n + 1) steps. Therefore, for every b, a ≤ b ≤ v(N), v−b ∈R N.
(iii). Take a co-insurance game vΠ,P with Π ≥ αP, for simplicity of notation
denote vΠ,P by v, and consider the corresponding veto-rich game v0 ∈G m
N0 deﬁned
by (13). As it is shown in the proof of (ii), the Davis-Maschler reduced game of
the game v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 with respect to the nucleolus
coincides with the game v−a, a = ν0, which in turn coincides with the co-insurance
game vΠ ,P with Π  = Π − ν0. Hence, vΠ ,P ∈R N. From Proposition 3 below and
the deﬁnition of a co-insurance game (5), since Π ≥ αP, it follows that
ν0 ≤ Π −P(N) − n min
S N
P(S) −P(N)
n − s +1
,
i.e.,
Π  ≥P(N)+n min
S N
P(S) −P(N)
n − s +1
.
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Notice that (16) provides rather rough estimation of Π∗. In fact, in the particular
case of bankruptcy games, (16) guarantees that vE;d ∈R N only when E ≤ 0. Next
theorem imposes weaker conditions on the parameters of a bankruptcy game vE;d
to guarantee that vE;d ∈R N.








the corresponding bankruptcy game vE;d ∈R N.
Proof. First take a bankruptcy game vE;d with E =
 
i∈N di and let v be its co-
insurance game representation, i.e., v =vΠ,P with Π =d(N)a n dP(S)=d(N\S).






0,S    0,
 
i∈S\{0}
di,S   0, for all S ⊆ N0.
We compute now the nucleolus payoﬀ ν0 to the veto player 0 in v0 applying Al-
gorithm 2 yielding nucleolus for monotonic veto-rich games with a veto-player 0
introduced below. Without loss of generality we assume that d1 ≤ d2 ≤ ...≤ dn.














2 ,S   0,
for all S ⊆ N0.
For any coalition S0   N0 it holds that
κv0(S0)=
v0(N0) − v0(S0)
n − s +1
=
d(N0\S0)
n − s +1
≥
d1(n − s)





Whence it follows that κ∗
0(v0)=κv0(N0\{1}), and therefore, Step 1 of Algorithm 2
assigns the nucleolus payoﬀ ν1(v0)=d1
2 to the player 1. Moreover, the Davis-
Maschler reduced game constructed in Step 1 is deﬁned on the player set N0\{1}
and coincides with the game v1. Using the similar reasoning it is not diﬃcult to see
that for any k =2,...,n, Algorithm 2 applied to the veto-rich game vk−1 deﬁned
on the player set N0\{1,...,k− 1} assigns the nucleolus payoﬀ
dk
2 to the player k
and goes to the next step with the Davis-Maschler reduced game coinciding with
the game vk deﬁned on the player set N0\{1,...,k}. Then applying the induction
argument we obtain that νi(v0)=di
2 for all i ∈ N and ν0 = ν0(v0)=
d(N)
2 .
Next observe that if a co-insurance game vΠ,P represents a bankruptcy game
vE;d, then for any a ∈ IR +, the co-insurance game v
−a
Π,P represents the bankruptcy
game vE−a;d. Hence, we may complete the proof following the same arguments as
in the proof of the statement (ii) of Theorem 4.    
Consider now the following algorithm for constructing a payoﬀ vector, say x ∈
IR
N, in a game v ∈R N.A Game Theoretic Approach to Co-Insurance Situations 61
Algorithm 1
0. Set M = N and w = v.
1. Find a coalition S   M with minimal size such that κw(S)=κ∗(w).
2. For i ∈ M\S,s e txi = κw(S).I fS = ∅, then stop, otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS,x ∈G S.S e tM = S and w =
wS,x a n dr e t u r nt oS t e p1 .
Theorem 6. For any veto-removed game v ∈R N, Algorithm 1 yields the nucleolus
payoﬀ, i.e., x = ν(v).
The proof of Theorem 6 is obtained by comparing the outputs of two algorithms
yielding nucleoli – Algorithm 1a p p l i e dt oav e t o - r e m o v e dg a m ev ∈R N and an-
other Algorithm 2, applied to the associated monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈G m
N0.
Algorithm 2 is closed conceptually to the algorithm for computing the nucleolus for
veto-rich games suggested in Arin and Feltkamp (1997). It is worth noting that for
the application of Algorithm 1 to a veto-removed game v ∈R N there is no need
in construction of the associated monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈G m
N0 which is only
necessary for proving Theorem 6. The proof of Theorem 6 is given after the proof
of Theorem 7.
The following Algorithm 2 constructs a payoﬀ vector, say y ∈ IR
N0, in a game
v0 ∈G
+
N0.S i n c eGm
N0 ⊂G
+




0. Set M = N0 and w = v0.
1. Find a coalition S0   M with minimal size such that κw(S0)=κ∗
0(w).




otherwise go to Step 3.
3. Construct the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈G S0.S e tM = S0 and
w = wS0,y and return to Step 1.
Theorem 7. For any veto-rich game v0 ∈G
+
N0, Algorithm 2 yields the nucleolus
payoﬀ, i.e., y = ν(v0).
Proof. Let v0 ∈G
+
N0. For the simpliﬁcation of notation denote the nucleolus ν(v0)
by x, x ∈ IR
n+1,a n dl e te∗(v0) denote the maximal excess with respect to the nucle-




(S,x). As a corollary to the Kohlberg’s
characterization of the prenucleolus (Kohlberg, 1971) it holds that the collection of
coalitions with maximal excess values with respect to the nucleolus is balanced. Due
to the balancedness, among the coalitions having the maximal excess there exists
S0   N0. We show that every singleton {i}, i/ ∈ S0, also has the maximal excess.
Let i/ ∈ S0. Again due to the balancedness, there exists S ⊂ N0, S   i, S    0, with
maximal excess. Observe that since S    0, then by deﬁnition of a veto-rich game
v0(S)=v0(S\{i})=v0({i})=0 .I f|S| > 1t h e n
e(S,x)=v
0(S) − x(S)=−x(S)=−x({i}) − x(S\{i})=e({i},x)+e(S\{i},x).
Since the core of every veto-rich game in G
N0
+ is nonempty, the nucleolus belongs to
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e(S\{i},x) ≤ 0. From where it follows that e({i},x) ≥ e(S,x), i.e., every singleton
{i}, i/ ∈ S, possesses the maximal excess as well.
For every S0   N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus from the






















({i},x)≤e∗(v0) · (n − t +1 ) .






n0 − t0 +1
≥− e∗(v0), (17)
while for S0   N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus holds the
equality κ
v0(S0)=−e∗(v0). Then it follows that S0   N0 has the maximal excess
with respect to the nucleolus if and only if κ
v0(S0)=κ∗
0(v0).
Therefore, on the ﬁrst iteration of Algorithm 2 when M = N0 and w = v0,S t e p1
provides a coalition S0   N0 with maximal excess with respect to the nucleolus.
Then Step 2 assigns to every i ∈ N0\S0 its nucleolus payoﬀ because the assigned
payoﬀ yi = κ
v0(S0)c o i n c i d e sw i t hxi = νi(v0)s i n c e
yi = κ
v0(S0)=−e∗(v0)=−(v0({i}) − xi)=xi, for all i ∈ N0\S0.
In every veto-rich game from the class G
+
M with M containing the veto-player 0
the nucleolus coincides with the prenucleolus due to the nonemptiness of the core
which was already mentioned above with reference to Arin and Feltkamp (1997).
Then, because of the Davis-Maschlerconsistency of the prenucleolus (Sobolev, 1975),
the nucleolus payoﬀs to the players in the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈G S0
constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 2 are the same as the nucleolus payoﬀs to the
players in S0 in the game w ∈G
+
M. Thus in order to complete the proof, it only
remains to show that the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y ∈G S0 of a game
w ∈G M




Take T ⊆ S0\{0}.T h e n
wS0,y(T)= m a x
Q⊆M\S0
(w(T ∪ Q) − y(Q)) = max
Q⊆M\S0
{0 − y(Q)} =0 ,
because w(T ∪Q) = 0 for every w ∈G
+
M,s i n c eT ∪Q ⊆ M\{0} for every Q ⊆ M\S0.
Thus, 0 is a veto-player in wS0,y ∈G S0 as well. Further, it is evident that wS0,y
is nonnegative. Hence, it remains to show that wS0,y(S0) ≥ wS0,y(T) for everyA Game Theoretic Approach to Co-Insurance Situations 63
T ⊆ S0.W h e nT ⊆ S0\{0}, wS0,y(T)=0≤ wS0,y(S). Consider now T0 ⊆ S0 and
let Q ⊆ M\S0.S i n c eT0 ∩ Q = ∅,
κw(T0 ∪ Q)=
w(M) − w(T0 ∪ Q)
m −| T0 ∪ Q| +1
=
w(M) − w(T0 ∪ Q)
m − t0 − q +1
.
Moreover, T0 ∪ Q ⊆ M and T0 ∪ Q   0. By Step 1 of Algorithm 2, κw(S0)i st h e
minimal among all coalitions in M containing the veto-player 0. From where and
also because of the obvious inequality s0>t0−1, it holds that
w(M) − w(T0 ∪ Q)
m − s0 − q
>
w(M) − w(T0 ∪ Q)
m − t0 − q +1
≥ κw(S0).
Hence,
w(M) − (m − s0) · κw(S0) >w (T0 ∪ Q) − q · κw(S0),
and therefore, since at Step 2 every player’s i ∈ M\S0 payoﬀ yi = κw(S0), it holds
that
w(M) − y(M\S0) >w (T0 ∪ Q) − y(Q).
Then by deﬁnition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game we obtain wS0,y(S0) ≥
wS0,y(T0) for every T0 ⊆ S0.    
From the proof of Theorem 7 also the upper bound for the nucleolus payoﬀ ν0
to the veto-player 0 in a veto-rich game v0∈G
+
N0 easily follows.
Proposition 3. For any veto-rich game v0∈G
+
N0
ν0 ≤ v0(N0) − n · κ∗
0(v0), (18)
with the equality, if and only if νi(v0)=νj(v0) holds for all i,j ∈ N.
Proof. Since v0(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N, every excess of a singleton coalition {i}, i  =0 ,
with respect to the nucleolus ν(v0)i se q u a lt o−νi(v0). From (17) in the proof of
Theorem 7 it follows that the maximal excess in v0 with respect to the nucleolus is
equal to −κ∗
0(v0). Therefore from the eﬃciency of the nucleolus we obtain that






(−νi(v0)) ≤ v0(N0)+n · (−κ∗
0(v0)),
where the equality hold, if and only if νi(v0)=κ∗
0(v0) for all i,j ∈ N.    






with the equality, if and only if νi(v0)=νj(v0)h o l d sf o ra l li,j ∈ N. Inequality
(19) will be used later in the proof of Theorem 6.
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Proof. of Theorem 6 Consider a veto-removed game v ∈R N. By deﬁnition of RN
there exists a monotonic veto-rich game v0 ∈G m
N0 such that v is the Davis-Maschler
reduced game of v0 obtained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the
nucleolus payoﬀ. Then because of the already mentioned above the Davis-Maschler
consistency of the nucleolus in a veto-rich game in Gm
N0, νi(v)=νi(v0) for all i ∈ N.
Since Algorithm 2 yields ν(v0), for proving Theorem 6 it is suﬃcient to show that
the payoﬀ vector x produced by Algorithm 1 for the game v coincides on N with
the payoﬀ vector y produced by Algorithm 2 for the game v0. For giving evidence
for that we show ﬁrst that either in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 S = ∅ is chosen and the
algorithm yields the nucleolus, or it holds that
κ∗(v)=κ∗
0(v0). (20)
From Theorem 7, y = ν(v0). v is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of v0 ob-
tained by deleting the veto-player 0 in accordance to the nucleolus ν(v0). Hence by
deﬁnition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game, v(S)=m a x {0,v0(S ∪{ 0}) − y0},
i.e., either v(S)=v0(S ∪{ 0}) − y0 or v(S)=0 .L e tS   N be the coalition chosen
in Step 1 at the ﬁrst iteration of Algorithm 1. It turns out that either S = ∅,o r




n − s +1
=
v(N)





i.e., κv(∅) ≤ κv(S) while |∅| =0<s , which contradicts the choice of S.
Let now S0   N0 be the coalition chosen in Step 1 at the ﬁrst iteration of
Algorithm 2 and let S=S0\{0}. Similarly to the paragraph above, it turns out that
either S =∅,o rv(S)=v0(S ∪{ 0}) − y0. Indeed if S  =∅ and v(S)=max{0,v0(S ∪





n0 − s0 +1
>
v0(N0) − y0





which contradicts Proposition 3 restated in the form (19). Thus, for the coalition
S0 chosen in Step 1 at the ﬁrst iteration of Algorithm 2 it holds that either S =
S0\{0} = ∅,o rv(S)=v0(S ∪{ 0}) − y0.
Hence, due to the Davis-Maschlerreduced game relationship between v and v0,i n
both algorithms for all S   N with the assumption that S=S0\{0} for S0 chosen
in Step 1 of Algorithm 2, it holds that either S = ∅ or v(S)=v0(S ∪{ 0}) − y0.
Thus, for proving (20) it is suﬃcient to prove that for all S   N it holds that
κv(S)=κ
v0(S ∪{ 0}).






n0 − s0 +1
=
v(N) − v(S)




v0(S0)=κv(S), for all S   N, S  = ∅. (21)
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0(v0), then Algorithm 2 terminates at the ﬁrst iteration and in
Step 2 every player i ∈ N gets the same payoﬀ yi=κ
v0({0}). Due to the coincidence
of nucleoli in games v and v0 on N, it holds that every player i ∈ N in v has the
same nucleolus payoﬀ that by eﬃciency is equal to
v(N)
n













0(v0), then there exists S N, S =∅, such that κ
v0(S0)=κ∗
0(v0).












where the second equality is due to v being the Davis-Maschler reduced game of v0.







and from Proposition 3 and Remark 5 it follows that νi(v0)=νj(v0) for all i,j∈N,
and therefore, for all i ∈ N,
νi(v0)





i.e., in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 the empty set is chosen and Algorithm 1 in fact yields
the nucleolus.
If κv(∅) >κ v(S), then there exists S    N, S   = ∅, such that κv(S )=κ∗(v)
(possibly, S  = S). Hence, due to (21), for S 
0 = S  ∪{ 0}   N0, κv(S )=κ
v0(S 
0),
i.e., in this case κ∗(v)=κ∗
0(v0)a sw e l l .T h u s ,i ti sp r o v e dt h a te i t h e ri nS t e p1
of Algorithm 1 either S = ∅ is chosen and the algorithm yields the nucleolus, or
κ∗(v)=κ∗
0(v0).
For completing the proof it remains to consider the situation when in Step 1
of Algorithm 1 a coalition S  N, S  =∅, is chosen. As it is shown above in such a
case in Step 1 of Algorithm 2 we always can chose S0 N0, S0=S ∪{ 0},f o rw h i c h
κ
v0(S0)=κv(S). Thus, at the ﬁrst iteration both algorithms at Step 2 assign xi=yi
for every i ∈ N\S = N0\S0. It is easy to see that the Davis-Maschler reduced game
wS,x constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 1 is the Davis-Maschler reduced game of
the Davis-Maschler reduced game wS0,y constructed in Step 3 of Algorithm 2. Then
observe that the situation at all next iterations of both algorithms remains the same.
Therefore, repeating the same reasoning as above we obtain that both algorithms
assign the same payoﬀs to all players in N.    
References
Arin, J., V. Feltkamp (1997). The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transfereble utility
games. International Journal of Game Theory, 26, 61–73.66 Theo S.H.Driessen, Vito Fragnelli, Ilya V.Katsev, Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
Aumann, R.J., M. Maschler (1985). Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from
the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory, 36, 195–213.
Davis, M., M. Maschler (1965). The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics
Quarterly, 12, 223–259.
Deprez, O., H.U. Gerber (1985). On convex principle of premium calculation. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics, 4, 179–189.
Driessen, T.S.H. (1985). Properties of 1-convex n-person games.O RS p e k t r u m ,7, 19–26.
Driessen, T.S.H., A.B. Khmelnitskaya, J. Sales (2005). 1-concave basis for TU games.
Memorandum 1777, Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Twente, The
Netherlands.
Driessen, T.S.H., S.H. Tijs (1983). The τ-value, the nucleolus and the core for a subclass
of games. Methods of Operations Research, 46, 395–406.
Fragnelli, V. M.E. Marina (2004). Co-Insurance Games and Environmental Pollution Risk.
In: Game Practice and the Environment (Carraro C., V. Fragnelli, eds.), pp. 145–163.
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham (UK).
Gillies, D.B. (1953). Some theorems on n-person games. Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University.
Kohlberg, E. (1971). On the nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on
Applied Mathematics, 20, 62–66.
Quant, M., P. Borm, H. Reijnierse, B. van Velzen (2005). The core cover in relation to the
nucleolus and the Weber set. International Journal of Game Theory, 33, 491–503.
Schmeidler, D. (1969). The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on
Applied Mathematics, 17, 1163–1170.
Shapley, L.S. (1971). Cores of convex games. International Journal of Game Theory, 1,
11–26.
Sobolev, A.I. (1975). The characterization of optimality principles in cooperative games by
functional equations. In: Mathematical Methords in the Social Sciences (Vorob’ev N.N.,
ed.), Vol. 6, pp. 94–151, Vilnus (in Russian).On the Notion of Dimension and Codimension
of Simple Games
Josep Freixas1   and Dorota Marciniak2
1 Department of Applied Mathematics III and High Engineering School (Manresa
Campus),
Technical University of Catalonia (Spain).
2 Technical University of Catalonia (Spain) and National Institute of
Telecommunications (Poland).
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sion for the class of simple games. It introduces a dual concept of a dimen-
sion which is obtained by considering the union instead of the intersection
as the basic operation, and several other extensions of the notion of dimen-
sion. It also shows the existence and uniqueness of a minimum subclasses
of games, with the property that every simple game can be expressed as an
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these subclasses in the description of a simple game, and give a practical
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1. Introduction
In this paper we introduce a novel approach of viewing a simple game by its its
dimension or codimension according to the minimal dimensional class of simple
games or respectively minimal codimensional class of simple games. We introduce
and study the properties of these notions. We show how they can be referred to as
a basis or dual basis for the class of simple games. We also provide a completeness
in the sense that any simple game can be measured in this terms, ie. any simple
game has a dimension and codimension, as deﬁned in this paper. We also describe
many important corollaries, following from these results, and we give some practical
interpretations of these notions. In particular we show the relations of these notions
to the winning and losing coalitions of the game - more precisely to the set of minimal
winning coalitions and maximal loosing coalitions,o rminimal blocking coalitions in
the game.
To recall a classical concept of dimension we refer to the class of weighted sim-
ple games which are probably the most important subclass of simple games. It
is well known that every simple game can be represented as an intersection of
weighted games. It nevertheless becomes of interest to ask how eﬃciently this can
be done for a given simple game. The concept of dimension known in the literature
is based on the fact that each simple game can be expressed as a ﬁnite intersection
  Corresponding author e–mail: josep.freixas@upc.edu, fax: +34 938777202. Research par-
tially funded by Grants SGR 2005–00651 from the Generalitat de Catalunya and MTM
2006–06064 from the Spanish Science and Innovation Ministry and the European Re-
gional Development Fund.68 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
of weighted simple games, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1993), (Taylor and Zwicker, 1995),
(Taylor and Zwicker, 1999). The question of eﬃciency leads to the deﬁnition of the
classical dimension. A simple game is said to be of dimension k if and only if it
can be represented as the intersection of exactly k weighted games, but not as the
intersection of k − 1 weighted games. In this sense, we can regard weighted simple
games as a generating system of the class of simple games with the intersection as
the basic operation. There exist several real–world examples of voting systems in
use today where laws are passed by a method known as ‘count and account,’ which
are examples of dimension 1 or 2. For analysis and some examples on this voting
system, we refer the reader to (Peleg, 1992) and (Carreras and Freixas, 2004).
The deﬁnition of dimension was introduced for graphs in the late 1970s; its
extension to hypergraphs (simple games not necessarily monotonic) is due to Jeres-
low (Jereslow, 1975). Nevertheless, this notion for simple games is reminiscent of the
dimension (Dushnik and Miller (Dushnik and Miller, 1941)) of a partially ordered
set, which was deﬁned as the minimum number of linear orders whose intersection
is the given partial ordering. In the present paper we restrict the contents to simple
games, disregarding the possibility of abstention or absence.
The ﬁrst goal of this paper consists in extending the concept of dimension,
originally deﬁned for weighted games, to other subclasses of simple games, and in
particular ﬁnding a ’basic’ subclass of simple games for which the associated notion
of dimension exists. We show in this paper that, in fact, such a smallest class exists
and we show its uniqueness as well. We show the same for the dual case, i.e. of the
codimension.
The notion of a codimension which we introduce gives the completeness to this
theory, and provides us with the tools of studding the dual cases. We answer a
natural question which arises in this context – whether it is feasible to get an
analogous concept of dimension, namely codimension, by using the union instead of
the intersection as the basic operation. Indeed, we show that the codimension is well
deﬁned for several subclasses of simple games. Moreover, we show that there exists
a unique smallest subclass of simple games for which the associated codimension
exists.
The results presented here emphasize the extent to which the study of the dimen-
sion constitutes a bridge between the theory of simple games and hypergraphs and
other theories like Reliability and Circuits Theory see, for example, Ramamurthy,
1990 or (Freixas and Puente, 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. After a section on preliminaries, revising the
terminology and recalling some signiﬁcant results on classical dimension of simple
games, we extend in Section 3 the concept of dimension to several classes of simple
games and introduce the notion of codimension of a simple game. Section 4 contains
some results on dimension and codimension and establishes a relationship between
the two notions. Section 5 shows the existence and uniqueness of subclasses of simple
games being (co)dimensionally minimum. Some computational aspects of dimension
and codimension are provided in Section 6. Concluding remarks are provided in
Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
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A simple game is a pair (N,W)w h e r eN = {1,2,...,n} and W is an arbitrary
collection of subsets of N. The simple game is monotonic if, moreover, S ∈ W and
S ⊆ T,t h e nT ∈ W. From now on we only deal with monotonic simple games with
the two additional assumptions ∅ / ∈ W and N ∈ W.
Simple games can be viewed as models of voting systems in which a single
alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. The
set N is called the grand coalition, its members are called players or voters,a n d
the sets in W are called winning coalitions. The intuition here is that a set S is a
winning coalition if and only if the bill or amendment passes when the players in
S are precisely the ones who voted for it. A subset of N that is not in W is called a
losing coalition and the collection of losing coalitions is denoted by L.I fe a c hp r o p e r
subcoalition of a winning coalition is losing, this winning coalition is called minimal.
The set of minimal winning coalitions is denoted by Wm. It should be noted that
a simple game is completely determined by its minimal winning coalitions. If each
proper supra-coalition of a losing coalition is winning, this losing coalition is called
maximal. The set of maximal losing coalitions is denoted by LM. Ap l a y e ri ∈ N
null in (N,W)i fi/ ∈ S for every S ∈ Wm. Ap l a y e ri ∈ N is a winner if {i}∈W. A
simple game (N,W)i sproper if S ∈ W implies N \ S ∈ L. A simple game (N,W)
is strong if S ∈ L implies N \ S ∈ W.I fD is a ﬁnite set, then |D| denotes the
cardinality of D.
A simple game (N,W) is called a weighted game if it admits a representation
by means of the n+1 non-negative real numbers [q;w1,...,wn] such that S ∈ W iﬀ
w(S) ≥ q, where for each coalition S ⊆ N, w(S)=
 
i∈S
wi. The number q is called
the quota of the game and wi the weight of player i. A k–out–of–n game is a simple
game where the minimal winning coalitions are those with k members. It is obvious
that k–out–of–n game is weighted and admits the representation [k;1,...,1
      
n
].
Two simple games (N,W)a n d( N ,W )a r es a i dt ob eisomorphic if there exists
a bijective map f : N → N  such that S ∈ W iﬀ f(S) ∈ W .
Let (N,W) be a simple game. Set Wi = {S ∈ W : i ∈ S} and let τij : N → N
denote the transposition of players i,j ∈ N (i.e., τij(i)=j, τij(j)=i and τij(k)=k
for k  = i and k  = j). The individual desirability relation considered in (Isbell, 1956)
and (Isbell, 1958)) and later on generalized in (Maschler and Peleg, 1966), is the
binary relation   on N:
i   j iﬀ τij(W j) ⊆ Wi,
and say that i is at least as desirable as j as a coalition partner. It is easy to see
that   is a preorder, and the lack of antisymmetry is then solved by introducing
the associated equivalence relation ≈ the indiﬀerent part of the desirability relation
w h i c hi sd e ﬁ n e db y
i ≈ j iﬀ i   j and j   i;
hence i ≈ j means that i and j are equi-desirable as coalitional partners. The other
basic problem with desirability is that it is not always complete (total). Then, if
any two players are comparable by  ,( N,W)i ss a i dt ob eacomplete simple game
(complete games are also known in the literature of simple games as linear, directed
or ordered games); in this case the ≈–classes are linearly ordered. Note that each
weighted game is complete because wi ≥ wj implies i   j.70 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
2.1. Preliminaries on the classical dimension
Revising the results and possible motivations related to the concept of the classical
dimension, we ﬁnd that in the literature only one concept of dimension has been
proposed, and as far as we know only this notion of dimension has been considered in
the theory of simple games. Following (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999), a simple game W
is said to be of dimension k if it can be represented as the intersection of k weighted
games, but cannot be represented as the intersection of k − 1 weighted games.
Equivalently, the dimension of W is the least k such that there exists weighted
simple games W1,...,W k such that
W = W1 ∩···∩Wk.
The possible motivation to introduce this concept of dimension has been based
on the observation that most naturally occurring, real–life voting systems in use
are of small dimension. As an example we can consider, the Electoral College of the
United States, which is a weighted game and hence has dimension 1. Another ex-
ample is the United Nations Security Council which has dimension 1 (for weighted
a representation see (Taylor, 1995) and (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) taking into ac-
count the possibility of abstention). Interesting examples of dimension 2 are the
United States federal system, also the procedure for amending the Canadian Consti-
tution (see (Taylor, 1995), (Kilgour, 1983) and (Levesque and Kilgour, 1984)) and
the current European Union Council of Ministers for motions not coming from the
European Commission. Two conspicuous examples of dimension 3 can be found in
the Union Council of Ministers after the enlargement to 27 members agreed in Nice
in December 2000, (Freixas, 2004). We do not know about the existence of some
real-world voting system with dimension greater than 3. Whenever the dimension of
a simple game is not a huge number an eﬃcient decomposition of the simple game
as intersection of weighted games can be used to compute power indices with gen-
erating functions as was illustrated in (Algaba et.al., 2001) for the Banzhaf power
index for the European Union after the enlargement to 27 countries.
In De˘ ıneko and Woeginger (De˘ ıneko and Woeginger, 2006) it is proven that the
following problem ‘Given k weighted games, decide whether the dimension of their
intersection exactly equals k’ is NP-hard and hence computationally intractable,
thus their result indicates that the computation of the dimension of simple games
is a combinatorially complicated concept.
An important property of the concept of dimension is that:
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1.7.2, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)). Every simple game
has a ﬁnite dimension.
The proof in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) of Theorem 1 uses the following argu-
ment (further details on the proof are omitted here). For a simple game W on N,
let LM = {T1,...,T k}. Clearly, W = W1 ∩···∩Wk where each Wi admits the
weighted representation [1;wi
1,...,w i




0, if j ∈ Ti;
1, otherwise.
Hence, W is the intersection of |LM| weighted games and, therefore it has dimension.
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by the number of maximal losing coalitions. The following result shows that there
are games of every dimension.
Theorem 2 (Theorem 1.7.4, (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)). For every m ≥ 1,
there is a simple game W of dimension m.
The proof in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) of Theorem 2 involves the following
game W of dimension m deﬁned on a set M (further details on the proof are
omitted here). Fix m ≥ 1a n dl e tM = {1,...,2m}.L e tW be the collection of sets
deﬁned by
S ∈ W iﬀ S ∩{ 2i − 1,2i}  = ∅ for i =1 ,...,m.
However, these games are highly ‘non-complete.’ Thus, one is left with the hope that
for games with high dimension, the complexity is caused by their non-completeness.
However, in (Freixas and Puente, 2008) it is proved that this conjecture is not true,
so that there exist complete games of every dimension. Exponential dimension is also
achieved for some simple games, see Theorem 1.7.5 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)
and Theorem 1 in (Freixas and Puente, 2001) for games with a higher dimensional
behavior.
3. Dimension and codimension
3.1. Duality and basic subsets of simple games
To introduce a notion of dimension and codimension we recall the basic structures
related to a simple game. First we recall a notions of blocking coalitions and the
dual game.
Let S be the class of simple games on N. With every simple game W ∈S ,w ec a n
associate a dual game W ∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \S/ ∈ W} whose elements are the blocking
coalitions in W, i.e., those that can prevent an issue from being passed. It is straight-
forward to check that the dual game is idempotent, i.e., W∗∗ = W and satisﬁes the
two de Morgan’s laws (see, e.g. Proposition 1.4.3 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999)):
(W1 ∪ W2)∗ = W ∗
1 ∩ W ∗
2 ,
(W1 ∩ W2)∗ = W ∗
1 ∪ W ∗
2 . (1)
Let C⊆Sbe a subset of simple games on N,a n dl e tC∗ = {W ∗ ∈S : W ∈C } .
We say that C is closed under duality if C = C∗. Particularly, S is itself closed under
duality.
An example of a proper subset of S which is closed under duality is the class
of complete games, brieﬂy denoted L, because i   j in W ∈Liﬀ i   j in W∗ ∈
L. A proper subset of L which is closed under duality is the class of weighted
games, brieﬂy denoted M, because if W ∈Madmits [q;w1,...,w n]a saw e i g h t e d
representation then [w−q+1;w1,...,w n] is a weighted representation for W∗ ∈M




A proper subset of M which is not closed under duality is the class of homoge-
neous games. Let H1 be the class of homogeneous games, i.e. W ∈H 1 if W admits a
representation [q;w1,...,w n] for which the weight of all minimal winning coalitions
equals the quota. Note that H1 is not closed under duality, but
 
i∈S
wi = q for all
S ∈ W m implies that the dual game, W∗ ∈Sadmits the weighted representation72 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
[w − q +1 ;w1,...,w n]w i t hw(T)=w − q for all T ∈ (L∗)M. In words, the dual
of a homogeneous game is a game that admits a representation as a weighted game
wherein the weight of all maximal losing coalitions coincide. Let H2 denote that
class of games, then H1  = H2 and H1
∗ = H2, and by idempotency H1 = H2
∗.O f
course, the set H = H1 ∪H 2 is closed under duality, although neither H1 nor H2
are.
3.2. The class of unitary vs. unanimity games
In this subsection we recall the dual analogy between the classes of unitary and
unanimity games.
We say that a game W is unitary if it admits a weighted representation[q;w1,...,
wn]w h e r eq =1 ,w ≥ 1, and wi is either 0 or 1 for all i =1 ,...,n.I fwi =1t h e n
i is a winner in W,w h e r e a swi = 0 implies that i is null in W.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,W is
unitary iﬀ Wm is uniquely formed by singletons (the winners of the game). Let U1
denote the class of unitary games then |U1| =2 n − 1.
The dual representationof a unitary game [1;w1,...,w n]i s[ w;w1,...,w n]w h i c h
is a weighted representation of the unanimity game W of coalition {k ∈ N : wk =1 },
equivalently, Wm is formed by a single coalition whenever the game is unanimous.
Let U2 denote the class of unanimity games, then U1  = U2 and U1
∗ = U2,a n d
by idempotency U1 = U2
∗. Of course, the set U = U1 ∪U 2 is closed under duality,
although neither U1 nor U2 are. It is clear that |U2| =2 n−1a n d|U| =2 n+1−(n+2).
3.3. New notions of dimension
Here we introduce the new concepts of dimension and codimension for simple games.
Let C   S be a proper subset of simple games on N, W ∈Sis said to be
of C-dimension k if it can be represented as the intersection of k games in C, but
cannot be represented as the intersection of k − 1 games in C. Equivalently, the
C-dimension of W is the least k such that there exists games W1,...,W k in C such
that
W = W1 ∩···∩Wk.
Brieﬂy, we will denote dimC(W)=k.N o t i c et h a tW ∈Ciﬀ dimC(W)=1 .
W ∈Sis said to be of C-codimension k if it can be represented as the union of k
games in C, but cannot be represented as the union of k−1 games in C.E q u i v a l e n t l y ,
the C-codimension of W is the least k such that there exists games W1,...,W k in
C such that
W = W1 ∪···∪Wk.
Brieﬂy, we will denote codimC(W)=k.T h eM-codimension is simply called codi-
mension.
3.4. Practical interpretation
The meaning in practice of the introduced notions is as follows. Let us consider the
new game “blocking the law to pass” for each of the games with dimension 2 or 3
mentioned in the Preliminaries. These games are the respectively the dual games
of the original ones e.g. (United States federal system, the procedure for amending
the Canadian Constitution or the current European Union Council of Ministers for
motions not coming from the European Commission), thus they decompose as union
of two or three weighted games (which are at the same time the duals of the weighted
games appearing in the original decomposition as intersection of them). As we shallOn the Notion of Dimension and Codimension of Simple Games 73
see in Theorem 3-(ii) the dimension of a game coincides with the codimension of
its dual game. Thus, every real–world example of a voting system with dimension p
provides a real–world example of a voting system with codimension p and conversely.
Note that for each of the voting systems considered in the Preliminaries (with
dimension greater than 1), it is even easier to win in the blocking game (with
codimension greater than 1) than to win in the original one. This is motivated
since voting systems are usually demanded to be proper so that |W|≤2n−1,w h i c h
implies that the dual game is strong and hence |W∗|≥2n−1.
A natural source of examples with small codimension but with exponential di-
mension (see (Freixas and Puente, 2001)) appears for a special type of compound
simple games considered by Shapley (Shapley, 1962). For compound games each
player belongs to one of m chambers. The bill is previously accepted or refused in
each one of the chambers and ﬁnally a rule of global decision (which includes all the
possible results for the chambers) is applied. A particular game of this type uses
unanimity in each one of the chambers, while the global decision is an individualist
game played by all the chambers. The resulting game is a composition of unanimity
games via individualism which models voting systems in which a lobby in a com-
mittee can impose its criteria to other lobbies whenever a full agreement of all its
members is reached.
4. Relationship between dimension and codimension
4.1. A minimum (co)dimensional class of simple games
A subset C   S is dimensionally minimal if it has C-dimension for all W ∈S , but
for all B   C there exists a W ∈Swithout B-dimension. Analogously, a subset
C   S is codimensionally minimal if it has C-codimension for all W ∈S , but for all
B   C there exists a W ∈Swithout B-codimension.
A subset C   S is dimensionally minimum if it is dimensionally minimal and
C⊆Dfor all set D being dimensionally minimal. Analogously, a subset C   S is
codimensionally minimum if it is codimensionally minimal and C⊆Dfor all set D
being codimensionally minimal.
It is an important issue to determine whether there exists a set of games C being
(co)dimensionally minimum because C would be the most reduced class of simple
games with (co)dimension. In this section we are concerned about the existence of
a minimum (co)dimensional class of simple games.
4.2. Dimension vs.Codimension
The following lemma is an easy consequence obtained from observing relations be-
tween previous deﬁnitions.
Lemma 1. Let B   C   S and let W ∈Swhich has a ﬁnite B-dimension (B-
codimension). Then:
(i) W has a ﬁnite C-dimension (C-codimension), and
(ii) dimC(W) ≤ dimB(W) (codimC(W) ≤ codimB(W)).
Proof. (i)I fW = W1 ∩···∩Wk (W = W1 ∪···∪Wk) with all Wi ∈B .T h e nB   C
implies W = W1 ∩···∩Wk (W = W1 ∪···∪Wk)w h e r ea l lWi ∈C .
(ii)F r o m( i) it directly follows that dimC(W) ≤ k (codimC(W) ≤ k)i fdimB(W)=
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Let C∗ be the subset of simple games on N such that W ∈C ∗ iﬀ W ∗ ∈C , i.e.
C∗ is the dual of C.
Theorem 3. Let C⊆S and let C∗ be its dual. Let W ∈S .T h e n :
(i) W has a ﬁnite C-dimension iﬀ W∗ has a ﬁnite C∗-codimension, and
(ii) codimC∗(W ∗)=dimC(W) if W has a ﬁnite C-dimension.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009).
Here we concentrate on the important consequences of these results:
Remark 1. (i) The games appearing in the proof of Theorem 1 are unitary. Hence,
it follows that each simple game has a ﬁnite U1-dimension. Moreover, all these
notions of dimension are bounded above by the number of maximal losing coali-
tions.
(ii) Analogously, taking the game considered in the proof of Theorem 2 and apply-
ing Theorem 3 it follows that each simple game has a ﬁnite U2-codimension.
Moreover, if we apply de Morgan’s laws (1) to the unitary game W considered
in the proof of Theorem 1 we obtain that
W
∗ = US1 ∪···∪USk
where every US is the unanimity game of coalition S, which is weighted and
admits the representation [w;w1,...,w n]w h e r e
wi =
 
1, if i ∈ S
0, otherwise.
Hence, the U2-codimension is bounded above by the number of minimal winning
coalitions and by Lemma 1 it also has H2-codimension, M-codimension or L-
codimension. Moreover, all these notions of codimension are bounded by the
number of minimal winning coalitions.
(iii) Taking the game considered in the proof of Theorem 2 and applying Theorem 3
we obtain that for every m ≥ 1 there is a game of codimension m. By applying
Morgan’s laws to the game in the proof of Theorem 2 it may be deduced that
if M = {1,...,2m} and W be the collection of sets deﬁned by the minimal
winning coalitions {1,2},{3,4},...,{2m − 1,2m},t h e nW is the union of the
m unanimity games. Let Wi be the game that gives weight 1 to each people in
{2i− 1,2i} and gives weight zero to everyone else. For each of these games, let
the quota q be 2. Notice that S ∈ W iﬀ {2i−1,2i}⊆S for some i iﬀ wi(S) ≥ 2




(iv) Theorem 4.3 in (Freixas and Puente, 2008) shows the existence of complete
games, i.e. W ∈Lwith M-dimension m for every m ≥ 1. By considering the
dual games of these complete games we obtain complete games of every codimen-
sion m. Further, Theorem 1.7.5 in (Taylor and Zwicker, 1999) and also Theorem
2.1 in (Freixas and Puente, 2001) show games with exponential M-dimension
(or simply, dimension). From Remark 1-(i) these games have U1-dimension and
by Lemma 1-(ii) dimM(W) ≤ dimU1(W), for all W ∈ S. Hence, those games
have exponential U1-dimension. Taking the dual games of those games we get
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(v) If we desire to compute a power index of a simple game that satisﬁes the transfer
axiom and the game has a large number of players, a large M-dimension but
a reduced M-codimension. Then we can compute the power index by using
generating functions (see e.g. (Brams and Aﬀuso, 1976)) and applying them to
each game appearing in the decomposition obtained by applying the union–
exclusion principle to an eﬃcient union of weighted games.
The next result allows computing the U1-dimension and the U2-codimension of
every simple game.
Theorem 4. (i) The U1-dimension of a simple game is the number of maximal
losing coalitions.
(iii) The U2-codimension of a simple game is the number of minimal winning coali-
tions.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009). Here we
present a corollary following from this result:
Theorem 4 together with Sperner’s theorem on independent families of subsets
of a given ﬁnite set allows providing upper bounds for the U1-dimension and U2-
dimension of a given simple game.
Corollary 1. Both U1-dimension and U2-codimension for a simple game W with











In the case n even there is a unique such game, which is the (n
2 +1)–out–of–n game
for the dimension and its dual game, i.e. the n
2–out–of–n game for the codimension.
If n is odd there are two such games which are: the ( n
2 +1)–out–of–n game and the
( n
2  +2 ) –out–of–n game for the dimension, and their dual games, the ( n
2  +1 ) –
out–of–n game (it is autodual) and  n
2 –out–of–n game for the codimension.
If a simple game is given by either the set of winning coalitions or the set of
losing coalitions, then obtaining the set of minimal winning coalitions or the set of
maximal losing coalitions requires polynomial time. Hence, the U1-dimension or the
U2-codimension of a simple game can be computed in polynomial time whenever the
game is deﬁned by either the set of winning coalitions or the set of losing coalitions.
Instead, if the game is deﬁned by the set of minimal winning coalitions then it
is required exponential time to get the maximal losing coalitions, and therefore
computing the U1-dimension requires exponential time. Analogously, if the game is
deﬁned by the set of maximal losing coalitions then it is required exponential time
to get the minimal winning coalitions, and therefore computing the U2-codimension
requires exponential time. See (Freixas et.al.,2008) for details on these results.
We conclude this section by giving a practical interpretation of the codimension
of the game. Codimension with respect to the class of unanimity games is equal to
the number of chambers, i.e. the number of minimal winning coalitions, thus it can
be seen as the number of possible strategies to win in this game, i.e. the number
of choices that an outsider can regard the game to force win. Let us consider a76 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
Parliament and a businessman, who wants to change a law in some way, then the
U2-codimension shows how many essential choices has the law to be passed. In fact,
the main objectives for the businessman to exert a great deal of inﬂuence are the
minimal winning coalitions, which are diﬀerent alternatives to pass the law.
5. Minimum (co)dimension
Here we point out the classes which are the minimum dimensionally and respectively
minimum codimensionally classes for simple games. They exist and moreover they
are unique.
Theorem 5. (i) The class, U1, of unitary games is dimensionally minimum.
(ii) The class, U2, of unanimity games is codimensionally minimum.
Proof of the theorem can be found in (Freixas and Marciniak, 2009).
The uniqueness of this class is shown in a following theorem.
Theorem 6. The set of all the unitary games or equivalently those which have
exactly one maximal losing coalition is the smallest set of games, with respect to
which every game has dimension.
Proof. We already know, from the previous theorem that it is a minimal one. Every
set of games for which the dimension of any games is ﬁnite has to contain all the
unitary games. Thus in fact the set of unitary games is the smallest one among the
sets of games, with respect to which the dimension of any simple game exists.
Corollary 2. From the above results the dual statement can be obtained: the set
of all games with exactly one minimal winning coalition (unanimity games) is the
smallest set of games, with respect to which the codimension of any game exists.
Proof. Let T be a class of games for which the codimT is ﬁnite for any simple game,
then T ∗ has the property that dimT ∗ is ﬁnite for any game, thus T ∗ contains the
class of unitary games, so T must contain dual of unitary games.
It is important to note the signiﬁcant role played by unanimity games in the
axiomatizations of several power indices. Indeed, Theorem 5-(ii) conﬁrms U2 to be
the minimum class for which simple games can be expressed as union of its elements.
The decomposition of a game as a union of unanimity games has been used in
some proofs for the most well–known power indices, among them, Shapley–Shubik,
Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan–Packel, Holler.
5.1. Some properties of unitary and unanimity games
We ﬁnally provide a coalitional property to test whether a given game is unitary
and do the same for unanimity games.
Let us consider two classes of simple games. A simple game W is primitive iﬀ
S ∈ W and S = S1 ∪ S2 then S1 or S2 belongs to W. A simple game W is smooth
iﬀ for all S,T ∈ W implies S ∩ T ∈ W.
Proposition 1. (i) A simple game is unitary if and only if it is primitive.
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Proof. (i)( ⇒) Assume that W is unitary, i.e. Wm is uniquely formed by singletons
(the winners of the game). Let S ∈ W and S = S1 ∪ S2. S ∈ W implies that
i ∈ S for a winner i, therefore either i ∈ S1 or i ∈ S2, and thus either S1 ∈ W
or S2 ∈ W which implies primitiveness.
(⇐) Assume that W is primitive but not unitary. Then there is a coalition S
in W m containing at least two players. Let S1   S and S2   S a partition of
S, i.e. S1 ∪S2 = S and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.A sS1 and S2 are losing coalitions we have
a contradiction with the hypothesis of primitiveness for the game.
(ii)( ⇒) Assume that W is unanimous, i.e Wm is formed by a single coalition R.L e t
S and T be two arbitrary winning coalitions, then there are minimal winning
coalitions R1 and R2 such that R1 ⊆ S and R2 ⊆ T.A sR is the unique element
in W m it yields R1 = R2 = R and, hence R ⊆ S ∩ T which implies that
S ∩ T ∈ W and so the game is smooth.
(⇐) Assume that W is smooth but not unanimous. Then W m contains at least
two minimal winning coalitions S and T with S ∩ T   S, S ∩ T   T. Hence,
S ∩ T/ ∈ W which is a contradiction with the assumption of smoothness.
6. Computational aspects of dimension and codimension
Unanimity games have a natural description – these are the games with unique
minimal winning coalitions. Dually the unitary games are precisely those which
has unique maximal losing coalition. The unanimity game which minimal winning
coalition is A will be denoted as  A  and the unitary game which maximal losing
coalition is A we will denote by  A .
Lemma 2. Let A ⊆ N.T h e n
dimU1 A  = |A|,c o d i m U2 A  = |N\A|
where U1 is the class of unitary games and U2 is the class of unanimity games.
Proof. For the dimension of  A  it is enough to see that
 A  =
 
a∈A
 N\{a}  (2)
A coalition W of the game  A  is winning if and only if A ⊆ W. W is winning in the
game  N\{a}  if and only if W   N\{a}.S oW is a winning coalition of the game  
a∈A N\{a}  if and only if ∀a∈AW   N\{a}, which holds if and only if A ⊆ W.
Thus the equality (2) holds. Moreover, none of the games  N\{a}  for a ∈ A can
be omitted. It follows that dimU1 A  = |A|. Using this result and Theorem 3 we
obtain that codimU2 A  = |N\A|. One just have to observe that  A  =  N\A ∗.
Proposition 2. Let G be a game such that codimU2G = k.L e t{A1,...,A k} be
the set of all minimal winning coalitions of G (G =  A1 ∩  A2 ∩···∩ Ak ). Let
A b eas u b s e to ft h es e to fp l a y e r s .T h e n
A is admissible if and only if ∀m∈{1,...,k}∃!a∈A a ∈ Am (3)
We claim that there is a 1-1 correspondence between admissible subsets and maximal
loosing coalitions of the game G given by {x1,x 2,...}  → N\{x1,x 2,...}.T h u sG
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Proof. All admissible subsets can be constructed in the following manner:
We choose a sequence of players with respect to the conditions:



































The sequence (x1,x 2,...) has at most k elements. Then the set {x1,x 2,...}
is an admissible subset.
O n ec a ne a s i l ys e et h a ti fA is admissible then any sequence made of its element
satisﬁes the conditions (5). Let us ﬁx an admissible subset A = {x1,x 2,...,x l}.
Then the coalition N\A is loosing. A coalition of G is loosing if and only if it
doesn’t contain any of the sets A1,A 2,...,A k. By the construction for each Am,m=
1,...,k there exists corresponding xim for some im ∈{ 1,2,...,l} such that xim ∈
Am and thus N\A do not contain Am as m was arbitrary N\A is a loosing coalition.
Now let us show that N\A is a maximal loosing coalition. It is so, because for
each set Am,m =1 ,...,l there exists exactly one element of A which belongs to
Am.
Clearly, if L is a maximal loosing coalition then N\L posses the above property
and thus it is deﬁned by an admissible subset. The equation (4) follows from the
fact that every game G is equal to the intersection of unitary games whose unique
maximal loosing coalition is a maximal loosing coalition of G.
Corollary 3. Let G be a game such that codimU2G = k then its U1 dimension is
equal to the number of admissible subsets of players and for small k it is given by
the formulas:
k =1dimU1G = |A1|
k =2dimU1G = |A1 ∩ A2| + |A1\A2|·| A2\A2|
k =3
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
dimU1G = |A1 ∩ A2 ∩ A3| + |A1 ∩ A2\A3|·| A3\(A1 ∪ A2)|
+ |A1 ∩ A3\A2|·| A2\(A1 ∪ A3)|
+ |A2 ∩ A3\A1|·| A1\(A2 ∪ A3)|
+ |A1\(A2 ∪ A3)|
+ |A2\(A1 ∪ A3)|
+ |A3\(A1 ∪ A2)|On the Notion of Dimension and Codimension of Simple Games 79
Proof. We already know that U2-codimension of a game is equal to the number of
maximal loosing coalitions. It remains to show the formulas, for k =1w ed i di ti n
lemma 2. For the case k =2a n dk = 3 it is straightforward using the characterisa-
tion of admissible subsets given in (3).
Corollary 4. Let G be a game of U1-dimension equal to k,a n dl e tA1,...,A k
denote the maximal loosing coalitions of G, i.e. G =
 k
i=1 Ai . Then the dual
game G∗ has U2-codimension equal to k. All its minimal winning coalitions are
N\A1,...,N\Ak.




And the above theorem provides a direct formula for the U2-codimension of a game
of a given U1-dimension. To obtain the formulas like in the preceding corollary one
just have to replace each Ai by its complement. Thus in particular admissible subsets
of G∗, or equivalently minimal winning coalitions of G, in this setting are the one
with respect to the condition:
A is admissible if and only if ∀m∈{1,...,k}∃!a∈A a/ ∈ Am (6)
Example 1. Let G be a game with three players {1,2,3}. Let the maximal loosing
coalitions be A1 = {1} and A2 = {2,3}. Then all its minimal winning coalitions are
{{1,3},{1,2}} and thus its U2-codimension is 2. It is easy to check that the given
formula for the U2-codimension gives the same result: A1 ∩ A2 = ∅ and thus the
formula reduces to dimU1G = |A1|·| A2| = 2. The admissible subsets of players are
{2,3} and {1}. In this example they are the same as maximal loosing coalitions,
this is just because this game has the property that a coalition is a maximal loosing
coalition if its complement is a maximal loosing coalition.
7. Conclusions
The notions of dimension and codimension introduced in this paper extend the clas-
sical notion of dimension for simple games. The paper proposes several subclasses of
simple games with associated dimension or codimension. The most relevant result
is the existence of a smallest subclass of games with dimension and the existence of
a smallest subclass of games with codimension. For these smallest classes we found
a closed formula to compute the dimension or codimension of a given simple game.
There is an analogy between dimension or codimension and basis of vector
spaces. In fact, a basis of a vector space is a maximal collection of linearly in-
dependent vectors. A class of simple games is a ‘basis’ with the intersection as a
basic operation iﬀ each game has dimension for this class and it is a maximal class
of games in which none of them is intersection of some other members of the fam-
ily (maximal independent set of games). We have proved that the class of unitary
games is a ‘basis’ (Theorem 5-(i)) and its constructive proof shows that the space
of all simple games with the intersection as operation has only one basis.A na n a l -
ogous reasoning follows for the class of unitary games with the union as operation.
Analogously, a class of simple games is a ‘basis’ with the union as a basic operation
iﬀ each game has codimension with for this class and it is a maximal class of games
in which none of them is union of some other members of the family (maximal80 Josep Freixas and Dorota Marciniak
independent set of games). We have proved that the class of unanimity games is a
‘basis’ (Theorem 5-(ii)) and its constructive proof shows that the space of all simple
games with the union as operation has only one basis.
Some hints for future research concern, for example, the classes of homoge-
neous games, complete (or linear) games or weakly linear games (introduced in
(Carreras and Freixas, 2008)). It becomes of interest to study whether there exist
a sequence of weighted games Gm with H1-dimension equal to m for all positive
integer m, and further, whether there exist a sequence of weighted games Gm with
exponential H1-dimension. It becomes of interest to investigate whether there exist
sequences of simple games Gm with L-dimension equal to m for all positive integer
m, and further, whether there exist sequences of simple games Gm with exponential
L-dimension. If the answers to the previous questions for complete games are aﬃr-
mative then we could think of similar questions for weakly linear games instead of
complete games. More general, which properties need to fulﬁll a proper subclass of
simple games, namely C, in such a way that the C-dimension of every simple game
is bounded above. Analogous questions may be asked for codimension.
It also deserves attention to extend the notions of dimension and codimension to
voting games with abstention see e.g. (Fishburn, 1973), (Rubenstein, 1980), (Felsen-
thal and Machover, 1997), (Tchantcho, et. al. 2008). Indeed, a general notion of
weighted voting system for voting systems with several alternatives in the input
and output has been developed in (Freixas and Zwicker, 2003).
References
Algaba, E., J.M. Bilbao, J.R. Fern´ andez, and J.J. L´ opez (2001). El ´ ındice de poder de
Banzhaf en la Uni´ on Europea ampliada. Q¨ uestii´ o, 25, 71–90.
Brams, S.J. and P.J. Aﬀuso (1976). Power and size: A new paradox. Theory and Decision,
7, 29–56.
Carreras, F. and J. Freixas (2004). A power analysis of linear games with consensus.
Mathematical Social Sciences, 48, 207–221.
Carreras, F. and J. Freixas (2008). On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by
regular semivalues. Mathematical Social Sciences, 55, 221–234.
De˘ ıneko V.G. and G.J. Woeginger (2006). On the dimension of simple monotonic games.
European Journal of Operational Research, 170, 315–318.
Dushnik B. and E.W. Miller (1941). Partially ordered sets. American Journal of Mathe-
matics, 63, 600–610.
Felsenthal D.S. and M. Machover (1997). Ternary voting games. International Journal of
Game Theory, 26, 335–351.
Fishburn P.C. (1973). The Theory of Social Choice. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Freixas J. (2004). The dimension for the European Union Council under the Nice rules.
European Journal of Operational Research, 156(2), 415–419.
Freixas, J., X. Molinero, M. Olsen, and M. Serna (2008). On the complexity of
problems on simple games. Technical report, archiv.org. Available online in:
http://arxiv.org/PScache/arxiv/pdf/0803/0803.0404v1.pdf.
Freixas, J. and D. Marciniak (2009). A minimum dimensional class of simple games TOP
An Oﬃcial Journal of Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research
Freixas, J. and M.A. Puente (2001). A note about games–composition dimension. Discrete
Applied Mathematics, 113, 265–273.
Freixas, J. and M.A. Puente (2008). Dimension of complete simple games with minimum.
European Journal of Operational Research, 188, 565–568.
Freixas, J. and W.S. Zwicker (2003). Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of
approval. Social Choice and Welfare, 21, 399–431.On the Notion of Dimension and Codimension of Simple Games 81
Isbell, J.R. (1956). A class of majority games. Quart. J. Math. Oxford Ser., 7(2), 183–187.
Isbell, J.R. (1958). A class of simple games. Duke Mathematics Journal, 25, 423–439.
Jereslow, R.G. (1975). On deﬁning sets of vertices of the hypercube by linear inequalities.
Discrete Mathematics, 11, 119–124.
Kilgour, D.M. (1983). A formal analysis of the amending formula of Canada’s Constitution
Act. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 16, 771–777.
Levesque, T.J. and D.M. Kilgour (1984). The Canadian constitutional amending formula:
Bargaining in the past and in the future. Public Choice, 44, 457–480.
Maschler, M., and B. Peleg (1966). A characterization, existence proof, and dimension
bounds for the kernel of a game. Paciﬁc Journal of Mathematics, 18, 289–328.
Peleg, B. (1992). Voting by count and account. In R. Selten, editor, Rational Interaction,
pages 45–52. Springer-Verlag.
Ramamurthy, K.G. (1990). Coherent structures and simple games. Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Rubenstein A. (1980). Stability of decision systems under majority rule. em Journal of
Economic Theory, 23, 150–159.
Shapley, L.S. (1962). Compound simple games I: Solutions of sums and products, RM–
3192. The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA.
Taylor, A.D. (1995). Mathematics and Politics. Springer Verlag, New York, USA.
Taylor, A.D. and W.S. Zwicker (1993). Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and
power. em Games and Economic Behavior, 5, 170–181.
Taylor, A.D. and W.S. Zwicker (1995). Simple games and magic squares. Journal of com-
binatorial theory, ser. A, 71, 67–88.
Taylor, A.D. and W.S. Zwicker (1999). Simple games: desirability relations, trading, and
pseudoweightings. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, USA.
Tchantcho, B., L. Diﬀo Lambo, R. Pongou, and B. Mbama Engoulou (2008). Voters’ power
in voting games with abstention: Inﬂuence relation and ordinal equivalence of power
theories. Games and Economic Behavior, 64, 335–350.Detection of Paradoxes of Power Indices for Simple Games 
Josep Freixas1,2 and Xavier Molinero1,3
1 Technical University of Catalonia (Campus Manresa); E-08242 Manresa, Spain
2 Department of Applied Mathematics 3. E-mail: josep.freixas@upc.edu
3 Department of Computer Science. E-mail: molinero@lsi.upc.edu
Abstract Within the context of weighted simple games, we consider some
well–known postulates -relative normalized measures- for relative power in-
dices. We essentially refer to the postulates: of monotonicity, donation and
bloc; and to the power indices by: Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan-Packel and
Holler. We do not consider the Shapley–Shubik index because satisﬁes all
these three postulates.
If a power index fails to satisfy one of the above postulates then the phenom-
ena is regarded to be paradoxical. This work considers the paradoxes that
arise from considering a particular postulate and a particular power index.
The question that naturally appears for each simple voting game and pair,
postulate & power index, is: how frequently does the paradox arise?
We develop some theoretical methods and experimental results to partially
answer the above question.
Keywords: Power indices, paradoxes, counting.
AMS 2000 Mathematics Subject Classiﬁcation: 91A12, 91A40, 91A80,
91B12.
1. Introduction
The purpose of this work is to identify whether a particular powe index satisﬁes
or not a certain postulate for a given game. We restrict our attention to some few
postulates: monotonicity, donation and bloc; and to some of the most well-known
power indices: Shapley–Shubik, Banzhaf, Johnston, Deegan–Packel and Holler.
For small values of the number of voters we do an exhaustive enumeration of
the occurrence/failure of each postulate for each power index.
It is known that the Shapley–Shubik index satisﬁes the three postulates, see
e.g. (Felsenthal and Machover, 1995). The Banzhaf and Johnston indices satisfy
the monotonicity postulate, whereas they violate the donation and bloc postulates.
Finally, the Deegan–Packel and Holler indices violate these three postulates.
We develop some theoretical methods and some experimental results to partially
answer the above question. Our experimental analysis give us some kind of evidence
on whether these postulate failures are simply occasional facts or can be regarded as
paradoxical phenomenons or, on the contrary, they frequently appear. In the latter
  This work was supported by the Grant MTM 2006–06064 of “Ministerio de Educaci´ on
y Ciencia y el Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional”, the Spanish “Ministerio de Ed-
ucaci´ on y Ciencia” programme TIN2006-11345 (ALINEX), the Grant MTM2009-08037
from the Spanish Science and Innovation Ministry, the SGRC 2005-00651, 2009-1029,
2005-00516 and 2009-1137 of “Generalitat de Catalunya”, and the Grant 9-INCREC-
11 of ”(PRE/756/2008) Ajuts a la iniciaci´ o/reincorporaci´ o a la recerca (Universitat
Polit` ecnica de Catalunya)”.Detection of Paradoxes of Power Indices for Simple Games 83
case we claim that the term ‘paradoxical’ for the failure of these properties is rather
inappropriate.
After some preliminaries we are going to recall, in Section 2, some postulates.
Section 3 brieﬂy recites some power indices. Afterwards, in Section 4, theoretical
and experimental results appear. The conclusions will ﬁnish this work.
1.1. Preliminaries
A simple voting game (abbreviated SVG) is a collection W of ﬁnite sets satisfying
the following conditions:
(i) W has a largest member, N = {1,2,...,n}, which includes all members of W.
Thus, N ∈W ;a n dS ⊆ N for all S ∈W.M o r e o v e r ,∅ / ∈W .
(ii) Whenever S ⊆ T ⊆ N and S ∈Wthen also T ∈W .
We shall refer to N, the largest set in W, as the latter’s assembly.T h em e m b e r s
of N are the voters for W. A set of voters (that is, a subset of N) is called a
coalition.A n ym e m b e ro fW is called a winning coalition. If S ⊆ N but S/ ∈W ,
then S is called a losing coalition. A winning coalition is minimal if it has no a
proper winning subset. Minimal winning coalitions completely determine the game,
so that the set of minimal winning coalitions, denoted by Wm is enough to fully
describe the game. A voter i is null if i/ ∈ S for every S ∈W m.T h edual game W∗
of a game W is W∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \ S/ ∈W } .T h ecardinal of a set of voters S is
denoted by |S|.
An SVG is proper (PSVG in short) whenever S ∈Wand T ∈Wthen S∩T  = ∅.
If the game is improper then two mutually contradictory decisions could be made
simultaneously.
An SVG is a weighted voting game (abbreviated WSVG) if it is possible to assign
for each i ∈ N a non–negative real number wi as weight, and ﬁxing as quota ar e a l
positive number such that
W = {S ⊆ N : w(S) ≥ q}
where w(S)=
 





if the vector of weights w =( w1,w 2,...,w n) is given. Note that two diﬀerent
WSVG can represent the same SVG. Moreover, the dual of a weighted game is
also a weighted game which admits representation [T −q+1;w1,w 2,...,w n]w h e r e
T = w(N).
2. Postulates
In this work we consider measures of a priori relative voting power for any SVG. For
any voter i ∈ N, we consider a numerical measure Ki(W), of the power to inﬂuence
a decision made by the assembly N of W. Also, the measure should be relative,i n
the sense that Ki(W) should measure what share of the total power of the assembly
is held by i as compared to all the other voters.84 Josep Freixas, Xavier Molinero
There are four postulates or axioms which seem unescapable for any reasonable
power index. Although one may deﬁne inescapable properties aﬀecting two or more
SVGs we are conﬁned in this work to properties involving only a single SVG. These
properties are common internal properties according to (Freixas and Gambarelli,
1997). Furthermore, we also brieﬂy sumarize four properties for power indices that
will be introduced at the beginnig of Section 4..
Now, we sketch the three postulates that we will develop in this work. The
interested reader can ﬁnd more details in (Felsenthal and Machover, 1995).
2.1. Monotonicity Postulate
Consider an arbitrary representation for a WVG, [q;w1,...,w n]. It seems intuitively
obvious that wi ≤ wj then voter j has at least as much voting power as voter i,
because any contribution that i can make to the passage of a resolution can be
equalled or bettered by j. This suggests that any reasonable power index K should
be required to satisfy the following condition. If
W =[ q;w1,...,w n]a n dwi ≤ wj then Ki(W) ≤ Kj(W). (1)
which is known as the monotonicity postulate.
2.2. Donation Postulate
Schotter presents and discusses cases of WVGs in which “it is possible to decrease a
voter’s voting weight within a voting body and [at the same time] increase his/her
power”. This phenomenon has been regarded paradoxical; indeed, Fisher and Schot-
ter (1978) termed it the paradox of redistribution. To deﬁne the phenomenon for-
mally, consider a pair of WVGs W and W , having the same [number of] voters,
the same q and the same total weight:










In the conﬁguration (2), a voter i for which wi >w  
i is called a donor and a voter
i for which wi <w  
i is called a recipient. Intuitively, the idea is that W represents the
initial distribution of weights and W  arises from it by redistribution , the donor(s)
‘donating’ some weight to the recipients(s); so each donor loses weight and each
recipient gains some, while the total weight is unchanged. If there are more than
one donor it is not surprising that a voter gains power by giving weight. However,
if there is a sole donor it seems quite unacceptable that the donor gains power.
If K is any power index, we say that K satisﬁes the donation postulate if in the




On the contrary, if K is any power index, we say that K displays the redistribution
paradox in the conﬁguration (2), if there is a sole donor i for which Ki(W) <K  
i(W).
2.3. Bloc Postulate
Let W be an SVG with assembly N and let i and j be distinct voters of W.T a k i n g
i&j to be a new entity, not belonging to N, deﬁne W[i&j] as the collection of all
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(i) S ⊆ N \{ i,j} and S ∈W;
(ii) S = T ∪{ i&j} for some T such that T ⊆ N \{ i,j} and T ∪{ i,j}∈W.
How should the relative power of the bloc i&j in the new SVG compare with
the relative powers of the two components i and j in the original SVG?
For the sake of brevity, let us write K for K(W)a n dKi&j[i&j]f o rK(W[i&j]).
At ﬁrst sight it may perhaps seem reasonable to assume that, bloc postulate,i fi and
j are two voters in an SVG, W and j is not null then
Ki&j[i&j] ≥ Ki (4)
What is the justiﬁcation of this postulate? The bloc i&j may be regarded as a result
of a voluntary merger between voters i and j. But it can equally be regarded as a
result of a takeover, in which i, having annexed j’s voting rights, now trades under
the new name i&j. The assumption that voter i must gain power by ‘swallowing’
in this way another voter j who is not a dummy seems to us intuitively compelling.
A voluntary merger will take place only if as a result of it both parties are at least
as well oﬀ as they were before. This would lead to the condition of supperadditivity
–which does not always hold, nor should be expected to. A takeover, however, need
not be beneﬁcial to both parties but only to the one instigating it. Intuitively, it
seems to us inconceivable that a voter should not ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to annex the
voting rights of another voter who is not null. Postulate (4) is a formal statement
of this intuition.
3. Power indices
Now we are going to describe the indices dealt in this work: Banzhaf, Johnston,
Deegan-Packel and Holler. As we have said before, we omit the Shapley–Shubik
index because satisﬁes all considered postulates.
3.1. Banzhaf index
Consider a given SVG W.T h eBanzhaf score of voter i in W is
ηi(W)= |{ S ⊆ N : S ∈Wand S \{ i} / ∈W }|.
Equivalently, ηi(W) could be deﬁned as
|{ S ⊆ N : S/ ∈Wand S \{ i}∈W}|.
The [relative] Banzhaf index, brieﬂy Bz index, (Banzhaf, 1965), Bzi(W)o fv o t e r
i in W is deﬁned in such a way that the Bzi(W) are proportional to the ηi(W)a n d






The denominator in (5) depends not only on n but on the whole of W. It turns out
that this makes the relative Bz index rather diﬃcult to handle mathematically.86 Josep Freixas, Xavier Molinero
3.2. Deegan and Packel index
Deegan and Packel (1979) base their index, DP index, on three assumptions. First,
that because every winning coalition expects to obtain the same (ﬁxed) payoﬀ as
any other, only minimal winning coalitions will actually be formed. Second, that
all minimal winning coalitions have equal probability of forming. Third, that the
minimal winning coalition formed will divide the payoﬀ equally among its members.
These authors then assign to each voter power proportional to the voter’s expected
payoﬀ, subject to the three assumptions. In order to state this deﬁnition more
formally, we consider Wm and put
hi(Wm)={S ∈W m : i ∈ S},
Thus, hi(W) is the family of minimal winning coalitions to which voter i belongs.









Thus to obtain DPi(W) we take the reciprocal of the number of members of each
minimal winning coalition to which i belongs, add up these reciprocals and divide
the sum by the number of all minimal winning coalitions. It is easy to show that
the DP index is normalized.
3.3. Holler or Public Good index
The public good index (Holler, 1982) by Holler, also called the Holler index (Ho
index, in short), is based on the fact that only minimal winning coalitions are







Recall ﬁrst that a player i is pivotal in coalition S ∈Wif i ∈ S and S \{ i} / ∈W .
Johnston, (1978), introduces what he calls a ‘slight’ alteration of the Bz index. The
alteration consists in modifying the deﬁnition of the score of voter i so that instead
of i gaining one point from each coalition S in which i is pivotal, i now gains only
1/pth of a point, where p is the number of voters who are pivotal in S.T h u st h e
Johnston index, brieﬂy Jn index, is formally a sort of hybrid between the Bz and
DP indices.
Let us therefore put, for each coalition S of W,
p(S) = the number of voters who are pivotal in S.
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4. Our Theoretical and Experimental Results
In general all relative power index assigns a numerical measure Ki[W] to each voter
i ∈ N and game (N,W) fulﬁlling the following minimum requirements:
– Ki[W] ≥ 0( positivity postulate)
–
 
i∈N Ki[W]=1 ( normalization postulate)
– Ki[W]=Kf(i)[W]( invariance under automorphisms)
– Ki[W]=0i fi is null (null postulate)
Assuming these requirements, consider the well–known relative power indices
already introduced in the previous section:
– The Shapley–Shubik index, (Shapley and Shubik, 1954)
– The Banzhaf index, ([Banzhaf, 1965)
– The Deegan–Packel index, (Deegan and Packel, 1979)
– The Johnston index, (Johnston, 1978)
– The Public Good or Holler index, (Holler, 1982)
Note that here we will only consider the last four power indices.
4.1. Donation paradox for weighted games vs. power indices
Deﬁnition 1 (Felsenthal and Machover, 1995). If Ψ is any relative power
index, Ψ is said to display the donation paradox if there is a voter i who is a sole
donor (wi >w  
i) while Ψi[q;w] <Ψ i[q;w ].
If the index in question is regarded as a valid measure of relative voting power,
then we have an acutely paradoxical situation, in which a voter gains power purely
as a direct result of his/her own donation. For instance, given the weighted game
represented by
[q;w] ≡ [8;5,3,1,1,1],
then voter 1 gains Bz power if he/she makes a donation to voter 2:










To check whether a weighted game W≡[q;w1,...,w n] displays the donation
paradox, we need to consider the following two parameters:
a(W)= m i n
S∈W
1∈S,2/ ∈S




where it is clear that a(W) ≥ q>b (W) for all game W.
Deﬁnition 2. We deﬁne W is separated from above if q>(a(W)+b(W))/2a n d
W is separated from below otherwise.
The following useful result allows to shorten the computational process whenever
the power index K satisﬁes Ki(W)=Ki(W∗), i.e. it is invariant for the dual game.88 Josep Freixas, Xavier Molinero
Theorem 1. For a given power index invanriant by duality and a pair of voters,
a weighted game displays the donation paradox from above if and only if the dual
weighted game displays the donation paradox from below.
Thus, we will apply Theorem 1 to the Bz index since it is invanriant for the
dual game, i.e. Bzi(W)=Bzi(W∗)f o ri ∈ N and any simple game W. To compute
how many (proper) weighted games with n voters veriﬁes the donation paradox for
the Bz index, we generate their minimal integer representations with n voters (see
(Freixas and Molinero, 2009; Muroga et al., 1962) for more details). Then for each
minimal integer representation
W =[ q;w1,...,w n]
we check the following steps while the chosen index will not produce a failure:






















2. If the donation paradox is not displayed for a weighted game separated from
above, then we check whether the donation paradoxof the dual game is displayed
from above. If the answer is aﬃrmative then the donation paradox of the original
weighted game is displayed from below (Theorem 1).
3. To repeat the previous steps applying −δ to +δ for any pair of voters.
The described process is a bit diﬀerent for the indices which are not invanriant
by duality, which is the case of: the DP, Ho and Jn indices. To compute how many
(proper) weighted games with n voters veriﬁes the donation paradox for either DP,
Ho or Jn indices, we again generate all minimal integer representations with n
voters, and then for each minimal integer representation
u =[ q;w1,...,w n]
we check the following steps while the power index (either DP, Ho or Jn) will not
be a failure:


















2. If the donation paradox is not displayed for a weighted game separated from
above, then we check whether it is displayed from bellow by considering [q −
1
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n 123 4 5 6 7
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
DBz 0 0 0 0 6 50 2102
D R B z 000 00 .051 0.045 0.072
PWG 1 2 5 14 62 566 14754
PDBz 0 0 0 0 3 25 1051
P D R B z000 00 .048 0.044 0.071
n 1 23456 7
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
DHo 0 0 1 9 76 980 28808
DRHo 0 0 0.125 0.360 0.650 0.882 0.981
PWG 1 2 5 14 62 566 14754
PDHo 0 0 0 4 35 479 14354
PDRHo 0 0 0 0.286 0.565 0.846 0.973
Table1. Number of non-isomorphic Weighted Games (WG) displaying the donation (D)
paradox for Banzhaf (Bz) and Holler (Ho) indices and theirs ratios (R), where the ratio is
the proportion of WGs such that the paradox occurs for a given number of players. Similar
data for Proper (P) games also appear.
3. To repeat the previous steps applying −δ to +δ for any two voters.
The exhaustive and experimental data obtained for Banzhaf and Holler indices
displaying the donation (D) paradox with less than 8 voters appear in Table 1.
Similar experiments have also been done for Deegan–Packeland Johnston indices
displaying the donation paradox.
4.2. Bloc paradox for weighted games vs. power indices
Using similar strategies as before we present here the experimental data for the Bz
and Ho indices displaying the bloc (B) paradox: See Table 2.
n 123 4 5 6 7
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
BBz 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
BRBz 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0006
PWG 1 2 5 14 62 566 14754
PBBz 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
P B R B z000 0 0 00 .0006
n 123 4 5 6 7
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
BHo 0 0 0 1 7 82 1023
B R H o 0000 .04 0.06 0.074 0.035
PWG 1 2 5 14 62 566 14754
P B H o 0 0 00 23 4 4 9 6
P B R H o000 00 .032 0.060 0.034
Table2. Number of non-isomorphic Weighted Games (WG) displaying the bloc (B) para-
dox for Banzhaf (Bz) and Holler (Ho) indices and theirs ratios (R), where the ratio is the
proportion of WGs such that the paradox occurs for a given number of players. Similar
data for Proper (P) games also appear.
As before, experiments for Deegan–Packel and Johnston indices displaying the
bloc paradox were also computed.
4.3. Monotonicity paradox for weighted games vs. power indices
Banzhaf and Johnston indices fullﬁll the monotonicity postulate, but Deegan–Packel
and Holler not. The experimental data for the Holler index displaying the mono-
tonicity (M) paradox appears in Table 3.
5. Conclusion
It is known that the Shapley–Shubik index satisﬁes the three postulates: donation
(1), dominance (3) and bloc (4) postulates. The Banzhaf and Johnston indices
display (1), whereas violate (3) and (4). Finally, the Deegan–Packel and Holler
indices violate these three intuitive postulates.90 Josep Freixas, Xavier Molinero
n 1 2 3 456 7
WG 1 3 8 25 117 1111 29373
MHo 0 0 0 2 29 524 20393
M R H o 0000 .08 0.248 0.472 0.694
PWG 1 2 5 14 62 566 14754
PMHo 0 0 0 0 9 197 8712
P M R H o000 00 .145 0.348 0.590
Table3. Number of non-isomorphic Weighted Games (WG) displaying the monotonicity
(M) paradox for the Holler (Ho) index and theirs ratios (R), where the ratio is the pro-
portion of WGs such that the paradox occurs for a given number of players. Similar data
for Proper (P) games also appear.
In summary, we have considered violations of three intuitive postulates (mono-
tonicity, donation and bloc), for the Banzhaf, Deegan–Packel, Johnston and Holler
indices. We have checked that these failures are not isolated facts due to some
particularities of the voting system at hand. Given an arbitrary game, one should
conceive these failures as the ”normal” behavior rather than as an exceptional fact.
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Abstract Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a
homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this
paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg
model for a general hierarchical structures composed by ﬁrms arranged into
groups of diﬀerent hierarchical levels and to ﬁnd optimal tax rate for this
model.
1. Introduction
Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous prod-
uct were studied by researchers extensively. Mainly two type of the models were
considered. One is a hierarchical Stackelberg game in which each ﬁrm chooses its
output at a stage sequentially. This is formulated as a multi-stage game. The other is
a standard two stage game in which multiple leaders choose outputs simultaneously
and independently at ﬁrst, and multiple followers decide outputs simultaneously
and independently later, given the leader’s total output.
Several researchers have tackeled to investigate the existence and uniqueness of
the hierarchical Stackelberg equilibrium. Under linear demand and cost functions
Boyer and Moreax (1986), and Vives (1988) showed the existence of the unique
Stackelberg equilibrium of the hierarchical Stackelberg game by directly computing
its solution. Robson (1990) established the existence of the Stackelberg equilibrium
under general conditions of demand and cost functions. For the Stackelberg models
with many leaders and followers researchers tackled questions concerning the ex-
istence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In duopoly case, Okamura,
Futagarni, and Ohkawa (1998) proved that there exists a unique Stackelberg equi-
librium under general demand and cost functions. The convexity of the follower’s
reaction function is essential for uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium. In cases
of a single leader and multiple followers. Sherall, Soyster and Murphy (1983) showed
the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium under general demand
and cost functions, and also that convexity of the reaction function of the follower’s
total output with respect to the leader’s output is crucial for the uniqueness of the
Stackelberg equilibrium.
This paper aims to obtain generalization of closed form solution for a general
hierarchical structure of ﬁrms arranged by leaderships into groups which can be
modelled by multi-stage game with perfect information in which sequentially level
by level multiple players (ﬁrms) of each level choose outputs simultaneously and
independently, and multiple followers (ﬁrms) of the next (lower) level of hierarchical
structure decide outputs simultaneously and independently later, given the players’s
of the higher level their total output, and then after all these sequential setting the
ﬁrms of the highest level assigns simultaneously their outputs. After this will extend
received result on diﬀerent tax rates and ﬁnd out what tax is preferable.92 Alexsandr Galegov, Andrey Garnaev
It is worthto note that in the modern marketa lot of hierarchicalstructures arise.
For example, market of operation systems is split mainly between Windows (67.1%)
and Linux (22.8%) meanwhile all the rest operations system takes together 10.1%
of the market. So, in the operation systems markets presets three level hierarchical
structure where the ﬁrst and second levels are occupied by one OS (Windows and
Linux) each meanwhile the third one is shared by all the rest OS. The world market
of tobacco (except China) is split into four levels. The ﬁrst level is shared by Altria
(28%) and British American Tobacco (25%). Japan Tobacco holds the second one
(16%). The third level is split among Imperial Tobacco (6%) and Altadis (3%). All
the rest equal competitors share the forth level.
When one deals with such hierarchical structures as a a ﬁrst approximation one
could consider the produced product as a homogeneous one. Of course, products
sold in both mentioned markets are diﬀerentiated. Sure, the importance of product
diﬀerentiation is underscored by smokers brand loyalty in the market for tobacco
products and by positive network externalities (stemming from the need of com-
patibility of an application software with an operating system) in the market for
operating systems. But as a ﬁrst and very rough approximation under very strong
assumption about homogeneous nature of the products these markets could be de-
scribed in frame of Cournot and Stackelberg models. When one starts studying
Cournot model even for two ﬁrms presented on a market - the ﬁrst two usual ques-
tions one has to answer are to ﬁnd Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg equilibria and
compare them (Gibbons, 1992).
The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the
Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by ﬁrms arranged
into groups of diﬀerent hierarchical levels acting sequentially level by level and
simultaneously inside of a level and to ﬁnd optimal tax rate for this model.
2. Cournot model
In Cournot model of oligopoly there are M ﬁrms producing the same good. Each
ﬁrm i, i ∈{ 1,...M} has a constant marginal cost of production ci.E a c hﬁ r m
simultaneously and independently sets the quantity qi of the good its is going to
produce. Am inverse aggregate demand function of p(q)=m a x {A − q,0},w h e r e
q = q1 + ...+ qM, is given. Then, the payoﬀ to ﬁrm i (i ∈{ 1,...,M})i sg i v e na s
follows
Πi(q1,...,q M)=( A −
M  
j=1
qj)qi − ciqi. (1)
Then the following result is a well known (see, for example (1) and we produce it
here only for convenience of readers.
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For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈{ 1,...,M} the equilibrium strate-
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Of course, in Theorem 1 we deal only with conception of interior solution which
exists under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi




cj ≥ Mci for i ∈{ 1,...,M}.
3. Tax extension of Cournout model
In this section we will consider the inﬂuence of tax systems used in Russian Federa-
tion (Vasin and Morozov, 2005) under condition that ﬁrms produce the same good.
Videlicet, we will consider total revenue tax, pure proﬁt, excise tax and VAT. In
Cournout model proﬁt function Πi of ﬁrm i will be given as follows:








⎠qi − ciqi,i ∈{ 1,...,M}, (3)









⎠qi − ciqi,i ∈{ 1,...,M}, (4)
where t –e x c i s et a xr a t e .
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⎠qi − ciqi,i ∈{ 1,...,M}, (6)
where βn =1− Tn,a n dTn –V A Tt a xr a t e ,cz - cost of purchased products and ci
–o w nﬁ r m sc o s t .
Following theorem will generalize theorem 1 on case of payment mentioned above
taxes.
Theorem 2. In case of taxation the Cournot model the equilibrium strategies are
given as follows
(a) Total revenue tax:
qi =
βtA + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
βt(M +1 )





βtA + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
 2










A − t + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
M +1





A − t + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
 2





M(A − t) − ¯ C
M +1
.
(c) Pure proﬁt tax:
qi =
A + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
M +1






A + ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
 2
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(d) VAT:
qi =
βn(A − cz)+ ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
βn(M +1 )





βn(A − cz)+ ¯ C − (M +1 ) ci
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In this section we consider the strong linear hierarchical structure model Leader-
Follower where the number of levels coincides with number of ﬁrms. This kind of
Stackelberg model can be solved in the sense the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Without loss of generality we can assume that the ﬁrst level leader is ﬁrm 1, the
second level leader is ﬁrm 2 and so on. Thus, ﬁrm M is lowest ﬁrm in the hierarchical
structure. The game is played in M stages. On the ﬁrst stage ﬁrm M chooses its
strategy to maximize ΠM assuming that all others strategies are ﬁxed. So, the ﬁrm
sets up its strategy as a root of the equation ∂ΠM/∂qM =0w h e r e
ΠM =( A −
M  
j=1















So, after substituting qM into (1) for i ∈{ 1,...,M −1} we obtain that the payoﬀ to

















qi,i ∈{ 1,...,M − 1}. (12)
On the second stage ﬁrm M − 1 chooses its strategy as a root of the equation














After substituting qM−1 into (12) for i ∈{ 1,...,M − 2} we obtain that the payoﬀ































(4cM−2 − 2cM−1 − cM).
a n ds oo n .T h e n ,s t e pb ys t e pﬁ r mM − k, k ∈{ 1,...M − 2} recursively sets its

















































and so, moving backward we have that on the level i, k ∈{ 1,...,M} the ﬁrm have











Thus, we proved the following result:























for i ∈{ 1,...,M}.















Of course, in Theorem 3 we deal only with conception of interior solution which
exists under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi
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It is clear that a ﬁrm increases own production if production cost of its rival is
increasing and it reduces own production if its own production cost arises. Namely,
qi is increasing on each cj where j  = i and qi is decreasing on each ci.
For a particular case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈{ 1,...,M} from Theo-
rem 3 we have the following result.
Theorem 4. For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈{ 1,...,M} the
equilibrium strategies are given as follows
qi =
1




2M+i(A − c)2,i ∈{ 1,...,M}.
Aggregate output is given by
M  
i=1







If the number of ﬁrms with equal production cost c increases then the aggregate
output tends to A − c.
5. General case
As a general case we consider a hierarchicalstructure composed by M ﬁrms arranged
into N groups of ﬁrms Γ1,...ΓN of diﬀerent hierarchical level such that the groups
Γi composes ith level and consists of Mi ﬁrms. Let ¯ Γi = ∪i
j=1Γi, i ∈{ 1,...N}
and ¯ Mi =
 i
j=1 Mi is the number of ﬁrms which are in levels from 1 to i.T h e n









⎠qi − ciqi,i ∈ ¯ ΓN. (14)
Let start stage by stage, level by level from the level N (ﬁrst stage) which is the
lowest one and it is composed by ﬁrms of group ΓN.S i n c e∂2Πi/∂q2
i = −2t h e s e
ﬁrms set up their strategies as a solution of the system of equations ∂Πi/∂qi =0 ,
i ∈ ΓN or
−2qi + A −
 
j∈ ¯ ΓN\{i}
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So, after substituting (15) into (14) for i ∈ ¯ ΓN−1 we obtain that the payoﬀ to ﬁrm

















qi,i ∈ ¯ ΓN−1. (16)
Pass on to the next level (the second stage), namely, to level N − 1c o m p o s e db y
ﬁrms from group ΓN−1.S i n c e∂2Πi/∂q2
i = −2/(MN + 1) these ﬁrms set up their
strategies as a solution of the system of equations ∂Πi/∂qi =0,i ∈ ΓN−1 where
Πi are given by (16). Then
−2qi + A −
 
j∈ ¯ ΓN−1\{i}




















N ¯ CN−1 − ¯ CN
 











s =1f o rs>r .
Thus, substituting qi from (17) into (16) we obtain the payoﬀs of the ﬁrms from





















N ¯ CN−1 + ¯ CN
 
 
qi,i ∈ ¯ ΓN−2.
N o w ,l e tu sp a s so nt ot h el e v e lM − k composed by ﬁrms of group ΓN−k.S i n c e
∂2Πi/∂q2
i = −2/PN
N−1 these ﬁrms set up their strategies as a solution of the system














































⎠qi for i ∈ ΓN−k−1.
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Thus, we proved the following result
Theorem 5. In the Stackelberg model with N groups of ﬁrms the equilibrium strate-










j+1 ¯ Cj − P N
1 ci
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Of course, in Theorem 5 we deal only with conception of interior solution which
exists under assumption that the parameters of the model are such that all the qi






j+1 ¯ Cj ≥ P
N
1 ci for i ∈ Γk,k ∈{ 1,...,N}.
For a particular case with equal marginal cost ci = c, i ∈{ 1,...,M} from Theorem 3
we have the following result.
Theorem 6. For the case with equal production cost ci = c, i ∈{ 1,...,M} in

























6. Tax extension of Stackelberg model
In this section we consider inﬂuence of tax systems used in Russian Federation
(Vasin and Morozov, 2005) on Stackelberg equilibrium. Proﬁt functions will be the
same with proﬁt functions from section 3.
Following theorem will generalize theorem 5 on case of taxes payment.
Theorem 7. For tax extension of Stackelberg model with N groups equilibrium
strategies are given as follows:
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7. Conclusions
In this work we considered the hierarchical structures in general form in the frame of
Cournout-Stackelberg model and constructed the optimal strategies in closed form.
We can apply this closed form solutions to estimate which impact they produce on
the market. As a criteria of such impact we can consider the market price joint p or
the quantity of the goods (Q = A − p) produced by all the ﬁrms. Then Q is given
as follows:






















(c) In the general case where the hierarchical structure is composed by M ﬁrms

















(d) In the general case with total revenue tax where the hierarchical structure is
















(e) In the general case with excise tax where the hierarchical structure is composed
















(f) In the general case with pure proﬁt tax where the hierarchical structure is
















(g) In the general case with VAT where the hierarchical structure is composed by
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We would like to mention that only pure proﬁt tax does not reduce the ﬁrms
output and does not increase price of the product, which is optimal for customers.
For example if there are three ﬁrms (M = 3) with marginal cost of production
ci, i =1 ,2,3 equals 1, 2 and 3, A = 10, cz =0 .5a n dt =0 .4. Also lets consider
tax rates from Russian Federation: βp =1− 0.15 = 0.85, βt =1− 0.06 = 0.94
and βn =1− 0.18 = 0.82, Then, Q{1,2,3} =6 ,Q{1,2},{3} =6 .833, Q{1},{2,3} =7
and Q{1},{2},{3} =7 .375 and the market prices are p{1,2,3} =4 ,Q{1,2},{3} =3 .167,
p{1},{2,3} =3a n dp{1},{2},{3} =2 .625. In this case we see that most preferable
for customers is case with 1 ﬁrm at each hierarchy level, because in this case we
have maximal total output. Lets consider taxation:: (a) Q{1},{2},{3} =7 .2872 and
p{1},{2},{3} =2 .7128 for total revenue tax, (b) Q{1},{2},{3} =7 .375 and p{1},{2},{3} =
2.625 for pure proﬁt tax, (c) Q{1},{2},{3} =7 .025 and p{1},{2},{3} =2 .975 for excise
tax, (d) Q{1},{2},{3} =6 .6357 and p{1},{2},{3} =3 .3644 for VAT.
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Abstract We study one-way ﬂow dynamic network formation games with
ﬁxed coalition partition via deﬁning coalition-homogeneous costs. Networks
are formed by allowing each agent to take local actions, and his principle
is to maximize the payoﬀ of his own coalition. We choose B&G function as
agents’ basic payoﬀ function which induces coalition-agents’ B&G function.
Under the new principle we provide the theorem of the existence of local
Nash network and the theorem of the architecture of local Nash network
and its dynamic formation process.
Keywords: network formation games, coalition-homogeneous cost, local
Nash networks, coalition-agent.
1. Introduction
Social and economic networks play an important role in modern society. In these
networks, agents are connected via certain relationship, such as friendship or trading
relationship. Each node in these networks represents an agent (an individual or an
organization), they beneﬁt from the links.
Bala and Goyal (2000a) discuss the non-cooperative model of network formation
games, and they describe the existence of strict Nash networks where the beneﬁts
and connection costs are homogeneous respectively. Jean Derks (2008) study non-
cooperative one-way ﬂow dynamic network formation games, and show that the
dynamic process of iterated local actions convergeswith probability 1 to a local-Nash
network, which is also a global-Nash networks. Jean Derks (2009a) also study cost
homogeneity and beneﬁt heterogeneity models of one-way ﬂow network formation
games, and ﬁnd an example that Nash networks may not exist. Jean Derks (2008)
and Billand study the existence of Nash networks of cost homogeneity and beneﬁt
heterogeneity models. Bala and Goyal (2000a, 2000b), Galeotti etc. (2006) and
Haller and Sarangi (2005) establish and study other network formation models,
such as two-way ﬂow model, where proﬁts can ﬂow in both directions of a link.
Galeotti (2006) study the characteristics of Nash networks of costs heterogeneity
and beneﬁts heterogeneity models, and the existence of the model where the society
is composed of distinct groups. But they focus on that agents maximize the payoﬀ
  This work was partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
(Grant No.70571040, 70871064), the International (Regional) Joint Research Program
of NSFC (Grant No.70711120204) and the Innovation Project of Graduate Education
in Shandong Province (Grant No.SDYC08045).One-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 105
of themselves (i.e. non-cooperation), do not consider existence and characteristics
of Nash networks of models with coalitions.
In this paper, we study the dynamic formation process of one-way ﬂow network
games with ﬁxed coalition partition, where the links between the agents are directed
and therefore depicted as arcs. The direction of the arcs corresponds to the ﬂow of
proﬁts, i.e., a link between agent i and j which points at i means that i receives
proﬁts from being connected to j. Each agent can only form links pointing at him.
All formed links together deﬁne the outcome network. We deﬁne the payoﬀ function
of each agent in the given network. A network is called a Nash network, if no agent
can gain a higher (strict higher) payoﬀ by deviating from his set of formed links.
We study non-cooperative one-way ﬂow network formation games. Given a par-
tition of the set of agents, the agents only need to pay less for the links within the
same coalition, and the principle of their actions is to maximize the payoﬀ of the
coalition they belong to.
2. Model and notations
2.1. Network
Deﬁnition 1. Let N = {1,...,n} denote a ﬁnite set of agents. Given a partition
of set N, ∆= {P1,...,P m},w h e r em ≤| N|,P r
 
Ps = ∅,1 ≤ r,s ≤ n,r  = s,a n d
m  
k=1
Pk = N.E v e r yPk in ∆ is reﬁned as coalition-agent.
We deﬁne a network g on the agent set N as a set of links, where loops are not
allowed, i.e. (i,i)  ∈ g for all i ∈ N.L e tG be the set of all possible networks on
N. A directed path from i to j in g is a sequence of distinct agents i1,...,i k with
k ≥ 1, such that i = i1 , j = ik and (is,i s+1) ∈ g for each s =1 ,..., k−1 ,denoted
j
g
→ i.P a r t i c u l a r l y ,f o rk =1 ,i= i1 is a directed path from i to i. Wheel networks
consist of one cycle joining all agents (see ﬁgure 1).
Figure1.
For convenience we use the symbols ’+’ and ’-’ to represent the mathematical op-
eration of two diﬀerent networks, or for a network and a single link. These opera-
tions are applied from left to right. For instance, the notation g − g  +( j,i)e q u a l s
(g\g )
 
{(j,i)}.106 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
We say that a link (j,i)i so w n e db yi.L e tg−i denote the network obtained from
g after removing the links owned by i. Notice that an outgoing link of i may still
exist in g−i.
Deﬁnition 2. Let πi : g → R1,i ∈ N be a payoﬀ function for g. The payoﬀ of





Let Ni(g)={j ∈ N : a directed path from j to i exists in g} denote the set of
agents who are observed by i in g.L e tNd
i (g)={j ∈ N :( j,i) ∈ g} denote the set
of neighbors of i in g.N o t et h a ti ∈ Ni(g), and i  ∈ Nd
i (g).
We will use the following payoﬀ function in this paper, which is called a B&G









where vij is the proﬁt that agent i receives from being connected to j, cij is the
cost of link (j,i) for agent i.
We say that link costs are homogeneous if there is a constant c with cij = c for all
i,j ∈ N. We say that link costs are owner-homogeneous (Derks et al., 2008) if for
each agent i there is a constant ci with cij = ci for all j ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 3. Network g is said to have coalition-homogenous costs,i ft h e r ei ss o m e
ck,k =1 ,...,m, such that cij = ck for all i,j ∈ Pk,i = j, furthermore the other
cij = c = const.


















































In fact, (1) can be considered as the B&G function of coalition Pk.
Deﬁnition 4. Network g is called connected network,i ft h e r ei sap a t hi0,i 1,...,i k
for any i,j,w h e r ei0 = i,ik = j,a n d( is,i s+1) ∈ g for s =1 ,...,k− 1.One-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 107
2.2. Network formation game
Given a set of agents N and a payoﬀ function πi for each agent i, a network formation
game proceeds in stages 1,2,3,....L e tgt be the network at the beginning of stage
t, which is known to all agents. The initial network g1 can be any network in G.
Then, at stage t according to a probability device, an agent, say i, is selected. We
assume that at each stage all agents have positive (stage independent) probabilities
of being chosen. Now, stage t proceeds by allowing agent i to modify the network
gt by adjusting his set of links. Thus, a new network gt+1 result, which marks the
start of stage t+1. The game ends with network g∗ if no agent wants to adjust his
links. As for the stage adjustments we examine two cases: one of local adjustments
and one of global adjustments. In the ﬁrst case the actions of player i are restricted
to (1) passing, (2) adding a new link pointing at i, (3) deleting a link pointing at
i, or (4) a replacement, which is a combination of (2) and (3). These four types of
actions are called local actions. In the second case player is allowed to completely
change the set of links pointing at him. These actions are called global actions.
Deﬁnition 5. An action of agent i is a set of agents, denoted as Si ⊆ N \{ i}.
For a global action, there are no restrictions on Si. For a local action we require
|Si \Nd
i (g)|≤1a n d|Nd
i (g)\Si|≤1. The network, after i chooses to link with the
agents in Si, is described by
g−i + {(j,i):j ∈ Si}
A local action Si of agent i is called a good local response for coalition Pk which he
belongs to, if  
l∈Pk




A local action Siof agent i is called a best local response for coalition Pk,i f
 
l∈Pk
πl(g−i + {(j,i):j ∈ Si}) ≥
 
l∈Pk
πl(g−i + {(j,i):j ∈ Ti})
for all local actions Ti.
Deﬁnition 6. An e t w o r kg is called local-Nash network of a one-way ﬂow dynamic
network formation game with coalition-homogenous costs if Nd
i (g)i sab e s tl o c a l
response for coalition which he belongs to for all i ∈ N.An e t w o r kg is called a
strict local-Nash network if Nd
i (g) is the unique best local response for coalition
which he belongs to for all i ∈ N.
With regard to the existence of local Nash network in the dynamic formation pro-
cess, we have
Theorem 1. When the costs are coalition-homogenous, the dynamic process of lo-
cal actions of one-way ﬂow dynamic network formation games with ﬁxed coalition
partition converges to a local-Nash network with probability 1.
In deed, coalition-agents can be considered as common agents, and (1) is the payoﬀ
function, the proof of above theorem is similar to literature (Derks et al., 2008).108 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
3. The dynamic network formation process of the local Nash network
when the costs are coalition-homogenous
When the costs are coalition-homogenous, the dynamic network formation process
of the local Nash network and the structural characteristics are closely related to
the sequence of agents’ actions. Taking the length of this article into account, here
we illustrate this problem only for the given sequence.
Example 1. Let N = {1,2,3,4},P 1 = {1,3},P 2 = {2,4}, the payoﬀ function π is
B&G function. Suppose for all i,j,vij = 2. Costs are coalition-homogenous, and
c13 = c31 =0 .5,c 24 = c42 =0 .5, the other cij = c = 1. Coalition-homogenous costs
mean that the costs of forming links within the coalition are lower as compared to
costs of forming links across the coalitions.
Let initial network g1 is empty network. Sequence of action is 1 → 2 → 3 → 4.(see
ﬁgure 2)










πP2(a)=π2(a)+π4(a)=v22 + v44 =2+2=4 .
Step 1 Because of c13 =0 .5 < 1=c12 = c14, agent 1 adds link (3,1) to form










πP2(b)=π2(b)+π4(b)=v22 + v44 =2+2=4 .










πP2(c)=π2(c)+π4(c)=v21 + v22 + v23 + v44 − c21 =8− 1=7 .










πP2(d)=π2(d)+π4(d)=v21 + v22 + v23 + v44 − c21 =8− 1=7 .One-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 109










πP2(e)=π2(e)+π4(e)=v21+v22+v23+v41+v42+v43+v44−c21−c42 =1 4 −1.5=1 2 .5.









πP2(f)=π2(f)+π4(f)=v21 +v22 +v23 +v24 +v41 +v42 +v43 +v44 −c21 −c42 =
=1 6− 1.5=1 4 .5.
Step 6 for agent 2, adding, deleting or replacing any link will not increase the
payoﬀ of coalition, so he chooses to pass, and ﬁnally the network g in ﬁgure 2 is
formed.











πP2(h)=π2(h)+π4(h)=v21 +v22 +v23 +v24 +v41 +v42 +v43 +v44 −c21 −c42 =
=1 6− 1.5=1 4 .5.
It is easily veriﬁed that network h shown in ﬁgure 2 is local-Nash network by
deﬁnition 6. In this paper the game is incomplete because of the coalition partition,
so we can allocate the payoﬀ within the coalition according to (Myerson, 1977).110 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
Figure2.
4. Main results
When the coalition costs and beneﬁts are homogeneous (beneﬁts are homogeneous
which means vij = v = const, for all i,j ∈ N), the dynamic formation process of
local-Nash network and its architecture are relevant to agents’ sequence of actions,
and the Nash network that dynamically generated may have distinctive features. In
this section, we suppose min
1≤k≤m
|Pk|≥2a n dv>c k.
Lemma 1. Let Ni(g) ⊆ Pk, that is, no links are formed between agents in Pk and
the other coalitions. Then the payoﬀ of the coalition is the largest, when all agents
within coalition form a wheel.
In deed, when all agents within coalition form a wheel, each agent connects with all
the other agents, and the cost is the smallest so the payoﬀ is the largest (Bala and
Goyal,2000). (1) can be transformed into
πPk(g)=|Pk|(|Pk|·v − ck)
Theorem 2. For network formation games of homogeneous coalition costs and ben-
eﬁts, when the coalition-homogenous costs and the costs between coalitions satisfy
Pv+ c0 <c<Pv (2)
where P =m a x 1≤k≤m |Pk|(|P  
1|−
|Pk|−1
2 ),c 0 =m a x {c1,c 2,...,c m},
P =m i n 2≤k≤m(|P  
k|
 k−1
i=1 |P  
i|),P 
1,...,P 
m is a permutation of P1,...,P m,w h i c h
is from the bigger to the smaller, and the previous n agents who take actions is a
permutation of 1,2,...,n. The dynamic process of local-Nash network formation is
forming coalition-inner wheels ﬁrst, then all the coalition-inner wheels connect with
each other and eventually form a connected network.
Proof. We assume that the agents of coalition P1,...,P m,t a k ea c t i o n sb yt u r n s .
According to (2) we know c>c 1, so the agents of coalition P1 form the coalition
inner-wheel ﬁrst.One-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 111
Suppose the previous i − 1 coalitions have formed inner-wheels, and there are no
links between them. For agent i1 who take actions ﬁrst in coalition Pi,( l e tt h e
agents of coalition Pi be i1,...,i |Pi|, and they are put in the right order according
to the sequence of actions), if he chooses to form a link with some agent of Pi,t h e n
the payoﬀ of coalition Pi is πPi =( |Pi| +1 ) v − ci; if he chooses to form a link with
some agent of the previous i−1 coalitions, then he must choose to form a link with
some agent of the coalition inner-wheel which has the largest number of agents,
and we suppose it is Pt, then the payoﬀ of coalition Pi is π 
Pi =( |Pi| + Pt|)v − c.
We get πPi >π  
Pi by (2), so he will choose to form a link with some agent of Pi,
and according to lemma 1 he will choose i|Pi|.A g e n ti2 will form a link with i1.
In coalition Pi, suppose the previous agents of ik(k  = |Pi|) have linked one after
another. When it is ik’s turn to take action, if he chooses to form a link with some
agent of Pi, then he will choose ik−1, and the payoﬀ of coalition Pi is
πPi =( 1+2+···+ k + |Pi|)v − kci
if he chooses to form a link with some agent of the previous i−1 coalitions, then he
must choose to form a link with some agent of coalition inner-wheel Pt which has
the largest number of agents, and the payoﬀ of coalition Pi is
π 
Pi =( 1+2+···+ k − 1+|Pi| + |Pt|)v − (k − 1)ci − c
According to (2) we have πPi >π  
Pi,s oik chooses to connect with ik−1.A st oi|Pi|
of Pi, if he chooses to connect with agents of Pi,i tm u s tb ei|Pi|−1, then the payoﬀ
of coalition Pi is πPi = |Pi|2v −| Pi|ci; if he chooses to connect with some agent of
the former i − 1 coalitions, he must choose the coalition wheel Pt which has the
largest number of agents, then the payoﬀ of coalition Pi is
π 
Pi =( 1+2+···+ |Pi|−1+|Pi| + |Pi|·| Pt|)v − (|Pi|−1)ci − c
by (2), πPi >π  
Pi,s oi|Pi| chooses to connect with i|Pi|−1. So coalition Pi will form
an inner wheel. Because we have supposed the agents of P1,P 2,...,P m take actions
by turns, we get m isolated inner wheels after each agent taking an action.
The agents will act in order of a permutation of 1,2,...,n. Suppose there are
no links between all coalition-inner wheels. In fact, if the minimal value which P
represents attained at some coalition P  
s,2 ≤ s ≤ m then P = |P  
s|(
 s−1
i=1 |P  
i|).1
1 If c ≥ Pv, the coalition other than P
 
s will not connect with coalitions the number
of whose members is less than |P
 
s|. First we prove coalitions the number of whose
members is more than or equals to |P
 
s| will not connect with coalitions the number of
whose members is less than |P
 




























1| + ···+ |P
 
i| + ···+ |P
 
s−1|)v − c = Pv − c ≤ 0
the two will not be connected. Obviously, coalitions the number of whose members is
less than |P
 
s| will not be connected either. So a certain agent of P
 












1| + ···+ |P
 
s−1|)v − c = Pv − c ≤ 0
at most. So P
 
s will not connect with any coalitions, that is to say, it is isolated.112 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
Next we will prove the strict Nash network is connected-network when c<P v.
After a turn of actions of all the agents, we have got coalition-inner wheels. In the
process of the second turn, P  
1 must form a link with another coalition, that is, in
the process of the agents’ actions, there must be an agent i who is the ﬁrst one
to connect with another coalition, either i ∈ P  
1 chooses to connect with another
coalition, or there exists a coalition P  
l,l  =1 ,i ∈ P  
lchooses to connect with an
agent in P  
1.
Case 1 When it is the turn of i ∈ P  
1 to act, if all the coalition-inner wheels are





1|v − c ≥ Pv − c>0
i must choose to connect with P  
2.
Case 2 When all the coalition-inner wheels are still isolated, because of








there must be some i and P  
l,l  =1 ,i∈ P  
l, i will choose P  
1 for the number of its





1|v − c ≥ Pv − c>0
P  
2 satisﬁes this condition at least.
With respect to the case of non-isolation among the coalition-inner wheels, the
above discussion shows coalition P  
1 must be within. Suppose P  
1 and P  
l form a gen-
eral coalition P  
1l after they are connected(in case 1 it is equivalent to l =2 ) ,













































= |P  
k|[|P  
1| + |P  
2| + ···+ |P  
k−1| + |P  
l|] > |P  
k|[|P  
1| + |P  
2| + ···+ |P  
k−1|]





















l+1| + ···+ |P  
k|]=|P  
k+1|[|P  
1| + |P  
2| + ···+ |P  
k|]
so P
(1) ≥ P and P
(1)v ≥ Pv>c .One-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 113
Analogous to the discussion above, a second link between coalitions will appear
under new partition. Repeat until all the coalition-inner wheels are connected, and
we get a connected network eventually.
In fact, the left side of the in equation (2) is to restrict and force each coalition to
form inner wheels ﬁrst, while the right side is set with reference to the connectivity of
the whole network. The following references and substantiations check some extreme
examples on Theorem 2, particularly, the understanding of Reference 1 can be
referred to Example 2.
Corollary 1. When we choose a ε>0 suﬃciently small, and c = Pv−ε,P 
1,...,P 
m
can form a wheel by turns, furthermore, the direction of the wheel is P  
1 → P  
2 ···→
P  
m → P  
1.I ft h ew h e e li st h ef o r mi nﬁ g u r e3(a), then it will be adjusted to the form
in 3(b) by the agents’ local actions.
Because the formation of Nash network is related to the order of agents’ action,
other forms of connected network may appear, for example, ﬁgure 3(c). But there
are some coalition-agents whose costs will be more than that when they form a
wheel. Especially, it may occur when the coalition homogeneous cost is 0.
Figure3.
Example 2. Let N = {1,2,...,9} be a set of agents. P1 = {1,2,3},P 2 = {4,5,6},
P3 = {7,8,9}. The payoﬀ function π is B&G function. Suppose vij =1f o ra l li
and j. The coalition-homogeneous cost is c1 = c2 = c3 = 0, and the cost among
coalitions is c = 7. Without loss of generality, we say that the agents act by the
order 1 → 2 →···→9.
Because the coalition-homogeneous cost is 0, while the cost among coalitions is 7,
agent 1 may add link (3,1), 2 adds link (1,2), 3 adds link (2,3), so coalition P1
form inner-wheel ﬁrst.114 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
When it is the turn of agent 4 to act, he may choose to connect with an agent in or
out of P2. In the former case, w.l.o.g., we say he add link (1,4), see ﬁgure 4(a), at
this time, πP2 = π4+π5+π6 = 4+1+1−7=−1 < 0. In the later case, let link (6,4)
be added, see ﬁgure 4(b), according to πP2 = π4 +π5 +π6 =2+1+1=4> −1, so
agent 4 chooses to add link (6,4).
Figure4.
Similarly, agent 5 may add link (4,5), agent 6 may add link (5,6), so agents in
coalition P2 will form inner-wheel. Agents in coalition P3 form inner-wheel as well.
When it is the turn of agent 1 to act, he may choose to connect with one of the
rest coalition-wheels P2,,...,P m, the number of whose members is the most. In
this example, because |P2| = |P3|, that is to say, he may choose to connect with
the coalition-wheel of P2 or P3, w.l.o.g., let link (5,1) be added, see ﬁgure 5(a).
Similarly, as to agent2, he chooses to connect with the wheel of coalition P3, let link
(8,2) is added, see ﬁgure 5(b). As to agent 3, he has already connected with all the
agents, so he chooses to pass. As to agent 4, he chooses to connect with the wheel
of coalition P1 or P3, because the payoﬀ when agent 4 connects with the wheel of
coalition P1 is more comparing to the case he connects with the wheel of coalition
P3, he chooses to connect with the wheel of coalition P1, let link (1,4) is added, see
ﬁgure 5(c). At this time, because agent 5 and 6 has already connected with all the
agents, they choose to pass. As to agent 7, he chooses to connect with the wheel
of coalition P1 or P2 , because the payoﬀ when agent 7 connects with the wheel of
coalition P1 equals to that when he connects with the wheel of coalition P2, let link
(5,7) is added, see ﬁgure 5(d). At this time, because agent 8 and 9 have already
connected with all the agents, so they choose to pass. Next, when it is the turn of
agent 1 to act, he will choose to delete link (5,1), and we obtain the local Nash
network, see ﬁgure 5(e).
When ci,i=1 ,2,3 is suﬃciently small and satisﬁes (2), similarly, the coalition-inner
wheel will form ﬁrst, then a network depicted in ﬁgure 5(e) is formed eventually.
Diﬀerently, because of the random of the link the agents choose, if the network is
the form in ﬁgure 6, then agent 2 will delete link (3,2), agent 4 will delete link (6,4),
agent 7 will delete link (8,7), and form a network depicted in ﬁgure 7.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we studied one-way ﬂow dynamic network formation games with ﬁxed
coalition partition via deﬁning coalition-homogeneous costs. Coalition-homogeneous
costs will play a vital role in the way of large network formation, and the change
of the costs of the links which could lead to the dynamic change of the coalition
partition may be a strategy of the agents. The same discussion will be helpful as toOne-Way Flow Dynamic Network Formation Games 115
Figure5.116 Hong-wei GAO, Ye-ming DAI, Wen-wen LI, Lin SONG, Ting-ting LV
Figure6.
Figure7.
the two-way ﬂow network, and heterogeneous costs will make the result complicated.
Noteworthy is that the method of classical game theory in the ﬁeld of network games
and network games play an important role in the social and economic life (Garnaev
et al., 2008; Gao et al., 2010).
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Abstract In the paper a game-theoretical model of quality choice under
competition is suggested. The game-theoretical model is presented as a two-
stage game where production companies compete on an industrial market
and consumer’s taste to quality in non-uniformly distributed. The strong
Nash equilibrium in the investigated game was obtained in explicit form
which allowed us to evaluate prices, companies market shares and revenues
in the equilibrium. A case study for Internet-trading systems was used to
approve the suggested quality choice mechanism.
Keywords: quality evaluation, quality measurement, consumer’s taste to
quality, quality choice, two-stage game, Nash equilibrium, Stakelberg equi-
librium, Pareto-optimal solution, optimal quality diﬀerentiation, index of
consumers satisfaction.
1. Introduction
The problem of quantitative estimation of quality and the development of quality
choice mechanism in case of competition are considered. Quality choice is an action
that is based on changing of quantitative quality estimation.
The main theoretical goal of the research is to develop a quality choice mecha-
nism which is based on construction and solution of the appropriategame-theoretical
model of competition taking into account the information on consumers preferences.
From practical point of view we are interested in quantitative quality estimation
methods.
In this paper quality of a product (or service) is considered as quantitative
estimation of its value expressed in monetary terms which an average consumer
gets when buying this product (or service). Therefore when consumer is absolutely
satisﬁed with the product (or service) its quality is equal to price he or she paid.
In order to estimate quality of an object basing on consumers’ opinions about
object’s characteristics to the questionnaire we will consider an object as a system
of these characteristics. Therefore, quality is calculated as some composite index,
which allows to estimate the level of consumers satisfaction with the product. To
realize this approach the technique presented in Hovanov et al., 1996 is used.
To deﬁne the preferable product quality under competition a game-theoretical
model was built. This model let us analyze the companies’ decision-making process
about goods production of demanded quality under competition.
  This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research under grant No.
08-01-00301-a and and up to subject-matter plan of Graduate school of management,
SPbU (project 16.0.116.2009).Quality Choice under Competition: Game-theoretical Approach 119
The suggested game-theoretical model is an extension of the models presented
in Benassi and Motta papers. They considered duopoly models under condition of
vertical product diﬀerentiation.
Motta (Motta, 1993) analyzes two types of models of vertical diﬀerentiation in
order to study the inﬂuence of price and quantity competition on the Nash equilib-
rium solution. The author shows that optimal product diﬀerentiation is higher in
Bertrand competition rather than in Cournot. This model is upgraded to the case
when market is uncovered and inclination to quality parameter is non-uniformly dis-
tributed (triangular distribution is analyzed). Another modiﬁcation of this model
is considered in Gladkova and Zenkevich, 2007.
In his paper Benassi (Benassi et al., 2006) considers duopoly model under condi-
tion of vertical product diﬀerentiation when market is uncovered. Author examines
the inﬂuence of consumer concentration according to their willingness to pay for
quality on companies behavior and decisions.
Noh’s paper (Noh and Moschini, 1993) is focused on sequential quality choice in
the game-theoretical model of duopoly and vertical product diﬀerentiation (Stack-
elberg model). The study is limited by the case of covered market. As well, similar
problem of simultaneous and sequential quality choice is considered in Aoki and
Pursa’s paper (Aoki and Pursa, 1996).
Theoretically the main goal of this paper is to ﬁnd quality Nash equilibrium
and optimal product diﬀerentiation in case of competition. To do that the game-
theoretical model of duopoly was constructed, which is based on Tirole, 1988 and
Gladkova and Zenkevich, 2009.
2. Game-theoretical model of quality competition
Two-stage game-theoretical model of duopoly under vertical product diﬀerentiation
is investigated. It is assumed, that there are two ﬁrms - 1 and 2 - on some industrial
market which produce homogeneous product diﬀerentiated by quality. The game
consists of two stages, when at the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms set its product quality level and
on the second stage they compete in prices knowing the qualities. Suppose, that on
each stage ﬁrms make their decisions simultaneously.
Suppose that each consumer has unit demand and has diﬀerent inclination to
quality. Assume that a customer is indicated by the parameter θ ∈ [0,θ] - ”inclina-
tion to quality” which deﬁnes a customer’s willingness to pay for quality.
Then the utility function of the consumer with inclination to quality θ (from
now on we will simply call him/her ”the consumer θ”) when buying the product of
quality s for price p is:
Uθ(p,s)=
 
θs − p, p ≤ θs
0,p>θ s (1)
where θ ∈ [0,θ] - inclination to quality of this customer. Here θs is maximum price
that the consumer θ is ready to pay for the product of quality s, i.e. the worth of
the product for the consumer θ.
It is clear that the consumer θ will purchase the product of quality s for price p
if Uθ(p,s) > 0 and won’t buy a product otherwise.
In the model assume that the parameter of inclination to quality θ is a random
variable and has triangular distribution with the following density function f(θ):120 Margarita A. Gladkova, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
f(θ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for θ ≤ 0
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Then distribution function can be presented as follows:
F(θ)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for θ ≤ 0
2




b2θ2 − 1, for θ∈B=(b
2,b]
1, for θ>b
Here the parameter b ∈ [0,θ] is an endpoint of the distribution support. Note
that distribution function is continuous, diﬀerentiated and increasing on the interval
[0,b]. Figure 1 represents the view of the density function f(θ).
Figure1. The density function f(θ).
Customer θ is indiﬀerent between buying a product of quality s1 for price p1
and not buying anything, if θs1 − p1 = 0. Therefore a value θ1 = θ1(p1,s 1)=p1
s1
characterize such customer.Quality Choice under Competition: Game-theoretical Approach 121
Let ﬁrm i produces goods of quality si and the production costs for the product
of quality si are ci. Lets, for instance, s2 >s 1 and this values are known to both
ﬁrms and customers. Assume that there is Bertrand competition in price. Let us
denote by pi the price of the ﬁrm i for the product of quality si.
Customer θ is indiﬀerent between buying a products of quality s1,s 2 for prices
p1,p 2 correspondingly, if θs1−p1 = θs2−p2. Therefore a value θ2 = θ2(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=
p2 − p1
s2 − s1 characterize such customer.
Deﬁne the demand functions Di(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2) of the ﬁrm 1 and 2 correspondingly
as:
D1(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=
  θ2(p1,p2,s1,s2)
θ1(p1,s1)
f(θ)dθ = F(θ2(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)) − F(θ1(p1,s 1));
D2(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=
  b
θ2(p1,p2,s1,s2)
f(θ)dθ =1− F(θ2(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)).
Firm i’s payoﬀ when producing a product of quality si ,w h e r esi ∈ [s,s] , will
be deﬁned as following function:
Ri(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=pi · Di(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2), (2)
where pi is the price of the ﬁrm i for the product of quality si.
The game-theoretical model of quality choice is deﬁned as a two-stage model of
duopoly, when :
– at the ﬁrst stage ﬁrms i simultaneously choose a quality levels si;
– at the second stage assuming that the quality levels si are known both to com-
petitors and customers, ﬁrms compete in product price, making their choices
simultaneously.
To solve this game we use the backward induction. In this case Nash equilibrium
is constructed in two steps. On the ﬁrst step, assuming that product qualities si
are known, we ﬁnd equilibrium prices p∗
i(s1,s 2). Knowing p∗
i(s1,s 2), on the second
step we ﬁnd qualities s∗
1,s ∗
2 of products of ﬁrm 1 and 2 correspondingly in Nash
equilibrium.
As the density function of the parameter θ is considered to be triangular, the
explicit form of the demand functions will diﬀer depending on the location of con-
sumers θ1 and θ2 across the interval [0,b]. Theoretically, there are three possible
cases:
1. θ1,θ 2 ∈ A,
2. θ1,θ 2 ∈ B,
3. θ1 ∈ A,θ2 ∈ B,
where A =[ 0 ,b/2] , B =( b/2,b] are illustrated on the Figure 1.
To ﬁnd the equilibrium prices prove the following theorem.122 Margarita A. Gladkova, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
Theorem 1. Consider any concave density function f(θ) deﬁned over [0,b],w h e r e
b ≥ 0,5, which is symmetric about the median of the distribution b/2 and f(0) =
f(1) = 0 and f(b/2) ≥ 2.I fθ∗
2 >θ ∗
1 identiﬁes the consumers at the perfect price
Nash equilibrium in the game in case of vertical diﬀerentiation, then θ∗
2 is unique
and θ∗
2 <b / 2.
Proof. Players’ payoﬀ functions are:
R1(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=p1(F(θ2) − F(θ1)),
R2(p1,p 2,s 1,s 2)=p2(1 − F(θ2)),
where θ1 = p1
s1,θ 2 = p2 − p1
s2 − s1 .







Thus we get the following equation:
z(θ2)=1− F(θ2), (3)
where z (θ2)=( t + θ2)f (θ2), t = p1
s2 − s1 > 0.





































,z (0) < 1 − F(0).
Hence, the solution of the equation (3) is θ∗
2 < b
2.
Note that on the interval [0,b/2] the function R2 is strictly concave with respect








Hence in the critical point θ∗
2, where the equation (3) is satisﬁed, there is a
maximum point of the payoﬀ function R2 on the interval [0,b/2].
Lets prove that in θ∗
2 the largest value of the function R2 on the interval [0,b]i s
achieved and this point is unique.
Lets analyze the equation (3). As the distribution function F(θ) is strictly in-
creasing on [0,b], then right part of the equation 1−F(θ2) is strictly decreasing on
[0,b].
Left part of the equation (3) z(θ2) is strictly increasing until f
 
(θ2) ≥ 0. This is
due to the view of the derivative: z
 
(θ2)=f(θ2)+( t + θ2)f
 
(θ2).
The function z(θ2) is continuous and z(b)=z(0) = 0. Then the largest value
of the function z(θ2)o n[ 0 ,b] is achieved in the point θ2 =   θ2. The inequalityQuality Choice under Competition: Game-theoretical Approach 123
f
 
(θ2) ≥ 0 is true for any θ2 < b
2. Besides, on this interval z
 
(θ2) > 0. Hence   θ2 > b
2
and θ∗
2 ∈ [0,   θ2].
Consider now an interval θ2 ∈ [  θ2,b] and show that on this interval there is no
point where the largest value of the function R2 is achieved.
To do so, introduce a function ϕ(θ2)=1 − F(θ2) − z(θ2) and calculate its
derivative ϕ
 
(θ2)=−2f(θ2) − (t + θ2)f
 
(θ2).
As the density function f(θ2) is decreasing and concave on the interval [  θ2,b],
then f
 
(θ2) is decreasing or ϕ
 
(θ2) is increasing functions.
Calculate the value of the function derivative ϕ(θ2)i np o i n t s  θ2 and b. Then:
ϕ









t +   θ2
 
f

































(θ2) is increasing, ϕ
 
(  θ2) < 0a n dϕ
 
(b) > 0. Thus there is a point
θ2 =   θ2,w h e r eϕ
 
(  θ2) = 0, and the minimum is achieved there.




< 0a n dϕ(b) = 0, then on the whole interval [  θ2,b] the function




, and then on the interval
[  θ2,b] there are no points where the equation (2.3) is true.
Then there is unique parameter value θ∗




2 <b / 2.
It is implied from theorem 1 that in order to ﬁnd price in equilibrium it is
suﬃcient to consider only one case when the parameters θ1,θ 2 ∈ A (see Figure 1).
Then the demand functions of ﬁrms 1 and 2 can be presented as following:
























and the payoﬀ functions can be written in the explicit form as:


























Lets ﬁnd prices in equilibrium p∗
1,p ∗
2 when qualities of goods are s1 and s2.124 Margarita A. Gladkova, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
The price values p∗
1,p ∗
2 can be found as a solution of the following system of
equations:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
































To solve the system of equations we make a substitution p2 = mp1,w h e r ea
coeﬃcient m>1. Then ﬁrst equation can be rewritten as the following quadratic
equation in m:
m















From the system of equation we get the price Nash equilibrium in explicit form:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




· m − 3  





· m(m − 3)
 
(3m − 1)(m − 3)
,
(5)
where m is given as (5).
Lets now calculate in the explicit form the demand of the ﬁrm 1 and 2 and its
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· m(m − 3)
 






2(s1,s 2),s 1,s 2)=2bs1 √
6
· m2(m − 3)
 
(3m − 1)3(m − 3)
.
(7)
At the second stage of the game we ﬁnd qualities in Nash equilibrium s1,s 2 ∈
[s,s] according to the payoﬀ functions R∗
1,R ∗
2,w h e r es < s are given.










1 +3 ( s2 − s1)2
·
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> 0 , i.e. the function R∗
2(s1,s 2) is strictly increasing with respect to
s2 . Thus, the ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium strategy will be the choice of maximum possible
quality value, i.e. s∗
2 = s .
To ﬁnd the equilibrium value s1 of the ﬁrm 1 make the following substitution of
variables s∗
1 = ks,w h e r e0<k<1 is an unknown parameter. Then the parameter






The explicit view of this equation solution is too lengthy but for any given
quantitative value of the parameter b, it is possible to get the quantitative value of
the parameter k, using computer algebra system Maple.
For instance, when the parameter of consumer’s willingness to pay for quality
θ deﬁned in the interval [0;0,5] , i.e. b =0 ,5, the solution of the equation (9) is





2 = s. (9)
Then substituting this solution in (5), we get the value of the parameter m =
3,3555.
According to the expressions for the equilibrium prices (6), demands (7) and







2 in equilibrium with respect to the parameters b and k as follow-
ing:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
p∗
1 = kbs √
6
·
   
k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 − k
3
 
k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +5 k
;
p∗






k2 +3 ( 1− k)2
 
·
   
k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 − k
3
 
k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +5 k
.
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨




k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +4 k
3(3
 





k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +4 k
3
 
k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +5 k
.
⎧
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k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +5 k
 3;
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k2 +3 ( 1− k)2 +5 k
 3.126 Margarita A. Gladkova, Nikolay A. Zenkevich
Note that ﬁrm 2 which produces the product of the higher quality s2 gets higher











k2 +3 ( 1− k)2
 
















k2 +3 ( 1− k)2
 
> 0.
According to the model construction there two asymmetric Nash equilibriums in
the model (ks,s)a n d( s,ks) , which are beneﬁcial for 2 and 1 players correspond-
ingly. It is easy to note that both equilibriums are Pareto optimal, which means
that they are strong equilibriums (Petrosyan et al., 1998).
Therefore when choosing optimal strategies under condition of competition the
players face the problem of so called ﬁght for leadership, like in the game ”Battery
of sexes”(Petrosyan et al., 1998). Thus, each ﬁrm will try to become a leader, i.e. to
start the production of the higher quality goods, which will give the ﬁrm the more
proﬁtable position in equilibrium.
Note as well that if we consider the Stackelberg model (ﬁrm 2 is a leader, ﬁrm 1
is a follower) the result will be similar but there will be only one equilibrium (ks,s).
Besides, the leader (ﬁrm 2) use its right to act ﬁrst and will take up the more beneﬁt
position in equilibrium.
3. Numerical example
In this section the numerical example of applicationof the suggestedgame-theoretical
model of competition and vertical diﬀerentiation for the market of Internet-trading
systems, which are used for exchange auction.
Internet-trading (or electronic-trading) is new, simple in use and highly eﬀec-
tive software package(e-trading platforms). Stock markets are not physical loca-
tions where buyers and sellers meet and negotiate, Internet-trading allows traders
to transact from remote locations. As well, it gives access to a huge amount of
analytical information.
There are more than 20 Internet-trading systems now which are used in Russia.
Some brokers develop their own systems, others use systems that were developed
by specialist software providers. In Russia specialist software is dominated. Here
ﬁrst of all QUIK, NetInvestor, TRANSAQ and ”ITS-Broker” can be called. The
Internet-trading system developed by QUIK is the most popular and is used by
more than 60 brokers (more than 3500 users).
There are more than 100 exchange brokers, which uses the Internet-trading sys-
tems. The list of such organizations is presented on the web-sites of the biggest Rus-
sian stock exchanges - ”Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange” (MICEX Group)
and ”Russian Trading System” (RTS).
The main purpose of the Internet-trading system is an on-line access to trading
systems. It lets the users to get the stock information and to make transactions. As
well it gives informationabout current state of the investment portfolio (the quantity
of bought/sold stock certiﬁcates),position with regard to monetary resources and
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When doing empirical investigation of the Internet-trading system quality we
distinguished eight main characteristics of such system, namely:
– quantity of available exchanging markets;
– operation speed, i.e. the speed of referring a request and getting information;
– system functionality (availability of price quotations, time-series and charts con-
struction), i.e. availability of integrated analytic;
– technical support;
– ability of data export;
– possibility of system upgrading by a user;
– price for a system and its maintenance;
– guarantee and durability, i.e. responsibilities of development company for any
possible errors, its elimination and compensation for losses.
3.1. Sample description
Data accumulation was organized using an experts questionnaire survey. Based on
the results of the survey we have a sample of 29 respondents. In our research we were
interested in opinions of the direct users of Internet-trading systems, namely, mem-
bers of the department of trading systems management and economists from brokers
companies (commission houses), who works with such systems. By geographic lo-
cation we chose users of Internet-trading systems from such biggest Russian cities
as Moscow, Saint-Petersburg and Ekaterinburg.
Broker companies often works with several Internet-trading systems, which al-
lows them to satisfy diﬀerent groups of investors. As the QUIK system is the domi-
nant Internet-trading system on Russian market, we distinguish two types of systems
- the QUIK system and the OTHER system (which includes all other systems). Ac-
cording to this suggestion, we get that 22 respondents are the users of the QUIK
system and 20 respondents work with the OTHER system.
3.2. Analysis and evaluation of the quality of Internet-trading system
The deﬁnitions of quality that are given in ISO 9000 (2005) documents distinguish
the systematic formation of all object characteristics. Thus, we can accept quality
of an Internet-trading system as some generalized quantitative estimation of quality
or composite quality index.
In this research respondents are consumers and experts at one time. On the basis
of their opinions about each characteristic of Internet-trading system we evaluated
this system quality in general. To realize this approach the composite index method
is used. This method is realized in ASPID-3W (Hovanov et al., 1996). Some speci-
ﬁcations of this method use and application for the evaluation of a quality of any
complex technical system under condition of information deﬁciency are presented,
for example, in Hovanov et al., 2009.
The ﬁrst stage of empirical research was data analysis and processing in order to
deﬁne the observed Internet-trading systems’ quality. For this purpose respondents
were asked to evaluate their satisfaction level concerning each system characteristic
that were mentioned at the beginning of this section. Besides, if a respondent uses
several Internet-trading systems he or she should estimate his satisfaction levels for
each system.
Then, using the composite index method, the Internet-trading systems qualities
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1. ﬁrst the composite indexes of satisfaction level for each system characteristic for
the QUIK system were deﬁned; and for each system characteristic the composite
indexes for the OTHER system were calculated;
2. on the basis of the composite indexes the generalized composite indexes of con-
sumer satisfaction α2 and α1 for the QUIK system and for the OTHER system
correspondingly were evaluated ;
3. on the basis of the generalized composite indexes α2 and α1 the qualitative
estimation of system quality is received using the following formulas: s2 = α2p2
(for the system QUIK) and s1 = α1p1 (for the system OTHER), where p2,p 1
are prices of the system QUIK and OTHER.
The formula we are going to use for quantitative estimation of quality needs
to be explained. The questionnaire contained the following question: ”If you aren’t
absolutely satisﬁed with your current Internet-trading systems, could you please
evaluate how much are you ready to increase the maximum price for which you
would buy a system that absolutely satisﬁes you (in percentage)?” Therefore if a
respondent is absolutely satisﬁed with a system, then according to the understand-
ing of quantitative estimation of quality the quality value s = p0 ,w h e r ep0-i st h e
price of the system. At the same time if consumer satisfaction level is 0 <α<1,
then s = αp0 .
Lets discuss now the relation of empirical and theoretical models. According
to our model assumptions if a consumer θ0 is absolutely satisﬁed with its current
Internet-trading system then the maximum price he or she is ready to pay for it is
equal to θ0p0. On the other hand: θ0p0 = p0 +∆p,w h e r e∆p is an increment of the
current price for which a respondent is ready to buy the considered Internet-trading
system. Hence, θ0 =1+∆p
p0 > 1. Lets denote respondent’s willingness to pay for
quality for: θ = ∆p
p0 .
Therefore the utility function of the consumer whose willingness to pay for qual-
ity is θ can be presented as:
Uθ(p,s)=
 
θs− p, p ≤ θs
0,p>θ s ,p= p0 − s, (10)
where θ ∈ [0,b] , and right interval endpoint b is deﬁned from the questionnaire
answers of respondents.
According to the data processing algorithm and analysis it is clear that usage of
the game-theoretical model of competition presented in section 2 is reasonable for
our sample.
3.3. Results
This subsection presents the results of the realization of the algorithm described
above using the data obtained from the consumers survey.
The data is collected by questionnaire survey. The questionnaire consists of
twelve questions divided by three groups w h i c hh e l p e du st oa n a l y z et h ec o n s u m e r s
and Internet-trading systems speciﬁcation.
First question group covered basic things such as what systems respondents use,
what for and how much they are satisﬁed in general with what they have now.
Second question group is about Internet-trading systems’ characteristics. There
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of importance. Then a respondent has to answer which systems’ characteristics he
or she is satisﬁed with and evaluate the level of that satisfaction (using 5 pointed
Lakert scale).
Third question group is about consumer’s preference about Internet-trading sys-
tems:
– which system is a key system for the organization;
– how much they are ready to increase the maximum price for which they would
buy a system that absolutely satisﬁes them;
– which system they would like to use in the future;
– which brand is more preferable.
The estimation of the quality of the system QUIK (product 2) and OTHER
(product 1) is realized using the consumers’ answers on the second question group.
Thus, with the help of the ASPID-3W, the composite indexes of consumers’ satis-
faction for each Internet-trading system characteristic were obtained (see table 2).
Weights coeﬃcients were received from consumers range of the importance of each
of 8 characteristic of the Internet-trading systems. They are presented in the table
1.
Then the composite indexes of consumers satisfaction α1 =0 ,572 and α2 =
0,545 for system QUIK and OTHER correspondingly were calculated.
Table 1. The weights coeﬃcients for each characteristic
Characteristics Weights





ability to self upgrading 2,828
price 4,379
guarantee 3,586
Table 2. Composite index of satisfaction for each characteristic
Characteristics Quik Other
quantity of available markets 0,639 0,774
operation speed 0,549 0,701
integrated analytic 0,492 0,498
technical support 0,699 0,612
data export 0,610 0,500
ability to self upgrading 0,394 0,407
price 0,507 0,636
guarantee 0,470 0,450
For each system the quality is evaluated according to the formula: si = αipi
,w h e r ei = 1 means the OTHER system and i = 2 - the QUIK system. The
price for the Internet-trading system OTHER is: p1 = 119000 RUB. (this price is
an arithmetic mean of prices for each system from the group OTHER, which are
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QUIK is p2 = 140000 RUB. correspondingly. Therefore the estimations of Internet-
trading systems’ qualities s1 = 68068 RUB. and s2 = 76300 RUB. correspondingly.
Let’s estimate now the range of Internet-trading systems qualities, i.e. estimate
the parameters s and s. To do that evaluate ﬁrst the composite indexes of consumers
satisfaction using the ASPID-3W for a consumer who appraises his satisfaction with
each system characteristic as ”1 - absolutely unsatisﬁed” and for a consumer who
appraises his satisfaction with each system characteristic as ”5 - totally satisﬁed”.
The results are α =0 ,056 and α =1 ,000 for these consumers correspondingly.
Thus, the range of Internet-trading systems qualities are s = αp1 = 6664 RUB. and
s = αp2 = 140000 RUB.
The endpoint b of the parameter θ is evaluated as b =m a x {max∆p1,max∆p2} =
0,5. Therefore, θ ∈ [0;0,5].
Lets test a hypothesis about the triangular distribution of the parameter θ of
the consumer willingness to pay for quality over the interval [0;0,5] .
As the sample is not big enough, consider the hypothesis of the triangular dis-
tribution of the average consumer willingness to pay for quality for the sampling
group of consumers. Therefore, we have to test the hypothesis that parameter θ has
triangular distribution on the interval [0,15916;0,220852].
Table 3 presents the results of subsidiary calculations when testing distribution
hypothesis using Kolmogorov test. Here xi and xi+1 - cell boundaries which are the
result of the sample division, li - theoretical frequencies for cell i, F∗ -t h ev a l u eo f
empirical distribution function, F - the value of expected (theoretical) distribution
function.
Using Kolmogorov test, a statistic is calculated according to the formula:
λ
∗ =s u p| F
∗(xi) − F(xi) |=1 ,124498.
Therefore, the triangular distribution hypothesis is accepted with signiﬁcance
value equal to 0,01.
The comparison of the empirical results and game-theoretical results described
in the previous section is presented below.
Table 3. Triangular distribution test
xi xi+1 li F∗ F F∗ − F
0,15916 0,167973 1 0,01 0,034327 0,024327
0,167973 0,176786 9 0,1 0,152158 0,052158
0,176786 0,185599 15 0,25 0,353875 0,103875
0,185599 0,194412 27 0,52 0,63245 0,11245
0,194412 0,203226 25 0,77 0,834055 0,064055
0,203226 0,212039 14 0,91 0,951774 0,041774
0,212039 0,220852 9 1 0,985608 0,014392




1 =0 ,6543s = 91602,
s∗
2 = s = 140000.
Note that both values s∗
1,s ∗
2 are from the quality range, i.e. s∗
i ∈ [6664,140000].
Comparing this values with those we get in the experiment s1 = 68068 and s2 =Quality Choice under Competition: Game-theoretical Approach 131
76300, it can be found that both Internet-trading systems’ developers should in-
crease the system quality as well as quality diﬀerentiation.
To evaluate price, recall ﬁrst that p = p0−s (see (14)). Then the Internet-trading










This results means that when the Internet-trading systems are more diﬀerenti-
ated in quality companies may diﬀerentiate more in prices. Indeed, the price diﬀer-
ence for the Internet-trading systems is equal now to 21 000 RUB., and according to
the game-theoretical model results it may be increased to more than 57 000 RUB.






This result represents the situation on the market today, as the rate of consumers
of the Internet-trading systems OTHER and QUIK is about 1 to 3.
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Abstract A natural connection between antagonistic matrix games and or-
tholattices (quantum logics) is established. It is shown that the equilibrium
in the corresponding quantum game deﬁnes the operator representation of
the quantum logic. The conditions of the quantum equilibrium are formu-
lated.
Keywords: quantum equilibrium, ortholattices, linear representations.
1. Introduction
Theorem of existence of equilibrium as a main result of the matrix game theory
has an interesting story. The creator of the game theory von Neumann proposed
in case of absence of the equilibrium in terms of usual acts to expand the strategic
possibilities of the participants of the conﬂict s1,...s n by including their probability
combinations
p = p1 · s1 + ...+ pn · sn,p 1 + ...+ pn =1 ,p 1,...p n   0( 1 )
– so called mixed strategies. It occurred that the mixed expansion of the game was
suﬃcient for solution of any game in the dynamics-repeating the game many times.
This idea was taken by von Neumann from the quantum mechanics in construction
of which he actively participated at that time. In quantum theory besides pure states
their convex combinations mixed states are also used. So the probability concept
came to the game theory. Mixed strategies in game theory and mixed states in
quantum mechanics have the same statistical interpretation. However in quantum
theory pure states can be combined in a more general way – one can take not only
convex, but any any nonzero complex linear combinations of pure states
ψ = λ1 · s1 + ...+ λn · sn (2)
–s oc a l l e dwave functions. In spite of the formal similarity of combinations (1)
and (2) there is a serious distinction between them: no wave function is a mixed
state. This leads to the idea about the secondary expansion of the strategic possibil-
ities of the player-expansion of the set of initial pure strategies by new s1,...s n pure
strategies – wave functions (2). Can it occur that quantum strategies – wave func-
tions will be more successful than the classical mixed strategies? This idea leading
to discovery of the quantum game theory was ﬁrst realized by D.A.Meyer (Meyer,
1999), who demonstrated the very possibility of use of quantum strategies. At last in
(L.Marinatto and T.Weber, 2000) and in (A.Grib, G.Parﬁonov, 2005) it was found
that sometimes there exists the advantage of quantum strategies over classical ones
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2. Quantum strategies: the ﬁrst steps
Introducing of quantum strategies into a game theory is based on the simple math-
ematical construction generalizing the idea of von Neumann. The set of initial pure
strategies of the player s1,...s n is taken as the orthonormal basis of the complex
Hilbert space. The expanded set of pure strategies is formed by linear combinations
of the form
ψ = λ1 · s1 + ...+ λn · sn, |λ1|2 + ...+ |λn|2 =1 ( 3 )
It is important to note that such strategies are basically diﬀerent from the strate-
gies (1), used in game theories: they are not mixed. Really if the linear combination
ψ w o u l db eam i x e ds t r a t e g yt h e nλ1 + ...+ λn =1 ,λ 1,...λ n   0. But then
λ2
1 + ...+ λ2
n < 1. So the idea of the game quantization is in expanding of the
set of pure strategies. As to mixed strategies they initially don’t play any role in
this scheme. At the ﬁrst glance such expansion looks unreasonable because to any
quantum strategy (3) automatically corresponds mixed strategy of the form
pψ = |λ1|2 · s1 + ...+ |λn|2 · sn, (4)
where the square of moduli of the coeﬃcients could be considered as probabilities
of use of corresponding pure strategies. In paper (L.Marinatto and T.Weber, 2000)1
this interpretation of quantum strategies was analyzed and it was shown that it gives
nothing new in comparison with classical game theory. However one can understand
it from general considerations. Any probability vector can be formally represented as
a set of squares of moduli of the components of normalized complex vector. However
in such formalism important properties of the probability amplitudes – phases are
not used. That is why one must not expect any quantum eﬀects. The advantages
of quantum strategies and new eﬀects are manifested only if one takes into account
not squares of moduli of the coeﬃcients but original coeﬃcients. L.Marinatto and











2 =1 ( 5 )
complex linear combinations of factorised states sA
j ⊗ sB
k .
The entangled state looks similar to the special kind of the mixed strategy used








pjk =1 ,p jk   0( 6 )
expressing the correlated behavior of the players. So the possibility of getting the
increase of the proﬁt due to use of entangled states is not a surprise because such
states as well as joint mixed strategies express coordinated behaviour. In the major-
ity of papers on quantum game theory it is entangled state which is used for getting
some new results. However can one get something new due to quantum eﬀects in
terms of independent choice of quantum strategies i.e. using only factorizable states?
1 See L.Marinatto and T.Weber ”A quantum approach to static games of complete infor-
mation”134 Andrei A. Grib, Georgy N. Parﬁonov
3. From quantum games to the quantum logic
Theory of quantum games is still at the initial stage and there is no unique system
of notions and interpretations. This can be seen from the fact that each group of
researchers write its own ”Introduction to quantum games theory”. General feature
of all concepts is the following.
A quantum game is a strategic use of a quantum system by participating par-
ties who are identiﬁed as players. The players have the necessary means to perform
actions on the quantum system and knowledge is shared among them about what
constitutes a strategy. Often the strategy space is the set of possible actions that
players can take on the quantum system. The players’ payoﬀ functions, or utili-
ties, are associated with their strategies. Payoﬀs are obtained from the results of
measurements performed on the quantum system. A two-player quantum game, for
example, is a set:
Γ =( H,ρ,S A,S B,H A,H B)
consisting of an underlying Hilbert space H of the physical system, the initial state
ρ,t h es e t sSA and SB of allowed quantum operations for two players, and the payoﬀ
functions HA and HB. In most of the existing set-ups to play quantum games the
initial state ρ is the state of one or more qubits,o rqutrits, or possibly qudits.
The explicit form of the initial state and the deﬁnition of payoﬀ function is
deﬁned in diﬀerent papers diﬀerently. In the majority of papers the procedures of
quantization of classicalgames, i.e. the means of introducing quantum strategies into
a classical game are proposed. We do not have the aim to invent the quantum version
of the classical game to use the quantum strategies in the context of microscopic
phenomena as the majority of researchers are doing. microscopic phenomena. In
the basic paper (A.A.Grib, G.N.Parﬁonov, 2005)2 it was shown by us that quantum
strategies naturally arise in description of macroscopic interactions, when the laws
of classical Boolean logic are broken. The quantization of the antagonistic quantum
game of two persons is made due to the scheme similar to the procedure of canonical
quantization in mechanics when one takes instead of the classical Hamiltonian some
self adjoint Hamiltonian operator. The rules of quantization are the following. If
h = ||hjk|| the payoﬀ matrix of the antagonistic game, then the payoﬀ function of











βk =1 ( 8 )
In case when the players act independently, the average proﬁt is deﬁned by the
expression
 h  =
 
j, k
hjk pj qk (9)
which arises under the consideration of the mixed expansion of the game. Note
that in this consideration there is no place for quantum strategies. The necessity
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of quantum strategies is arising when the components of vectors α,β satisfy other,
diﬀerent from the (8), relations. Then putting these or those equations for the
components of the mentioned vectors lead to this or that quantum game. The form
of these relations depends on the logical conditions of the participants of the conﬂict.
In paper (L.K.Franeva, A.A.Grib, G.N.Parﬁonov, 2007)3 examples of macro-
scopic game interactions with breaking of relations of classical logic are given. In
this paper the simple version of these relations was studied:
α1 + α3 =1 ,α 2 + α4 =1 ,β 1 + β3 =1 ,β 2 + β4 = 1 (10)
leading to breaking of the Kolmogorovian axiomatic of the probability:
p1 + p2 + p3 + p4 =2 ,q 1 + q2 + q3 + q4 =2
One can notice that same relations are present in quantum mechanics of the electron.
This occurs due to the fact that the measurement procedures are described in the
physics of the microworld in terms of quantum logic.
4. Probability on ortholattices
In quantum theory the notion of probability is modiﬁed and it does not satisfy
Kolmogorov’saxioms and it must be modiﬁed. The main axiom – axiomof additivity
a ∩ b = ∅ =⇒ Pr(a ∪ b)=Pr(a)+Pr(b)
is changed on the more weak axiom
a ⊥ b =⇒ Pr(a ∨ b)=Pr(a)+Pr(b)
based on the notion of orthogonality of events. Orthogonality is some speciﬁcation
of the notion of disjointness coinciding with the latter in case of Boolean logic. The
notion of orthogonality implies consideration of new structures – ortholattices.A n
ortholattice is a mathematical structure L = {L, , ⊥,1,0} where
I. {L, ,1,0} is a bounded lattice,w h e r e1 is the maximum and 0 is the minimum.
In other words:
(i) ”   ”i sapartial order relation on L (reﬂexive, antisymmetric and transitive);
(ii) any pair of elements a,b has an inﬁmum a ∧ b and a supremum a ∨ b such
that:
a ∧ b   a,b and ∀c: c   a,b ⇒ c   a ∧ b;
a,b   a ∨ b and ∀c: a,b   c ⇒ a ∨ b   c;
(iii) ∀a : 0   a; a   1.
II. the operation ”⊥” (called orthocomplement) satisﬁes the following conditions:
(i) (a⊥)⊥ = a (double negation);
(ii) a   b ⇒ b⊥   a⊥ (contraposition);
(iii) a ∧ a⊥ = 0 (non contradiction).
The notion of the ortholattice makes possible to formulate the deﬁnition of orthog-
onal events:
a ⊥ b ⇐⇒ a   b⊥
3 See L.K.Franeva, A.A.Grib, G.N.Parﬁonov – Quantum games of macroscopic partners136 Andrei A. Grib, Georgy N. Parﬁonov
Boolean algebras are ortholattices and their orthocomplements are identical to com-
plements. But, diﬀerently from Boolean algebras, ortholattices do not generally
satisfy the distributive laws of ∧ and ∨. There holds only
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c)   a ∧ (b ∨ c)
and the dual form
a ∨ (b ∧ c)   (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c).
The lattice C(H) of all closed subspaces in a Hilbert space is a characteristic ex-
ample of a non distributive ortholattice. Another example of the non distributive
ortholattice – is the set P(H) of selfadjoint projectors in a Hilbert space with partial
order relation: a   b ⇔ ab = ba = a. The morphism a  → ima, putting to projector
its image realizes the isomorphism of these two ortholattices.
5. The speciﬁc of the quantum probability
The set of all probability measures on the ortholattice is described by relations:
p1 + p3 =1 ,p 2 + p4 =1 ,p 1,p 2,p 3,p 4   0
These distributions can be parameterized by points (p1,p 2) of the unit square of
the coordinate plane 0   p1   1, 0   p2   1. However in quantum theory not
all of these distributions have sense. It is due to the fact that probabilities arise to
describe the result of measurement procedure, which supposes the act of preparation
of the system in deﬁnite state. Quantum probability measures are constructed on
the basis of the representations of the elements of an ortholattice a ∈Lby means
of projectors E(a) in a Hilbert space H such that
E(a ∧ b)=E(a) · E(b),E (a⊥)=I − E(a),E (1)=I
for any elements a,b ∈L ,t h a tcommute. In this case the probabilities of the elements
a ∈ L are calculated according to Pr ρ(a)=t r ( ρE(a)) where ρ is a density matrix.
If ψ ∈His pure states, then ρ = |ψ  ψ| and probabilities are calculated according
to Pr ψ(a)= ψ|E(a)|ψ ,  ψ|ψ  = 1. It occurs that in case of the nondistributive
ortholattice (10) the set of quantum probability measures, i.e. those obtained by
the procedure of measurement does not full all the square.
Let us take αj  →   αj – some representation of the ortholattice (10) by projector
operators. Then due to orthogonality relations α1
⊥ = α3, α2
⊥ = α4, pairs of
operators   α1,   α3 and   α2,   α4 commute, which is not true about operators   α1,   α2 and
  α3,   α4.R e a l l y ,i f[   α1   α2]=0a n d[   α3   α4] = 0, then one has the relations α1
⊥ =
α2, α3
⊥ = α4 and the ortholattice (10) occurred to be Boolean, but this is not
correct because of non Boolean relations (10). From this one sees that nontrivial
commutation relations
[  α1   α2]=γ12  =0 , [  α3   α4]=γ34  = 0 (11)
introduce auxiliary constraints for probabilities p1,p 2 and p3,p 4.I no t h e rw o r d s
besides natural relations for probabilities, there are some hidden relations for prob-
abilities induced by the very measurement procedure. To ﬁnd these relations one
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6. The representations of the ortholattice ♦ + ♦
Let us ﬁx some Hilbert space H as the space of representation. Taking self adjoint
projection operators   αj : H→Hso that
  α1 +   α3 = I,   α2 +   α4 = I (12)
then for the normalized vector ψ ∈Hthe probability is pj =  ψ|  αj|ψ .F r o mt h i s
immediately follows
p1 + p3 =1 ,p 2 + p4 =1
Other relations are deﬁned by the choice of these or those commutation relations
for pairs of operators   α1,   α2   α3,   α4. From symmetry considerations let us agree
that operators   α1,   α2,   α3,   α4, representing the elements of the lattice have the same
range rk   αj = dimim   αj = r.
Then due to   α3 = I−  α1 and [  α1  α3] = 0, one obtains r = n−r,w h e r en =d i mH
and so the space H – is even dimensional on C. Then by using the property that
projectors of the same range are unitary equivalent one can ﬁnd such operator
u ∈ SU(n), that the relation   α2 = u†  α1u takes place. It is easy to see that then
  α4 = u†  α3u. Depending on the choice of the corresponding unitary operator one gets
diﬀerent models. It is natural to consider among diﬀerent possible representations of
the ortholattice irreducible representations, when the family of projecting operators
{  αj} does not have nontrivial subspaces. It is easy to check that such representations
are two dimensional on C. More easily are formed the representations on R. To ﬁnd
them introduce on H some complex structure   – the morphism of H on itself such
that (x + y)  = x  + y , (λx)  = λx  ,x    = x.
The operator of the complex structure is involution   2 = I, and its eigen spaces
are +1 and −1. The eigen subspace L = {x ∈H|x  = x} is the two dimensional real
linear space. The real part Re x,y  of the Hermitian scalar product  x,y  in Hilbert
space H transforms L into two dimensional Euclidean space. Consider the special
case when the operators of the representation are invariantrelative to some complex
structure  , i.e each of the projective operators commutes with the operator of the
complex structure:   αj   =     αj.T h e nL is the invariant subspace for each operator
  αj and all these orth-projectors will have in space L range equal to one. Due to
rk   αj =1f o ra l lj. The element u ∈ SO(2), exists that   α2 = u−1  α1u. Calculation
shows that in this case   α4 = u−1  α3u.
The operator u is rotation on the plane. This rotation transforms the line
 1 =i m   α1 into a line  2 =i m   α2 and correspondingly the line  3 =i m   α3 into
a line 4 =i m  α4.L e tθ is the angle between the lines  1,  2,t h e nu is the operator of
rotation on the angle θ.N o t et h a t0 ◦   θ<180◦ – because by rotation on 180o every
line is transformed into itself. The angle can be calculated (13), from the operators
of the representation. Let us ﬁnd the commutation relations for the operators of the
representation. To do this consider s1 =2  α1−I, s2 =2   α2−I – the reﬂection oper-
ators relative to the lines  1,  2. One can see from elementary geometric considera-
tions that the composition S1S2 is the rotation on the angle 2θ.S os1s2 = u2 Reﬂec-
tions are involutions, so s2
1 = s2




1 =( s1s2)−1 = u−2.
Calculating the commutator one obtains [s1s2]=4 [   α1  α2]a n ds o
[  α1  α2]=
u2 − u−2
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Figure1. The realization of the space of strategies as some real space of strategies
Let x ∈Lsome unit operator on the plane. Due to u2 being the rotation on
the angle 2θ, one obtains from elementary geometric considerations that vector
u2x−u−2x is perpendicular to the vector x and has the length 2sin2θ.S ou2−u−2 =
2ιsin2θ where ι – is the operator of rotation on the direct angle: ι2 = −I.O n ec a n
write with the help of this operator all nontrivial commutation relations:




Construct matrix representation of the ortholattice (10). Let us take in the real space
of states L the normalized eigen basis of the projector   α1. Matrices of operators
  α1,   α2 in this basis have the form











where θ – is the angle between  1,  2. Calculation shows that








Now consider the general complex case. Take f ∈H– the normalized eigen vector of
the projection operator   α2, with the eigen value 1. Then the projector   α2 = |f  f|.
Expanding the vector f in eigen basis of the operator   α1, one obtains the coordinate
representation  f| = eiϕ·(cosθ, e−iλ sinθ)w h e r eϕ and λ are some real parameters.
From this one gets
  α2 =
 














In the result one obtains commutation relations
[  α1  α2]=[   α2  α3]=[   α3  α4]=[   α4  α1]=
1
2
ι(λ)sin2θ (14)Quantum Nash-Equilibrium and Linear Representations of Ortholattices 139
similar to those obtained for the real version (13). From ι(λ)ι†(λ)=I, the operator
ι(λ) – is unitary. Due to ι(λ)2 = −I, One sees,that ι(λ) is th ”rotation” in two
dimensional complex space on the direct angle. There is a set of such rotations.
To classify them note that operators κ(λ)=−ι(λ)ι(0) form the one parametric
subgroup SU(2): κ(α + β)=κ(α) · κ(β) In terms of the double list enveloping
SU(2) → SO(3) the operators ι(λ) are classiﬁed as rotations on the direct angle
around the axices in R3.
7. The quantum strategies on the ortholattice ♦ + ♦
In case of the irreducible representation of the ortholattice the coordinate represen-
tation of the normalised vectors in the eigen basis of the operator   α1 has the form
 ψ| =( c o sξ, sinξ). Calculating the probabilities p1 =  ψ|  α1|ψ ,p 2 =  ψ|  α2|ψ ,a n d
using the matrix representation of operators   α1,   α2, one ﬁnds that p1 =c o s 2 ξ,
p2 =c o s 2 ξ cos2 θ +2c o sξ cosθsinξ sinθ +s i n
2 ξ sin
2 θ = cos2(ξ − θ)
where 0◦   θ<180◦ – the parameter of the representationof the ortholattice,
corresponding to the given commutation relation. Excluding from these equations
the parameter of the state ξ one obtains the equation of the constraint for p1,p 2:
p2
1 − 2p1p2 cos2θ + p2
2 − 2p1 sin
2 θ − 2p2 sin
2 θ +s i n
4 θ = 0 (15)
The corresponding quadratic form has the positive discriminant δ =s i n
2 2θ,s ot h i s
equation deﬁnes the ellipse.
This ellipse is included into the square 0   p1,p 2   1. For θ =4 5 ◦ it is a circle.
For θ close to 0◦ and to, 90◦ it is dealated in the direction of diagonals. Write the
ellipse equation in the canonical form using the aﬃne transformation
p1 + p2 = cos
2ξ + cos
2(ξ − θ)=1+cos(2ξ − θ)cosθ
−p1 + p2 = cos2ξ − cos2(ξ − θ)=sin(2ξ − θ)sinθ







gives the parametric equations x1 = cos(2ξ − θ),x 2 = sin(2ξ − θ)a n di nt h e




Pay attention to the important property that the transformation ξ  → ξ + 180◦
means going from the wave function ψ to the wave function −ψ and so the quantum
state is not changed(only the phase factor is changed). This agrees with the equation
of the circle, invariant under the shift ξ on 180◦. This makes possible to represent
the quantum strategy by the unit vector on the plane or by a point on the unit
circle. It is easy to see that the correspondence ψ  → (x1,x 2) is the double list
envelope of the space of quantum strategies by the set of wave functions.
8. Quantization of classical games
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the quantization procedure, changing Boolean values αj,β k on the projection oper-
ators αj  →   αj,β k  →   βk in Hilbert spaces HA, HB, describing the players strategies
  αj : HA −→ H A,   βk : HB −→ H B In the result one obtains the self adjoint payoﬀ
operator
  h =
 
j, k
hjk   αj ⊗   βk (16)
The players strategies are described by the wave functions and the game situations
are represented by the resolved vectors of the tensor product HA ⊗H B.
Let ϕ ∈H A,ψ∈H B – are quantum strategies. Calculation gives the following
expression for the average proﬁt in the factorized state ϕ ⊗ ψ:
   h  =
 
j, k
hjk  ϕ ⊗ ψ|  αj ⊗   βk|ϕ ⊗ ψ  =
 
j, k
hjk  ϕ|  αj|ϕ  ψ|  βk|ψ 
Denoting pj =  ϕ|  αj|ϕ ,q k =  ψ|  βk|ψ  one comes to the same as in the classical
game theory expression for the average proﬁt




with the diﬀerence that pj,q k, are in general not classical probabilities. The operator
representation makes possible to consider as games with classical Boolean probabil-
ities as their generalisations on ortholattices. It needs only to choose properly the
projection operators. If one takes the operators   αj,   βk so that
  α1 +   α2 +   α3 +   α4 = I, [  αj  αk]=0 ,j = k (17)
  β1 +   β2 +   β3 +   β4 = I, [  βj  βk]=0 ,j = k (18)
then one obtains the classical game with usual mixed strategies constrained by the
conditions
p1 + p3 + p2 + p4 =1 ,q 1 + q3 + q2 + q4 =1
If one takes the projection operators   αj,   βk so that
  α1 +   α3 = I, [  α1  α3]=0 ,   α2 +   α4 = I, [  α2  α4] = 0 (19)
  β1 +   β3 = I, [  β1  β3]=0 ,   β2 +   β4 = I, [  β2  β4] = 0 (20)
then one comes to limitations:
p1 + p3 =1 ,p 2 + p4 =1 ,q 1 + q3 =1 ,q 2 + q4 = 1 (21)
At last one of the players can be classical but the other can follow the quantum
logic. In other words the quantization of the game is deﬁned by the choice of these
or those commutation relations.Quantum Nash-Equilibrium and Linear Representations of Ortholattices 141
9. Search of equilibria
Results of this part generalize the previous results obtained for special cases. By
the linear transformation of variables
2p = xMθ + e, 2q = yMτ + e (22)






,e =( 1 ,1)
the equations of constraint can be written as x2
1 + x2
2 =1 ,y 2
1 + y2
2 =1 .S oe a c h
player chooses some point on the unit circle and the quantum game occurs to be
the classical game on torus.
Let h = ||hjk|| – the matrix of the antagonistic game of two persons each having
four strategies and p =( p1,p 2,p 3,p 4), q =( q1,q 2,q 3,q 4) are quantum strategies
of players in the probability representation. Then the average quantum proﬁt is
 h  = phq†. Due to relations (21), the four dimensional vectors p,q can be linearly
expressed through two dimensional vectors p,q:







,k =( 0 ,0,1,1)
The average proﬁt in new variables is
 h  =( pZ + k)h(Z†q† + k†)=pZhZ†q† + pZhk† + khZ†q† + khk†
Changing the variables (22) and putting away the scale factors and additive con-
stants one gets
 h  ∼ (xMθ + e)ZhZ†(Mτ
†y† + e†)+2 ( xMθ + e)Zhk† +2 khZ†(Mτ
†y† + e†)
Putting additive constants once more one has
 h  ∼ xMθZhZ†Mτ
†y† + xMθZh(Z†e† +2 k†)+( eZ +2 k)hZ†Mτ
†y†









Then  h  ∼ xAy† + xu† + vy†. To ﬁnd Nash equilibria use the following criterium
of the equilibrium: (G.Parﬁonov, 2008)4 Pair (x,y) is the Nash equilibrium if and
only if for some λ,µ   0 one has the equalities :
yA
† + u = λx, xA + v = µy (23)
Search of eigen equilibria corresponds to ﬁnding such values of parameters of the
representation ϑ,τ, for which for some values s,t one has the relations:
vA† = su, uA = tv (24)
4 See G.Parﬁonov – Multiple Nash-equilibrium in Quantum Game142 Andrei A. Grib, Georgy N. Parﬁonov
Supposing u,v  = 0 consider vectors x = u/|u|,y= v/|v|. Putting them into the
system (23) one gets
yA† + u =
|u|
|v|




So if the system of equations (24) for ϑ,τ,s,t has the solution with limitations
s+|v|   0,t +|u|   0, then the pair (x,y) is the Nash equilibrium. Let us analyze








From this one has
aMθ
†MθC = tb, bMτ





1c o s 2 γ
cos2γ 1
 
It is important that the matrix C and vectors a,b from angle parameters θ,τ are
not dependent.
Supposing matrix C to be non-degenerate take f = bC−1,g= aC−1 The the
equations (25) can be written as aNθ = tf, bNτ = sg. From this one obtains the
relations a1 + a2 cos2θ = tf1,a 1 cos2θ + a2 = tf2. Excluding the parameter t,o n e
obtains the equation for deﬁning the parameter of the representation θ and τ
a1 + a2 cos2θ





b1 + b2 cos2τ




But the values a1,a 2,b 1,b 2,f 1,f 2,g 1,2 depend only on the elements of the payoﬀ
matrix h = ||hjk||, so we can formulate the ﬁnal result:
In case of the equilibrium the linear representations of the lattices of the players
of the game are totally deﬁned by the elements of the payoﬀ matrix.
So one comes to a conclusion that to deﬁne the quantum game one needs only
the payoﬀ matrix and logical relations forming the corresponding ortholattice.
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Abstract The stochastic game Γ under consideration is repetition of the
same stage game G which is played on each stage with diﬀerent coalitional
partitions. The probability distribution over the coalitional structures of
each stage game depends on the initial stage game G and the n-tuple of
strategies realized in this game. The payoﬀs in stage games (which is a si-
multaneous game with a given coalitional structure) are computed as compo-
nents of the generalized PMS-vector (see (Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009),
(Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006)). The total payoﬀ of each player in game Γ
is equal to the mathematical expectation of payoﬀs in diﬀerent stage games
G (mathematical expectation of the components of PMS-vector). The con-
cept of solution for such class of stochastic game is proposed and the exis-
tence of this solution is proved. The theory is illustrated by 3-person 3-stage
stochastic game with changing coalitional structure.
Keywords: stochastic games, coalitional partition, Nash equilibrium, Shap-
ley value, PMS-vector.
Introduction
This paper belongs to the well investigated direction in management theory - game
theory which deals with existence and ﬁnding optimal solution problems of man-
agement in a collision of parties, when each party tries to inﬂuence development
of the conﬂict in accordance with its own interest. Problems that arise in diﬀerent
practical spheres are solved according to the game theory models. In particular,
these are the problems of management, economics, decision theory.
In the paper a class of multistage stochastic games with diﬀerent coalitional
partitions is examined. A new mathematical method for solving stochastic coali-
tional games, based on calculation of the generalized PMS-value introduced in
(Grigorieva and Mamkina, 2009), (Petrosjan and Mamkina, 2006) for the ﬁrst time,
is proposed along with the proof of the solution existence. The probability distribu-
tion over the coalitional structures of each stage game depends on the initial stage
coalitional game and the n-tuple of strategies realized in this game. The theory is
illustrated by 3-person 3-stage stochastic game with changing coalitional structure.
Remind that coalitional game is a game where players are united in ﬁxed coali-
tions in order to obtain the maximum possible payoﬀ, and stochastic game is a
multistage game with random transitions from state to state, which is played by
one or more players.Solution for a Class of Stochastic Coalitional Games 145
1. Statement of the problem
Suppose ﬁnite graph tree Γ =( Z, L)w h e r eZ is the set of vertices in the graph
and L is point-to-set mapping, deﬁned on the set Z: L(z) ⊂ Z, z ∈ Z. Finite graph
tree with the initial vertex z0 will be denoted by Γ (z0).
In each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z0) simultaneous N-person game is deﬁned
in a normal form
G(z)= N,X1,...,Xn,K 1,...,Kn  , (1)
where





    xz
j = k, k= 1,m j
 
is the set of pure strategies of player j ∈ N
identical for all vertices z ∈ Z;
− mj is the number of pure strategies of player j ∈ N in the set Xj;
− xz









∈ Σj is the mixed strategy of player j ∈ N at the vertex
z ∈ Z where µ
j
k is a choice probability for the j-th player to pick k-th pure strategy:
µ
j






− Σj is the set of all mixed strategies of j-th player;
− xz =( xz
1, ..., xz
n) ∈ X, x z
j ∈ Xj,j = 1,n ,i st h en-tuple of pure strategies




Xi is the set of n-tuples identical for all vertices z ∈ Z;
− µz =( µz
1, ..., µz
n) ∈ Σ, µ z
j ∈ Σj,j = 1,n ,i st h en-tuple of mixed strategies




Σj is the set of n-tuple in the mixed strategies identical for all
vertices z ∈ Z;
∗ Kj (xz) ,x z ∈ X, is the payoﬀ function of the player j, identical for all vertices
z ∈ Z ;i ti sp r o p o s e dt h a tKj (xz) ≥ 0 ∀xz ∈ X and ∀ j ∈ N.
Furthermore, let in each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z0) the coalitional parti-
tion of the set N be deﬁned




i. e. the set of players N is divided into l coalitions each acting as one player.
Coalitional partitions can be diﬀerent for diﬀerent vertices z,i .e .l = l(z) .
Then in each vertex z ∈ Z we have the simultaneous l-person coalitional game















Xj is the set of strategies ˜ xz
Si of coalition Si,i = 1,l ,where the
strategy ˜ xz
Si ∈ ˜ Xz
Si of coalition Si is n-tuple strategies of players from coalition Si,





  j ∈ Si
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∈ ˜ Xz, ˜ xz
Si ∈ ˜ Xz
Si,i = 1,l ,is n-tuple of strategies in the
game G(z, Σ z);




Si is the set of n-tuples in the simultaneous game G(z, Σ z);
− ˜ µz
i is the mixed strategy of coalition Si ,i = 1,l ,a tt h ev e r t e xz ∈ Z;
− ˜ Σz
i is the set of all mixed strategies of coalition Si ,i= 1,l ,a tt h ev e r t e x
z ∈ Z;
− ˜ µz =( ˜ µz
1, ..., ˜ µz
l ) ∈ ˜ Σz , ˜ µz
i ∈ ˜ Σz
i ,i = 1,l ,is the n-tuple of mixed strategies
in the game G(z)i nt h em i x e ds t r a t e g i e sa tt h ev e r t e xz ∈ Z;




i is the set of n-tuple in the mixed strategies at the vertex z ∈ Z;






Kj (x) ,i = 1,l,
where xz =( xz
1, ..., xz
n)a n d˜ xz =
 
˜ xz
S1, ..., ˜ xz
Sl
 
are the same n-tuples in the
games G(z)a n dG(z, Σ z) correspondingly such that for each component xz
j,j =
1,n ,f r o mt h en-tuple xz it follows that the component xz,j∈ Si, is included in
the strategy ˜ xz
Si from the n-tuple ˜ xz.
Denote by only xz the n-tuple in the games G(z)a n dG(z, Σ z). However it
does not lead to µz =˜ µz.
After that for each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z0) the transition probabilities
p(z, y; xz) to the next vertices y ∈ L(z) of the graph Γ (z0) are deﬁned. The
probabilities p(z, y; xz) depend on n-tuple of strategies xz realized in the game
G(z, Σ z) with ﬁxed coalitional partition:
p(z, y; xz) ≥ 0,  
y∈L(z)
p(z, y; xz)=1.
Deﬁnition 1. The game deﬁned on the ﬁnite graph tree Γ (z0)w i t hi n i t i a lv e r t e x
z0 will be called the ﬁnite step coalitional stochastic game ˜ Γ (z0):
˜ Γ (z0)=
 
N, Γ (z0) , {G(z, Σz)}z∈Z , {p(z, y; x




− N = {1,...,n} is the set of players identical for all vertices z ∈ Z;
− Γ (z0) is the graph tree with initial vertex z0;
−{ G(z, Σz)}z∈Z is the simultaneous coalitional l- p e r s o ng a m ed e ﬁ n e di na
normal form in each vertex z ∈ Z of the graph Γ (z0);
−{ p(z, y; xz)}z∈Z,y ∈L(z),x z∈XZ is the realization probability of the coalitional
game G(y, Σ y)a tt h ev e r t e xy ∈ L(z) under condition that n-tuple xz was realized
at the previous step in the simultaneous game G(z, Σ z);
− k ˜ Γ is the ﬁnite and ﬁxed number of steps in the stochastic game ˜ Γ (z0); the
k- t hs t e pi nt h ev e r t e xzk ∈ Z is deﬁned according to the condition of zk ∈ (L(z0))
k,
i. e. the vertex zk is reached from the vertex z0 in k steps.
States in the multistage stochastic game ˜ Γ are the vertices of graph tree z ∈ Z
with the deﬁned coalitional partitions Σz i ne a c hv e r t e x ,i .e .p a i r( z, Σ z). Game ˜ ΓSolution for a Class of Stochastic Coalitional Games 147
is stochastic, because transition from state (z, Σ z)t ot h es t a t e( y, Σ y), y ∈ L(z),
is deﬁned by the given probability p(z, y; xz).
Game ˜ Γ (z0) is realized as follows. Game ˜ Γ (z0) starts at the vertex z0,w h e r e
the game G(z0 ,Σ z0) with a certain coalitional partition Σz0 is realized. Play-
ers choose their strategies, thus n-tuple of game xz0 is formed. Then with given
probabilities p(z0,z 1 ; xz0) depending on n-tuple xz0 the transition from vertex
z0 on the graph tree Γ (z0) to the game G(z1 ,Σ z1) ,z 1 ∈ L(z0), is realized. In
the game G(z1 ,Σ z1) players choose their strategies again, n-tuple of game xz1 is
formed. Then from vertex z1 ∈ L(z0) the transition to the vertex z2 ∈ (L(z0))
2
is made, again n-tuple game xz2 is formed. This process continues until vertex
zk ˜ Γ ∈ (L(z0))




= ∅ is reached.
Denote by ˜ Γ (z) the subgame of game ˜ Γ (z0), starting at the vertex z ∈ Z of
the graph Γ (z0), i. e. at coalitional game G(z, Σ z). Obviously the subgame ˜ Γ (z)
is also a stochastic game.
Denote by:
− uz
j (·) is the strategy of player j, j = 1,n,in the subgame ˜ Γ (z)w h i c ht o
each vertex y ∈ Z assigns the strategy x
y
j of player j in each simultaneous game












Si (·) is the strategy of coalition Si in the subgame ˜ Γ (z)w h i c hi sas e to f
strategies uz
j (·) ,j∈ Si;
− uz (·)=( uz




S1 (·) ,...,u z
Sn (·)
 
is the n-tuple in the
game ˜ Γ (z).
It’s easy to show that the payoﬀ Ez
j (uz (·)) of player j, j = 1,n ,in any game
˜ Γ (z) is deﬁned by the mathematical expectation of payoﬀs of player j in all its
subgames, i. e. by the following formula (Zenkevich et al., 2009, p. 158):
Ez









Thus, a coalitional stochastic game ˜ Γ (z0) can be written as a game in normal
form
˜ Γ (z0)=  
















j is the set of the strategies uz
j (·) of the player j, j = 1,n .148 Xeniya Grigorieva
The payoﬀ Hz
Si (xz) of coalition Si ∈ Σz,i= 1,l,in each coalitional game
G(z, Σ z) of game ˜ Γ (z0)a tt h ev e r t e xz ∈ Z in all n-tuple xz is deﬁned as the sum







Si (uz (·)) ,S i ∈ Σz,i= 1,l,in the subgame ˜ Γ (z) of the game
˜ Γ (z0)a tt h ev e r t e xz ∈ Z is deﬁned as the sum of payoﬀs of players from the
coalition Si in the subgame ˜ Γ (z)a tt h ev e r t e xz ∈ Z:
Hz






















It’s clearly, that in any vertex z ∈ Z under the coalitional partition Σz the
game ˜ Γ (z)w i t hp a y o ﬀ sEz
j of players j = 1,ndeﬁned by (4), is a non-coalitional
game between coalitions with payoﬀs Hz
Si (uz (·)) deﬁned by (7). For non-coalitional
games the existence of the NE (Petrosjan et al., 1998, p. 137) in mixed strategies is
proved.
Remind that the Nash equilibrium (NE) is n-tuple ¯ uz (·):
Hz
Si (¯ uz (·)) ≥ Hz
Si
 




Si (·) ∈ Uz
Si , ∀ Si ∈ Σz,i = 1,l,
where Uz
Si is the set of the strategies uz
Si (·) of coalition Si ∈ Σz,i= 1,l ,a n d  
¯ uz (·) || uz
Si (·)
 
means that the coalition Si deviates from the n-tuple ¯ uz (·)c h o o s -
ing a strategy uz
Si (·) instead of strategies ¯ uz
Si (·) ∈ ¯ uz (·).
However, as the payoﬀs of players j, j = 1,n,are not selected from the payoﬀ
of coalition in the subgame ˜ Γ (z), it may occur at the next step in the subgame
˜ Γ (y) ,y∈ L(z) , with another coalitional partition at the vertex y, the choice of
player j is not trivial and is diﬀerent from the corresponding choice of entering into
an equilibrium strategy ¯ uz
j (·) in the subgame ˜ Γ (z).
So, solving the coalitional stochastic subgame ˜ Γ (z) means forming the NE ¯ uz (·)
in the subgame ˜ Γ (z) taking into account the presence of coalition structures in the
subgames included in the subgame ˜ Γ (z) in particular, by calculating the PMS-
vector of payoﬀs of players in all subgames included in the subgame ˜ Γ (z).
Formulate follow problem: it’s required to solve coalitional stochastic game
˜ Γ (z0), i. e. to form n-tuple of NE ¯ uz (·) in the game ˜ Γ (z0) by using the gener-
alized PMS-vector as the optimal solution of coalitional games.
2. Nash Equilibrium in a multistage stochastic game
Remind the algorithm of constructing the generalized PMS-value in a coalitional
game. Calculate the values of payoﬀ Hz
Si (xz) for all coalitions Si ∈ Σz,i= 1,l,



















In case of l = 1 the problem is the problem of ﬁnding the maximal total payoﬀSolution for a Class of Stochastic Coalitional Games 149
of players from the coalition S1,i nc a s eo fl = 2 it is the problem of ﬁnding of
NE in bimatrix game, in other cases it is the problem of ﬁnding NE n-tuple in a
non-coalitional game. In the case of multiple NE (Nash, 1951) the solution of the
corresponding coalitional game will be not unique.
The payoﬀ of each coalition in NE n-tuple Hz
Si (¯ µz) is divided according to







(s −1) !(s−s )!
s!
[w(S ) − w(S \{j})] ∀ j = 1,s, (8)
where s = |Si| (s  = |S |) is the number of elements of set Si (S )a n dv (S )i st h e





Then PMS-vector in the NE in mixed strategies in the game G(z, Σ z) is deﬁned
as
PMS(¯ µ
z)=( P M S 1 (¯ µ




z)=Sh(Si : j),j∈ Si,i = 1,l.
We proceed to the construction of solutions in the game ˜ Γ (z0).
Step 1. Calculate PMS-vector in NE in the mixed strategies for all coalitions
Si ∈ Σz,i = 1,l,of each coalitional game G(z, Σ z), L(z)=∅:
PMS(z)=( P M S 1 (z) ,..., PMSn (z)) ,
where PMS(z): =P M S ( ¯ µz)a n dP M S j (z): =P M S j (¯ µz) are PMS-vector and
components of PMS-vector accordingly in one step coalitional game G(z, Σ z),
L(z)=∅.
Step 2. Consider from the end of game ˜ Γ (z0) all possible two stage subgames
˜ Γ (z) ,y ∈ L(z) ,L (y)=∅, with payoﬀs of coalitions
Hz













∀ Si ∈ Σz,i= 1,l.Find the NE ¯ xz or ¯ µz and ¯ uz (·). Calculate PMS-vector in
NE for all coalitions Si ∈ Σz,i= 1,l,of each coalitional stochastic subgame
˜ Γ (z) ,y ∈ L(z) ,L (y)=∅ :
PMS(z)=
 
PMS1 (z) ,..., PMSn (z)
 
,
where PMS(z): =PMS(¯ uz (·)) and PMSj (z): =PMSj (¯ uz (·)) are PMS-vector and
its components accordingly in the coalitional stochastic game ˜ Γ (z), L(z)  = ∅.
Step k. Deﬁne the operator PMS⊕ as PMS-vector, which for each player j =
1,nin any coalitional game G(z, Σz) of subgame ˜ Γ (z) ,y∈ [L(z)]
k−1 ,L (y)=150 Xeniya Grigorieva
∅, correspondingly PMS-components in the NE ¯ uz (·):






















Example 1. Let there be 3 players in the game each having 2 strategies, and let pay-
oﬀs of each player in all game n-tuples be deﬁned, see table 1. Consider all possible
combinations of coalitional partition, cooperative and non-coalitional games.
Table1.
The strategies The payoﬀs The payoﬀs of coalition
I II III I II III (I, II) (II, III) (I, III) (I, II, III)
11 142 1 635 7
11 212 2 343 5
12 131 5 468 9
12 251 3 648 9
21 153 1 846 9
21 212 2 343 5
22 104 3 473 7
22 204 2 462 6
1. Solve coalitional game G(Σ1), Σ1 = {S1 = {I,II},N \S1 = {III}},b yc a l c u -
lating PMS-value: PMS1 =2 5
7; PMS2 =2 3
7; PMS3 =2 1
3 .
2. Solve coalitional game G(Σ2), Σ2 = {S2 = {II,III},N \S2 = {I}} , by cal-
culating PMS-value in pure strategies: PMS1 = PMS2 = PMS3 =3 .
3. Solve coalitional game G(Σ3), Σ3 = {S3 = {I,III},N \S3 = {II}}: PMS1 =
=2 .59; PMS2 =2 .5;PMS3 =2 .91.
4. Solve cooperative game G(Σ4), Σ4 = {N = {I,II, III}}, see table 2. Find the




[v {I,II} + v {I,III}−v {II}−v {III}]+
1
3




[v {II,I} + v {II,III}−v {I}−v {III}]+
1
3




[v {III,I} + v {III,II}−v {I}−v {II}]+
1
3
[v {I,II,III}−v {I,II} + v {III}] .Solution for a Class of Stochastic Coalitional Games 151
Table2.
The strategies The payoﬀs
The payoﬀs of
coalition
Imputation of the maximal
coalition payoﬀ proportional
by Shapley’s vector
I II III II II I I HS (I, II, III) λ1HS λ2HS λ3HS
11 1 42 1 7
11 2 12 2 5
12 1 31 5
12 2 51 3 9 2.5 3.5 3
21 1 53 1
21 2 12 2 5
22 1 04 3 7
22 2 04 2 6
Find maximal guaranteed payoﬀs:
v {I,II} =m a x{4, 3} =4 ; v {I,III} =m a x{3, 2} =3 ; v {II,III} =m a x{3,4} =4 ;





































































































5. Solve the non-coalitional game G(Σ5), Σ5 = {S1 = {I},S 2 = {II},
S3 = {III}} . NE does not exist in pure strategies.
Use maximal guaranteed payoﬀs calculated in item 4
v {I} =1; v {II} =2 ; v {III} =2.
Find optimal strategies according to Nash arbitration scheme (Grigorieva, 2009),
see table 3, where ”−” means that strategies are not optimal according to Pareto,
but ”+” - are optimal according to Pareto. Then we have optimal n-tuples (1, 1, 2)
and (2, 1, 2) which provide identical payoﬀ (1, 2, 2) in both n-tuples.
Conclusion
∗ For Σ1 = {S1 = {I,II},N \S1 = {III}} we have payoﬀ ((2.71, 2.43), 2.33).
∗ For Σ2 = {S2 = {II,III},N \S2 = {I}} we have payoﬀ (3, (3, 3)).
∗ For Σ3 = {S3 = {I,III},N \S3 = {II}} we have payoﬀ (2.59, (2.5), 2.91).
∗ For Σ4 = {N = {I,II, III}} we have (2.5, 3.5, 3).
∗ For Σ5 = {S1 = {I} ,S 2 = {II} ,S 3 = {III}} we have optimal payoﬀ (1, 2, 2)
in n-tuples (1, 1, 2) and (2, 1, 2).
Example 2. In example 1 we considered the game with 3 players, each having
2 strategies, see table 1. Consider the following stochastic game according to the
example 1, see ﬁgure 1.
On the graph shown in the ﬁgure 1, transition probabilities of passing from one
game to another are shown, moreover (p1,p 2,p 3) is determined by the table 4.152 Xeniya Grigorieva
Table3.
The strategies The payoﬀs
I II III I II III
11 142 1 (4 − 1)(2 − 2)(1 − 2) < 0 -
11 212 2 (1 − 1)(2 − 2)(2 − 2) = 0 +
12 131 5 (3 − 1)(1 − 2)(5 − 2) < 0 -
12 251 3 (5 − 1)(1 − 2)(3 − 2) < 0 -
21 153 1 (5 − 1)(3 − 2)(1 − 2) < 0 -
21 212 2 (1 − 1)(2 − 2)(2 − 2) = 0 +
22 104 3 (0 − 1)(4 − 2)(3 − 2) < 0 -
22 204 2 (0 − 1)(4 − 2)(2 − 2) < 0 -
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Remark. Frankly speaking, there must be 5 such tables (according to the num-
ber of games G, from which stochastic game can begin), and transition probabilities
from one game to another at diﬀerent steps may diﬀer. In the given example we
would use data in the table 4 for all games G, and we would consider them to be
constant at each step. Payoﬀs of players in each game G are obtained in the example
1.
Table4.
The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities
I II III I II III Gnoncoal GS1 GS2 GS3 Gcoop
11 142 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
11 212 2 0.1 0 0 0.8 0.1
12 131 5 0.7 0 0.1 0 0.2
12 251 3 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
21 153 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
21 212 2 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5
22 104 3 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2
22 204 2 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0
Algorithm for solving the problem.
1. Consider two step game ˜ Γ (GS3), shown at the very left and upper angle of
the graph in the ﬁgure 1. Make up table 5 of payoﬀs of players: insert data about
payoﬀs in all n-tuples of game GS3 and optimal payoﬀs for all coalitional games.
1.1) Values of payoﬀs:
E ˜ Γ(GS3) (1, 1, 1) = K (1, 1, 1) + p1 (GS3||Gnoncoal, (1, 1, 1)) PMSnoncoal+
+p2 (GS3||GS1, (1, 1, 1)) PMSGS1 + p3 (GS3||Gcoop, (1, 1, 1)) PMScoop.
According to i. 3 of example 1 it is followes that K (1, 1, 1) = (4, 2, 1) (see
table 5). Payoﬀs in n-tuple of NE of the following simultaneous games are equal







,PMScoop =( 2 .5, 3.5, 3).
Then








+0.1 · (2.5, 3.5, 3) ≈ (5.32, 4.19, 3.13) .
Similarly calculate payoﬀ vector in the game GS3 in all other n-tuples, see table
6.
1.2) Solve coalitional game ˜ Γ (GS3) with payoﬀs from table 6 (payoﬀs are cal-
culated by formula (9), data is used from table 5).
1.2.1) Find NE in mixed strategies in the bimatrix game:
η =0 .81
+1




ξ =0 .67 +(1, 2)




(8.45, 4.19) (11.80, 3.40)
(7.88, 4.88) (7.64, 6.73)
(8.25, 4.55) (13.60, 3.64)




Second row is dominated by the forth one. First row is dominated by the convex
linear combination of the third and forth rows. Find n-tuple of NE in the mixed
strategies in the bimatrix game by the formulas










,u =( 1,...,1) ,





















Find mean payoﬀs of coalition {I,III} and player II in the n-tuple of NE
E
 
µ1 ,µ 2 
=0 .67(0.81 · [8.25; 4.55] + 0.19 · [13.6;3.64])+
+0.33(0.81 · [9.45; 5.19] + 0.19 · [8.6;7])=[9.29; 4.76] .
Table5.




































The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities for the stage games
I II III I II III Gnoncoal GS1 GS2 GS3 Gcoop
11 142 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
11 212 2 0.1 0 0 0.8 0.1
12 131 5 0.7 0 0.1 0 0.2
12 251 3 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
21 153 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
21 212 2 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5
22 104 3 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2
22 204 2 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0
1.2.2) Find guaranteed payoﬀs v {I} and v {III} of players I and III. For this





Find mathematical expectation of payoﬀs of players I and III, see table 7.
Thus, v {I} =4 .26, v {III} =4 .74.
1.2.2) Divide the mean payoﬀ of coalition {I,III} in the n-tuple of NE
E
 
µ1 ,µ 2 
=9 .29 between its players according to Shapley value:
Sh1 = v {I} +
1
2
[v {I,III}−v {I}−v {III}]=4 .41,
Sh3 = v {III} +
1
2
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Table6.
The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities
I II III I II III (I, II) I
1 1 1 5.32 4.19 3.13 8.45 4.19
1 1 2 3.42 4.55 4.83 8.25 4.55
1 2 1 4.50 3.40 7.30 11.80 3.40
1 2 2 7.73 3.64 5.88 13.60 3.64
2 1 1 6.32 5.19 3.13 9.45 5.19
2 1 2 3.15 4.88 4.73 7.88 4.88
2 2 1 2.70 7.00 5.90 8.60 7.00














The strategies of N\ S,
the payoﬀs of S
η =0 .81
+1
1 − η =0 .19
+2
0 −(1, 1)
ξ =0 .67 +(1, 2)






(5.32, 3.13) (4.50 , 7.30)
(3.42, 4.83) (7.73 , 5.88)
(6.32, 3.13) (2.70 , 5.90)






3 - tuple ( 1 ;1 ;2 ) ( 1 ;2 ;2 )
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.1 0 0 0.8 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.67 · 0.81 = 0.54 0.67 · 0.19 = 0.13
3 - tuple ( 2 ;1 ;2 ) ( 2 ;2 ;1 )
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.33 · 0.81 = 0.27 0.33 · 0.19 = 0.063
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
of NE
0.28 0.04 0.08 0.51 0.09
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1.2.3) PMS-value of players I and III of coalition S3 gets the following values:
PMS1 =4 .41; PMS2 =4 .76; PMS3 =4 .89.
1.3) Deﬁne transition probabilities to the games G from GS3 in the subgame
˜ Γ (GS3) and get table 8.
2. Similarly solve games ˜ Γ (GS2)a n d ˜ Γ (GS1), see ﬁgure 1.
2.1) Solve the coalitional game ˜ Γ (GS2) with payoﬀs from table 9 (payoﬀs are
calculated by formula (9), data is used from table 5).
η =1
+1




ξ =0 −(1, 2)





(7.33, 5.32) (8.33, 6.32)
(9.52, 7.73) (11.54, 2.83)
(9.38, 3.42) (9.60, 3.15)















Guaranteed payoﬀs equal v {II} =4 .19, v {III} =4 .83 correspondingly. Then
PMS1 =4 .5; PMS2 =5 .03;PMS3 =5 .67.
Table9.
The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities
I II III I II III (I, II) I
1 1 1 5.32 4.19 3.13 7.33 5.32
1 1 2 3.42 4.55 4.83 9.38 3.42
1 2 1 4.50 3.40 7.30 10.70 4.50
1 2 2 7.73 3.64 5.88 9.52 7.73
2 1 1 6.32 5.19 3.13 8.33 6.32
2 1 2 3.15 4.88 4.73 9.60 3.15
2 2 1 2.70 7.00 5.90 12.90 2.70
2 2 2 2.83 6.73 4.81 11.29 3.07
2.2) Solve coalitional game ˜ Γ (GS1) with payoﬀs from table 10.
η =0 .48
+1




ξ =0 .53 +(1, 2)




(9.51, 3.13) (7.97, 4.83)
(9.70, 5.90) (9.56, 4.81)
(7.90, 7.30) (11.37, 5.88)
(11.51, 3.13) (8.02, 4.73)
⎞
⎟ ⎟
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Find guaranteed payoﬀs v {I} and v {II} of players I and II, see table 11. Thus,
v {I} =4 .34, v {II} =4 .38.
Find the mean payoﬀs of coalition {I,III} and player II in the n-tuple of NE
E
 
µ1 ,µ 2 
=0 .53(0.48 · [7.9;7.3] + 0.52 · [11.37; 5.88])+
+0.47(0.48 · [11.51; 3.13] + 0.52 · [8.02; 4.73]) = [9.7;5.34] .
Then
PMS1 =4 .83; PMS2 =4 .87; PMS3 =5 .34.
Table10.
The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities
I II III I II III (I, II) I
1 1 1 5.32 4.19 3.13 9.51 3.13
1 1 2 4.22 4.02 4.57 8.23 4.57
1 2 1 4.50 3.40 7.30 7.90 7.30
1 2 2 8.32 3.24 5.68 11.56 5.68
2 1 1 6.32 5.19 3.13 11.51 3.13
2 1 2 3.40 4.71 4.65 8.10 4.65
2 2 1 2.70 7.00 5.90 9.70 5.90














The strategies of N\S,
the payoﬀs of S
η =0 .48
+1
1 − η =0 .52
+2
0 −(1, 1)
ξ =0 .53 +(1, 2)






(5.32, 4.19) (3.42 , 4.55)
(4.5, 3.4) (7.73 , 3.64)
(6.32, 5.19) (3.15 , 4.88)





Deﬁne transition probabilities to the games G from GS1 in the subgame ˜ Γ (GS1),
see table 12.
3. Now solve the game ˜ Γ
 
˜ Γ (GS3) , ˜ Γ (GS2) , ˜ Γ (GS1)
 
, see ﬁgure 1. Initial
table of data is included in the table 13. Compose the table of payoﬀs used by
formula (9), see table 14.
Then we have the bimatrix game:158 Xeniya Grigorieva
Table12.
3 - tuple ( 1 ;2 ;1 ) (1; 2; 2)
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.7 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.25 0.28
3 - tuple ( 2 ;1 ;1 ) (2; 1;2)
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.23 0.24
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
of NE
0.419 0.051 0.109 0.228 0.193
Gj Gnoncoal GS1 GS2 GS3 Gcoop
Table13.




































The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities for the stage games
I II III I II III Gnoncoal GS1 GS2 GS3 Gcoop
11 142 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
11 212 2 0.1 0 0 0.8 0.1
12 131 5 0.7 0 0.1 0 0.2
12 251 3 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
21 153 1 0.8 0.1 0 0 0.1
21 212 2 0.25 0 0 0.25 0.5
22 104 3 0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2
22 204 2 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0
Table14.
The strategies The payoﬀs The probabilities
I II III I II III (I, II) I
1 1 1 5.53 4.44 3.43 9.97 3.43
1 1 2 4.87 6.36 6.41 11.23 6.41
1 2 1 4.65 3.60 7.57 8.25 7.57
1 2 2 9.47 5.86 8.17 15.33 8.17
2 1 1 6.53 5.44 3.43 11.97 3.43
2 1 2 3.60 5.44 5.22 9.04 5.22
2 2 1 3.75 8.42 7.77 12.17 7.77
2 2 2 4.56 8.93 7.39 13.48 7.39Solution for a Class of Stochastic Coalitional Games 159
η =0 .32
+1
1 − η =0 .68
+2
0 −(1, 1)
ξ =0 .61 +(2, 2)






(9.97, 3.43) (11.23, 6.41)
(12.17, 7.77) (13.48, 7.39)
(8.25, 7.57) (15.33, 8.17)





The n-tuple of NE in the mixed strategies: µ1 =
 







Find guaranteed payoﬀs v {I} and v {II} players I and II, see table 15. Thus,
v {I} =5 .08, v {II} =5 .44.
Find mean payoﬀs of coalition {I,III} and player II in the n-tuple of NE:
E
 
µ1 ,µ 2 
=0 .61 (0.32 · [12.17; 7.77] + 0.68 · [13.48; 7.39])+
+0.39 (0.32 · [8.25; 7.57] + 0.68 · [15.33; 8.17]) = [13.1;7.69] .
Then
PMS1 =6 .35; PMS2 =6 .71; PMS3 =7 .69.














The strategies of N\S,
the payoﬀs of S
η =0 .32
+1
1 − η =0 .68
+2
0 −(1, 1)
ξ =0 .39 +(1, 2)
0 −(2, 1)





(5.53, 4.44) (4.87 , 6.36)
(4.65, 3.60) (9.47 , 5.86)
(6.53, 5.44) (3.60 , 5.44)





Since the game ˜ Γ
 
˜ Γ (GS3), ˜ Γ (GS2), ˜ Γ (GS1)
 
is a three stage game, then
mean payoﬀ of each player at one step can be calculated by formula:
(6.35, 6.71, 7.69)/3 = (2.12, 2.24, 2.56)
Moreover, in the optimized case the examined three step stochastic game is
diﬀerent from the graph, shown in the ﬁgure 1. Show the solved game in the ﬁgure
2.160 Xeniya Grigorieva
Table16.
3 - tuple (1; 2; 1) (1; 2; 2)
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.7 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0.3 0.6 0
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.12 0.27
3 - tuple (2; 2; 1) (2; 2;2)
Probability of passage
in the game Gj
0.1 0 0.7 0 0.2 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
0.20 0.41
Probability of
realization 3 - tuple
of NE
0.104 0.13 0.438 0.265 0.064
Gj Gnoncoal GS1 GS2 GS3 Gcoop
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4. Conclusion
In this paper the new algorithm of solving of ﬁnite step coalitional stochastic game is
proposed. A mathematical method for solving stochastic coalitional games is based
on calculation of the generalized PMS-value. The example shows realization of the
proposed approach.
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Abstract The main purpose of this work is research of the agents behav-
ior on the stock market using methods of evolutionary game theory and
construct evolutionary dynamics for the long-run period. For this model we
considered and compared some additional cases of the dynamics. Following
dynamics for the model were constructed: the evolutionary dynamics, the
OLG dynamics and continuous dynamics of the imitation behavior. As a
result we compared solutions, which were given by all dynamics.
Keywords: Evolutionary game, ESS strategy, stock market, cheap-talk
game, replicative dynamic, discrete dynamics, imitation models, imitation
dynamics.
In this work, we construct an evolutionary model of the behavior of the stock
market agents in case of takeover. Consider stock market with set of agents. Suppose
that each agent has some blocks of shares of diﬀerent companies. Assume that
market agents have three types of behavior. The ﬁrst type is to hold the block of
share-and receive proﬁt from it. The second type is to get control of the company.
In this case agent buys blocks of shares and collects the control, but the main
suggestion is, that each agent can’t buy the control of company independently, he
can buy the control, only if he cooperates with other agent, which has block of
shares of the same company. The third type of behavior is to detect purposes of the
opponent. In other words, if the ﬁrst agent meets other agent, who wants to hold
his block of shares, then he holds too. If the ﬁrst agent meets other agent who wants
to buy the control of the company, then agents cooperate and buy the control.
Suppose that stock market agents are randomly matched, and their interaction
can be described by symmetric two-player game. In this game the ﬁrst strategy of
the agents is to hold the blocks of shares, the second strategy) is to buy control. In
this game players get following payoﬀs, if both players hold their blocks of shares,
then their get little payoﬀ, which is equal 2. If one player wants to buy the control,
and other doesn’t, then the ﬁrst agent gets 0, because he expends money, but doesn’t
have the control, and the second player gets 3, because he has proﬁt from his block
of shares. If both players want to buy the control and cooperate, then they buy it
and get payoﬀ 4.
The main purpose of this work is research of the agents behavior on the stock
market using methods of evolutionary game theory and construct evolutionary dy-
namics for the long-run period. For this model we considered and compared some ad-
ditional cases of the dynamics. Following dynamics for the model were constructed:Construction Diﬀerent of Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model 163
the evolutionary dynamics, the OLG dynamics and continuous dynamics of the
imitation behavior. As a result we compared solutions, which were given by all
dynamics.
1. Base game




B (0,3) (4, 4).
Denote players strategies in this base game as H and B,s t r a t e g yB corresponds
to the ﬁrst type of agents behavior,strategy H describes the second type of behavior.
This symmetric game we will call base game.
Obviously the base game has three Nash equilibriums, two equilibrium are in
pure strategies and one is mixed strategy equilibrium.
In base game we can verify, which strategies are evolutionary stable. To check
which strategies are evolutionary stable, we use the criteria of evolutionary stability,
remind the basic deﬁnition and the criteria:
Deﬁnition 1. x ∈ ∆ is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) if for every strategy
y  = x there exists εy ∈ (0,1) such as inequality
u[x,εy +( 1− ε)x] >u [y,εy +( 1− ε)x]
holds for all ε ∈ (0,εy).
Evolutionary stability criteria (Maynard Smith, Price 1973):
u(y,x) ≤ u(x,x), for all y,
u(y,x)=u(x,x), then u(y,y) <u (x,y),y  = x.
We can present following interpretation for this property. Evolutionary stability
of some strategy x means that this strategy gives better payoﬀ against any other
strategy y and gives the best payoﬀ against every alternative best reply y.
Denote as ∆ESS the set of evolutionary stable strategies. In our case this set
contains two strategies, ∆ESS = {H,B}.
2. Extended game
Consider some extension of the base game. In extended game we add the third
strategy E to the base game. This strategy describe new type of behavior of the
market agents and we will call players, using strategy E, rational players. Rationality
of the player means that agents, which use strategy E can recognize actions of his
opponents. If one rational player meets his opponent, who use strategy B then
the rational player also uses strategy B, and rational player uses strategy H,i f
his opponent uses strategy H. In case when rational player meets another rational
player, then both players play Nash equilibrium strategies.164 Gubar Elena
In base game we have two strict Nash equilibriums hence in extended game
we will consider two cases, which describes two cases of market agents preferences.
Below we present payoﬀ matrices for both cases. Payoﬀ matrix for the ﬁrst case
(case A) of extended game:
HBE
H (2,2) (3,0) (2,2)
B (0,3) (4, 4) (4,4)
E (2,2) (4, 4) (4,4)
We assume that in the ﬁrst case both rational players use strategy B and then
we have 4 as a payoﬀ in strategy proﬁle (E,E). In this case we have ﬁve Nash
equilibriums proﬁles and the set of Nash equilibrium strategies is ∆NE = {H,B,E}.
However in this case we do not have any evolutionary stable strategies, but we have
two neutrally stable strategies B,E and denote as ∆NSS the set of neutrally stable
strategies. Remind the deﬁnition of neutrally stability
Deﬁnition 2. x ∈ ∆ is neutrally stable strategy (NSS), if for every strategy y ∈ ∆
there exists some εy ∈ (0,1) such that inequality
u[x,εy +( 1− ε)x] ≥ u[y,εy +( 1− ε)x]
holds for all ε ∈ (0,εy).
To verify this kind of stability we can easily use following criteria:
Deﬁnition 3. Neutrally stable criteria (Maynard Smith, 1982):
u(y,x) ≤ u(x,x), for all y
u(y,x)=u(x,x), then u(y,y) ≤ u(x,y),y  = x.
Neutrally stability means that if player uses neutrally stable strategy x then he
gets better payoﬀ against any other strategies and can get the same payoﬀ against
every alternative best reply.
We get that in the ﬁrst case of extended game strategies B,E are neutrally
stable strategies, ∆NSS = {B,E}.
Consider the second case of the extended game. In this case both rational players
use strategy H and then we have 2 as a payoﬀ in strategy proﬁle (E,E). Payoﬀ
matrix for the second case (case B) of extended game:
HBE
H (2,2) (3,0) (2,2)
B (0,3) (4, 4) (4,4)
E (2,2) (4, 4) (2,2)
For this payoﬀ matrix we have following set on Nash equilibrium strategies:
∆NE = {H,B,E,x =( 1 /2,0,1/2)}.
We checked that in this case of extended game there are no any neutrally stable
strategies, but strategy B is evolutionary stable and ∆ESS = {B}.
Relative to both cases of extended game we get that the structure of Nash
equilibriums and sets of ESS and NSS strategies are diﬀer from base game.Construction Diﬀerent of Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model 165
3. Replicator dynamic
Consider the long run period and describe the market agents behavior, using in-
struments of evolutionary game theory. Suppose that we have large but ﬁnite group
of agents on the stock market and assume that each agent in the group has some
block of shares of diﬀerent companies, which distribute between the agents. In this
large group of market agents are randomly matched ant their interaction can be
described by the extended game.
In the continuous case, as a result, we construct the replicator dynamics for the
agents. But previously, we give some additional deﬁnitions.
Let each player in this group of agents is programmed to play only one pure
strategy during whole time period and the mixed strategy in this case described in
following way.
Denote as x(t)=( xH(t),x B(t),x E(t)) mixed strategy of the large group of
market agents. The component of this mixed strategy means how many agents use
certain pure strategy. In our case we have following components: xH(t) is the group
share programmed to pure strategy H, xB(t) is the group share programmed to




xiu(ei,x) an average payoﬀ of large group of agents,
where ei is i-th pure strategy. The main equation for replicator dynamics was pro-
posed by Taylor and Jonker, 1978:
˙ xi =[ u(ei,x) − u(x,x)]xi,i = 1,n. (1)
Remaind two propositions, which deﬁne main properties of replicator dynamics.
Proposition 1. (Bomze, Weibull, 1994) x ∈ ∆NSS is Lyapunov stable in the repli-
cators dynamics (1).
Proposition 2. (Taylor, Jonker, 1978) x ∈ ∆ESS is asymptotically stable in the
replicators dynamics (1).
Construct replicator dynamics for both cases of extended game.
For the ﬁrst case of extended game we get following system of diﬀerential equa-
tions:
˙ xH = −xH(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +2 ( 2 xE − 1)) + 2(2x
2
B +4 xBxE + xE(2xE − 1)))
˙ xB = −xB(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +4 xE)+4 ( xB + xE)(xB + xE − 1))
˙ xE = −xE(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +2 ( 2 xE − 1)) + 4(xB + xE)(xB + xE − 1))
(2)
Using some set of initial states xH =0 .01,0.06,...,0.96,x B =0 .98,0.93,...,0.03,
xE =0 .1., we found numerical solution for the system. Solutions trajectories are
presented in the picture below:
In the ﬁrst case of extended game, share xH is decreased during the time, but
shares of agents xB and xE are increased. Hence in this case it if better for players
cooperate and to buy large blocks of shares or the control of the target company.
By proposition 1 we can say that states xE and xB are Lyapunov stable, because
both strategies are neutrally stable strategies. For the second case of extended game
we get the following system of diﬀerential equations:
˙ xH =( 2 xHxB +( xH − 1)xB − 2xB(1 − xH − xB))xH
˙ xB =( ( −2+2 xB)xH + xHxB +( 2− 2xB)(1 − xH − xB))xB
˙ xE =( 3 xHxB − 2xB(1 − xH − xB))(1 − xH − xB)
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Figure1. Replicator dynamics for the ﬁrst case of extended game
Using the initial states xH =0 .01,0.02,...,0.98,x B =0 .98,0.97,..., 0.01,
xE =0 .1 we ﬁnd solution for the system (3). Solutions trajectories for the system





Figure2. Replicator dynamics the second case of extended game extended game
For replicator dynamics, described be equations (3) we have some boundary
initial states xH(0) = 0.37,x B(0) = 0.63,x E(0) = 0.01,x H(0) = 0.35,x B(0) =
0.65,x E(0) = 0.01,x H(0) = 0.36,x B(0) = 0.64,x E(0) = 0.01.
From the initial states xH =0 .01,...,0.36 all trajectories aspire to the vertex
xB and from initial states xH =0 .37,...,0.98 solutions trajectories aspire to state
xE. But in the long run period in the second case of extended game during the time
strategy H is vanished (by proposition, Samuelson, 1993) and players share XB is
increased.
By proposition 2 we get that xB is asymptotically stable, because strategy B is
ESS strategy in extended game.
Analyze both cases we can say that in long run period it is better for the market
agents to use strategy B, which required agents to cooperate with his opponents.
And as a result agents can buy large blocks of shares or the company’s control.
Indeed this type of behavior more risks, however strategy B will survive during
whole time period.
4. Overlapping generation dynamics
Consider special case and suppose that evolution selection is modeled in discrete
time with each period t =0 ,1,2...representing a generations, moreover we assumeConstruction Diﬀerent of Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model 167
that generations can be overlapped in time and agents appear and disappear on
the market r ≥ 1 times per time units. The time unit can be one week, one month
or one year and assume that each time period in interaction involving the share
1/r, r ∈ (0,1] of the total group. The interaction between the agents occurs at
random with equal probability for all individuals in the total group of agents. Here
x(t)=( xB(t),x E(t),x H(t)) is group state at moment t.V a l u e sxB(t),x E(t),x H(t)
are shares of the agents, which use corresponding types of behavior B,H,E.A si n
previous section assume that each agent is programmed to pure strategy and can be
replaced by u(ei,x(t)) + β ≥ 0 agents at moment, where u(ei,x(t) is players payoﬀ
with pure strategy i, in state x(t). Variable β is lifetime of the agent in the market.
The replicator dynamics for this case is described by the expression:
xi(t +1 )=
1 − τ + τ(β + u[ei,x(t)])
1 − τ + τ(β + u[x(t),x(t)])
xi(t),i = H,B,E (4)
x(t) ∈ ∆, β ≥ 0,t =0 ,1,2,...
Variable τ ∈ (0,1] is length of the time interval between two successful changes of
the group.












For the initial states xH =0 .05,0.1,...,0.95,x B =0 .95,0.9,...,0.05,x E =0 .5
and the rates of parameters β =0 .2;τ =0 .8, t =0 ,1,2,... trajectories for the






Figure3. Overlapping generations dynamics the ﬁrst case of extended game
Consider the second case of the extended game and construct dynamics of over-











For the initial states xH =0 .05,0.1,...,0.95,x B =0 .5, xE =0 .95,0.9,...,0.05,
xH =0 .05,0.1,...,0.95,x B =0 .95,0.9,...,0.05,x E =0 .5a n dβ =0 .2;τ =0 .8,




Figure4. Overlapping generations dynamics the second case of extended game
We get that in for the ﬁrst case of the extended game solution trajectories from
all initial states aspire to boundary xB,x E. For the second case of the extended
game all solution trajectories aspire to the vertex xB and share xH will vanishes in
long run period.
5. Replication by Imitation
As in previous paragraphs, consider large, but ﬁnite group of stock market agents.
Each agent uses one on the three described strategies H, B or E, corresponds to
three types of agents behavior. The agents match at random in total group of agents
and assume, that agents inﬁnitely live and interact forever. During the meeting an
agent can review the own strategy and his opponent strategy, and hence, he can
change the own strategy to sampled strategy.
There are two basic elements in this model. The ﬁrst element is time rate at
which agents in the group review their strategy choice. The second element is choice
probability at which agents change their strategies. Both elements depend on the
current group state and on the performance of the agent’s pure strategy.
Let K = {H,B,E} is set of pure strategies, denote as ri(x) an average review
rate of the agent, who uses pure strategy i, in the group state x =( xH,x B,x E).
Player with pure strategy i will be called as i-strategist. Variable pi
j(x)i sp r o b -




i (x)),i = H,B,E is the resulting probability distribution
over the set of pure strategies. This assumption can be interpreted in following way,Construction Diﬀerent of Types of Dynamics in an Evolutionary Model 169
if one agent exits from the market, then he is replaced by another one. In general





j(x) − ri(x)xi,i = H,B,E. (7)
In this paper we use special case of the imitation dynamics of successful agents.
6. Imitation of Successful Agents
Suppose that each agent samples another stock agent from the total group with
equal probability for all agents and observes the average payoﬀ to his own and
the sampled agent’s strategy. When both players show their strategies then player
who uses strategy i gets payoﬀ u(ei,x)+ε and player, who uses strategy j gets
u(ej,x)+ε ,w h e r eε,ε  is random variables with continuously probability distri-
bution function φ. The random variables ε and ε  can be interpreted as individual
preference diﬀerences between agents in the market. As distribution function we use
uniform distribution and consider particular case φ(z)=α + βz, α,β ∈ R, β > 0.
Players compare their payoﬀs: if the payoﬀ of the sampled agent is better than
of the reviewing agent, he switches to the strategy of the sampled agent. In other
words if this inequality u(ej,x)+ε  >u (ei,x)+ε is justify for player with pure
strategy i then he switches to the strategy j.







xj(φ[u(ei − ej,x)] − φ[u(ej − ei,x)])
⎤
⎦xi. (8)
Use the fact that φ(z)=α + βz and transform (7):
˙ xi =2 β[u(ei,x) − u(x,x)]xi. (9)
Use payoﬀ matrix of the ﬁrst case of the extended game and get the system of
diﬀerential equations:
˙ xH =2 β(−xH(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +2 ( 2 xE − 1))) + 2(2x
2
B +4 xBxE + xE(2xE − 1))));
˙ xB =2 β(−xB(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +4 xE)+4 ( xB + xE)(xB + xE − 1)));
˙ xE =2 β(−xE(2x
2
H + xH(3xB +2 ( 2 xE − 1)) + 4(xB + xE)(xB + xE − 1)));
(10)
Solutions trajectories for the system (10) and the initial states xH =0 .01,0.02,
xE =0 .1 ..., 0.98,x B =0 .98,0.97,..., 0.01, and β =0 .8 are presented in the
following picture:
Write the system of diﬀerential equations for the second case of the extended
game:
˙ xH =2 β((2xHxB +( xH − 1)xB − 2xB(1 − xH − xB))xH);
˙ xB =2 β(((−2+2 xB)xH + xHxB +( 2− 2xB)(1 − xH − xB))xB;)
˙ xE =2 β(3xHxB − 2xB(1 − xH − xB))(1 − xH − xB);
(11)
Solutions trajectories for the system (11) and the set of initial states xH =
0.01,0.02,x E =0 .1 ...,0.98,x B =0 .98,0.97,...,0.01, and β =0 .8 are presented
in the picture below:170 Gubar Elena
XE
XB XH




Figure6. The Imitation dynamics the second case of extended game
We get that solutions trajectories in case of imitation dynamics of successful
agents are close to the evolutionary dynamics case, strategies E and B survive in
long run period for the ﬁrst case of the game and strategy B survives in long run
period for the second case of the game. Shares of market agents, which use strategy
H will be vanished from the market in both cases.
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Abstract In this paper the problem of allocation over time of total cost
incurred by coalitions of countries in a coalitional game of pollution reduction
is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is
computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some
given mechanism between its members. Obtained solution is time consistent
and satisﬁes the irrational-behavior-proofness condition.
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1. Introduction
The global environmentalproblem requires joint eﬀort of many countries. There may
be disagreement among diﬀerent parties as to the problem of allocation of costs of
reducing emissions or pollution accumulations. This disagreement can be solved
by negotiations, a mechanism which involves two important elements, i. e. fairness
and (strategic) power. Existing multinational joint initiatives like Kyoto Protocol
or pollution permit trading can hardly be expected to oﬀer a long-term solution
because there is no guarantee that participants will always be better oﬀ within the
entire duration of the agreement. More than anything else, it is due to the lack of
this kind of guarantees that current cooperative schemes would fail to provide an
eﬀective mean to avert disaster. Kyoto protocol speciﬁes emission targets for the
period 2008-2012. Such long term perspective brings forward an equally challenging
task which is how to allocate over time the total individual share of the cost so that
the countries stick, as time goes by, to the agreed solution at initial time, supposing
that the global allocation problem has been solved.
To create a cooperative solution that every party would commit to from begin-
ning to end, the proposed arrangement must remain optimal throughout the period
of question. This is a ’classic’ game-theoretic problem. Time-consistency means that
if one renegotiates the agreement at any intermediate instant of time, assuming that
cooperation has prevailed from initial date till that instant, then one would obtain
the same outcome. The notion of time-consistency in cooperative diﬀerential games
was introduced in the paper (Petrosyan, 1993). Diﬀerential games provide an ef-
fective tool to study pollution control problems and to analyze the interactions
between the participant’s strategic behaviors and dynamic evolution of pollution.172 Anna V. Iljina,Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaya
In this paper a model of pollution cost reduction is considered. Earlier the prob-
lem of global warming was considered by many authors (Dockner et al., 2000, Hau-
rie and Zaccour, 1995, Kajtala and Pohjola, 1995). This model was introduced in
the paper (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). Firstly it was used in discontinuous time
(Germain et al., 1998). The approach of this paper is diﬀerent. The more gen-
eral coalitional setting is considered, when not only the grand coalition, but also a
coalitional partition of players can be formed. This kind of approach was not consid-
ered before when the process was modeled as diﬀerential game because of principle
diﬃculties connected with the construction of solution. Coalitional values for static
games have been studied in a series of papers (Bloch, 1966, Owen, 1997). In a recent
contribution, it was proposed a characterization of the Owen value for static games
under transferable utility (Albizur and Zarzuelo, 2004). The coalitional value for
static simultaneous games with transferable payoﬀs was deﬁned by generalizing the
Shapley value to a coalitional framework (Owen, 1997). In particular, the coalitional
value was deﬁned by applying the Shapley value ﬁrst to the coalition partition and
then to the cooperative games played inside the resulting coalitions. This approach
assumed that coalitions in the ﬁrst level can cooperate (as players) and form the
grand coalition. The game played with coalition partitioning becomes a cooperative
one with a specially deﬁned characteristic function: The Shapley value computed
for this characteristic function is then the Shapley-Owen value for the game.
The present paper emerges from idea that it is more natural not to assume that
coalitions on the ﬁrst level can form a grand coalition. At the ﬁrst step the Nash
equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed. Secondly, the value of
each coalition is allocated according to the Shapley value in the form of PMS-vector,
that was derived in the paper (Petrosyan and Mamkina, 2006). The approach gives
ﬁrst time in game-theoretic literature the possibility to ﬁnd a solution of coalitional
diﬀerential game.
If the obtained solution is time consistent and satisﬁes group and individual ra-
tionality, however no rational payers can deviate from the chosen coalitional path.
If irrational behavior appear later in the game the concerned player would still be
performing better under the coalitional scheme. This condition is named irrational-
behavior-proofness condition or the D.W.K. Yeung’s condition. The coalitional solu-
tion of the game of pollution cost reduction satisﬁes the D.W. K. Yeung’s condition.
The main result of this paper is the calculation of this solution (PMS-vector),
the proof of its time-consistency and the veriﬁcation of D.W.K. Yeung’s condition.
2. Problem statements
The dynamics of the model is proposed (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). Let I be
the set of countries involved in the game of emission reduction: I = {1,2,...,n}.
The game starts at the instant of time t0 from initial state x0. Emission of player
i,(i =1 ,2,...,n)a tt i m et,t ∈ [t0;∞) is denoted ui(t). Let x(t)d e n o t et h es t o c k
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where δ denotes the natural rate of pollution absorption. Let denote ui(t)=ui and
x(t)=x.L e tCi(ui) be the emission reduction cost incurred by country i when




(ui(t) − ¯ ui)
2, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ ¯ ui,γ > 0.
Di(x(t)) denotes its damage cost:
Di(x)=πx(t),π > 0.
Both functions are continuously diﬀerentiable and convex, with and C 
i(ui) < 0
and D 






subject to the equation dynamics (10), where u =( u1,...,u n)a n dδ is the common
social discount rate.





Suppose that each player i ∈ I is playing in interests of the coalition Sk,t o












subject to the equation dynamics (10).
3. Solution of the problem
By assumption, each player i ∈ Sk is playing in the interests of the coalition Sk.
Without loss of generality it can be assumed that coalitions Sk are acting as players.
Then at the ﬁrst stage a Nash equilibrium is computed. The Nash equilibrium is cal-
culated with the help of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (Dockner et al., 2000).
The total cost of coalition Sk is allocated among the players according to Shapley
value of corresponding subgame Γ(Sk). The game Γ(Sk)i sd e ﬁ n e da sf o l l o w s :l e t
Sk be the set of players involved in the game Γ(Sk),Γ(Sk) is a cooperative game.
The computation of the characteristic function of this game isn’t standard. When
the characteristic function is computed for the coalition K ∈ Sk, the left-out players
stick to their feedback Nash strategies. Payoﬀs of all players i ∈ I forms a PMS-
vector (Petrosyan and Mamkina, 2006). This implies that PMS-vector is deﬁned by
the following way:
Deﬁnition 1. The vector
PMS(x,t)=[ PMS1(x,t),PMS 2(x,t),...,PMS n(x,t)],174 Anna V. Iljina,Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaya




(n − m)!(m − 1)!
nk!
[V (M,x) − V (M\{i},x)]
and (S1,S 2,...,S m) is the partition of the set I.
In subsection 3.1 we calculate a Nash equilibrium supposing that coalitions S1,S 2,...,S m
are acting as players. Then in subsection 3.3 we construct PMS-vector, which we
consider as the solution of the constructed coalitional game.
3.1. Computation of the Nash equilibrium
On the ﬁrst step we compute a Nash equilibrium in the game played by calitions.













subject to pollution accumulation dynamics (10). To obtain a feedback Nash equi-
librium, assuming diﬀerentiability of the value function, the system of Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equations must be satisﬁed. Denote by WSk the Bellman function
of this problem. Above mentioned system is given by the following formula:














Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of formulas (2) with respect to ui and equating
to zero leads to
u
N





,i ∈ Sk. (3)
Substituting uN




























It can be shown in the usual way that the linear functions
WSk = ASkx + BSk,k =1 ,2,...,m (5)
satisﬁes the equation (2). Now note that
∂WSk
∂x
= ASk. (6)D.W.K. Yeung’s Condition for the Coalitional Solution 175






















If we combine this with (3) and (7) we get
u
N






for i ∈ I,i fi ∈ Sk. As the result we obtain the total cost of coalition Sk,k =






















3.2. Computation of the Shapley value
Recall that the total cost of coalition Sk is allocated among the players according
to the Shapley value. Similarly we have to ﬁnd the characteristic function for the
game Γ(Sk) and the Shapley value. The computation of the characteristic function
of this game isn’t standard. When the characteristic function is computed for the
coalition K ∈ Sk, the left-out players stick to their Nash strategies.
Computation of Nash equilibrium in the game Γ(Sk). We can easily com-
pute Nash equilibrium. Each player seeks to minimize a stream of discounted sum of








−ρ(t−t0){Ci(ui)+Di(x)}dt, i ∈ Sk, (10)
subject to equation dynamics (10). The value function Wi(x,t)o fs y s t e mo fd y n a m i c










ui − δx(t))],i∈ Sk. (11)
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side (11) with respect to ui and equating to zero leads
to the following Nash emission strategies:
u
n





,i ∈ Sk. (12)
Recall that un
i = uN
i ,i∈ Sj,i / ∈ Sk ,w h e r euN
i is given by the formula (8).




























− δx(t)),i ∈ Sk.
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Taking into account (5) we get











































Wi = Aix + Bi,i ∈ Sk. (16)
Compute outcomes for all remaining possible coalitions in the game
Γ(Sk). The characteristic function for the intermediate coalition L ∈ Sk is com-










subject to the equation dynamics (10). Let WL(x,t) be the Bellman function of the
problem (17). The solution of the problem (17) is equivalent to the solution of the
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:











ui − δx)]. (18)
Suppose the players from I\Sk stick to (8) and the players from Sk\L stick to (12).
Diﬀerentiating the right hand side of expression (18) subject to ui,i∈ L, we get
the strategies uL
i ,i∈ L. Substituting uL
i ,u N
i ,u n
































− δx(t)),L ⊂ Sk,
where l = |L|. Combining this with (5) and (6), we get:
























AL − δx(t)),L ⊂ Sk.
It can be easily checked that

































⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






where Wi(x,t) is given by (16), WL(x,t) is given by (19) and WSk(x,t)i sg i v e nb y
(9).
The Shapley Value. We can see that values of characteristic function V (M,x,t)































for any i ∈ I,i fi ∈ SK.
3.3. Constructing of the PMS-vector
We obtain the Shapley Value (22) for any game Γ(Sk),w h e r e( S1,S 2,...,S m)i s
a coalitional partition of the set of players I. Taking into account deﬁnition 1, we
obtain the formula for PMS-vector:
PMS(x0,t 0)=( PMS1(x0,t 0),PMS 2(x0,t 0),...,PMS n(x0,t 0)), (23)
where PMSi(x0,t 0)=Shi(Sk,x 0,t 0)i fi ∈ Sk, see (22). Substituting the Nash
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4. Time-consistency
Time-consistency means that if one renegotiates the agreement at any intermedi-
ate instant of time, assuming that coalitional agreement has prevailed from initial
date till that instant, then one would obtain the same outcome. The notion of
time-consistency was introduced (Petrosyan, 1993) and was used in problems of
environmental management (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). We begin with deﬁni-
tions, which were introduced in the paper (Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). Consider
subgames of our game with initial conditions (xN(t),t) on the coalitional trajectory
and denote by PMS(xN(t),t) the corresponding PMS-vector:
PMS(xN(t),t)=( PMS1(xN(t),t),PMS 2(xN(t),t),...,PMS n(xN(t),t)),
where PMSi(xN(t),t)=Shi(Sk,x N(t),t)i fi ∈ Sk, see (22).
Deﬁnition 2. The vector β(t)=( β1(t),β 2(t),...,β n(t)) is a PMS-vector distribu-





−ρ(t−t0)βi(t)dt, i ∈ I.
Deﬁnition 3. The vector β(t)=( β1(t),β 2(t),...,β n(t)) is a time-consistent PMSDP




e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)PMSi(xN(t),t),i ∈ I.
If this condition is valid for any t ∈ [t0,∞), then initial agreement is unaltered
during the game.







is a time-consistent PMSDP.











where i ∈ SK and xN(t) is given by formula (24). It can be readily shown by
direct calculation that (25) satisﬁes the deﬁnition 2. This proves that (25) deﬁnes
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5. The D.W.K. Yeung’s condition
In this paper the irrational-behavior-proofness condition is considered, which was
named D.W.K. Yeung’s condition (Yeung, 2006). Consider the solution of the game
in the form of PMS-vector. All players are involved in the game with coalitional
structure. If at any intermediate instant of time t the initial agreement is disturbed,
then the costs of all players will be less than the costs in the case, when coalitions
weren’t formed. The D.W.K. Yeung condition













where Vi(x(t0)) is the maximal guarantied payoﬀ of player i with the initial state
x(t0), when he plays individually, Vi(xN(t)) is the maximal guarantied payoﬀ with
initial state xN(t). The second expression which stands in right part of condition
(26) is the payoﬀ of player i which he gots during the time t − t0 with help of the
distribution procedure of PMS-vector βi(t), where βi(t) equals (25).
In the condition (26) the sign of inequality is diﬀerent, because every player seeks
to decrease total costs. In the condition (26) the multiplier e−ρ(τ−t0) is appeared,
because the game with discounted payoﬀs is considered.
Consider the integral in the right hand side of inequality (26). The substitution
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The value of Vi(xN(t)) = V ({i},x N(t),t) is deﬁned by the formula (21). Simpli-




















































ργ(ρ + δ)2 +
π2
2ργ(ρ + δ)2.















nj = n. (27)








k − 2nk +1 )≥ 0,
which is true. We have proved that the condition (26) is right.
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Abstract In this paper we introduce and analyze a reputation scheme for
common resource sharing problem from game theory perspective. The paper
tries to answer the question: If each player is allocated resources proportional
to its reputation, will the player’s strategy be good for the system? The
problem is formulated for a general form of reputation metric and analyzed
for more speciﬁc, but still representative form of the reputation metric.
Keywords: game theory, reputation system, p2p.
1. Introduction
Many popular Internet applications including data backup, media streaming and
software updates are built on peer-to-peer architecture (Lua et al., 2005). Such sys-
tems require proper motivation to users to operate (Akella et al., 2002), (Mazalov
et al.,2007), (Zhang et al., 2005). It means that eﬀectiveness of these systems is
based on free will of individuals to contribute to the systems (Qiu et al.,2003),
(Shenker, 1995). A problem that limits the usage for such system is called free-riding
(Feldman et al., 2004); it is selﬁsh behavior of individuals who do not contribute to
the system while trying to use the system. To prevent such behavior of individu-
als, reputation systems were proposed. In reputation systems a reputation metric
is associated with each individual. While individuals contribute to the system they
increase their metric, and decrease during selﬁsh use of the system. While the rep-
utation metric provide some incentives and were used in many systems, the study
of metric itself was not extensive.
The incentive problem for distributed systems often can be formulated in terms
of distributed ﬁle (data) sharing system. In our model we will state two ways of indi-
vidual behavior. The ﬁrst one is ’to contribute’, and the second one is ’to consume’.
The reputation metric is in the form of accumulation of all previous contribution
and consumption. We assume that every player of the system is trying to individ-
ually maximize its proﬁt. Hence we are trying to ﬁnd a Nash equilibrium in such a
system, and study the equilibrium dependence on the reputation metric.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state a formal description
of the resource sharing problem. In Section 3, the necessary background on the
maximum principle and the optimal control is given. In Section 4, we analyze the
problem for a special case of the reputation function f(x)=
expx
1+expx. In Section 5,
the optimal trajectory is deﬁned. Section 6 concludes the paper.Applying a Reputation Metric in a Two-Player Resource Sharing Game 183
2. Formulation
Let us have n players. Player i at time moment t contributes ci(t) to the system
(0 ≤ ci(t) ≤ 1), and requests ri(t) from the system (0 ≤ ri(t) ≤ 1). Reputa-
tion value (or we will call it history) xi(t) starting from initial value (0) changes
linearly ˙ xi(t)=ci(t) − ri(t). The proﬁt of player i is calculated over time t (as-




f(xi(t))ri(t)   N
j=0 f(xj(t))rj(t)+  − lci(t)
 
dt,w h e r ef is the reputation metric function. As
we can see, every player receives not the amount of the requested data ri(t), but
the proportion of it, weighted by the reputation function. l is the price of contribu-
tion (in diﬀerent systems it has diﬀerent values). We want to study dependence of


















˙ x1(t)=c1(t) − r1(t)
˙ x2(t)=c2(t) − r2(t)
0 ≤ c1(t),c 2(t),r 1(t),r 2(t) ≤ 1
x1(0) = x2(0) = 0
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(1)
From the system (1) we can see that the accumulated history x(t) changes depending
on the behavior in interval (−∞,∞). Function f should weight the history, and it
clearly maps from interval (−∞,∞)o n t o[ 0 ,1] (there is no restriction that the upper
bound equals to 1, but for simplicity we will bound it from above by 1). Proportion
under the integral sign means that the resource ﬁrst and second players want to
gain is not suﬃcient for both of them (r1(t)+r2(t) > 1). Hence they receive amount
proportional to their behavior.
While the study of such system is complicated, in this paper we attempt to
study a special case of the equation where f(x)=
expx
1+expx. This view of the function
is quite natural, it maps all reputations from domain (−∞,∞) to domain (0,1).
While reputation x can be negative, the value of the function just compresses the x
closer to 0. In such form we may say that it is some kind of goodness probability of
a player (probability metric). By changing the variable we can formulate the task184 Andrey S. Lukyanenko, Andrei V. Gurtov, Vladimir V. Mazalov

















˙ k1(t)=k1(1 − k1)(c1(t) − r1(t))
˙ k2(t)=k2(1 − k2)(c2(t) − r2(t))
0 ≤ c1(t),c 2(t),r 1(t),r 2(t) ≤ 1
k1(0) = k2(0) = 0.5
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(2)
Now history x1,x 2 itself takes values in interval (0,1), hence those can be used as
reputation functions. The rule ˙ ki(t)=ki(1 − ki)(ci(t) − ri(t)) with initial value
ki(0) = 0.5 restricts function ki(t) to always stay on the (0,1) interval. This paper
is devoted to the study of this special case of a 2-player game. The study of the
special case helps in understanding the behavior and study of more general system
(1).
3. Background. Maximum principle of Pontryagin.
To analyze the stated problem we will formulate the maximum principle of Pon-
tryagin (Pontryagin et al., 1962) ﬁrst and then give some required background. We
will use notation and Theorem 5.4 from (Basar and Olsder, 1999). Let x(t)b et h e
trajectory, u(t)–c o n t r o la n df – law of the dynamic system, which connects tra-
jectory, control and time. Let also T be the ﬁnal time, L(u) the cost function and
γ some mapping from time space onto space of admissible control space (S). Then
the problem in general can be written as the following system:




0 g(t,x(t),u(t))dt + q(T,x(T)),
T =m i n
t≥0
{t : l(t,x(t)) = 0},
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(3)
where condition l(t,x(t)) = 0 deﬁnes achievement of terminal state. For such a
























⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(4)
where λ is a co-state variable, function H(t,p,x,u) is called the Hamiltonian func-
tion and operation (...)  is a transposition operation. Now we can state the maxi-
mum principle of Pontryagin in the following theorem:
Theorem 1. (Theorem 5.4 from (Basar and Olsder, 1999)) Consider the optimal
control problem deﬁned by (3) and under the open loop information structure. If the
functions f,g,q and l are continuously diﬀerentiable in x and continuous in t and
u, then relations (4) provide a set of necessary conditions for the optimal control
and the corresponding optimal trajectory.
For a more formal description of all game-theoretic notations and theorem, see
(Basar and Olsder, 1999), and for the proof of the theorem above, see (Pontryagin
et al., 1962).
4. Analysis
In this section, we will give the analysis for the system (2) using the maximum prin-
ciple, described in the previous section. First of all we construct the Hamiltonians;





k1r1 + k2r2 +  
 
+λ11k1(1 − k1)(c1 − r1)+





k1r1 + k2r2 +  
 
+λ21k1(1 − k1)(c1 − r1)+
λ22k2(1 − k2)(c2 − r2)( 6 )
Note, in this section we will be using i,j as indexes. Whenever it is not mentioned
explicitly we assume that following conditions hold i,j ∈{ 1,2} and j  = i, i.e., i is
the index of ﬁrst player and j is the index of the second player.186 Andrey S. Lukyanenko, Andrei V. Gurtov, Vladimir V. Mazalov







(k2r2 +  )k1r1(1 − k1)













(k1r1 +  )k2r2(1 − k2)







(k1r1 + k2r2 +  )2dt.





, where i,j ∈{ 1,2}. (7)
Thus, for λii, i ∈{ 1,2} we have (we also use j ∈{ 1,2},j = i)
˙ λii(t)=
ri(kjrj +  )
(k1r1 + k2r2 +  )2 − λii(t)(1 − 2ki)(ci − ri)( 8 )
Multiplying both parts of equation above by e
  t










0 (1−2ki)(ci−ri)dt ri(kjrj +  )
(k1r1 + k2r2 +  )2. (9)
Now, we can simplify e
  t
0 (1−2ki)(ci−ri)dt, from (2) we have that dki(t)=ki(1 −
ki)(ci(t) − ri(t))dt,t h u s
  t
0





















λii(t)ki(1 − ki)=c +
  t
0
(k2r2 +  )k1r1(1 − k1)
(k1r1 + k2r2 +  )2 dt, (12)
where c is an arbitrary constant deﬁned by boundary condition λii(T)=0 .N o w ,




(k2r2 +  )k1r1(1 − k1)
(k1r1 + k2r2 +  )2 dt. (13)Applying a Reputation Metric in a Two-Player Resource Sharing Game 187






(kjrj +  )kir1(i − ki)
(kiri + kjrj +  )2 dt. (14)







(kiri + kjrj +  )2dt. (15)
 
Lemma 1. λ11(t) ≤ 0, λ22(t) ≤ 0, λ12(t) ≥ 0, λ21(t) ≥ 0 for any t ∈ [0,T].
Proof. We know that ki(t) ∈ (0,1) for all i and t;a l s ori(t) ≥ 0 for all t,t h u s
functions under all integrals are non-negative and, hence, the value of integral itself
is non-negative, and function ki(1−ki) outside the integral is always positive, thus,
the sign before integral deﬁnes the non-negativity or non-positivity of corresponding
co-state variable.
 
Now for simplicity we deﬁne new functions:




















Lemma 2. Lij(t) ≥ 0 for ∀t ∈ [0,T] and Lij(t) is decreasing in time t and at the
ﬁnal moment of time Lij(T)=0for all i,j ∈{ 1,2}.
Proof. From Lemma 1 we know that λii ≤ 0a n dλij ≥ 0f o ri,j ∈{ 1,2} and
i  = j.N o wt h es i g no fLii is opposite to λii and sign of Lij i st h es a m ew i t hλij.
For decreasing it is enough to notice that function the function under integral is
positive and for some ﬁxed (optimal) control function the trajectory is also ﬁxed
(as the solution is in open loop form), from this we immediately have that with
increase of time the value of integral decreases or remains the same.
 
The idea of maximum principle for ﬁnding optimal controls can be formulated in
the following way:









1,k∗,λ ∗). (17)188 Andrey S. Lukyanenko, Andrei V. Gurtov, Vladimir V. Mazalov
It means that player’s optimal controls minimize the corresponding Hamiltonian.
In our case the Hamiltonians have the following forms
H1 =( l + λ11k1(1 − k1))c1 − k1
 
1
k1r1 + k2r2 +  
+ λ11(1 − k1)
 
r1+
λ12k2(1 − k2)(c2 − r2). (18)
H2 =( l + λ22k2(1 − k2))c2 − k2
 
1
k1r1 + k2r2 +  
+ λ22(1 − k2)
 
r2+
λ21k1(1 − k1)(c1 − r1). (19)
Now, we deﬁne new functions that we will be needed for solution
ai(t)=
ki




ki(kjrj +  )
(ki + kjrj +  )2. (21)
Lemma 3. The following inequality always holds a(t) ≥ b(t).
Proof. Putting the function for a(t) (20) and function for b(t) (21) together, we can
see that the inequality always holds for positive ki,ri i ∈{ 1,2}.
ki
kjrj +  
≥
ki(kjrj +  )
(ki + kjrj +  )2, (22)
which corresponds to inequality
1
(kjrj +  )2 ≥
1
(ki + kjrj +  )2, (23)





aLii(t), then the following theorem holds
Theorem 3. Optimal control for player i has the following form:
ci =
 
0, if Lii(t) ≤ l,




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, if Lii(t) >a i(t),
1, if Lii(t) ≤ bi(t),
di(t), otherwise .
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Proof. From (18) and (19) we have that ci independently minimizes corresponding
Hamiltonian from ri,t h u s ,ci =0 ,w h e nl+λ11k1(1−k1) ≥ 0, and ci =1 ,o t h e r w i s e .
From the other hand, l + λ11k1(1 − k1) ≥ 0i se q u i v a l e n tt ol − Lii(t) ≥ 0, from
which we get the ﬁst system (24).
In order to ﬁnd ri, which minimizes corresponding Hamiltonian, we need to ﬁnd
ri, which maximizes the following function
 
ki
kiri + kjrj +  
+ λiiki(1 − ki)
 
ri (26)
Let’s ﬁnd the derivative by ri of this function
ki(rjkj +  )
(kiri + kjrj +  )2 − Lii(t) = 0 (27)
In turn, its solution is equivalent to the solution of the following quadratic equation
ki(rjkj +  ) − Lii(t)(kiri + kjrj +  )2 =0 , (28)




Liiai, the negative one is always out-
side admissible set of ri. Additionally, it can be easily checked that function (26)









Liiai and after that point it decreases.
From this we can conclude that if point di(t) < 0t h e nri(t) = 0 maximizes the
function (26), if pint di(t) > 1t h e nri(t) = 1 maximizes function (26), otherwise
ri(t)=di(t) maximizes that function. The ﬁrst condition di(t) < 0i se q u i v a l e n tt o
Lii(t) >a i(t), the second di(t) > 1i se q u i v a l e n tt oLii(t) ≤ bi(t). This concludes
the proof.
 
Note, that the optimal control is written in closed loop form, which depends on the
remaining path. It means that the current decision is based on the decisions we will
make from the current point path until the ﬁnal moment (T). It is a natural way
of dynamic programing to ﬁnd the optimal solution, when we know values at the
end of the optimal trajectory and ﬁnd them in backward direction until the initial
position (t =0 ) .
5. Optimal trajectory
Based on Theorem 3 we can construct the optimal trajectory, knowing optimal
control on it. See three possible cases in Fig. 1. Now, we are going to give an
iterative scheme to construct the optimal trajectory based on the knowledge of
optimal controls. First of all, assume that in the ﬁnal point T we are in the position
ki(T) (we actually have ki(0) as the initial position, but we will use it in the end of
computation to ﬁnd the ki(T) point, for now assume that is given instead of xi(0)).
From Lemma 2 we know that at ﬁnal point Lii(T) = 0. In Figure 1 it corresponds
to selﬁsh behavior ci −ri = −1, i.e., when we request a lot but contribute nothing.
Based on that we construct a backward path, ki(t) based on the dynamic system













11 − di −di −1






11 − di 0 −1
(c) l<b i
Figure1. Three possible cases.
it has also some dynamics in time. When the function Lii(T), which depends on
the remaining part starts to be greater than bi(t)o rl we will need to switch to
another corresponding optimal control, and hence to the new function of dynamics
for ki. Notice, that by Lemma 2 the function Lii(T) can intersect the value l only
once (though, it can remain on it for a long time), while Lii(T) can many times
intersect ai(t)a n dbi(t) thus changing the optimal control value on the new part of
trajectory.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have formulated a common resource sharing problem using game
theory in a new form, where we introduced dynamically changing ranks, based on
which every player obtains resources. The ranks are more closely relevant to the form
of interaction history of a player. Although, it is natural to assume that the ranking
itself restricts players from selﬁsh behavior, the study of this is rare and not easily
always solvable. In this work we formulated the reputation based resource sharing
problem in general form, for a wide set of ranks. We analyzed a more speciﬁed form
of the reputation recomputation, which does follow the behavior and idea of general
reputation form. Finally, we give solution in a decision form based on three cases.
We determine the optimal controls and the optimal trajectory.Applying a Reputation Metric in a Two-Player Resource Sharing Game 191
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Abstract In the real game situations, the possible values of parameters are
imprecisely known to the experts, all data of the game are not exactly known
to the players, and information is often lacking. Imprecision on the environ-
ment, preferences, payoﬀs and moves of other players, may be of diﬀerent
types, but not only the probabilistic type of the Bayesian games. In the
probabilistic approaches of uncertainty, events or statements are assumed to
be well deﬁned. On the contrary, the Zadeh’s fuzziness concept extends the
imprecision or vagueness appreciations to that events and statements. The
theory of fuzzy sets has been extensively applied to a variety of domains
in soft computing, modeling and decision making. This contribution intro-
duces these attractive techniques with numerical applications to economic
single-objective bi-matrix games. The computations are carried out using
the software MATHEMATICA
7.0.1.
Keywords: fuzzy logic game; fuzzy linear/quadratic programming problem;
extension principle; function principle.
1. Introduction
1.1. Fuzzy approach
In the real game situations, the possible values of parameters are imprecisely known
to the experts and all data of the game are not exactly known to the players.
Imprecision on the environment, preferences, payoﬀs and moves of other players,
may be of diﬀerent types, but not only the probabilistic type of the Bayesian games.
The fuzzy sense of imprecision, introduces a degree of membership for each element
of a given set. In the classical crisp collection of elements X,e a c he l e m e n tx can
belong to or not to the set. For a fuzzy set ˜ A, the characteristic function allows
various degrees of membership µ ˜ A(x)f o rx ∈ X,w h e r eX denotes the universe





This introduction presents elements on the fuzzy games theory, applications of fuzzy
games to economic and management problems, and recalls the equivalence we have
between games and technical programming problems.
1.2. Fuzzy games history
Research on fuzzy games have been developed rapidly since the mid 1970s (Zadeh
et al., 1974- Negoitˇ a and Ralescu, 1975- Butnariu, 1978- Aubin, 1979). The study
by (Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2000a) formulates a linear programming (LP) problem
with fuzzy (triangular) parameters and a fuzzy goal of each coalition of players.
In the fuzzy programming problem, the decision maker (DM) may know the cost
coeﬃcients in the objective function, whereas the payoﬀs in the constraints would
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larger class of combinatorial games and also belong to the so-called ”soft comput-
ing” which combines fuzzy logic, neural networks and evolutionary programming
(Aubin, 1979, 1981). In FLGs, the decision making is re-formulated in an uncertain
(fuzzy) environment : the decision makers are confronted with fuzzy constraints,
fuzzy utility maximization and also fuzziness about the moves of the competitors
(Campos, 1989- Vodyottema et al., 2004, de Wilde, 2004). Moreover, cooperative
FLGs are describing coalitions, where the n players associate a certain rate to their
participation (Mareˇ s, 2001). Such games are deﬁned on fuzzy subsets of the whole
set of n players (Aubin, 1979, 1981- Garagic and Cruz, 2003- Azrieli and Lehrer,
2007- Hwang, 2007). The axiomatic analysis by (Billot, 1992) reformulates the basic
microeconomic theory to deal with fuzzy choice and preferences. The fuzzy prefer-
ence operator   is deﬁned by  : X2  → [0,1], X denoting the set of alternatives.
Hence x   y will be interpreted as the degree to which x is at least as good as y.T h e
resolution method consists in introducing tolerance levels which allow the violation
of each constraint (Delgado et al., 1989). The concepts of equilibrium may be based
on Zimmermann’s approach, in two steps for solving LP multi-objective problems
with fuzzy goals (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970- Chanas, 1978- Lai and Hwang, 1992-
Kim and Lee, 2001- Bector and Chandra, 2005- Kacher and Larbani, 2008). In the
reality, the decision makers with conﬂicting interests, are faced to multiple attributes
such as costs, time and productivity. For such problems, methods and applications
have been developed in (Zimmermann, 1978- Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2000a, 2001 -
Sakawa, 2000). These models are based on the maximin and the minimax principles
of the matrix game theory. The equilibrium solutions correspond to players trying
to maximize a degree of attainment of the fuzzy goals. The aggregation of all the
fuzzy sets in the multi-objective models use the fuzzy decision rule by Bellman and
Zadeh (Lai and Hwang, 1994- Chen, 2002- Keller, 2009a,b).
1.3. Fuzzy games to economics and management
Fuzzy games have been applied to a wide range of subjects in economics and man-
agement modeling, such as: linear production models, inventory models, oligopolistic
competition markets, and management of technology (MOT).
Linear production model. The pioneered production model by (Owen, 1975) is
describing a cooperative game in which the players pool resources to produce ﬁn-
ished goods. The goods are next sold at the market price. In the resulting LP pro-
duction model, the total revenue is maximized subject to the resource constraints.
The Owen’s production model has been extended to fuzzy situations, notably by
(Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2000b,c- Chen et al., 2007). The parameters involved in the
objective and in the constraints of the LP problem are fuzzy numbers which reﬂect
the imprecise knowledge of experts. The DMs maximize the total revenue from sell-
ing, subject to the resource constraints, and in absence of demand limitation. A
parametric programming approach is used to solving the linear production model.
Nishisaki and Sakawa (Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2000b) also prove the existence and
non-emptiness of the α-core of the fuzzy game. In (Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2000c),
two solution concepts based on fuzzy goals are deﬁned: one is deﬁned by maximizing
the minimal fuzzy goal and the other by maximizing the sum of fuzzy goals. Molina
and Tejada (Molina and Tejada, 2006) analyze a linear production with committee
control to allow players to graduate their cooperation willingness. The resources are
controlled by committees of players in a fuzzy context.194 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Production inventory model. The studies by (Park, 1987- Lee and Yao, 1996-
Yao and Lee, 1998- Lin and Yao, 2000) aim the optimality of the stock quantity of
the inventory with back orders. The economic orders quantities are fuzzy numbers
(FNs). As a result, the total cost is found to be higher than in the crisp model.
In (Chen et al., 1996), the fuzzy context is extended to demand, order costs and
back order costs. The computation of ˜ B = f( ˜ A1, ˜ A2,..., ˜ An) with trapezoidal FNs
˜ A1, ˜ A2,..., ˜ An uses the Chen’s function principle (instead of the Zadeh’s exten-
sion principle). In their study, Chen et al. (Chen et al., 1996) propose a production
inventory model with imperfect products to the electronic industry. The fuzzy arith-
metic operations with trapezoidal FNs also use the function principle.
Oligopolistic market model. In their study, (Greenhut et al., 1995) propose a
fuzzy approach to the oligopolistic market. According to this approach, the mem-
bership function expresses the degree to which a ﬁrm belongs to the oligopolistic
market.
Management of technology. The Management of Technology (MOT) is con-
cerned with the identiﬁcation and selection of technologies, innovation management,
transfer and licensing, R & D. In the MOT, the problem of determining optimal
strategies is transformed to a problem of ﬁtting Nash equilibria of a bi-matrix game.
The study by (Chen and Larbani, 2006) approaches the product development of
nano materials in a matrix game model for fuzzy multiple attributes decision mak-
ing problems.
1.4. Equivalence theorems
Two Players I and II have mixed strategies given by the m-dimensional vector x and
the n-dimensional vector y, respectively. The payoﬀs of Players I and II are the m×n
matrices A and B, respectively. Let em be an m-dimensional vector of ones, en hav-
ing a dimension n. The objective of Player I will be: {maxx x’Ay subject to e’mx =
1, x ≥ 0}. The objective of Player II will then be: {maxy x’By subject to e 
ny =
1, y ≥ 0}. Following (Mangasarian and Stone, 1964), a bi-matrix game is shown to
be equivalent to a quadratic programming (QP) problem and a zero-sum game to
aL Pp r o b l e m .
Equivalence to QP problems
Deﬁnition 1. (Nash equilibrium). A Nash equilibrium point is a pair of strategies




Ay∗ =m a x
x
{x’Ay∗|em.x =1 ,x ≥ 0}
x∗
 




By|en.y =1 ,y ≥ 0}
Applying the Kuhn-Tucker (K-T) necessary and suﬃcient conditions, we set the
Equivalence Theorem (Mangasarian and Stone, 1964- Lemke and Howson, 1964-
van der Panne, 1966- Shimizu and Aiyoshi, 1980):
Theorem 1. (Equivalence Theorem). A necessary and suﬃcient condition that










x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0,
where α,β ∈ R are the negative of the multipliers associated with the constraints.
Proof: see (Mangasarian and Stone, 1964), pages 350-351.
Equivalence to LP problems In zero-sum games we have B = −A with γ = −β.
The QP problem degenerates to two dual problems (see Fig.1).
Figure1. LP dual problems












and the strategies are x =( x1,x 2)a n dy =( y1,y 2). The application of the Equiv-
alence Theorem 1 gives the optimal strategies x∗ =( .6,.4) and y∗ =( .6,.2).
2. Fuzzy data environment and fuzzy games
Besides of the usual ”True” and ”False” binary statements, there are also vague (or
fuzzy) statements in the real world of the decision making. The linguistic statements
may be : ”possible”, ”almost sure”, ”hardly fulﬁlled”,”approximately equal to”,
”considerable larger to”, etc.
1 Algorithms for solving two-person games are presented in (Canty, 2003-
Engwerda, 2005).196 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Figure2. Solving games with MATHEMATICA
2.1. Fuzzy number representations
Deﬁnition 2. (Membership function of a fuzzy number). Any vague statement ˜ S
is considered as a fuzzy subset of a universe space X with the membership function
µ˜ S : X  → [0,1] . For any x ∈ X : µ˜ S(x)=1m e a n s˜ S is ”True” for x; µ˜ S(x)=0
means ˜ S is ”False” for x,a n d0<µ ˜ S(x) < 1m e a n s˜ S is ”possible” for x with the
degree of possibility µ˜ S(x). This function is called the membership function (MF)
of the fuzzy number (FN).
Let the MF of the fuzzy ˜ A be piecewise continuous triangular shaped. The fuzzy ˜ A is
said convex normalized. The support of ˜ A is such that supp ˜ A = {x ∈ X|µ ˜ A(x)=0 }.
The height of ˜ A is such that hgt ˜ A =s u p x µ ˜ A(x). The crossover points are deﬁned
by c = {x|µ ˜ A(x)=1
2}.T h eα-cuts of ˜ A gives the crisp set of elements with at least
the degree α, such that αA = {x ∈ X|µ ˜ A(x) ≥ α} (see Fig.3).
LR-representation




















a ),x ≥ ¯ a,
where ¯ a denotes the ”mean value” and δ−
a ,δ +
a the left and right spreads. For the







The LR-representation (Dubois and Prade, 1980) increases notably the computa-
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Figure3. Fuzzy number elements
Figure4. LR-representation of a FN198 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Membership shapes. The MFs may take one of the basic forms in Fig.5. The Figure
A is an increasing ramp MF type. The Figure B is a sigmoidal MF for which a
parameter controls the slope at the crossoverpoint (c,µ(c)). The Figure C represents
a bell-shaped fuzzy set, centered at c with crossover points c − w and c + w,a n d
with slope s/2w at the crossover points. The trapezoidal and the triangular forms
(Figures D and E) are often used, because of their simplicity.
Figure5. Basic shapes for membership functions
2.2. Arithmetic operations on fuzzy numbers
The extension principle is a method of calculating the MF of the output from the
MFs of the input fuzzy quantities. More precisely, let the symbol ∗ : R×R  → R with
∗∈{ +,−,.,/}, a binary operation over real numbers. Then, it can be extended to
the operation   over the set F(R) of fuzzy quantities (see Appendix B).
Extension Principle 2
2 On the contrary to the convolution form of the extension principle, Chen’s rule is a useful
pointwise multiplication for trapezoidal MFs. Let F be a mapping from n-dimension
FNs belonging to the trapezoidal family ˜ Ai =( ai,b i,c i,d i;wi)w h e r ewi =m a x x µ ˜ Ai(x)
i ∈ Nn. The fuzzy ˜ B in R is ˜ B = F( ˜ A1, ˜ A2,..., ˜ An)=( r,s,t,u : w). The determinationFuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 199
Theorem 2. (Extension principle). Denote for ˜ a, ˜ b ∈ F(R) the quantity ˜ c =˜ a ˜ b,
then the MF µc is derived from the continuous MFs µa and µb by the expression
µ˜ a˜ b(z)= s u p
z=x∗y
min{µ˜ a(x),µ ˜ b(y)}.
This formula tells that the possibility that the fuzzy quantity ˜ c =˜ a   ˜ b achieves
z ∈ R is as great as the most possible of the real x, y such that z = x ∗ y,w h e r e
the a, b take the values x,y respectively. For the addition, we have the ordinary
convolution
µ˜ a
  ˜ b(z)=
  z
0
µ˜ a(x)µ˜ b(z − x)dx.
Example. Let the MFs of the fuzzy ˜ a and ˜ b be deﬁned in Fig.6. The α-cuts are α˜ a =
Figure6. Fuzzy numbers ˜ a and ˜ b
[α+1,3−α]a n d α˜ b =[ α+4,7−2α]. Then, we have α˜ c = α(˜ a
 ˜ b)= α˜ a+ α˜ b =
[2α +5 ,10 − 3α]. Solving in α,w eo b t a i n
µ˜ a




(x − 5)/2,x∈ [5,7],
(10 − x)/3,x ∈ [7,10],
0, otherwise.
Theorem 3. (Addition of LR-type fuzzy numbers). Let ˜ a and ˜ b two FNs of LR-type
˜ a =( ¯ a,δ−
a ,δ+




b )LR,t h e n˜ a







For ˜ a =( 2 ,1,1)LR and ˜ b =( 5 ,1,2)LR,w es i m p l yh a v e˜ a
 ˜ b =( 7 ,2,3)LR.T h e
extended addition is illustrated in Fig.7.
2.3. Standard fuzzy games
Standard fuzzy games are LP problems with fuzzy constraints.To solve the LP prob-
lem, the fuzzy constraints must be converted into crisp inequalities by using some
ranking functions. One auxiliary problem is then to be solved. We will consider three
situations for the game. In the ﬁrst case, the resources of the production problem
are imprecise (fuzzy) to the DM. In the second case, the technical coeﬃcients are
nonsymmetric triangular FNs. In the third case, the fuzzy model is extended to soft
constraints, when the DM allows some violation in the accomplishment of the con-
straints. A numerical example illustrates a general situation, where the resources,
the technical coeﬃcients and the inequalities are all imprecise.
of the trapezoidal parameters r,s,t,u and w is given in Appendix A, for ˜ A ∗ ˜ B with
∗∈{ +,−,.,/}.200 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Figure7. Extended addition of fuzzy sets
Case 1: LP problem with fuzzy resources . Let the maximizing LP problem
with fuzzy (imprecise) resources ˜ b be
maxx c
 .x, (c,x ∈ R
n)
subject to
Ai.x ≤ ˜ bi (i ∈ Nm),
x ≥ 0.
In a production scheduling problem, the vector c denotes n costs, the m × n
matrix A technical coeﬃcients, the vector b m resources and the vector x the n
variables. The solution algorithm of the Zimmermann’s symmetric method consists
in the following steps:
Step 1 : Deﬁnition of the memberships and determination of the fuzzy feasible set
.L e tt h eith resource bi being deﬁned by the interval [bi,b i + pi] with tolerance








pi ,b i <x<b i + pi
0,x ≥ bi + pi
The degree Di(x)t ow h i c hx satisﬁes the ith constraint is then µi(Ai.x). All the




Step 2 : Deﬁnition of the fuzzy optimal values . The objective admits a lower and
an upper bound respectively equal to
max
 
zl = c’.x | Ai.x ≤ bi (i ∈ Nm), x ≥ 0




zu = c’.x | Ai.x ≤ bi + pi (i ∈ Nm), x ≥ 0
 
.







zu−zl ,z l < c’.x <z l
0, otherwise





















≥ λ, (i ∈ Nm),
x,λ≥ 0.
Case 2: LP problem with fuzzy technical coeﬃcients . Suppose that all the
coeﬃcients of the constraints are nonsymmetric triangular FNs (TFNs)
˜ aij =( aij,a ij − aij,a ij +¯ aij), and ˜ bi =( bi,b i − bij,b i +¯ bi).
According to the operations on the TFNs (using a simple partial order such that
˜ u ≤ ˜ v ⇔ max{˜ u, ˜ v} =˜ v), we have to solve the following crisp LP
maxx c.x
subject to
Ai.x ≤ bi (i ∈ Nm)
Ai.x − Ai ≤ bi − bi (i ∈ Nm)
Ai.x + ¯ Ai ≤ bi +¯ bi (i ∈ Nm)
x,λ≥ 0.
Case 3: LP problem with soft constraints . Let a maximizing problem with
triangular coeﬃcients (excluding the objective function) and soft constraint. We
have
maxx c’.x, (c,x ∈ R
n)
subject to
˜ Ai.x   ˜ bi (i ∈ Nm),
x ≥ 0.202 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
The entries ˜ aij, ˜ bi are FNs of F(R) whose values are known with imprecision. The
fuzzy inequality   tells that the DM will allow some violation in the accomplishment
of the constraint. The MFs µi : F(R)  → [0,1],i∈ Nm measure the adequacy
between both sides of the constraint ˜ Ai.x and ˜ bi. The fuzzy ˜ ti express the margins
of tolerance for each constraint. Let   be a ranking relation (<) between FNs, The
auxiliary parametric LP problem is
maxx c’.x, (c,x ∈ Rn)
subject to
˜ Ai.x (<) ˜ bi + ˜ ti(1 − α)( i ∈ Nm),
x ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1]
The DM may choose diﬀerent rules such as : ˜ x (<)1 ˜ y ⇔ x ≤ y
or ˜ x (<)2 ˜ y ⇔ ¯ x ≤ y. A diﬀerent solution will be obtained for each rule.
Conversion of the fuzzy constraints into crisp inequalities. The FLP problem may
be written
maxx c’.x (c,x ∈ Rn)
subject to
˜ Ai.x ≤  ˜ bi + ˜ ti(1 − α), (i ∈ Nm)
x ≥ 0.
In the constraint, the inequality rule ≤  is to be chosen by the DM among several
ranking functions (or index) matching each FN into the real line. The DM may
choose the rule 1: ˜ x(<)1˜ y ⇔ x ≤ y or the rule 2: ˜ x(<)2˜ y ⇔ ¯ x ≤ y. Diﬀerent
solutions will be obtained.
Solving an auxiliary problem. Let a TFN be expressed by ˜ a =( a,a−,a +), where
a−,a + are the lower and the upper limit of the support, respectively. Ranking the
two fuzzy sides of the inequality may give the following auxiliary parametric LP
problem














i )(1 − α), (i ∈ Nm)
x ≥ 0.
2.4. Numerical example
This numerical example is due to (Delgado et al., 1990). The FLP problem is
maxx1,x2 z =5 x1 +6 x2
subject to
˜ 3x1 + ˜ 4x2     18,
˜ 2x1 + ˜ 1x2     7,
x1,x 2 ≥ 0.
The FNs take the form of tensors in Fig.8. A same FN as ˜ 3 may thus have diﬀerent
deﬁnitions, in a given problem.Fuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 203
Figure8. Fuzzy parameters and tolerances
According to the ranking rule that the DM will choose, two diﬀerent auxiliary
problems and solutions are obtained. We have
rule 1 :˜ x<  1 ˜ y ⇔ x ≤ y.
maxx1,x2 z =5 x1 +6 x2
subject to
3x1 +4 x2 ≤ 18 + 3(1 − α),
2x1 + x2 ≤ 7+( 1− α),
x1,x 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1]
The parameterized solution with rule 1 given by MATHEMATICA is shown in
Fig.9. The expression of the objective is 1
5(163−23α), and that of the variables are
x1 = 1
5(11 − α)a n dx2 = 3
5(6 − α). rule 2 :˜ x<  2 ˜ y ⇔ ¯ x ≤ y.
Figure9. Parameterized solution with rule 1
maxx1,x2 z =5 x1 +6 x2
subject to
4x1 +5 .5x2 ≤ 16 + 2.5(1 − α),
3x1 +2 x2 ≤ 6+.5(1 − α),
x1,x 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1]
The parameterized solution with rule 2 given by MATHEMATICA is shown Fig.10.
The solutions are also expressions deﬁned on intervals. The optimal objective is
piecewise with 3
2(13 − α)f o rα ∈ (0, 5
9]a n d 1
34(683 − 87α)f o rα ∈ (5
9,1]. The
solutions for x1 and x2 are shown in Fig.11.204 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Figure10. Parameterized solution with rule 2




2 with rule 2
3. Single objective fuzzy matrix games
3.1. Problem formulation and equilibrium solution
The problem formulation and the equilibrium solutions of bi-matrix games are com-
pared for both crisp and fuzzy versions.
Problem formulation
1) Crisp bi-matrix game formulation. A two-person bi-matrix game is represented
by G =( Sm,Sn,A,B), where Sm,S n are the strategy spaces of the Players I
and II, respectively. The two Players I and II have mixed strategies which are the
m-dimensional vector x and the n-dimensional vector y, respectively. The strategy
spaces are deﬁned by the convex polytopes
S
m = {x ∈ R
m
+, x
 em =1 }
and
Sn = {y ∈ Rn
+, y en =1 }.
The payoﬀs of Players I and II are m × n matrices A and B with real entries,
respectively. The payoﬀ domains of Players I and II are the sets D1 = {x’Ay| x ∈
Sm}⊆R and D2 = {x’By| y ∈ Sn}⊆R.
The programming problems of the Players I and II are
{max
x




x’By subject to e 
ny =1 , y ≥ 0},
respectively.
2) Fuzzy bi-matrix game formulation. A (not completely) fuzziﬁed two-person bi-
matrix game with fuzzy goals and fuzzy payoﬀs, is represented by
G =( S
m,S
n,   A,   B, ˜ v, ˜ p, ˜ p
 , ˜ w, ˜ q, ˜ q
 , , ),
where   A,   B are the payoﬀs m × n matrices with fuzzy entries, ˜ v, ˜ w the aspiration
levels of Players I and II, ˜ p, ˜ p  the fuzzy tolerance levels for Player I, ˜ q,˜ q  the fuzzy
tolerance levels for Player II and  ,  the fuzzy inequalities. A fuzzy goal for Player
I is a fuzzy set ˜ G1 which MF is µ1 : D1  → [0,1]. The fuzzy goal of Player II is
similarly deﬁned. The fuzzy payoﬀ matrix   A may have one LR-representation for
the entries such as ˜ aij =( aij,δ−
aij,δ+
aij)LR, where aij denotes the mean value, δ−
aij
and δ+
aij the left and right spreads.
Equilibrium solution
1) Crisp bi-matrix game solution. The value of the game is obtained at the point
(x
 ∗Ay∗,x
 ∗By∗). According to the Equivalence Theorem, the conditions for the
pair (x∗,y∗) to be an equilibrium point is the solution of the QP problem
max
x,y,p,q x’(A + B)y − p − q
subject to
B
 x ≤ qen,
Ay ≤ pem,
x em =1 ,
y en =1 ,
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0,
where p,q ∈ R are the negative of the multipliers associated with the constraints.
2) Fuzzy bi-matrix game solution
Deﬁnition 4. (Bellman-Zadeh decision principle). Based on the principle of deci-
sion by Bellman-Zadeh, the fuzzy decision is expressed as the intersection of the
fuzzy goals and expected payoﬀs, such as for Player I,
µa(x,y) =m i n
 
µx  Ay(p),µ˜ G1(p)
 
.
The fuzzy decision for Player II, is similarly deﬁned.
Deﬁnition 5. (Degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal). A degree of attainment of






µx  Ay(p),µ˜ G1(p)
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The degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal for Player II d2(x,y) is similarly de-
ﬁned. According to the Nishizaki and Sakawa’s model, each player is supposed to
maximize the degree of attainment of his goal. An equilibrium solution is then
deﬁned w.r.t. the degree of attainment of the fuzzy goals by the two players. Let
G =( Sm,Sn,   A,   B) be a fuzzy bi-matrix game, the Nash equilibrium solution w.r.t.
the degree of attainment of the fuzzy goal is a pair of strategies (x∗,y∗) if, for all
other strategies, we have
d1(x∗,y∗) ≥ d1(x,y∗) for all x ∈ Sm,
d2(x∗,y∗) ≥ d2(x∗,y) for all y ∈ Sn.




x (A + ∆A)y∗ − a
¯ a − a + x ∆Ay∗
subject to
x
 em =1 ,
x ≥ 0.
The programming problem of the Player II is similarly deﬁned. Applying the K-T
conditions, we have the equivalence Theorem.
3.2. Bi-matrix games with fuzzy payoﬀs
The problems of Player I and Player II are solved according to identical steps. The
initial problem is transformed into an another problem, by changing the variables.
A ranking function is then introduced. Finally, the resulting auxiliary problem is
solved. A numerical example illustrates the procedure.
Problem of the Player I. The fuzzy matrix game problem of the maximizing





˜ aijxi   v, (j ∈ Nn)
m  
i=1
xi =1 ,x i ≥ 0( i ∈ Nm).
The Player I’s payoﬀs ˜ aij are fuzzy. The fuzzy inequality   tells that the DM will
allow some violation in the accomplishment of the constraint.
1) Variable changing. The variables are changed into ui = xi/v (i ∈ Nm). We have  m
i=1 ui =1 /v,t h e nv =1 /
 m








˜ aijui   1, (j ∈ Nn)
ui ≥ 0( i ∈ Nm).Fuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 207
2) Introduction of a ranking function. For solving the FLP problem in canonical
form, a ranking function is introduced to compare both fuzzy sides of the inequality.








˜ aijui ≥  1 − ˜ pj(1 − α), (j ∈ Nn)
ui ≥ 0( i ∈ Nm),α ∈ (0,1].
The fuzzy ˜ pi’s are the maximum violation that the Player I will allow for the con-
straints.
3) Solution of the auxiliary problem. Let the Player I’s payoﬀs ˜ aij be TFNs ex-








ij are the lower and the upper limit
of the support, respectively. Ranking the two sides of the inequalities leads to the
















i )(1 − α), (j ∈ Nn)
ui ≥ 0( i ∈ Nm),α ∈ (0,1].
4) Numerical example. This numerical example is due to (Campos,1989). The fuzzy
payoﬀ matrix of Player I is
˜ A =
   180   156
  90   180
 
The TFNs are deﬁned by   180 = (180,175,190),   156 = (156,150,158),   90 =
(90,80,100). The fuzzy margins are ˜ p1 =˜ p2 =( 0 .10,0.08,0.11) for the Player I.
The FLP problem is
min u1 + u2
subject to
  180u1 +   90u2 ≥  1 −   0.10(1 − α)
  90u1 +   180u2 ≥  1 −   0.10(1 − α)
u1,u 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1].
The auxiliary problem is
min u1 + u2
subject to
545u1 + 270u2 ≥ 3 − 0.29(1− α)
464u1 + 545u2 ≥ 3 − 0.29(1− α)
u1,u 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1].208 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Solving the auxiliary problem and changing the variables, the optimal Player I’s
strategies are x∗ =( 0 .77,0.23) and v(α)= 482.43
3−0.29(1−α),α ∈ (0,1].
Problem of the Player II. The fuzzy matrix game problem of the minimizing





˜ aijyj   w, (i ∈ Nm)
n  
j=1
yj =1 ,y j ≥ 0( j ∈ Nn).
The losses of Player II ˜ aij are fuzzy numbers of F(R) whose values are known with
imprecision.
1) Variable changing. Let change the variables into sj = yj/w (j ∈ Nn). We have  n
j=1 sj =1 /w,t h ew =1 /
 n








˜ aijsj   1, (i ∈ Nm)
sj ≥ 0( j ∈ Nn).
The RHS of the fuzzy inequality is transformed to a crisp number.
2) Introduction of a ranking function. For solving the FLP problem in canonical
form, we apply the following procedure : a ranking function is introduced to com-
pare both fuzzy sides of the inequality, and solving a parametric LP problem. The








˜ aijsj ≤  1+˜ qi(1 − α), (i ∈ Nm)
sj ≥ 0( j ∈ Nn),α ∈ (0,1].
The fuzzy ˜ qj’s are the maximum violation that the Player II will allow for the
constraints.
3) Solution of the auxiliary problem .L e tt h eP l a y e rI I ’ sl o s s e s˜ aij be TFNs be




ij). Ranking the two fuzzy sides of the inequalityFuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 209
















i )(1 − α), (i ∈ Nm)
sj ≥ 0( j ∈ Nn),α ∈ (0,1].
4) Numerical example. The fuzzy losses matrix of Player II is
˜ A =
   180   156
  90   180
 
.
The TFNs are deﬁned by   180 = (180,175,190),   156 = (156,150,158),   90 =
(90,80,100). The fuzzy margins are ˜ q1 =˜ q2 =( 0 .15,0.14,0.17) for the Player II.
The FLP problem is
max s1 + s2
subject to
  180s1 +   156s2 ≤  1 −   0.15(1 − α)
  90s1 +   180s2 ≤  1 −   0.15(1 − α)
s1,s 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1].
The auxiliary problem is
max s1 + s2
subject to
545s1 + 464s2 ≤ 3+0 .46(1 − α)
270s1 + 545s2 ≤ 3+0 .46(1 − α)
s1,s 2 ≥ 0,α ∈ (0,1].
Solving the auxiliary problem and changing the variables, the optimal Player’s II
strategies are y∗ =( 0 .23,0.77) and w(α)= 482.43
3+0.49(1−α),α ∈ (0,1].
3.3. Bi-matrix games with Fuzzy goal
The ﬁrst task of each player is to determine a linear MF µ(x,y) for each pair of
strategies (x,y). We assume that the degree of satisfaction of each player depends
on the expected payoﬀ xAy. For Player I, the maximin solution w.r.t. a degree of
achievement of the fuzzy goal is an optimal solution. Similarly for Player II, the
minimax solution w.r.t. a degree of achievement of the fuzzy goal is an optimal
solution. Let the single-objective matrix game G =( Sm,Sn,A) with fuzzy goals
where Sm and Sn denote the compact convex strategy spaces of Players, such that
Sm = {x ∈ Rm
+, e x =1 } and Sn = {y ∈ Rn
+, e y =1 },a n dw h e r eA ∈ Rm×n is
the payoﬀ matrix of the game with real entries.210 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Maximin problem of the Player I. For any pair of strategies (x,y)t h eM F
µ(x,y) depends on the expected payoﬀ xAy. Assume that the degree of satisfaction





1, xAy ≥ ¯ a
xAy−a
¯ a−a ,a ≤ xAy ≤ ¯ a
0, xAy ≤ a,
where ¯ a and a are the best and the worst degree of satisfaction to the Player I,
respectively. These extremal values are determined by


















The MF of the fuzzy goal is shown in Fig.12.
Figure12. Fuzzy goal membership function of Player I
The maximin solution of Player I is given by the following Theorem.
Theorem 4. (Maximin solution). For a single-objective two-person matrix game
with a linearly fuzzy goal function, the Player I’s maximin solution w.r.t. a degree




¯ a − a




≥ λ,(j ∈ Nn)
e x =1 , (e, x ∈ Rm),
x ≥ 0.
Proof: see (Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2001), page 39. 
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2x1 − x2 +2≥ 8λ,
5x1 − 2x2 +3 x3 +2≥ 8λ,
x1 +6 x2 − x3 +2≥ 8λ,
e.x =1 , x ≥ 0.
The Player I’s optimal strategies (in Fig.13) are x∗
1 = .875,x ∗
2 = .125 and x∗
3 =0 .
Figure13. Player I’s solution
Minimax problem of the Player II. For any pair of strategies (x,y)t h eM F
µ(x,y) depends on the expected payoﬀ xAy. Assume that the degree of satisfaction





1, xAy ≤ a
¯ a−xAy
¯ a−a ,a ≤ xAy ≤ ¯ a
0, xAy ≥ ¯ a,
where ¯ a and a are the worst and the best degree of satisfaction to the Player II,
respectively. These extremal values are determined by


















The MF of the fuzzy goal is shown in Fig.14.
The minimax solution of Player II is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. (Minimax solution). For a single-objective two-person matrix game
with a linearly fuzzy goal function, the Player II’s minimax solution w.r.t. a degree212 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Figure14. Fuzzy goal membership function of Player II




¯ a − a




≤ λ +1 ,(i ∈ Nm)
e y =1 , (e, y ∈ Rn),
y ≥ 0.
Proof: see (Nishizaki and Sakawa, 2001), page 41. 














2y1 +5 y2 + y3 +2≤ 8(1 + λ),
−y1 − 2y2 +6 x3 +2≤ 8(1 + λ),
3y2 − y3 +2≤ 8(1 + λ),
e.y =1 , y ≥ 0.
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Figure15. Player II’s solution
Appendix
A Fuzzy number arithmetic
Two methods can be used in fuzzy arithmetics: one method is based on interval
arithmetics and the other uses the extension principle (Mareˇ s, 1994 - Nguyen and
Walker, 2006).
A1. Interval arithmetics
Interval arithmetics are based on two properties of the FNs 3: 1) each FN is uniquely
represented by its α-cuts and 2) the α-cuts are closed intervals of real numbers for
all α ∈ (0,1]. Let ˜ A and ˜ B denote TFNs and let ∗ be one of the four arithmetic
operations: addition, substraction, multiplication and division. A fuzzy set ˜ A∗ ˜ B is
deﬁned by the α-cuts
α(A ∗ B)= α A ∗α B, for any α ∈ (0,1].






where the α-cuts are converted into the fuzzy set α ˜ A, deﬁned as
˜ A = α
αA.
Proof: see (Klir and Yuan, 1995, pages 41-42).
The numerical example in (Klir and Yuan, 1995, page 105) considers two TFNs ˜ A
and ˜ B deﬁned in Fig.16.
Figure16. Fuzzy numbers ˜ A and ˜ B
3 This appendix is inspired from (Klir and Yuan, 1995). The computations and plots use
the software MATHEMATICA 7.0.1.214 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
The α-cuts are
αA =[ 2 α − 1,3 − 2α]a n d
αB =[ 2 α +1 ,5 − 2α].
The four arithmetic operations on closed intervals are deﬁned in Fig.17 4
Figure17. α-cuts with the arithmetic operations
The resulting FNs are represented in Figs.1819.
Figure18. Fuzzy arithmetics
A2. Extension principle
The extension principle supposes that the standard arithmetic operations on real
numbers are extended to FNs.
Theorem 7. (Extension principle). Let ∗ denote one of the four operations (addi-
tion +, substraction -, multiplication ., and division /), and let ˜ A, ˜ B denote FNs.
We deﬁne a continuous FN ˜ A ∗ ˜ B on R by




µ ˜ A(x),µ˜ B(y)
 
,f o ra l lz ∈ R.








we use the same rule, provided that 0 is not in [d,e].Fuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 215
Figure19. Arithmetics with triangular fuzzy numbers ˜ A and ˜ B
Proof: see (Klir and Yuan, 1995, pages 106-109).
B Function principle
The Chen’s function principle is more appropriate for multiple (≥ 3) trapezoidal
FNs rather than the extension principle. Let two trapezoidal FNs ˜ A and ˜ B be
˜ A =( a1,a 2,a 3,a 4;w1)a n d ˜ B =( b1,b 2,b 3,b 4;w2), where w1 and w2 denote the
height of ˜ A and ˜ B, respectively. The two FNs are illustrated in Fig.20.
We have to calculate ˜ C = ˜ A ∗ ˜ B,w h e r e∗∈{ +,−,.,/}. The resulting fuzzy
trapezoidal number is deﬁned by
C =( c1,c 2,c 3,c 4;w),
where w =m i n {w1,w 2}. Deﬁning the set
T = {a1 ∗ b1,a 1 ∗ b1,a 1 ∗ b4,a 4 ∗ b1,a 4 ∗ b4},
we deduce c1 =m i nT and c4 =m a xT. Letting
s1 =m i n {x,µ ˜ A(x) ≥ w},s 2 =m i n {x,µ ˜ B(x) ≥ w},
t1 =m a x {x,µ ˜ A(x) ≥ w},t 2 =m a x {x,µ ˜ B(x) ≥ w},
we deﬁne the set
T1 = {s1 ∗ s2,s 1 ∗ t2,t 1 ∗ s2,t 1 ∗ t2},
and deduce
c2 =m i n {T1} and c3 =m a x {T1}.
The results of the fuzzy arithmetic, using the function principle are shown in Fig.21.216 Andr´ eA .K e l l e r
Figure20. Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers ˜ A and ˜ B
Figure21. Arithmetics with trapezoidal fuzzy numbers ˜ A and ˜ BFuzzy Conﬂict Games in Economics and Management 217
Abbreviation Deﬁnition Symbol Deﬁnition
DM decision maker ˜ A fuzzy number A
FLG fuzzy logic game (A,A
−,A
+) (mean, lower, upper limit)
FLP fuzzy linear programming
αA α-cut of A
FN fuzzy number α ˜ A special fuzzy set
K-T Kuhn-Tucker conditions en n-dimensional vector of ones
LP linear programming ˜ p fuzzy tolerance
LR-type left-right representation δ
−,δ
+ left, right spread
MF membership function µ ˜ A(x) left, right spread
MOT management of technology F(R) fuzzy sets family
QP quadratic programming Nn n positive integers
RHS right-hand side R real line
R&D research and development   ranking relation
TFN triangular fuzzy number (<)R inequality rule R
 ,   fuzzy inequality  
Min operator
⊕,  , ⊗  fuzzy operations
Table1. Index of abbreviations and symbols
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Abstract We consider a new model of a TU game endowed with both coali-
tion and two-level cooperation structures that applies to various network sit-
uations. The approach to the value is close to that of both Myerson (1977)
and Aumann and Dr` eze (1974): it is based on ideas of component eﬃciency
and of one or another deletion link property, and it treats an a priori union
as a self-contained unit; moreover, our approach incorporates also the idea
of the Owen’s quotient game property (1977). The axiomatically introduced
values possess an explicit formula representation and in many cases can be
quite simply computed. The results obtained are applied to the problem of
sharing an international river among multiple users without international
ﬁrms.
Keywords: TU game, coalition structure, cooperation structure, Myerson
value, Owen value, Aumann-Dr` eze value, component eﬃciency, deletion link
property
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1. Introduction
The study of TU games with coalition structures was initiated ﬁrst by Aumann and
Dr´ eze (1974), then Owen (1977). Later this approachwas extended in Winter (1989)
to games with level structures. Another model of a game with limited cooperation
presented by means of a communication graph was introduced in Myerson (1977).
Various studies in both directions were done during the last three decades but
mostly either within one model or another. The generalization of the Owen and the
Myerson values, applied to the combination of both models that resulted in a TU
game with both independent coalition and cooperation structures, was investigated
by V´ azquez-Brage et al. (1996).
In the paper we study TU games endowed with both coalition and coopera-
tion structures, the so-called graph games with coalition structures. Diﬀerent from
V´ azquez-Brage et al. (1996), in our case a cooperation structure is a two-level co-
operation structure that relates fundamentally to the given coalition structure. It
is assumed that cooperation (via bilateral agreements between participants) is only
  The research was supported by NWO (The Netherlands Organization for Scientiﬁc Re-
search) grant NL-RF 047.017.017.
   I am thankful to Gerard van der Laan who attracted my interest to the problem of
sharing a river among multiple users that later resulted in this paper. I would like
also to thank again Gerard van der Laan as well as Ren´ e van den Brink, and Elena
Yanovskaya for interesting discussions around the topic and valuable comments and
remarks on earlier versions of the paper.Graph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 221
possible either among the entire coalitions of a coalition structure, in other terms
a priori unions, or among single players within a priori unions. No communication
and therefore no cooperation is allowed between single players from distinct ele-
ments of the coalition structure. This approach allows to model various network
situations, in particular, telecommunication problems, distribution of goods among
diﬀerent cities (countries) along highway networks connecting the cities and local
road networks within the cities, or sharing an international river with multiple users
but without international ﬁrms, i.e., when no cooperation is possible among single
users located at diﬀerent levels along the river, and so on. A two-level coopera-
tion structure is introduced by means of graphs of two types, ﬁrst, presenting links
among a priori unions of the coalition structure and second, presenting links among
players within each a priori union. We consider cooperation structures presented
by combinations of graphs of diﬀerent types both undirected – general graphs and
cycle-free graphs, and directed – line-graphs with linearly ordered players, rooted
trees and sink trees. Fig. 1(a) illustrates one of possible situations within the model
while Fig. 1(b) provides an example of a possible situation within the model of
V´ azquez-Brage et al. with the same set of players, the same coalition structure, and
even the same links connecting players within a priori unions. In general, the newly
introduced model of a game with two-level cooperation structure cannot be reduced
to the model of V´ azquez-Brage et al.. Consider for example negotiations between
two countries held on the level of prime ministers who in turn are citizens of their
countries. The communication link between countries can be replaced neither by
communication link connecting the prime ministers as single persons and therefore
presenting only their personal interests, nor by all communication links connecting
citizens of one country with citizens of another country that also present links only
on personal level. The two models coincide only if a communication graph between
a priori unions in our model is empty and components of a communication graph
in the model of V´ azquez-Brage et al. are subsets of a priori unions. An example
illustrating this situation with the same player set, the same coalition structure,
and the same graphs within a priori unions, as on Fig. 1(a) is given on Fig. 1(c).
Figure1. a) model of the paper; b)m o d e lo fV ´ azquez-Brage et al.; c) case of the coincidence
Our main concern is the theoretical justiﬁcation of solution concepts reﬂecting
the two-stage distribution procedure. It is assumed that at ﬁrst, a priori unions
through upper level bargaining based only on cumulative interests of all members222 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
of every involved entire a priori union, when nobody’s personal interests are taken
into account, collect their total shares. Thereafter, via bargaining within a priori
unions based now on personal interests of participants, the collected shares are dis-
tributed to single players. As a bargaining output on both levels one or another
value for games with cooperation structures, in other terms graph games, can be
reasonably applied. Following Myerson (1977) we assume that cooperation possible
only among connected players or connected groups of players and, therefore, we
concentrate on component eﬃcient values. Diﬀerent component eﬃcient values for
graph games with graphs of various types, both undirected and directed, are known
in the literature. We introduce a uniﬁed approach to a number of component ef-
ﬁcient values for graph games that allows application of various combinations of
known solutions concepts, ﬁrst at the level of entire a priori unions and then at the
level within a priori unions, within the unique framework. Our approach to values
for graph games with coalition structures is close to that of both Myerson (1977)
and Aumann and Dr` eze (1974): it is based on ideas of component eﬃciency and
one or another deletion link property, and it treats an a priori union as a self-
contained unit. Moreover, to link both communication levels between and within a
priori unions we incorporate the idea of the Owen’s quotient game property (Owen,
1977). This approach generates two-stage solution concepts that provide consistent
application of values for graph games on both levels. The incorporation of diﬀer-
ent solutions aims not only to enrich the solution concept for graph games with
coalition structures but, because there exists no universal solution for graph games
applicable to full variety of possible undirected and directed graph structures, it
also opens the broad diversity of applications impossible otherwise. Moreover, it
also allows to chose, depending on types of graph structures under scrutiny, the
most preferable, in particular, the most computationally eﬃcient combination of
values among others suitable. The idea of the two-stage construction of solutions is
not new. The well known example is the Owen value (Owen, 1977) for games with
coalition structures that is deﬁned by applying the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953)
twice, ﬁrst, the Shapley value is employed at the level of a priori unions to deﬁne a
new game on each one of them, and then the Shapley value is applied to these new
games. Other applications of the two-stage construction of solutions can be found
in Albizuri and Zarzuelo (2004) and in Kamijo (2009). As a practical application of
the new model we consider the problem of sharing of an international river among
multiple users.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Basic deﬁnitions and notation along
with the formal deﬁnition of a graph game with coalition structure and its core
are introduced in Sect. 2.. Sect. 3. provides the uniform approach to several known
component eﬃcient values for games with cooperation structures. In Sect. 4. we
introduce values for graph games with coalition structures axiomatically and present
the explicit formula representation, we also investigate stability and distribution of
Harsanyi dividends. Sect. 5. deals with the generalization on graph games with
level structures. Sect. 6. discusses application to the water distribution problem of
an international river among multiple users without international ﬁrms.Graph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 223
2. Preliminaries
2.1. TU Games and Values
Recall some deﬁnitions and notation.A cooperative game with transferable utility
(TU game)i sap a i r N,v ,w h e r eN = {1,...,n} is a ﬁnite set of n ≥ 2p l a y e r sa n d
v:2 N → IR is a characteristic function, deﬁned on the power set of N, satisfying
v(∅) = 0. A subset S ⊆ N (or S ∈ 2N)o fs players is called a coalition,a n d
the associated real number v(S)p r e s e n t st h eworth of S. The set of all games with
ﬁxed N we denote by GN. For simplicity of notation and if no ambiguity appears, we
write v instead of  N,v  when refer to a game. A value is a mapping ξ: GN → IR
N
that assigns to every v ∈G N a vector ξ(v) ∈ IR
N;t h er e a ln u m b e rξi(v)r e p r e s e n t s
the payoﬀ to player i in v.Asubgame of v with a player set T ⊆ N, T  = ∅,i s
a game v|T deﬁned as v|T(S)=v(S), for all S ⊆ T. A game v is superadditive,i f
v(S ∪T) ≥ v(S)+v(T), for all S,T ⊆ N, such that S ∩T = ∅. A game v is convex,
if v(S ∪ T)+v(S ∩ T) ≥ v(S)+v(T), for all S,T ⊆ N. In what follows for all
x ∈ IR
N and S ⊆ N, we use standard notation x(S)=
 
i∈S xi and xS = {xi}i∈S.
The cardinality of a given set A we denote by |A| along with lower case letters like
n = |N|, m = |M|, nk = |Nk|,a n ds oo n .
It is well known (Shapley, 1953) that unanimity games {uT} T⊆N
T =∅
, deﬁned as
uT(S)=1 ,i fT ⊆ S,a n duT(S) = 0 otherwise, create a basis in GN, i.e., every









(−1)t−s v(S), for all T ⊆ N, T  = ∅. Following Harsanyi (1959) the coeﬃ-
cient λv
T is referred to as a dividend of coalition T in game v.
For a permutation π: N → N, assigning rank number π(i) ∈ N to a player i ∈
N,l e tπi = {j ∈ N |π(j) ≤ π(i)} be the set of all players with rank number smaller
or equal to the rank number of i, including i itself. The marginal contribution vector
mπ(v) ∈ IR
n of a game v and a permutation π is given by mπ
i (v)=v(πi)−v(πi\{i}),
i ∈ N.B yu we denote the permutation on N relevant to the natural ordering from
1t on, i.e., u(i)=i, i ∈ N,a n db yl the permutation relevant to the reverse ordering
n,n − 1,...,1, i.e., l(i)=n +1− i, i ∈ N.







, for all i ∈ N.
The core (Gillies,1953) of v ∈G N is deﬁned as
C(v)={x ∈ IR
N | x(N)=v(N),x (S) ≥ v(S), for all S ⊆ N}.
Av a l u eξ is stable, if for any v ∈G N with nonempty core C(v), ξ(v) ∈ C(v).
2.2. Games with Coalition Structures
A coalition structure or, in other terms, a system of a priori unions on a player set N
is given by a partition P = {N1,...,Nm} of the player set N, i.e., N1∪...∪Nm = N
and Nk ∩Nl = ∅ for k  = l.Ap a i r v,P  of a game v ∈G N and a coalition structure
P on the player set N constitutes a game with coalition structure or, in other terms,
a game with a priori unions or simply P-game.T h es e to fa l lP-games with a ﬁxed224 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
player set N we denote GP
N.AP-value is a mapping ξ: GP
N → IR
N that associates
with every  v,P  ∈ GP
N a vector ξ(v,P) ∈ IR
N.G i v e n v,P  ∈ GP
N, Owen (1977)
deﬁnes a game vP, called a quotient game,o nM = {1,...,m} in which each a priori




Nk), for all Q ⊆ M.
Note that  v,{N}  represents the same situation as v itself. Later on by  N  denote
the coalition structure composed by singletons, i.e.,  N  = {{1},...,{n}}.F u r t h e r -
more, for every i ∈ N,l e tk(i) be deﬁned by the relation i ∈ Nk(i),a n df o ra n y
x∈IR





M be the corresponding vector of total payoﬀs to
a priori unions.
2.3. Games with Cooperation Structures
A cooperation structure on N is speciﬁed by a graph Γ, undirected or directed.
An undirected/directed graph is a collection of unordered/ordered pairs of nodes
(players) Γ ⊆ Γ c
N = {{i,j}|i,j ∈ N, i  = j} or Γ ⊆ ¯ Γ c
N = {(i,j)|i,j ∈ N,i  =
j} respectively, where an unordered/ordered pair {i,j} or correspondingly (i,j)
presents a undirected/directed link between i,j ∈ N.Ap a i r v,Γ  of a game v ∈G N
and a communication graph Γ on N constitutes a game with graph (cooperation)
structure or simply Γ-game.T h es e to fa l lΓ-games with a ﬁxed player set N we
denote GΓ
N.AΓ-value is a mapping ξ: GΓ
N → IR
N that assigns to every  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N
a vector ξ(v,Γ) ∈ IR
N.
For any graph Γ on N and any S ⊆ N,t h esubgraph of Γ on S is the graph Γ|S =
{{i,j}∈Γ |i,j ∈ S}. In an undirected graph Γ on N a sequence of diﬀerent nodes
(i1,...,i k), k ≥ 2, is a path from i1 to ik, if for all h =1 ,...,k−1, {ih,i h+1}∈Γ.I n
ad i g r a p hΓ on N a sequence of diﬀerent nodes (i1,...,i k), k ≥ 2, is an undirected
path from i1 to ik, if for all h =1 ,...,k− 1, (ih,i h+1) ∈ Γ and/or (ih+1,i h) ∈ Γ,
and is a directed path from i1 to ik, if for all h =1 ,...,k− 1, (ih,i h+1) ∈ Γ.W e
consider connectedness with respect to (undirected) paths and say that two nodes
are connected, if there exists an (undirected) path from one node to another. A graph
is connected, if any two nodes are connected. Given a graph Γ, S ⊆ N is connected,
if Γ|S is connected. Denote by CΓ(S) the set of all connected subcoalitions of S,
by S/Γ the set of maximally connected subcoalitions, called components,a n dl e t
(S/Γ)i be the component of S containing i ∈ S.N o t i c et h a tS/Γ is a partition of




completely connected components P ∈P,a n dN/Γc(P)=P. For any  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N,
a payoﬀ vector x ∈ IR
N is component eﬃcient,i fx(C)=v(C), for every C ∈ N/Γ.
Later on, when for avoiding confusion it is necessary to specify the set of nodes N,
we write ΓN instead of Γ.
Following Myerson (1977), we assume that for  v,Γ ∈GΓ
N cooperation is possible




v(C), for all S ⊆ N.
The core C(v,Γ)o f v,Γ ∈G Γ
N is deﬁned as a set of component eﬃcient payoﬀ
vectors that are not dominated by any connected coalition, i.e.,
C(v,Γ)={x ∈ IR
N |x(C)=v(C), ∀C∈N/Γ, and x(T)≥v(T), ∀T ∈C
Γ(N)}. (1)Graph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 225
It is easy to see that C(v,Γ)=C(vΓ).
Below along with cooperation structures given by general undirected graphs we
consider also those given by cycle-free undirected graphs and by directed graphs –
line-graphs with linearly ordered players, rooted and sink forests. In an undirected
graph a path (i1,...,i k), k ≥ 3, is a cycle,i fi1 = ik. An undirected graph is cycle-
free, if it contains no cycles. In a directed link (i,j), j is a subordinate of i and i is a
superior of j. In a digraph Γ, j  = i is a successor of i and i is a predecessor of j,i f
there exists a path (i1,...,i k)w i t hi1 = i and ik = j. A digraph Γ is a rooted tree,
if there is one node in N, called a root, having no predecessors in Γ and there is a
unique directed path in Γ from this node to any other node in N. A digraph Γ is
a sink tree, if the directed graph, composed by the same set of links as Γ but with
the opposite orientation, is a rooted tree; in this case the root of a tree changes its
meaning to the absorbing sink. A digraph is a rooted/sink forest,i fi ti sc o m p o s e d
by a number of nonoverlapping rooted)/sink trees. A line-graph is a digraph that
contains links only between subsequent nodes. Without loss of generality we may
assume that in a line-graph L nodes are ordered according to the natural order from
1t on, i.e., line-graph Γ ⊆{ (i,i +1 )| i =1 ,...,n− 1}.
2.4. Graph Games with Coalition Structures
At r i p l e v,P,Γ P  presenting a combination of a TU game v ∈G N with a coali-
tion structure P and with limited cooperation possibilities presented via a two-
level graph structure ΓP = ΓM,{ΓNk}k∈M  constitutes a graph game with coalition
structure or simply PΓ-game.T h es e to fa l lPΓ-games with a ﬁxed player set N
we denote GPΓ
N .APΓ-value is deﬁned as a mapping ξ: GPΓ
N → IR
N that associates
with every  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N a vector ξ(v,P,Γ P) ∈ IR
N.
It is worth to emphasize that in the model under scrutiny the primary is a coali-
tion structure and a cooperation structure is introduced above the given coalition
structure. The graph structure ΓP is speciﬁed by means of graphs of two types –
ag r a p hΓM connecting a priori unions as single elements, and graphs ΓNk within
a priori unions Nk, k ∈ M, connecting single players. Moreover, observe that PΓ-
games  v, N ,Γ  N   and  v,{N},Γ {N}  with trivial coalition structures reduce to
a Γ-game  v,ΓN . Later on for simplicity of notation, when it causes no ambiguity,
we denote graphs ΓNk within a priori unions Nk, k ∈ M,b yΓk.
Given  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N , one can consider graph games within a priori unions
 vk,Γ k ∈G Γ
Nk,w i t hvk = v|Nk, k ∈ M. Moreover, owning a coalition structure one
can consider a quotient game. However, a quotient game relating to a PΓ-game
should take into account the limited cooperation within a priori unions, and hence,
it must diﬀer from the classical one of Owen. For any  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N , we deﬁne











Nk), |Q| > 1, for all Q ⊆ M. (2)
Next, it is natural to consider a quotient Γ-game  vPΓ,Γ M ∈G Γ
M.
Furthermore, given a Γ-value φ, for any  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N with a graph structure
ΓM on the level of a priori unions suitable for application of φ to the corresponding226 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
quotient Γ-game  vPΓ,Γ M 1, along with a subgame vk within a priori union Nk,







φk(vPΓ,Γ M),S = Nk,
v(S),S  = Nk, for all S ⊆ Nk,
where φk(vPΓ,Γ M) is the payoﬀ to Nk given by φ in  vPΓ,Γ M .I np a r t i c u l a r ,f o r
any x ∈ IR
M,axk-game vx





v(S),S  = Nk, for all S ⊆ Nk.
In this context it is natural to consider Γ-games  v
ξ
k,Γ k , k ∈ M, as well.
Following the similar approach as for games with cooperation structure, the core
C(v,P,Γ P)o f v,P,Γ P ∈GPΓ
N is the set of payoﬀ vectors that are
(i) component eﬃcient both in the quotient Γ-game vPΓ,Γ M and in all graph
games within a priori unions  vk,Γ k , k∈M, containing more than one player,

























Remark 1. Notice that in the above deﬁnition the condition of component ef-
ﬁciency on components equal to the entire a priori unions at the level within a
priori unions is excluded. The reason is the following. By deﬁnition of a quotient
game, for any k ∈ M, vPΓ({k})=v
Γk
k (Nk). If Nk ∈ Nk/Γk, i.e., if Γk is con-
nected, v
Γk
k (Nk)=v(Nk), and therefore, vPΓ({k})=v(Nk). Besides by deﬁnition,
xP({k})=xP
k = x(Nk), for all k ∈ M. Furthermore, singleton coalitions are always
connected, i.e., {k}∈CΓM(M), for all k ∈ M. Thus, in case when Nk ∈ Nk/Γk,t h e
presence of a stronger condition x(Nk)=v(Nk)at the level within a priori unions
may conﬂict with a weaker condition xP({k}) ≥ vPΓ({k}) ,w h i c hi nt h i sc a s ei st h e
same as x(Nk) ≥ v(Nk), at the level of a priori unions, that as a result can lead to
the emptiness of the core.
The next statement easily follows from the latter deﬁnition.
Proposition 1. For any  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N and x ∈ IR
N,
x ∈ C(v,P,Γ P) ⇐⇒
 
x







k ,Γ k),∀k ∈ M : nk>1
 
.
Remark 2. The claim xNk ∈ C(vx
P
k ,Γ k), k∈M, is vital only if Nk ∈Nk/Γk, i.e.,
if Γk is connected; when Γk is disconnected, it can be replaced by xNk ∈C(vk,Γ k),
as well.
1 In general Γ-values can be applied only to Γ-games determined by graphs of certain
types; for more detailed discussion see Sect. 3..Graph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 227
3. Uniform Approach to Component Eﬃcient Γ-Values
We show now that a number of known component eﬃcient Γ-values for games
with cooperation structures given by undirected and directed graphs of diﬀerent
types can be approached within a unique framework. This unique approach will be
employed later in Section 4. for the two-stage construction of PΓ-values.
A Γ-value ξ is component eﬃcient (CE) if, for any  v,Γ ∈G Γ




3.1. The Myerson Value
The Myerson value µ (Myerson, 1977) is deﬁned for any Γ-game  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N with
arbitrary undirected graph Γ as the Shapley value of the restricted game vΓ, i.e.,
µi(v,Γ)=Shi(v
Γ), for all i ∈ N.
The Myerson value is characterized by two axioms of component eﬃciency and
fairness.
A Γ-value ξ is fair (F) if, for any  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N, for every link {i,j}∈Γ,
ξi(v,Γ) − ξi(v,Γ\{i,j})=ξj(v,Γ) − ξj(v,Γ\{i,j}).
3.2. The Position Value
The position value, introduced in Meessen (1988) and developed in Borm et al.
(1992), is deﬁned for any  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N with arbitrary undirected graph Γ.T h e
position value π attributes to each player in a graph game  v,Γ  the sum of his
individual value v(i) and half of the value of each link he is involved in, where the
value of a link is deﬁned as the Shapley payoﬀ to this link in the associated link







Γ), for all i ∈ N,
where Γi = {l ∈ Γ|l   i}, v0 is the zero-normalization of v, i.e., for all S ⊆ N,
v0(S)=v(S) −
 
i∈S v(i), and for any zero-normalized game v ∈G N and a graph
Γ, the associated link game  Γ,vΓ  between links in Γ is deﬁned as
vΓ(Γ  )=vΓ
 
(N), for all Γ   ∈ 2Γ.
Slikker (2005) characterizes the position value on the class of all graph games via
component eﬃciency and balanced link contributions.















3.3. The Average Tree Solution
A new algorithmically very attractive2 solution concept for undirected cycle-free
Γ-games, the so called average tree solution (AT-solution), recently introduced in
Herings et al. (2008). Recall the deﬁnition. Consider a cycle-free graph game  v,Γ 
and let i ∈ N.T h e ni belongs to the component (N/Γ)i and induces a unique
rooted tree T(i)o n( N/Γ)i in the following way. For every j ∈ (N/Γ)i\{i},t h e r ei s
a unique path in the subgraph  (N/Γ)i,Γ|(N/Γ)i  from i to j. That allows to change
undirected links on this path to directed so that the ﬁrst node in any ordered pair
is the node coming ﬁrst on the path from i to j. The payoﬀ ti
j(v,Γ) associated in
the tree T(i)t oa n yp l a y e rj ∈ (N/Γ)i (obviously, in this case (N/Γ)j =( N/Γ)i)
is equal to the worth of the coalition composed of player j and all his subordinates
in T(i) minus the sum of the worths of all coalitions composed of any successor of





v(¯ ST(i)(h)), for all j ∈ (N/Γ)i,
where for any node j ∈ (N/Γ)i, FT(i)(j)={h ∈ (N/Γ)i |(j,h) ∈ T(i)} is the
set of all subordinates of j in T(i), ST(i)(j) is the set of all successors of j in
T(i), and ¯ ST(i)(j)=ST(i)(j) ∪ j. Every component C ∈ N/Γ in the cycle-free
graph Γ induces |C| diﬀerent trees, one tree for each one of diﬀerent nodes. The
average tree solution assigns to each cycle-free graph game  v,Γ  the payoﬀ vector









j(v,Γ), for all j ∈ N.
The average tree solution deﬁned on the class of superadditive cycle-free graph
games appears to be stable. On the entire class of cycle-free graph games the average
tree solution is characterized via two axioms of component eﬃciency and component
fairness.



















3.4. Values for Line-Graph Games
Three following values for line-graph Γ-games are studied in Brink et al. (2007),






Γ), for all i ∈ N,
2 In comparison with the Myerson value (the Shapley value) with computational com-
plexity of the order n!, the AT-solution has the computational complexity of the order
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the lower equivalent solution given by
ξLE
i (v,Γ)=ml
i(vΓ), for all i ∈ N,







, for all i ∈ N.
All of these three solutions for superadditive line-graph games turn out to be stable.
Moreover, on the entire class of line-graph games each one of them is characterized
via component eﬃciency and one of the three following axioms expressing diﬀerent
fairness properties.
A Γ-value ξ is upper equivalent (UE) if, for any line-graph  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N, for any
i =1 ,...,n− 1, for all j =1 ,...,i,
ξj(v,Γ\{i,i+1})=ξj(v,Γ).
A Γ-value ξ is lower equivalent (LE) if, for any line-graph  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N, for any
i =1 ,...,n− 1, for all j = i +1 ,...,n,
ξj(v,Γ\{i,i+1})=ξj(v,Γ).
A Γ-value ξ possesses the equal loss property (EL) if, for any line-graph  v,Γ ∈
GΓ


















v(¯ SΓ(j)), for all i ∈ N
and the sink value
si(v,Γ)=v( ¯ PΓ(i)) −
 
j∈OΓ (i)
v( ¯ PΓ(j)), for all i ∈ N
respectively for rooted/sink forest Γ-games are studied in Khmelnitskaya (2009).
Both these values are stable on the subclass of superadditive games. Moreover,
the tree and sink values on the correspondent entire class of rooted/sink forest Γ-
games can be characterized via component eﬃciency and successor equivalence or
predecessor equivalence respectively.
A Γ-value ξ is successor equivalent (SE) if, for any rooted forest  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N,
for every link {i,j}∈Γ, for all k being successors of j,o rk = j,
ξk(v,Γ\{i,j})=ξk(v,Γ).
A Γ-value ξ is predecessor equivalent (PE) if, for any sink forest  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N,
for every link {i,j}∈Γ, for all k being predecessors of i,o rk = i,
ξk(v,Γ\{i,j})=ξk(v,Γ).230 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
3.6. Uniform Framework
Notice that each one of the considered above Γ-values for Γ-games with suitable
graph structures is characterized by two axioms, CE and one or another deletion
link (DL) property, reﬂecting the relevant reaction of a Γ-value on the deletion of
a link in the communication graph, i.e.,
CE + F for all undirected Γ-games ⇐⇒ µ(v,Γ),
CE + BLC for all undirected Γ-games ⇐⇒ π(v,Γ),
CE + CF for undirected cycle-free Γ-games ⇐⇒ AT(v,Γ),
CE + UE for line-graph Γ-games ⇐⇒ UE(v,Γ),
CE + LE for line-graph Γ-games ⇐⇒ LE(v,Γ),
CE + EL for line-graph Γ-games ⇐⇒ EL(v,Γ),
CE + SE for rooted forest Γ-games ⇐⇒ t(v,Γ),
CE + PE for sink forest Γ-games ⇐⇒ s(v,Γ).
In the sequel, for the uniﬁcation of presentation and simplicity of notation, we
identify each one of Γ-values with the corresponding DL axiom. For a given DL,
let GDL
N ⊆G Γ
N be a set of all  v,Γ ∈G Γ
N with Γ suitable for DL application. To
summarize,
CE + DL on GDL
N ⇐⇒ DL(v,Γ),
where DL is one of the axioms F, BLC, CF, LE, UE, El, SE, or PE. Whence,
F(v,Γ)=µ(v,Γ)a n dBLC(v,Γ)=π(v,Γ) for all undirected Γ-games,CF(v,Γ)=
AT(v,Γ) for all undirected cycle-free Γ-games, UE(v,Γ), LE(v,Γ), and EL(v,Γ)
are UE, LE, and EL solutions correspondingly for all line-graph Γ-games,SE(v,Γ)=
t(v,Γ) for all rooted forest Γ-games, and PE(v,Γ)=t(v,Γ) for all sink forest Γ-
games.
4. PΓ-Values
4.1. Component Eﬃcient PΓ-Values
We adapt now the notions of component eﬃciency and discussed above deletion link
properties to PΓ-values and show that similar to component eﬃcient Γ-values, the
deletion link properties uniquely deﬁne component eﬃcient PΓ-values on a class
of PΓ-games with suitable graph structure. The involvement of diﬀerent deletion
link properties, depending on the considered graph structure, allows to pick the
most favorable among other appropriate combinations of Γ-values applied on both
levels between and within a priori unions in the two-stage construction of PΓ-values
discussed below. Moreover, consideration of the only one speciﬁc combination of Γ-
values restricts the variability of applications, since Γ-values developed for Γ-games
deﬁned by undirected graphs are not applicable in Γ-games with, for example,
directed rooted forest graph structures, and vice versa.
Introduce ﬁrst two new axioms of component eﬃciency with respect to PΓ-
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the quotient game property3 of the Owen value in a sense that the vector of total
payoﬀs to a priori unions coincides with the payoﬀ vector in the quotient game.
A PΓ-value ξ is component eﬃcient in quotient (CEQ) if, for any  v,P,Γ P ∈
GPΓ






A PΓ-value ξ is component eﬃcient within a priori unions (CEU) if, for any
 v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ




Reconsider deletion link properties, now with respect to PΓ-games. Recall that
every PΓ-value is a mapping ξ: GPΓ
N → IR
N. A mapping ξ = {ξi}i∈N generates
on the domain of PΓ-games a mapping ξP : GPΓ
N → IR
M, ξP = {ξP




i∈Nk ξi, k ∈ M,a n dm mappings ξNk : GPΓ
N → IR
Nk, ξNk = {ξi}i∈Nk, k ∈
M. Since there are many PΓ-games  v,P,Γ P  with the same quotient Γ-game
 vPΓ,Γ M , there exists a variety of mappings ψP : GΓ
M →G PΓ
N assigning to any
Γ-game  u,Γ ∈G Γ
M,s o m ePΓ-game  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N , such that vPΓ = u and
ΓM =Γ. In general, it is not necessarily that ψP(vPΓ,Γ M)= v,P,Γ P . However,
for some ﬁxed PΓ-game  v∗,P∗,Γ∗
P  one can always choose a mapping ψ∗





P . Any mapping ξP◦ ψP : GΓ
M → IR
M by deﬁnition
represents a Γ-value that, in particular, can be applied to the quotient Γ-game
 vPΓ,Γ M ∈GΓ
M of some PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P ∈GPΓ
N . Similarly, for a given Γ-value
φ: GΓ
M → IR





assigning to any Γ-game  u,Γ ∈GΓ
Nk,s o m ePΓ-game  v,P,Γ P ∈GPΓ
N , such that
v
φ





Γ-value that, in particular, can be applied to Γ-games  v
φ
k,Γ k ∈G Γ
Nk relevant to
some PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N together with the given Γ-value φ.F o rag i v e n
(m+1)-tuple of deletion link axioms  DL
P,{DL






N composed of PΓ-games  v,P,Γ P  with graph structures
ΓP =  ΓM,{Γk}k∈M  such that  vPΓ,Γ M ∈G DL
P
M ,a n d vDL
P
k ,Γ k ∈G DL
k
Nk , k ∈
M.




N satisﬁes (m+1) -tuple of deletion link
axioms  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M ,i fΓ-value ξP◦ ψP meets DL
P and every Γ-value ξNk◦
ψDL
P
k , k∈M, meets the corresponding DL
k.
We focus on PΓ-values that reﬂect the two-stage distribution procedure when at
ﬁrst the quotient Γ-game vPΓ,ΓM  is played between a priori unions, and then the
total payoﬀs yk, k ∈ M, obtained by each Nk are distributed among their members
by playing Γ-games  v
y
k,Γ k . To ensure that beneﬁts of cooperation between a priori
3 AP - v a l u eξ satisﬁes the quotient game property, if for any  v,P ∈G
P





unions can be fully distributed among single players, we assume that solutions
in all Γ-games  v
y
k,Γ k , k ∈ M, are eﬃcient. Since we concentrate on component
eﬃcient solutions, it is important to ensure that the requirement of eﬃciency does
not conﬂict with component eﬃciency, which is equivalent to the claim that for





If Γk is connected, i.e. if Nk is the only element of Nk/Γk, then the last equality
holds automatically since by deﬁnition v
y
k(Nk)=yk. Otherwise, for every k ∈ M,




We say that in  v,P,Γ P ∈G PΓ
N the graph structure {Γk}k∈M is compatible with
ap a y o ﬀy ∈ IR
M in  vPΓ,Γ M , if for every k ∈ M,e i t h e rΓk is connected, or (4)
holds.
For applications involving disconnected graphs Γk, the requirement of compati-
bility (4) appears to be too demanding. But it is worth to emphasize the following.
Remark 3. If all Γk, k ∈ M, are connected, then {Γk}k∈M is always compati-
ble with any payoﬀ y ∈ IR
M in  vPΓ,Γ M , and eﬃciency follows from component
eﬃciency automatically.









structures {Γk}k∈M compatible with DL
P(vPΓ,Γ M).




N , that meets
CEQ, CEU, and  DL
P,{DL

















k(i) ,Γ k(i)),n k(i) > 1,
for all i ∈ N. (5)
From now on we refer to the PΓ-value ξ as to the  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M -value.





N that satisﬁes CEQ, CEU, and  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M .T a k eaPΓ-value




N meeting CEQ, CEU, and  DL
P,{DL






N with Γ ∗
P = Γ ∗
M,{Γ ∗
k}k∈M ,a n dl e tv∗
PΓ denote its quotient game.
Notice thatby choiceof  v∗,P∗,Γ∗










Nk , for all k∈M.
Step 1. Level of a priori unions.
Consider the mapping ψ∗
P : GDL
P




N that assigns to any Γ-game
 u,Γ ∈G DL
P




N , such that vPΓ = u andGraph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 233




P . By deﬁnition of
ξP, for any  u,Γ ∈GDL
P
M and  v,P,Γ P =ψ∗





ξi(v,P,Γ P), for all k ∈ M. (6)










Combining the last two equalities and taking into account that by deﬁnition of ψ∗
P,
vPΓ =u and ΓM =Γ,w eg e tt h a tf o ra n y u,Γ ∈GDL
P





i.e., the Γ-value ξP◦ψ∗
P on GDL
P
M satisﬁes CE. From the characterization results for
Γ-values, discussed above in Sect. 3., it follows that CE and DL
P together guarantee








k (u,Γ), for all k ∈ M.












M), for all k ∈ M.














M), for all k ∈ M.
Hence, due to arbitrary choice of the PΓ-game  v∗,P∗,Γ∗
P , it follows that for any









k (vPΓ,Γ M), for all k ∈ M. (7)
Notice that for k ∈ M such that Nk = {i}, equality (7) reduces to
ξi(v,P,Γ P)=DL
P
k(i)(vPΓ,Γ M), for all i ∈ N s.t. Nk(i) = {i}. (8)
Step 2. Level of single players within a priori unions.
Consider k ∈M for which nk  >1. Let the mapping ψ∗
k  :GDL
k 





assign to  u,Γ ∈G DL
k 




N , such that
vDL
P
k  =u and Γk  =Γ,a n dl e tψ∗






By deﬁnition of ξNk , for any  u,Γ ∈GDL
k 
Nk  and  v,P,Γ P =ψ∗
k (u,Γ), it holds that
(ξNk  ◦ ψ
∗
k )i(u,Γ)=ξi(v,P,Γ P), for all i ∈ Nk . (9)234 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya












N ,s u c h










k  =u and Γk  =Γ, and therefore for any C∈Nk /Γ, C =Nk , v(C)=v|NK (C)=
vDL
P
k  (C)=u(C), we obtain that for any  u,Γ ∈GDL
k 
Nk  , for every C∈Nk /Γ,
 
i∈C





k (vPΓ,Γ M),C = Nk ,
u(C),C  = Nk ,
with  vPΓ,Γ M  being the quotient Γ-game for  v,P,Γ P  = ψ∗
k (u,Γ). Whence, on











 u,Γ ∈G DL
k 
Nk  |u(Nk )=DL
P




the Γ-value ξNk  ◦ ψ∗
k  meets CE. CE together with DL
k
 






(ξNk  ◦ ψ∗
k )i(u,Γ)=DLk
 
i (u,Γ), for all i ∈ Nk .
Observe that by choice of ψ∗
k ,  (v∗)DL
P
k  ,Γ∗




k ). Hence, in particular,
the last equality holds on the Γ-game  (v∗)DL
P
k  ,Γ∗
k  , i.e.,









k ), for all i ∈ Nk .
Wherefrom, since (9) and by choice of ψ∗







k ), for all i ∈ Nk .
Due to the arbitrary choice of both,  v∗,P∗,Γ∗
P  and k  ∈ M for which nk  > 1, it









k(i) ,Γ k(i)), for all i ∈ N s.t. nk(i) > 1. (10)
Observe that the proof of equality (10) is based on equality (7) only when
Nk ∈ Nk/Γk, but (7) holds for all Nk, k ∈ M. To exclude any conﬂict, we show




N , (10) agrees with (7), when Nk / ∈ Nk/Γk, as well. Let




N be such that for some k   ∈ M, nk   > 1a n dNk   / ∈
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Whence, due to component eﬃciency of DLk
  
-value and since, for every C ∈
Nk  /Γk  , C   Nk  , it holds that vDL
P





C∈Nk  /Γk  
v(C).




N , the graph structure within a priori unions {Γk}k∈M
in  v,P,Γ P  is compatible with DL





k (vPΓ,Γ M), for all k ∈ M : Nk / ∈ Nk/Γk. (11)
Combining the last two equalities we obtain that (7) holds for k   as well.
Notice now that (8) and (10) together produce formula (5).





by (5) meets all axioms CEQ, CEU, and  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M . Consider arbitrary




N . To simplify discussion and w.l.o.g. we assume that for
all k ∈ M, nk > 1. Consider some k ∈ M and let C ∈ Nk/Γk. Because of component






If C  = Nk,t h e nvDL
P
k (C)=vk(C)=v|Nk(C)=v(C). Hence, due to arbitrary










k (vPΓ,Γ M), for all k ∈ M : Nk ∈ Nk/Γk.




N , due to validity of equality (11), just proved CEU





















k (vPΓ,Γ M), for all k ∈ M. (13)













Whence and due to component eﬃciency of DLP-value, we obtain that ξ meets
CEQ. Next, let a mapping ψP : GDL
P




N assign to any  u,Γ ∈GDL
P
M ,




N , such that vPΓ =u and ΓM =Γ. Then, for236 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
any  u,Γ ∈G DL
P
M and  v,P,Γ P  = ψ∗










k (vPΓ,Γ M), for all k∈M.
Hence, (ξP◦ψP)(u,Γ)=DL
P(u,Γ), i.e., Γ-value ξP◦ψP meets DLP. Similarly we
can show that for every k ∈ M, Γ-value ξNk◦ ψDL
P
k satisﬁes DL
k.    
A simple algorithm for computing the  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M -value of a PΓ-game




N follows from Theorem 1:
- compute the DL
P-value of  vPΓ,Γ M ;
- distribute the rewardsDL
P
k (vPΓ,Γ M), k∈M, obtained by a priori unions among
single players applying the DL
k-values to Γ-games  vDL
P
k ,Γ k  within a priori
unions.
Example 1. Consider a numerical example for the  LE,CF,...,CF
      
m
 -value ξ of a
PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P  with cooperation structure ΓP =  ΓM,{Γk}k∈M  given by line-
graph ΓM and undirected trees Γk, k ∈ M. As we will see below in Sect. 6., the
 LE,CF,...,CF
      
m
 -value provides a reasonable solution for the river game with mul-
tiple users.
Assume that N contains 6 players, the game v is deﬁned as follows:
v({i})=0 , for all i ∈ N;
v({2,3})=1 ,v ({4,5})=v({4,6})=2 .8,v ({5,6})=2 .9,
otherwisev({i,j})=0 , for all i,j∈N;
v({1,2,3})=2 ,v ({1,2,3,i})=3 , for i=4,5,6; otherwise v(S)=|S|, if |S|≥3;
and the coalition and cooperation structures, respectively, are given by Fig. 2.
Figure2.
In this case N = N1 ∪ N2 ∪ N3;
N1={1},N 2={2,3},N 3={4,5,6}; Γ1=∅,Γ 2={{2,3}},Γ 3={{4,5},{5,6}};
M = {1,2,3}; ΓM = {(1,2),(2,3)};Graph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 237
the quotient game vPΓ is given by
vPΓ({1})=0 ,v PΓ({2})=1 ,v PΓ({3})=3 ,
vPΓ({1,2})=2 ,v PΓ({2,3})=5 ,v PΓ({1,3})=4 ,v PΓ({1,2,3})=6 ;
























the games vk, k =1 ,2,3, within a priori unions Nk are given respectively by
v1({1})=0 ;
v2({2})=v2({3})=0 ,v 2({2,3})=1 ;
v3({4})=v3({5})=v3({6})=0,v 3({4,5})=v3({4,6})=2.8,v 3({5,6})=2.9,
v3({4,5,6})=3 ;
and the restricted games v
Γk



























Due to the above algorithm, the PG-value ξ can be obtained by ﬁnding of the lower
equivalent solution in the line-graph quotient game  vPΓ,Γ M  and thereafter the
total payoﬀs to the a priori unions LEk(vPΓ,Γ M), k ∈ M, should be distributed
according to the average-tree solution applied to cycle-free graph LE-games within
a priori unions, i.e., for all i ∈ N, ξi(v,P,Γ P)=AT i(vLE



















































It was already mentioned before that the PΓ-games  v, N ,Γ N   and
 v,{N},Γ{N}  reduce to the Γ-game  v,ΓN . Whence, any  F,{DL
k}k∈N -value of
 v, N ,Γ  N   and any  DL,F -value of  v,{N},Γ {N}  coincide with the Myerson
value of  v,ΓN ; moreover, if the graph ΓN is complete, they coincide also with the
Shapley value and the Owen value. Thereafter note that in a PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P 
with any coalition structure P, empty graph ΓM, and complete graphs Γk, k ∈ M,
any  DLP,F,...,F
      
m
 -value coincides with the Aumann-Dr` eze value of the P-game
 v,P . However, the  DLP,{DL
k}k∈M -value of a PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P  with non-
trivial coalition structure P never coincides with the Owen value (and therefore
with the value of V´ azquez-Brage et al. (1996), as well) because in our model no
cooperation is allowed between a proper subcoalition of any a priori union with
members of other a priori unions. On the contrary, the Owen model assumes that
every subcoalition of any chosen a priori union may represent this union in the
negotiation procedure with other entire a priori unions.
4.2. Stability
Theorem 2. If the set of DL axioms is restricted to CF, LE, UE, EL, SE, and PE,
then the  DL
P,{DL





belongs to the core C(v,P,Γ P).
Remark 4. Under the hypothesis of Theorem 2, all  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M -values are
combinations of the AT solution for undirected cycle-free Γ-games, the UE, LE,
and EL solutions for line-graph Γ-games, and the tree/sink value for rooted/sink
forest Γ-games, that are stable on the class of superadditive Γ-games (cf. Herings
et al. (2008), Brink et al. (2007), Demange (2004), Khmelnitskaya (2009)).
Proof. For any superadditive PΓ-game  v,P,Γ P , the quotient game vPΓ and
games vk, k ∈ M, within a priori unions are superadditive as well. Due to Re-
mark 4, DL(v,Γ) ∈ C(v,Γ), for every superadditive  v,Γ ) ∈G DL
N . Whence,
DL
P(vPΓ,Γ M) ∈ C(vPΓ,Γ M), (14)
DL
k(vk,Γ k) ∈ C(vk,Γ k), for all k ∈ M : nk>1. (15)
From (14) and because every singleton coalition is connected it follows that
DL
P




k (Nk), for all k ∈ M : nk>1.
Observe that, if Nk ∈ Nk/Γk, the games v
Γk
k and vk coincide, and therefore, because
of the last inequality, the DLP
k -game vDL
P




k ,Γ k) ∈ C(vDL
P
k ,Γ k), for all k ∈ M : nk>1&Nk∈Nk/Γk. (16)




= C(vk,Γk). Besides, by deﬁnition
any of the following Γ-values: the AT solution for undirected cycle-free Γ-games,
the UE, LE, and EL solutions for line-graph Γ-games, and the tree/sink valuesGraph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 239
for rooted/sink forest Γ-games, is deﬁned via the correspondent restricted game.




k(vk,Γ k). Wherefrom, together





k ,Γ k) ∈ C(v
DL
P
k ,Γ k), for all k ∈ M : nk>1. (17)


























k ,Γ k), for all k ∈ M : nk>1.
Whence together with (17), it follows that
 DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M |Nk(v,P,Γ P) ∈ C(v
DL
P
k ,Γ k), for all k ∈ M : nk>1. (19)
Due to Proposition 1, (18) and (19) ensure that
 DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M (v,P,Γ P) ∈ C(v,P,Γ P).    
Return back to Example 1 and notice that it illustrates Theorem 2 as well.
Observe, that v is superadditive, and ξ(v,P,Γ P)= LE,CF,CF,CF (v,P,Γ P) ∈
C(v,P,Γ P). But φ(v,P,Γ P)= F,F,F,F (v,P,Γ P) being the combination of the
Myerson values, i.e., φi(v,P,Γ P)=µi(v
µ
k(i),Γ k(i)), i ∈ N,d o e sn o tb e l o n gt o


















, φN3 / ∈ C(v
µ
3,Γ 3). Whence, due to Proposition 1,
φ(v,P,Γ P) / ∈ C(v,P,Γ P).
Due to Proposition 1, every core selecting PΓ-value meets the weaker properties
of CEQ and CEU together. Whence and from Theorem 2 the next theorem follows.
Theorem 3. If the set of DL axioms is restricted to CF, UE, LE, EL, SE, and PE,
then the  DL
P,{DL





is the unique core selector that satisﬁes (m+1)-tuple of axioms  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M .
Now let  v,P,Γ P  be a superadditive PΓ-game in which all graphs in ΓP =
 ΓM,{Γk}k∈M  are either undirected cycle-free, or directed line-graphs or rooted/sink
forests, and besides all Γk, k∈M, are connected. Then there exists a (m+1)-tuple
of  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M  axioms of types CF, UE, LE, EL, SE, or PE, for which the co-





N . Whence applying Theorem 2, we obtain that Theorem 4 below
holds true. It is worth to note that it is impossible to guarantee that {Γk}k∈M,i s
compatible with DL
P(vPΓ,Γ M), when among Γk, k ∈ M, some graphs are discon-
nected.240 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya




N ,f o rw h i c ha l l
graphs in ΓP =  ΓM,{Γk}k∈M  are either undirected cycle-free, or directed line-
graphs or rooted/sink forests, and all graphs Γk, k ∈ M, are connected, C(v,P,Γ P)  =
∅.
4.3. Harsanyi Dividends
Consider now  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M -values with respect to the distribution of Harsanyi







T is the dividend of T in v, the Harsanyi dividend of a coalition has a nat-
ural interpretation as the extra revenue from cooperation among its players that
they could not realize staying in proper subcoalitions. How the value under scrutiny
distributes the dividend of a coalition among the players provides the important in-
formation concerning the interest of diﬀerent players to create the coalition. This
information is especially important in games with limited cooperation when it might
happen that one player (or some group of players) is responsible for the creation of
a coalition. In this case, if such a player obtains no quota from the dividend of the
coalition, she may simply block at all the coalition creation. This happens, for ex-
ample, with some values for line-graph games (see discussion in Brink et al. (2007)).
Because of Theorem 1, every  DL
P,{DL
k}k∈M -value is a combination of the
DL
P-value in the quotient Γ-game and DL
k-values, k ∈ M, in the corresponding
Γ-games within a priori unions. Whence and by deﬁnition of a PΓ-game we obtain
Proposition 2. In any  v,P,Γ P ∈GPΓ
N the only feasible coalitions are either S=  




S of S =
 
k∈QNk according to the DL
P-value and of S ⊂ Nk according to the
DL
k-value.
5. Generalization on Games with Level Structures
Games with (multi)level (coalition) structures were ﬁrst consideredin Winter (1989).
A level structure on N is a ﬁnite sequence of partitions L =( P1,...,Pq) such that
every Pr, is a reﬁnement of Pr+1,t h a ti s ,i fP ∈P r,t h e nP ⊂ Q for some Q ∈P r+1.
Similarly as for games with coalition structures, for games with level structures it
is assumed that cooperation possible only either between single players within a
priori unions N1
k ∈P 1, k ∈ M1, at the ﬁrst level, or at each level r =1 ,...,q− 1
among entire a priori unions Nr
k,Nr
l ∈P r, k,l ∈ Mr, that simultaneously belong
to the same element of Pr+1, or among entire a priori unions N
q
k ∈P q, k ∈ Mq,
at the upper level q, and besides no cooperation is allowed between elements from
diﬀerent levels. It is worth to stress that when we consider cooperation among a
priori unions we bear in mind a priori unions as entire units and not as collec-
tions of single players or smaller subunions belonging to coalition structures at the
lower levels. A multilevel graph (cooperation) structure on N is speciﬁed by a tuple
of graphs ΓL =  ΓMq,{{Γ r
k}k∈Mr}
q
r=1 ,w h e r eΓMq deﬁnes links between a priori
unions N
q
k ∈P q, k ∈ Mq at the upper level q;a n yΓ r
k, k ∈ Mr, r =2 ,...,q,p r e s e n t s
links between a priori unions N
r−1
k ∈P r−1 at the level r−1t h a tb e l o n gt ot h es a m e
a priori union Nr
k ∈P r at the level r; and graphs Γ 1
k, k ∈ M1, connect single players
within a priori unions N1
k ∈P 1, k ∈ M1, at the ﬁrst level. Fig. 3 provides a possibleGraph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 241
Figure3.242 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
example of the (two-)level (coalition) structure endowed with the three-level graph
structure.
At r i p l e v,L,Γ L  presenting a combination of a TU game v ∈G N with level
structure L and with limited cooperation possibilities presented via multilevel graph
structure ΓL constitutes a graph game with level structure or simply LΓ-game.T h e
set of all LΓ-games with a ﬁxed player set N we denote GLΓ
N .ALΓ-value is deﬁned
as a mapping ξ: GLΓ
N → IR
N that associates with every  v,L,Γ P ∈G LΓ
N a vector
ξ(v,L,Γ L) ∈ IR
N.
We extend now the approach suggested to PΓ-values on LΓ-values. First adapt
the notion of component eﬃciency. Introduce some extra notation. Let kr(i)i ss u c h
that i ∈ Nr
kr(i) ∈P r, for all r =1 ,...,q. For every r=2,...,q−1a n dkr ∈Mr,l e t
P
kr
r−1={Nk ∈P r−1 | Nk ⊆ Nkr ∈Pr}, M
kr





























r − 1  .











Nk), |Q| > 1, for all Q ⊆ Mq,
where v
q
PΓ is the quotient restricted game inPΓ-game  vq,Pq, ΓMq,{Γkq}kq∈Mq  .
A LΓ-value ξ is component eﬃcient in levels (CEL) if, for any  v,L,Γ P ∈G LΓ
N ,




















Notice that for LΓ-games with at least two levels there are three conditions
of component eﬃciency instead of two given by CEU and CEQ for PΓ-games.
This happens because the graph structures within a priori unions at quotient levels
r=2,...,q−1 possess peculiarities of both graph structures, within a priori unionsGraph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 243
containing single players at the ﬁrst level and among a priori unions at the upper
level.
In case of LΓ-games a few issues, such as the consideration of a tuple of DL
axioms  DL Pq,{{DL k} k∈Mr}
q−1
r=1  with respect to a LΓ-value, the compatibility of co-
operation structures {Γk}k∈Mr, r=1,...,q−1, with the payoﬀs in quotient Γ-games







are much similar to their analogs for PΓ-games. So, without any loss we skip the
detailed discussion over these matters.







CEL, and  DL Pq,{{DL k}k∈Mr}
q−1













k1(i)), for all i ∈ N,



















kq(i)(vPqΓ,Γ Mq),S = Nkq−1(i),
vPq−1Γ(S),S   Nkq−1(i),
for all S ⊆ Nkq−1(i).
The proof of Theorem 5 is a straightforward generalization of the proof of The-
orem 1 and we leave it to the careful reader.
Theorems 2-4 for PΓ-values also admit natural extensions on LΓ-values.
6. Sharing a River with Multiple Users
Ambec and Sprumont (2002) approach the problem of optimal water allocation for a
given river with certain capacity over the agents (countries) located along the river
from the game theoretic point of view. Their model assumes that between each
pair of neighboring agents there is an additional inﬂow of water. Each agent, in
principal, can use all the inﬂow between itself and its upstream neighbor, however,
this allocation in general is not optimal in respect to total welfare. To obtain more
proﬁtable allocation it is allowed to allocate more water to downstream agents which
in turn can compensate the extra water obtained by side-payments to upstream
ones. The problem of optimal water allocation is approached as the problem of
optimal welfare distribution. Brink et al. (2007) show that the Ambec-Sprumont
river game model can be naturally embedded into the framework of a line-graph Γ-
game. In Khmelnitskaya (2009) the line-graph river model is extended to the rooted-
tree and sink-tree digraph model of a river with a delta or with multiple sources
respectively. All these models consider each agent as a single unit. We extend the
model to multiple agents assuming that each agent represents a community of users.
However, in our model no cooperation between single users or proper subgroups of
users belonging to diﬀerent agents is allowed, i.e., the presence of international ﬁrms
having branches at diﬀerent levels along the river is excluded.244 Anna B.Khmelnitskaya
Let N =
 
k∈M Nk be a set players (users of water) composed of the commu-
nities of users Nk, k ∈ M, located along the river and numbered successively from
upstream to downstream. Let elk ≥ 0, k ∈ M, l is a predecessor of k, be the inﬂow
of water in front of the most upstream community(ies) (in this case l =0 )o rt h e
inﬂow of water entering the river between neighboring communities in front of Nk.
Moreover, we assume that each Nk is equipped by a connected pipe system bind-
ing all its members. Without loss of generality we may assume that all graphs Γk,
k ∈ M, presenting pipe systems within communities Nk are cycle free; otherwise
it is always possible to close some pipes responsible for cycles. Indeed, for a graph
with cycles there is a ﬁnal set of cycle-free subgraphs with the same set of nodes as
in the original graph. It is not a problem to choose an optimal subgraph from this
set with respect to minimizing technological costs of water transportation within
the community. Fig. 4–6 illustrate the model.
Figure4. Line-graph river
Figure5. River with delta
Following Ambec and Sprumont (2002) it is assumed that for each Nk there is a
quasi-linear utility function representing the utility of Nk as a single unit and which
is given by uk(xk,t k)=bk(xk)+tk where xk is the amount of water allocated to
Nk, bk:I R + → IR is a continuous nondecreasing function providing beneﬁt bk(xk)
to Nk through the consumption of xk of water, and tk is a monetary compensation
to Nk. Moreover, in case of a river with a delta it is also assumed that, if splittingGraph-Restricted Games with Coalition Structures 245
Figure6. River with multiple sources
of the river into branches happens to occur after a certain Nk, then this comunity
takes, besides his own quota, also the responsibility to split the rest of the water
ﬂow to the branches such to guarantee the realization of the water distribution plan
to his successors. Further, we assume that, if the total shares of water for all Nk,
k ∈ M,a r eﬁ x e d ,t h e nf o re a c hNk there is a mechanism presented in terms of a
TU game vk that allocates the obtained share of water optimally to the players in
Nk. We do not discuss how the games vk, k ∈ M, are constructed and leave it open
outside the scope of the paper.
In the model under scrutiny, no cooperation is allowed among single users from
diﬀerent levels along the course of the river. Thus, the problem of optimal water al-
location ﬁts the framework of the introduced above PΓ-game which solution is given
by a PΓ-value that in turn is a combination of solutions for a line-graph, rooted-
tree, or sink-tree Γ-game among Nk, k ∈ M, and cycle-free graph games within
each Nk. In accordance with the results obtained in Ambec and Sprumont (2002),
Brink et al. (2007), Khmelnitskaya (2009), the optimal water distribution among
Nk, k∈M, can be modeled as a line-graph, rooted-tree, or sink-tree superadditive
river game. If all games vk, k ∈M, determining water distribution within commu-
nities are superadditive as well, then all discussed in the paper PΓ-values for such
type of PΓ-games are selectors of the core of the river game with multiple users.
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Abstract In the present work we study the simple motion diﬀerential games
of several objects on the surface with positive curvature. Using Jacobi ﬁeld
(Gromoll, Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968; Thorpe, 1979) it is constructed ana-
logue of the strategy of parallel approach (Petrosjan, 1965), characterized
with the property that straight lines through positions of the pursuer and
the evader remains close to each other during the game. This strategy is used
to solve a pursuit problem with many pursuers, in which the maximal speeds
of all players are equal (similar pursuit game without phase constraints was
studied by B.N.Pshenichniy, 1976). Moreover, it is proved that if the evader
has advantage over pursuers in speed, then the evader can avoid contact
with pursuers (in case players move on the plane the game was examined by
F.L.Chernous’ko, 1976, and an evasion strategy in direction was constructed
by him).
Keywords: diﬀerential games, pursuit, evasion, strategy, geodesic, Jacobi
ﬁeld, curvature.
1. Introduction
Phase constraints often arise in the real conﬂict control systems. The cases, when
the object moves in a bounded set or on a surface in Rn ( o ra l o n gac u r v e ) ,a r e
examples of such constraints.
Diﬀerent aspects of simple pursuit-evasion games under state constraints were
studied in many works (see the reference). Particularly, in (Ivanov, 1980) a pursuit-
evasion problem with many pursuers was solved on a compact set. In (Kuchkarov
and Rikhsiev, 2001) a pursuit problem was solved when the evader moves on a
strictly convex surface and the pursuer does along the space, with dynamical possi-
bilities of the players being equal. In the paper of A.A.Azamov and A.Sh.Kuchkarov
(2009), published in the second volume of the current series, a pursuit-evasion dif-
ferential game and its diﬀerent generalizations were considered when the evader
moves along a given curve (generalization of Rado’s game ”Lion and Man”). In the
paper (Ibragimov, 2002) a game problem was studied on a closed convex set with
integral constrains on controls of players.
In simple pursuit diﬀerential games, that is games described by equations
˙ x = u, ˙ y = v; x, y, u, v ∈ R
n, |u|≤ρ, |v|≤σ
strategy of parallel approach (called π-strategy and characterized with the property
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which is one of the eﬀective strategies, was applied by L.A.Petrosjan (1965, 1977)
and others (see, for example, Pshenichnii, 1976; Azamov and Samatov, 2000) to
solve diﬀerent pursuit diﬀerential game problems.
If the pursuer is subject to state constraint, then π-strategy, in general, may
not be applicable. In the present paper we consider pursuit and evasion diﬀerential
games when players move on a convex hypersurface.
When the evader doesn’t have an advantage in maximal speed, employing the
Jacobi ﬁeld we construct analogue of the π-strategy. In particular, if the hyper-
surface is a subspace, then constructed strategy coincides with the π-strategy. In
realization of this strategy, geodesics passing through the positions of the pursuer
and the evader change to a ”close” geodesic.
In the case where players have the same dynamical possibilities (analogue of
Pshenichnii’s work, 1976) it is proved that in the diﬀerential game with many pur-
suers pursuit can be completed after several maneuvers when pursuers use this
strategy.
In case when the evader has an advantage in maximal speed, an evasion strategy
was constructed to avoid from many pursuers (analogue of Chernous’ko’s work,
1976).
2. Statement of the Problem
Let M be an n-dimensional surface (hypersurface) in Rn+1 (n ≥ 2) from the class
of smoothness C2; Mz be the tangent hyperplane to M at the point z ∈ M; N be
the ﬁeld of unit normal vectors of M, i.e. vector N(z) is orthogonal to Mz at each
point z ∈ M.
Recall that the geodesic connecting the points x and y is an absolutely con-
tinuous curve γ :[ 0 ; τ] → M, τ > 0,x= γ(0),y= γ(τ) that has the short-
est length among the curves on M connecting x and y. If there is a geodesic
γ :[ 0 ; τ] → M, τ > 0, connecting the points x and y, then its length is called
distance between points x and y denoted d(x,y). In the sequel, we assume that all
diﬀerentiable curves γ :[ α,β] → M have unit velocities |γ (τ)|≡1,τ∈ (α,β), i.e.
all diﬀerentiable curves are considered to be given by natural parametrization.
The following assumption will be needed throughout the paper: for any point
z ∈ M and vector ω ∈ Mz, |ω| = 1 there exists a geodesic γ :[ 0 ,∞) → M such
that γ(0) = z, γ (0) = ω.
Motions of the group of pursuers P = {P1,P 2, ..., Pm} and the evader E are
described by the equations
Pi :˙ xi = ui,x i(0) = xi0; E :˙ y = v, y(0) = y0,y 0  = x0, (1)
in M, where xi,y∈ M, ui ∈ Mxi,v∈ My; ui,v are control parameters.
Deﬁnition 1. The Borel measurable function u(t)=( u1(t),u 2(t),..., um(t)),
|ui(t)|≤ρi,t≥ 0, (respectively v(t), |v(t)|≤σ, t ≥ 0) is called a control of the
group of pursuers P (the evader E) if for the solution x1(t), ...,xm(t) ( respectively
y(t)) of the initial value problem
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hold almost everywhere on t, t ≥ 0, where ρi > 0,σ> 0.
The set of all controls of the group of pursuers (of the evader respectively) denoted
by UP (VE).
Deﬁnition 2. A function U =( U1,U 2, ...,Um), where
Ui(x1,x 2,...,xm,y ,v ) → Bρi(xi), (x1,x 2,..., xm,y ,v ) ∈ Mm+1 × Bσ(y),
is called a strategy of the group of pursuers P if




˙ y = v(t),y (0) = y0,
˙ xi = Ui(x1,x 2,...,xm,y ,v (t)),x i(0) = xi0,i =1 ,2,...,m,
(3)
has a unique absolutely continuous solution (x(t),y(t)) = (x1(·),x 2(·),..., xm(·),
y(·));
2) the function u(t)=˙ x(t),t≥ 0, belongs to UP.
The function xi(·) is called a trajectory of the pursuer Pi generated by the triple:
strategy U, the initial position (x10,x 20,..., xm0,y 0), and the control v(·). Here
Ba(x)={z ∈ Mx : |z − x|≤a} is a ball on the tangent space Mx.
Deﬁnition 3. Let there exists a number T and a strategy U of the group
of pursuers P such that for any control v(·) of the evader E the trajecto-
ries x1(·),x 2(·) ..., xm(·),y (·) generated by the strategy U, the initial position
{x10,x 20,..., xm0,y 0}, and the control v(·) satisfy the equality xi(t)=y(t)a t
some i ∈{ 1,2,,...,m} and t ∈ [0,T]. Then we say that pursuit can be completed
for the time T in the game (1)-(3).
Deﬁnition 4. A mapping V : Mm+1 → Rn is called a strategy of the evader E if
there is a partition ∆ :0 = t0 <t 1 < ... < such that
1) tn →∞as n →∞ ;





˙ y = V (t, x1(ti),x 2(ti),...,xm(ti),y (ti)),t i ≤ t ≤ ti+1,y (0) = 0,
˙ xj = uj(t),x j(0) = xj0,j=1 , 2,...,m,
(4)
has a unique absolutely continuous solution (x(·),y(·));
3) the function v(t)=˙ y(t),t≥ 0, belongs to the set VE.
Deﬁnition 5. If the exists a strategy V of the evader E and a partition ∆ such
that for any control u(·) of the group P the solution of the system (4) satisﬁes the
inequalities xi(t)  = y(t),t ≥ 0,i=1 ,2,..., m, then we say that evasion is possible
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3. Evasion from many pursuers
In this section we consider two evasion diﬀerential games. In the ﬁrst one maximal
speeds of the pursuers don’t exceed that of the evader and the number of pursuers
less than or equal to the dimension of the surface. In the second one the evader has
advantage over the pursuers in speed, and the number of the pursuers is arbitrary.
Theorem 1. Let ρi ≤ σ =1 ,i =1 ,2,...,m, and m ≤ n. Then evasion is possible
in the game (1)-(4).
Proof. The ball B(p,r) is called convex if for any x, y ∈ B(p,r) there is a unique
geodesic γ :[ 0 ,a ] → M with the ends x,y and the length d(x,y) that completely
belongsto B(p, r). The ball B(p,r0) is called strongly convex if all balls B(p, r), 0 <
r<r 0, are convex.
It is known [Gromoll, Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968] that for any r>0t h e r ee x i s t sa
number r0 = r0(B(p,r)) > 0 such that all balls B (q, r0),q∈ B(p,r) are strongly
convex. Let r0 = B(y0,1). Set k =1+[ 1 /r0] and consider the partition of the
segment [0, 1] by
t0 =0 ,t i+1 = ti +1 /(2k),i =1 , 2,...,2k − 1.
We proceed by induction. We show that if xi(t)  = y(t),i =1 ,2,...,m on
[0,t l],l∈{ 0,1,...,2k−1}, then there exists a control v = v(t), |v(t)|≤1,t l ≤ t<
tl+1, such that pursuit will not be completed on [tl,t l+1]. Let
J(l)={i ≤ m : d(xi(tl),y(tl)) ≤ 1/k}.
It follows immediately from the deﬁnition that all balls B(p,1/(2k)),p∈ B(y0,r 0),
are convex and, in addition, for each i ∈ J(l) there exists a unique geodesic γi :
[0,a i] → M with the ends γi(0) = y(tl)a n dγi(ai)=xi(tl) (note that y(t) ∈ B(y0,1)
for all t ∈ [0,1]). As dimM = n, n ≥ m, then there exists a vector ωl, in the tangent
hyperplane to M at y(tl) such that  ωl, ˙ γi(0)) ≤0, |ωl| =1 ,i∈ J(l), where  ·, · 
is the inner product Rn+1.
We construct a geodesic γ0 :[ tl,t l+1] → M that satisfy the conditions
γ0(tl)=y(tl), ˙ γ0(tl)=ωl. It is clear that [Gromoll, Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968]
such a geodesic exists and is unique. We deﬁne the control v(t) of the evader on












|˙ γ(τ)|dτ = t − tl,t l ≤ t ≤ tl+1.
Using triangle inequality gives
d(xi(t),y(t)) ≥ d(xi(tl),y(tl)) − d(xi(tl),x i(t)) − d(y(tl),y(t))
> 1/k − ρi(t − tl) − (t − tl) ≥ 0
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for all i/ ∈ J(l) t ∈ [tl,t l+1] (recall tl+1 − tl =1 /(2k)).
Now we assume that i ∈ J(l). Then by the deﬁnition of the set J(l) and convexity
of the ball B(y(tl+1), 1/(2k)) we have
{γi(t): tl <t≤ tl+1}∩B(y(tl+1),1/(2k)) = ∅,
i.e.
d(y(tl+1),x i(tl)) = d(γ0(tk+1),γ i(tk+1)) > 1/(2k).
Therefore from the triangle inequality for all t ∈ [tl,t l+1]w eo b t a i n
d(xi(t),y(t)) ≥ d(y(tl+1),x i(t)) − d(y(tl+1),y(t))
≥ d(y(tl+1,x i(tl)) − d(xi(tl+1),x i(t)) − d(y(tl+1)),y(t))
> 1/(2k) − (t − tl)ρi − (tl+1 − t)/ρi ≥ 0.
(6)
Combining (5) with (6) yields xi(t)  = y(t) for all t ∈ [tl,t l+1]a n di ∈{ 1,2,...,m}.
Hence, by induction we obtain that for all t ∈ [0,1] and i ∈{ 1,2,...,m} relations
xi(t)  = y(t)h o l d .
Repeated application of this argument enables us to conclude that none of the
points xi(t)c o i n c i d e sw i t hy(t)o nt h ei n t e r v a l s[ 1 ,2], [2,3],.... The proof of the
theorem is complete.
Theorem 2. Let ρi <σ , i=1 ,2,...,m. Then evasion is possible in the game (1)
-(4).
Proof. We introduce an orthogonal cartesian coordinate system, z(1),z(2),...,z(n+1)
at the point O = y0 of Rn+1,w h e r ea x i sOz(n+1), coincides with normal vector to
M at O. In this coordinate system hypersurface M can be given by the equation
z




at a neighborhood |z − y0|≤r, r > 0, of the point y0. Fix the numbers ε>0a n d









for all z,|z − y(0)|≤r0 and i ∈{ 1,2,...,n}. As the functions ∂f(z)/∂z(i) are
continuous and ∂f(0)/∂z(i) =0 ,i=1 ,2,...,n, then such numbers ε and r0 exist.
Let Π be orthogonal projection operator from Rn+1 onto the hyperplane
z(n+1) =0 . Then for any control v(·) ∈ VE and corresponding solution y(t),t ≥ 0,
of the equation ˙ y = v(t) with initial state y0 we have
|Π ˙ y(t)| =
 




















|v(t)|2 − ε2n|v(t)|2 ≥ (1 − ε)|v(t)|.
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Now taking |v(t)|≡1 yields |Π ˙ y(t)|≥1−ε. Therefore |Π ˙ xi(t)|≤|˙ xi(t)|≤ρi <
1 − ε (see, (7)).
Let
¯ y = Πy, ¯ v = ˙ ¯ y, ¯ xi = Πxi, ¯ ui = ˙ ¯i x, 0 ≤ i ≤ m.
Then
¯ y = Πy, ¯ v = ˙ ¯ y = Π ˙ y = πv;¯ xi = Πxi, ¯ ui = ˙ ¯ xi = Π ˙ xi = Πui, 0 ≤ i ≤ m. (9)
Now we consider an evasion game of the point ¯ y (the evader) from the points
¯ x1, ¯ x2,..., ¯ xm (the pursuers) in Rn.W et a k e¯ v and ¯ u1, ¯ u2, ..., ¯ um as control param-
eters, which satisfy inequalities (see, (8) - (9)): |¯ v|≥1 − ε>ρ i ≥| ¯ ui|, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
If y0  = xi0, then, clearly, ¯ y(0)  =¯ xi(0) for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
At this time, if the evader ¯ y uses the evasion method in direction (Chernous’ko,
1976), then evasion is possible from the points ¯ x1, ¯ x2,..., ¯ xm on the interval [0,r/2]
(to this end, it is suﬃcient to apply ”the evasion maneuver along narrow corridor”
in the direction (1,0,...,0) on that interval. After that the evader ¯ y applies the
mentioned maneuver to avoid of points ¯ x1, ¯ x2,..., ¯ xm in direction (−1,0,...,0) on
the interval [r/2, 3r/2].
Repeated application of this maneuver on intervals [3r/2,5r/2], [5r/2,7r/2],
[7r/2,9r/2] and so forth ensures the evader ¯ y to avoid of points ¯ x1, ¯ x2,..., ¯ xm. Of
course, during the motion of the point ¯ y the point y remains in the circle |y−y0| <r 0
on [0,∞), i.e. (7) and (8) holds for all t ≥ 0. The relations ¯ y(t)  =¯ xi(t),t ≥ 0,i =
1,2,...,m, imply that y(t)  = xi(t) for all t ≥ 0a n di =1 ,2,...,m. Proof of the
theorem is complete.
Note that ¯ xi and ¯ ui (respectively ¯ y and ¯ v) are deﬁned uniquely by xi and ui (y
and v)
4. Pursuit diﬀerential game
4.1. Strategies of Pursuers
In this subsection, we assume that the Riemann curvature with respect to any two
dimensional plane W, W ⊂ Mx (curvature in two dimensional direction) at any
point x ∈ M is non negative and bounded by some number 1/R, R > 0 [Gromoll,
Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968].
Lemma 1. Let y :[ 0 ,α] → M be an absolutely continuous curve on M; f :[ 0 ,α]×
[0,β] → M be a smooth mapping that satisfy conditions
1) f(t,0) = y(t);
2) for any ﬁxed t the curve f(t,r), 0 ≤ r ≤ β, is a geodesic;
3) the vector ﬁeld fr(t,r)|r=0 is parallel along the curve y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α (fr =
∂f/∂r and  ·, · ).
Then
 frt,f t | r=0 =0 , 0 ≤ t ≤ α. (10)
Recall that such a mapping f :[ 0 ,α]×[0,β] → M is called the Jacobi rectangle.
Proof. Since the vector ﬁeld fr(t,r)|r=0 is parallel along the curve y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α,
the vector ﬁeld ∂(fr(t,r)|r=0)/∂t is orthogonal to M along y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α(Thorpe,
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The following lemma is the result of the Rauh’s comparison theorem (Gromoll,
Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968).
Lemma 2. Let X be the Jacobi ﬁeld along the geodesic γ :[ 0 ,∞) → M. If
 X (0),X(0)  =0and X(0)  =0 , then 0 < |X(r)|≤| X(0)| for all r ∈ (0,πR/2).
Lemma 3. Let d(x,y) ≤ πR/2,γ:[ 0 ,r 0] → M be a geodesic such that γ(0) = y
and γ(d(x,y)) = x, and X be a Jacobi ﬁeld along γ such that X(0) = v, |v|≤σ ≤ ρ,
 X (0),X(0)  =0 . Then there exists a number a(x,y,v) ≥ 0 such that
U0(x,y,v)=X(d(x,y)) − a(x,y,v)γ (d(x,y)), |U0(x,y,v)|x = ρ. (11)
Proof. We obtain from Lemma 2 that |X(r)|≤| X(0)| = |v|≤σ ≤ ρ if 0 <r<
πR/2. Therefore there exists a number a(x,y,v) that satisﬁes the relations (11).
Remark 1. In case M is Euclidean space the strategy U0(x,y,v)c o i n c i d e sw i t h
the strategy of parallel approach (Petrosjan, 1965). If M is n-dimensional sphere,
then it can be shown that the function U0(x,y,v) is deﬁned for all possible triples
(x,y,v).
Theorem 3. Let (x0,y 0) ∈ M2,d (x0,y 0) <π R / 2; v(t),t≥ 0, be a control of the
evader E. Then
1) there exists a solution (x(t),y(t)) of the initial value problem
˙ y = v(t),y (0) = y0, ˙ x = U0(x,y,v(t)),x (0) = x0, (12)
on the maximal time interval [0,α) where x(t)  = y(t);
2) if x(t)  = y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α and ϕ :[ 0 ,α]×[0,πR/2] → M is the Jacobi rectangle
such that y(t)=ϕ(t,0), and for each ﬁxed t ∈ [0,α] the curve ϕ(t,τ) is geodesic on
M through x(t), then the vector ﬁeld V t = ϕr(t,r)|r=0 is parallel along the curve
y(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ α and
d
dt
(d(x(t),y(t))) = − V t,v(t) −
 
ρ2 −| v(t)|2 + | V t,v(t) |
2. (13)
Proof. 1). Let v(t),t ≥ 0, be an arbitrary evader’s control, y(t),t≥ 0b et h e
solution of the initial value problem ˙ y = v(t),y (0) = y0,f (0,r)=ϕ(0,r)a n d
f :[ 0 ,∞) × [0,πR/2] → M be the Jacobi rectangle that satisfy hypothesis of
Lemma 1.
Recall that for each ﬁxed t the vector ﬁeld ft(t,r) is the Jacobi ﬁeld [Gromoll,
Klingenberg, Meyer, 1968] along the curve f(t,r), 0 ≤ r ≤ πR/2t h a ts a t i s f yt h e
condition ft(t,0) = v(t), and the vector ﬁeld fr(t,r) is tangent one. Therefore
Lemmas 1 and 2 imply that
0 < |ft(t,r)|≤| ft(t,0)| = |v(t)|≤σ ≤ ρ
if 0 ≤ r ≤ πR/2. Hence, the solution r(t) of the initial value problem




 ft,f r  +
 







,r (0) = d(x0,y 0),
exists and doesn’t increase on the time interval [0,θ), where r(t)  =0 . Set
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Then |˙ z(t)|≡ρ and
˙ z(t)=ft (t,r(t)) + fr (t,r(t)) ˙ r(t),t ∈ [0,θ).
Then it is not diﬃcult to verify (see, Lemma 3) that
ft (t,r(t)) + fr (t,r(t)) ˙ r(t)=U0 (z(t),y(t),v(t))
and the function z(·) satisﬁes the equation
˙ z(t)=U0 (z(t),y(t),v(t)),z (0) = x0.
Therefore by uniqueness of the solution we have θ = α,
x(t) ≡ z(t),d (z(t),y(t)) = r(t),ϕ (t,r) ≡ f(t,r), (14)
and the ﬁeld ϕr(t,r)|r=0 is parallel along the curve y(t),t ∈ [0,α].
2). Let Xt(r) be a Jacobi ﬁeld orthogonal to the curve ϕ(t,r)a l o n gϕ(t,r)f o r
every ﬁxed t ∈ [0,α]a n d





To prove (13) we decompose the vector ft(t,0) = v(t) in orthogonal vectors
Xt(0) and γt(0) :












ρ2 −| Xt (d(x(t),y(t)))|
2.
It can beeasily checked that
˙ r(t)=λ2(t) − λ1(t). (15)
By (11) and (12) we obtain
λ1(t)= γt(0),v(t)  =  ϕr(t,r)|r=0 ,v (t)  =  V t,v(t) ,
λ2(t)=−
 






Combining the last formulas with (14) and (15) gives (13). The proof of the
theorem is complete.
In its turn equality (13) implies
d
dt
(d(x(t),y (t))) ≤ σ − ρ.
Integrating the last inequality yields
d(x(t),y(t)) ≤ d(x0,y 0)+( σ − ρ)t.
Hence, the following corollary is true
Corollary 1. If m =1 ,(x0,y 0) ∈ M2 and d(x0,y 0) ≤ πR/2, then pursuit can be
completed in the game (1)-(4) with the help of the strategy U0(x,y,v) for the time
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4.2. Pursuit diﬀerential game with many pursuers
If at least for one i, ρi >σ , then, clearly, pursuit can be completed from any initial
positions. Therefore, a pursuit game is intensional if maximal speeds of all players
are equal. That is why we consider the case ρi = σ = 1 and the pursuit game
(Pshenichnii, 1976)
Theorem 4. Let geodesics γi :[ 0 ,r 0] → M satisfy conditions γi(0) = y0,γ  
i(0) =
ei,y 0 ∈ int conv{e1,e 2,..., em}, and xi0 = γi(ri), 0 <r i ≤ Rπ/2,i=1 ,2,...,m, be
initial positions. Then pursuit can be completed in the game (1)-(4) with the help













where v ∈ My0.





 v,ei  > 0,v ∈ My0.
Proof. Let v(·) be an arbitrary control and y(·) be corresponding trajectory of the
Evader E; Fy(t)(e) be a parallel shift of the vector e ∈ My0 to the point y(t)
along the curve y(t),t ≥ 0. Let the pursuers use the strategies Ui = U0(xi,y ,v ),












1 −| v(t)|2 +
    
Fy(t)(ei),v(t)




















where ¯ v(t)=v(t)/|v(t)|, if v(t)  =0 . In case v(t)=0 , ¯ v(t) is any unit vector tangent
























 v,ei  (16)
whenever d(xi(t),y(t)) > 0 for all i, where v is a unit vector tangent to M at y0.











Hence, by the time T an equality xi(t)=y(t) holds at least for one i. Proof of
the theorem is complete.
Remark 2. If the initial positions of the players don’t satisfy hypothesis of The-
orem 4, then the pursuers using another strategies can take the necessary position
and then apply the strategy U0.256 Atamurat Sh. Kuchkarov, Gafurjan I. Ibragimov
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Abstract The hierarchical game, in which the tax authority and ﬁnite num-
ber of taxpayers are players, is considered. The tax authority interacts to
each taxpayer as ”principal-to-agent”. The players are supposed to be risk
neutral. Every taxpayer can declare his income’s level as equal or less, than
the true level of his income. Tax and penalty rates are deﬁned as constants.
The tax authority makes audit with individual probability for every tax-
payer. It is assumed that these probabilities are known by the taxpayers.
Audit is supposed to reveal 100% of evasions. The taxpayer must pay a tax
on his evasion level and a penalty, which depends on this level, as a result of
audit, that revealed a tax evasion. Diﬀerent cases of penalties are considered.
Players’ payoﬀ fuctions and strategies are deﬁned. The aim of every player
is to maximize his payoﬀ function.
Thus, the game theoretical model of taxation for ﬁnite number of taxpayers
is considered. The Nash equilibrium in the corresponding game is found.
Keywords: tax control, taxpayers, tax authority, penalties, hierarchical
game, optimal strategies, Nash equilibrium.
1. Introduction
One of the most important aspects of modeling of taxation is the tax control. Due to
the mathematical tradition, founded in such works as (Chander and Wilde, 1998)
and (Vasin and Vasina, 2002) this aspect is considered as the interaction between
taxpayers and tax authority and is studied in the network of game theoretical atti-
tude. This paper is devoted to a consideration of the simple game theretical model
of this interaction and (as in previous models) to solving of such a problem as the
search of the equilibrium and optimal strategies of players.
The hierarchical game (Petrosyan and Zenkevich and Semina, 1998), in which
the tax authority (high level) and the ﬁnite number of taxpayers (low
level) are players, is considered. Following (Boure and Kumacheva, 2005),
(Chander and Wilde, 1998) and (Vasin and Morozov, 2005), it is considered that
the tax authority interacts with each taxpayer as ”principal-to-agent”. The players’
behaviour is supposed to be risk neutral.
It is also interesting to study this model in diﬀerent cases of the proﬁt func-
tions of players. These functions depend on taxes and penalties. Such sources as
(Vasin and Vasina, 2002) or (Vasin and Morozov, 2005) give us information about
four cases of penalties (known from the economic practice in diﬀerent countries).
All of them are considered in the model described. Also one speciﬁc case of penalty
(interesting from the mathematical point of view) is considered.258 Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
2. The model
n taxpayers are considered, each of them has income level equal to ik,w h e r ek = 1,n.
The income of the taxpayer rk is declared at the end of a tax period, where rk ≤
ik for each k = 1,n. As in earlier models, such as (Chander and Wilde, 1998) or
(Vasin and Vasina, 2002), it is considered here that the audit of the k-th taxpayer
is made by the tax authority with probability pk. Model is built following the
assumption, that taxpayers are aware of these probabilities. It is supposed, that the
tax authority’s audits reveal tax evasions always.
3. Players’ strategies and their proﬁt functions
In the game considered the ﬁrst move is made by the tax authority (the central
player), choosing the vector p =( p1,p 2,...,pn). Then the taxpayers’ moves are
made (low level players), choosing the values of declared income rk.
If the evasion is revealed by the tax audit, then the evaded taxpayer should pay
the underpaid tax and the penalty; both of which depend on the evasion’s level.
Let t be the tax rate, π be the penalty rate. Four cases of penalties are known from
(Vasin and Vasina, 2002):
1. the penalty is proportional to diﬀerence between true and payed tax:
F(I,Ir)=( 1+δa)(T(I) − T(Ir));
2. the net penalty is proportional to evasion:
F(I,Ir)=T(I) − T(Ir)+δb(I − Ir);
3. the penalty is restricted due to the given level of the agent’s minimal income
I(≤ Imin) in the case of his nonoptimal behaviour:
0 ≤ F(I,Ir) ≤ I − T(Ir) − I;
4. the post-audit payment is proportional to the revealed evaded income:
F(I,Ir)=δd(I − Ir),
where (in terms of (Vasin and Vasina, 2002)) I and Ir are taxpayer’s true and de-
clared incomes correspondingly, T(Ir) is a tax function, δ is a penalty coeﬃcient and
F(I,Ir) is a penalty function. It should be noticed that in (Vasin and Vasina, 2002))
a post-audit payment is understood under F(I,Ir).
The net penalty is proportional to evasion Let’s consider the model
in the simplest case, when the penalty is proportional to evasion (the sec-
ond case in (Vasin and Vasina, 2002))). (Analogical model was considered in
(Kumacheva and Petrosyan, 2009)). Let’s deﬁne the penalty as (t + π)(ik − rk)f o r
the k-th taxpayer (where k = 1,n). The expected tax payment of the taxpayer k is:
uk = trk + pk(t + π)(ik − rk), (1)A Model of Interaction Between Taxpayers and the Tax Authority 259
where the ﬁrst summand is always paid by the taxpayer (pre-audit payment), and
the second – as the result of the tax auditing, made with probability pk (post-audit
payment). The expected payoﬀ bk of the taxpayer k is:
bk = ik − uk = ik − trk − pk(t + π)(ik − rk). (2)
Function bk depends on values of the audit’s probability and on the declared
income, i.e.
bk = bk(pk,r k).








Let ck be the cost of the audit of the taxpayer k. It is diﬀerent for each tax-
payer, because the costs of auditing of each taxpayer are diﬀerent. As in previ-
ous models (for example, (Chander and Wilde, 1998), (Vasin and Vasina, 2002) or
(Boure and Kumacheva, 2005)), the tax authority’s net income consists of taxation
(taxpayers’ payments corresponding to the declared income), taxes paid on the dif-
ference between true and declared levels of income and penalties (last two are the
audit results) less total audit cost. Being the sum of payments got from every tax-
payer, the expected tax authority’s net income can be calculated as the diﬀerence








(uk − pkck). (3)




where p =( p1,p 2,...,pn).
4. A search of the optimal strategies
Proposition 1. The optimal strategy of the tax authority (in order to maximize its
income) is p = t
t+π; the optimal strategy of the taxpayers (in the same meaning) is
r∗
k(pk)=0 ,w h e npk < p,a n dr∗
k(pk)=ik when pk ≥ p.
Proof. If the k-th taxpayer’s aim is considered as the minimization of the function
uk, it should be taken into account, that in terms of this model uk is the linear
function of variable rk. Therefore, the function gets its minimum on one of the ends
of the segment [0,i k].260 Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
Figure1. T h ec a s eo fpk(t+π) <t ,t h a ti se q u i v a l e n tt opk < p. The evasion is proﬁtable
for the k-th taxpayer. Thus, his optimal strategy is rk =0 .
Figure2. The case of pk(t + π) >t ,t h a ti se q u i v a l e n tt opk > p. The evasion is not
proﬁtable for the k-th taxpayer. Thus, his optimal strategy is rk = ik.A Model of Interaction Between Taxpayers and the Tax Authority 261
When declared income is deﬁned as rk = ik, then function uk = tik,w h i c h
corresponds to the true tax payment. When declared income is deﬁned as rk =0 ,
then function uk = pk(t + π)ik, which corresponds to the expected post-audit tax
payment.
The value of the probability of audit p = t
t+π is critical for each taxpayer’s
decision whether to evade or not.
So, the k-th taxpayer’soptimal strategy is r∗
k(pk)=0 ,w h e npk < p,a n dr∗
k(pk)=
ik,w h e npk ≥ p.
Remark 1. The value of the probability of audit pk = p is the point of indiﬀerence,
i.e. every taxpayer can declare rk =0o rrk = ik. In both cases the taxpayer’s
expected tax payment is uk = tik. That’s why it is possible to join the case of
equality with the case of inequality pk > p.
If every taxpayer plays in optimal way, i.e. rk = r∗
k(pk)f o re a c hk = 1,n,t h e n
the expected tax authority’s income depends only on vector p, chosen by the tax
authority, i.e.
R = R(p1,p 2,...,pn).
If pk ≥ p, the taxpayer doesn’t evade and declares rk = ik for each k = 1,n.
Then Rk = tik − pkck, function Rk is decreasing on the segment [p,1] and gets its
maximum in the point pk = p:
max
pk




If pk < p then the taxpayer evades and declares his minimal possible income as
rk =0f o re a c hk = 1,n.T h e n
Rk = pk(t + π)ik − pkck.
Depending on correlation between (t + π)ik and ck, function Rk can decrease or




Rk = Rk(0) = 0,
or when pk → p−:
lim
pk→p−




Remark 2. Due to the economic meaning of the parameters t, π and ck,i ti s
rational to suppose that (t + π)ik ≥ ck (penalties and taxes from the true income
are not less, then the audit cost). Diﬀerent situations, in which this condition is not
hold, exist in practice. Among them there is expensive audit (because of its technical
diﬁculties). But the case (t + π)ik <c k is not proﬁtable for the tax authority in
terms of this model (the audit gives only dead loss, i.e. Rk ≤ 0). That’s why in the
following reasonings it will be supposed that the condition (t + π)ik ≥ ck is hold.262 Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
The maximal total expected income from taxation of n taxpayers is deﬁned as









Thus, the optimal (in order to maximize of income) strategies of taxpayers and
tax authority were found.    
Figure3. Dependence the k-th taxpayer’s expected proﬁt bk on the probability of audit
pk
Proposition 2. The situation (r∗
k,p) is the unique Nash equilibrium in this game.
Proof. Obviously, there is no proﬁt for any player in the case of deviation from their
optimal strategies.
For example, consider the situation, when the tax authority chooses p as a
strategy and one of the taxpayers chooses rk  = r∗−k. When the taxpayer’s strategy
is r∗
k, then his expected tax payment is uk = tik and his proﬁt function is bk =
ik −tik. When the k-th player does not play optimal, then rk  = r∗ −k, uk increases
and bk decreases. Therefore the unilateral deviation of the situation (r∗
k,p)i sn o t
proﬁtable for every taxpayer.
Analogical situation appears, when the tax authority plays nonoptimal, i.e. pk  =
p. In this situation R(pk) ≥ R(p).
These considerations correspond to the next defenition
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Figure4. Dependence the tax authority’s expected proﬁt Rk on the probability of audit
pk
Deﬁnition 1. Situation x∗ =( x∗
1,...,x ∗
i,...,x ∗
n) in the game Γ is the situation of












where H is the proﬁt function, xi is the i-th player’s strategy and Xi is the set of
the i-th player’s strategies.
Thus, (r∗
k,p) is the Nash equilibrium. Its uniqueness follows from the uniqueness
of the players’ optimal strategies.    
5. Other cases of penalties
5.1. The penalty is proportional to the diﬀerence between true and
payed tax
As the penalty is proportional to the diﬀerence between true and payed tax, in the
considered model it is deﬁned as (1+π)t(ik −rk). Then, the expected tax payment
(1) of the k-th taxpayer is
uk = trk + pk(1 + π)t(ik − rk),
the expected payoﬀ (7) of the taxpayer k is
bk = ik − uk = ik − trk − pk(1 + π)t(ik − rk).







(trk + pk(1 + π)t(ik − rk) − pkck).
While searching for the optimal players’ strategies and their proﬁt functions,
reasoning and results, got in the previous case, remain valid for p = 1
1+π.
5.2. The penalty is restricted due to the given level of the agent’s
minimal income in the case of his nonoptimal behavior
In this case (the third case in (Vasin and Vasina, 2002) the post-audit payments
obviously belong to the segment [0,I− T(Ir) − I]. In terms of this model it means
that
uk ∈ [trk,i k − i].
Then the minimal income i should be deﬁned. When it’s done, there is a possi-
bility to search opimal strategies.
5.3. The post-audit payment is proportional to the revealed evaded
income
In this case the expected tax payment (1) can be deﬁned as
uk = trk + δd(ik − rk),
where the second summand is the post-audit payment. If put t + π as δd, then this
case is absolutely analogical to the ﬁrst case of the penalty taking considered.
5.4. Speciﬁc case: penalty is proportional to the square of diﬀerence
between true and declared levels of the taxpayer’s income
As far as in this model the players are supposed to be risk-neutral, it is interesting
how the players’ strategies will change if the penalty function changes signiﬁcantly.
As an example let’s consider the case of the penalty deﬁned as π(ik − rk)2.I ti s
the most interesting case from the mathematical point of view. The expected tax
payment (1) of the taxpayer k is:
uk = trk + pk(t + π)(ik − rk)2, (5)
The players’ proﬁt function is deﬁned analogically to the previous cases. The
expected payoﬀ bk of the taxpayer k is:
bk = ik − uk = ik − trk − pk(t + π)(ik − rk)2.







(uk − pkck). (6)
Proposition 3. The optimal strategy of the tax authority (in order to maximize




;t h ek-th taxpayer’s optimal strategy (in the same
meaning) is r∗
k(pk)=ik − t
2pk(t+π).A Model of Interaction Between Taxpayers and the Tax Authority 265
Proof. The optimal strategy of the taxpayer k is the solution of the task of the




which is equivalent to
t − 2pk(t + π)(ik − rk)=0 .






When every taxpayer’s behaviour is optimal, i.e. rk = r∗
k(pk) for every k = 1,n,t h e
tax authority’s expected income depends only on vector p, i.e.

















The optimal strategy of the tax authority is the solution of the task of the maxi-







− ck =0 .







The maximum of the tax authority’s income is deﬁned as the sum of the maximal
values of Rk (as in (4)), where
max
pk




).    
Remark 3. So, big penalty, as considered in this case, can be explained as the
psychological pressure on those taxpayers, who evade taxation. They know that if
their evasion is revealed they may become bankrupts. Taking this possibility into
account it is necessary for the tax authority to set the penalty depending on the
level of the agent’s minimal income in the case of his nonoptimal behavior (as it
was done in the third case in (Vasin and Vasina, 2002)). This way of penalty taking
is reasonable when (t + π)ik <c k or (1 + π)tik <c k (as were considered in the
previous cases), i.e. when auditing is a priori not proﬁtable.266 Suriya Sh. Kumacheva
Proposition 4. (Analogical to the case, when the net penalty is proportional to
evasion) the situation (r∗
k,p) is the unique Nash Equilibrium in this game.
Proof. Absolutely analogical to the proof of 2.    
6. Conclusion
Thus, the diﬀerent cases of penalties are considered:
1. In the case, when the penalty is proportional to the diﬀerence between true and
payed taxes, the k-th taxpayer’s optimal strategy is r∗
k(pk)=0 ,w h e npk < p,
and r∗
k(pk)=ik,w h e npk ≥ p; the optimal strategy of the tax authority is
p = t
t+π.T h es i t u a t i o n( r∗
k,p) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
2. In the case, when the net penalty is proportional to the evasion, results, got in
the previous case, remain valid for p = 1
t+π.
3. In the case, when the post-audit payment is proportional to the revealed evaded
income (uk = trk + δd(ik − uk)), t + π was put as δd. Then, this case becomes
absolutely analogical to the ﬁrst case of the penalty taking considered.
4. In the case, when the penalty is proportional to the square of diﬀerence between
true and declared levels of the taxpayer’s income, the optimal strategy of the




;t h ek-th taxpayer’s optimal strategy is r∗
k(pk)=
ik− t
2pk(t+π).T h es i t u a t i o n( r∗
k,p) is the unique Nash Equilibrium in this game.
The reasonings for the using of this case of penalty taking is the realization of
conditions (t+π)ik <c k or (1+π)tik <c k. To stave any taxpayer oﬀ bankruptcy
the additional restriction on the penalty (as were considered in the third case
in (Vasin and Vasina, 2002)) can be used.
Thus, the game theoretical model of interaction between taxpayers and tax
authority is considered. The optimal players’ strategies (in order to maximize their
income) and the Nash equilibrium are found.
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Abstract Previous results on non-constant discounting in continuous time
are extended to the ﬁeld of deterministic diﬀerential games with a stochastic
terminal time. Diﬀerent cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts
for diﬀerential games with random duration are analyzed. The results are
illustrated by solving the cake-eating problem describing the classical model
of management of a nonrenewable resource for a logarithmic utility func-
tion. Time-consistency in cooperative diﬀerential games with non-constant
discounting is brieﬂy discussed.
Keywords: non-constant discounting, naive and sophisticated agents, ran-
dom duration, diﬀerential games, non-renewable resources.
1. Introduction
Variable rate of time preferences have received considerable attention in recent
years. There is substantial evidence that agents are impatient about choices in the
short term but are patient when choosing between long-term alternatives (see, for
instance, Ainslie, 1992, Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992 or Thaler, 1981.
The most relevant eﬀect of non-constant discounting is that preferences change
with time: an agent making a decision at time t has diﬀerent preferences compared
with those at time s (Strotz, 1956). Therefore, we can consider him or her at dif-
ferent times as diﬀerent agents. An agent making a decision at time t is usually
called the t-agent. If the planning horizon is a given (ﬁnite or inﬁnite) interval,
in a continuous time setting, we can understand the dynamic optimization prob-
lem with non-constant discounting as a perfect information sequential game with a
continuous number of players (the t-agents) making their decisions sequentially.
A t-agent can act in two diﬀerent ways: naive and sophisticated. Naive agents
take decisions without taking into account that their preferences will change in the
near future. Then, they will be continuously modifying their calculated choices for
the future, and their decisions will be in general time inconsistent. The solution is
obtained by solving the associated optimal control problems for each t-agent, and
patching together the optimal decision rules at time t. In order to obtain a time
consistent strategy, the t-agent should be sophisticated, in the sense of taking into
  J.M.S. acknowledges ﬁnancial support from MICINN, Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovaci´ on
(Spain), projects MTM2006-13468 and ECO2009-08274.268 Jes´ us Mar´ ın-Solano, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas
account the preferences of all the t -agents, for t  >t . Therefore, the solution to the
problem of the agent with non-constant discounting should be constructed by look-
ing for the subgame perfect equilibria of the associated game with an inﬁnite number
of t-agents. This prompts the use of a dynamic programming approach, applying the
Bellman optimality principle. As a result, the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman in
optimal control theory is replaced by a much more complicated dynamic program-
ing equation introduced in Karp, 2007 (see also Mar´ ın-Solano and Navas, 2009 and
Ekeland and Lazrak, 2008).
In this paper we extend previous results in non-constant discounting in contin-
uous time (in a deterministic setting) in two diﬀerent ways. First, we consider the
case of a stochastic terminal time (Petrosjan and Murzov, 1966, Yaari, 1965). And
second, we consider multi-agent problems. As a result, we analyze diﬀerent solution
concepts for diﬀerential games with random duration when the agents discount the
future by using a non-constant but equal instantaneous discount rate of time pref-
erence. The results are illustrated by solving the classical model of nonrenewable re-
sources (see, e.g., Dockner et al (2000)), a cake-eating problem that has been studied
with some detail in the literature of non-constant discounting when the time horizon
is ﬁnite (not random) or inﬁnite, and there is just one agent. Finally, the problem-
atic associated to the extension of the concept of time-consistency in cooperative
diﬀerential games (Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003, Petrosjan and Shevkoplyas, 2000)
with non-constant discounting is brieﬂy approached.
2. Non-constant discounting with random duration
2.1. Non-constant discounting
Let x =( x1,...,x n) ∈ X ⊂ Rn be the vector of state variables, u =( u1,...,u m) ∈
U ⊂ Rm the vector of control (or decision) variables, L(x(s),u(s),s)t h ei n s t a n -
taneous utility function at time s and T the planning horizon (terminal time). In
the conventional model, agents discount future utilities using an exponential with





w h e r et h es t a t ev a r i a b l es evolve according to ˙ xi(s)=gi(x(s),u(s),s), for s ∈ [t,T]
with initial conditions xi(t)=xi
t,f o ri =1 ,...,n. In order to maximize the func-
tional J, we must solve a standard optimal control problem and, since the discount
rate is constant, the solution becomes time consistent. We will assume that the
functions L(x,u,s)a n dgi(x,u,s), for i =1 ,...,n, are continuously diﬀerentiable
in all their arguments.
Now, let us assume that the instantaneous discount rate is non constant, but
a function of time r(s), for s ∈ [0,T]. Impatient agents will be characterized by a
non-increasing discount rate r(s). The discount factor at time t used to evaluate a
payoﬀ at time t + τ, τ ≥ 0, is θ(τ)=e−
  τ
0 r(s)ds. Then, the objective of the agent
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In the discrete time case, most papers center their attention to the so-called
quasi-hyperbolic discounting, ﬁrst proposed by Phelps and Pollak, 1969. The utility
function is deﬁned as Ut = ut +β(δut+1 +δ2ut+2 +δ3ut+3 +···), where 0 <β≤ 1,
and uk denotes the utility in period k. We will not assume any particular discount
function in this paper.
For the solution of Problem (1-2), if the agent is naive, then we can adapt the
standard techniques of optimal control theory as follows. If V t = V t(x,s) denotes
the value function from the viewpoint of the t-agent, the 0-agent will solve the







L(x,u,s)+∇xV 0(x,s) · g(x,u,s)
 
,x (0) = x0 ,
(3)
i.e., the naive agent at time 0 solves the problem assuming that the discount rate of
time preference will be r(s), for all s ∈ [0,T]. The optimal control will be a function
u0(s). In our framework of changing preferences, this solution corresponds to the
so-called pre-commitment solution, in the sense that it is optimal as long as the
agent can precommit (by signing a contract, for example) his future behavior at
time t = 0. We will denote the precommitment solution by V P(x,s) ≡ V 0(x,s),
and the corresponding decision rule as uP(s)= ≡ u0(s). If there is no commitment,
the 0-agent will take the action u0(0) but, in the immediate near future, the  -agent
will change his decision rule (he is time-inconsistent) to the solution of





{L(x,u,s)+∇xV  (x,s) · g(x,u,s)} ,x ( )=x  .
Once again the optimal control trajectory u (s), s ∈ [ ,T], will be changed for
t> by the following t-selves. In general, the solution for the naive agent will be







L(x,u,s)+∇xV t(x,s) · g(x,u,s)
 
,x (t)=xt ,
for t ∈ [0,T], and patching together the “optimal” solutions ut(t). Alternatively, we
can ﬁnd the solution by using the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle for the dynamic
optimization problem of each t-agent, characterized by the instantaneous discount
rate of time preference r(s − t) and initial condition x(t)=xt.
In order to solve Problem (1-2) for a sophisticated agent, ﬁrst we need to deﬁne
what we mean by a Markov equilibrium. Recall that the concept of optimality plays
no role here, since what is optimal for the t-agent will not be optimal (in general) for
the future s-agents, s>t . A natural approach to the problem consists in considering
ﬁrst the equilibrium of a sequence of planners in discrete time and then passing to
the continuous time limit. This is probably the most intuitive and natural approach,
and it is in the spirit of the construction of equilibrium concepts in the literature
of diﬀerential games (see e.g. Friedman, 1974 or Petrosjan and Zenkevich, 1996.
Hence, Karp, 2007 deﬁned a Markov perfect equilibrium as the formal continu-
ous time limit of a discretized version of the corresponding dynamic game (see
Mar´ ın-Solano and Navas, 2009 for a description of the problem in ﬁnite horizon and
free terminal time). As a result, the equilibrium rule u∗ = σ∗(x,s) is obtained as the270 Jes´ us Mar´ ın-Solano, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas
solution to a dynamic programming equation which is a “modiﬁed” HJB equation.
An alternative approach, similar in spirit to the one ﬁrst suggested in Barro, 1999,
consists in assuming that the decision-maker at time t can precommit his future
behavior during the period [t,t +  ]. In Ekeland and Lazrak, 2008 this idea was re-
formulated by considering that the t-agent is allowed to form a coalition with his
immediate successors (s-agents, with s ∈ [t,t + ]), provided that, for s>t+ ,t h e
corresponding s-agents choose their equilibrium rule. Then, the equilibrium rule was
calculated by taking the limit   → 0. It is remarkable that the equilibrium necessary
conditions obtained in Karp, 2007 and Ekeland and Lazrak, 2008) are consistent,
although the two approaches are diﬀerent in nature.
Let V S(xt,t) represents the value function of the sophisticated t-agent, with
initial condition x(t)=xt. We assume the V S(xt,t) is continuously diﬀerentiable in
all its arguments. If u∗ = σ∗(x(s),s), s ∈ [t,T], is the equilibrium rule, let us denote
L∗(x(s),s)=L(x(s),σ∗(x(s),s),s). By substituting the equilibrium rule in the
dynamic equation (2) with initial condition x(t)=xt, the solution can be expressed
as x(s)=x(xt,s). Hence, we can write L∗(x(s),s)=L∗(x(xt,s),s)=¯ L(xt,s).

















θ(s − t)[r(s − t) − r(T − t)] ¯ L(x,s)ds (5)
(we omit the subindex in xt)w i t hV S(x,T) = 0. Assume also that u∗ = σ∗(x,t)
attains the maximum in Equation (4). If, for each pair (x,t), the state trajectory
x∗(s)s o l u t i o nt o˙ x(s)=g(x(s),σ∗(x(s),s),s) with initial condition x(t)=x is
unique, then the Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) is obtained by solving (4-5). If
the planning horizon is unbounded, T = ∞, if there exists limt→∞ r(t)=¯ r>0, we
must replace the term r(T − t) in Equations (4) and (5) by ¯ r.
Alternatively, equations (4-5) can be written as follows (see Corollary 1 in














θ(s − t)r(s − t)¯ L(x,s)ds .
When comparing the solution provided by standard optimal control theory
(Equation (3), which is the solution for the precommitment agent) with that for
the sophisticated agent (Equation (4)), there are two diﬀerences. First, the term
r(t)V P(x,t) in (3) changes to r(T − t)V S(x,t). Second, and more importantly, a
new term K(x,t) (given by (5)) appears in Equation (4). This new term involves the
utility function L. Note that, in (5), ¯ L(x,s) is essentially the function L evaluated
at the equilibrium rule. This is a substantial change with respect to the standard
HJB equation. If the discount rate is constant, K = 0 and we recover the usual HJB
equation. Otherwise, this extra term has to be added, and Equation (4) becomesNon-Constant Discounting in Diﬀerential Games with Random Duration 271
an integro-diﬀerential equation. In general, if we can not solve the dynamic equa-
tion (2), the term ¯ L(x,s) in (5) has to be substituted by L∗(x(s),s)) and Equation
(4) is a very complicated functional equation. These facts determine a substantial
increase in the complexity of the mathematical treatment.
Another fundamental diﬀerence between standard optimal control theory and
the sophisticated solution to Problem (1-2) comes from the fact that, since the
problem with non-constant discount rate of time preference is equivalent to a game
with a continuous number of agents, each of whom wants to maximize the expected
present discounted value of current and future welfare, the notion of optimality is
substituted by that of Markov Perfect Equilibrium. But these equilibria can be non
unique. In fact, such non-uniqueness of candidate equilibria is usual in an inﬁnite
time setting, and was addressed in Karp, 2007 (in a deterministic inﬁnite horizon
context), where a Pareto ranking of steady states was established.
2.2. Random duration
In many intertemporal decision problems the agent does not know in advance the
ﬁnal time. If the terminal time is very large, it is customary in economics to as-
sume that T = ∞. In this section we will assume that the ﬁnal time T is a ran-
dom variable with a known (maybe subjective) distribution function. For instance,
in the case of uncertain lifetime presented by Yaari, 1965, the distribution func-
tion Ft(s) is the conditional probability that a consumer will die before time s,
given that he is alive at time t,f o rt<s . Within the ﬁeld of diﬀerential games,
a random terminal time was introduced in a zero-sum pursuit diﬀerential game in
Petrosjan and Murzov, 1966, who derived the corresponding Bellman-Isaacs equa-
tion for the value of the game. For an analysis of the optimal control problem with
a random stopping time see Boukas et al, 1990.
Under non-constant discounting and random duration, for t = 0, 0-the agent’s




where T is a random variable described by a distribution function F(τ). Let us



























If we do not discount the future (θ(s)=1 ,f o ra l ls ∈ [0,∞)), Burness, 1976 proved
that the solution provided by standard optimal control theory is time consistent
if, and only if, the process is stationary. The extension of this result to the case of
non-constant discounting is straightforward. Therefore, it seems natural to impose
this condition in order to preserve the time consistency of the solution in the stan-










and the value function for
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θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))L(x,u,s)ds .
Let W(x,t)=( 1− F(t))V (x,t). From (3), given x(0) = x0, the precommitment











With respect to the solution for a naive agent, given x(0) = x0,i tc a nb e











for t ∈ [0,∞), and patching together the “optimal” solutions ut(t).
















θ(s − t)[r(s − t) − ¯ r](1− F(s))¯ L(x,s)ds . (9)
Recall that ¯ r = limt→∞ r(t), where we are assuming that the limit exists and it is
strictly positive.












L(x,u,t)+∇xV P(x,t) · g(x,u,t)
 
;
the solution for the naive agent can be obtained by patching together the “optimal”
solutions ut(t) obtained from the set of partial diﬀerential equations






























L(x,u,t)+∇xV S(x,t) · g(x,u,t)
 
.
In the case of a constant instantaneous discount rate of time preference, Equations
(10), (11) and (12) coincide with the HJB equation for an optimal control problem
with random duration.
3. Diﬀerential games. Solution concepts
For the (β,δ)-preferences introduced by Phelps and Pollak, 1969, diﬀerential games
with time-inconsistent preferences were already studied in Alj and Haurie, 1983. In
this section we will discuss diﬀerent solution concepts in diﬀerential games for the
general model with non-constant discounting and random duration described in
Section 2.
Let us consider a diﬀerential game deﬁned on [0,T]. The state of the game at
time t is described by a vector x ∈ X ⊆ Rn. The initial state is ﬁxed, x(0) = x0.
There are N players. Let ui(t) ∈ Ui ⊆ Rmi be the control variable of player i.E a c h




θ(s − t)Li(x(s),u 1(s),u 2(s),...,u N(s),s)ds .






θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))Li(x(s),u 1(s),...,u N(s),s)ds .
Next, let us review some of the main solution concepts in diﬀerential games under
random terminal time when the discount function is non-constant. In order to illus-
trate how to compute the diﬀerent equilibria, we will solve the cake-eating problem
describing the management of a non renewable natural resource.
3.1. Pareto solution
In the benchmark case when the agents cooperate, the whole coalition will look for









λi(1 − F(s))Li(x(s),u 1(s),...,u N(s),s)ds ,
with λi ≥ 0, for all i =1 ,...,N,
 N
i=1 λi < ∞. If all the agents are naive, we can
solve a series of standard optimal control problem in order to obtain the solution
(see the previous section). On the contrary, if all the agents are sophisticated, we
can get the solution by solving Equations (8-9) for Wc(x,t)=( 1− F(t))V c(x,t).274 Jes´ us Mar´ ın-Solano, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas
Example 1 (A cake-eating problem. Management of a nonrenewable resource). Con-
sider a nonrenewable natural resource that can be exploited simultaneously by N
agents (ﬁrms, countries,...). Let x(s)a n dci(s) denote the stock of the resource
and player’s i rate of extraction at time s, respectively. The evolution of the stock
of the resource is given by ˙ x(s)=−
N  
i=1
ci(s), and the initial stock of the resource is
known for all the players, x(0) = x0. We assume that the preferences of the players
are described by the same logarithmic utility function, u(ci)=l nci. The planning
horizon T is stochastic, and all the agents discount the future by using the same
discount function θ(s − t), so that t-player’s i objective function is
  ∞
t
θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))lnci(s)ds .
Let us compute the cooperative solution in case all agents have equal weights.
We set λ1 = ··· = λN =1 .I fc(t)=ci(t) denotes the extraction rate of the
representative t-agent, the resulting non-standard optimal control problem with
non-constant discounting consists in maximizing
  ∞
t
θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))N lncds,
˙ x = −Nc, x(t)=xt .
Naive agents. In order to obtain the optimal solution for the representative naive
t-agent, we can solve the family of HJB equations (7). Alternatively, we can apply
the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle to the Hamiltonian Ht(x,c,p,s)=θ(s−t)(1−
F(s))Nu(c)−pNc, and patch together the extraction rates c(t) obtained as solution
of each problem. We will follow this procedure here. The optimal rate of extraction
according to the preferences of the t-agents is
c(s)=
θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))
N
  ∞
t θ(τ − t)(1 − F(τ))dτ
x(t) .
The solution for the representative naive t-agent follows by patching together the





t θ(τ − t)(1 − F(τ))dτ
x(t) . (13)
Sophisticated agents. If the agents are sophisticated, we have to solve the functional














where K(x,t) is given by (9). From the maximization of the right hand term in (14)
we get c =
1 − F(t)
∂Wc/∂x
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From (15), the solution to the diﬀerential equation ˙ x = −Nc with initial con-































and using (15) and substituting in (14) we get
¯ r
N
[α(t)lnx + β(t)] + lnx
  ∞
t









+l nx − 1
 
.
Since the above equation has to be satisﬁed for every x,t h e n
˙ α(t) − ¯ rα(t)+N(1 − F(t)) = N
  ∞
t
θ(s − t)[r(s − t) − ¯ r](1 − F(s))ds .
It is easy to check that the solution to the equation above is given by (13), hence
the coincidence of the naive and sophisticated solutions for the problem with non
random and ﬁxed terminal time under log-utility (Pollak, 1969) is preserved in the
case of random duration. In Mar´ ın-Solano and Navas, 2009 is illustrated that such
coincidence is not preserved for more general isoelastic utility functions.
3.2. Markovian Nash equilibrium
In a non cooperative setting with simultaneous play, we will restrict our attention
to the case when the agents apply non-degenerate Markovian strategies, ui(t)=
φi(x,t). If the agents are naive, each t-player solves a standard diﬀerential game
with Markovian strategies, by using the corresponding HJB equations. If the agents
are sophisticated, the equilibria can be obtained by applying Equations (8) (or
(12)) and (9). The next theorem summarizes these conditions for Markovian Nash
equilibria of the N-player game with random duration for sophisticated agents.
Theorem 1. Let (φ1,φ 2,...,φ N) be a given N-tuple of functions φi: X×[0,∞) →
Rmi such that the following assumptions are satisﬁed:
1. there exists a unique absolutely continuous curve x:[ 0 ,∞) → X to the initial
value problem
˙ x(t)=g(x(t),φ 1(x(t),t),φ 2(x(t),t),...,φ N(x(t),t)) ,x (0) = x0 ,
2. for all i =1 ,2,...,N, there exists a bounded continuously diﬀerentiable function
WS
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=m a x
{ui}
{(1 − F(t))Li(x,φ1(x,t),...,φ i−1(x,t),u i,φ i+1(x,t),...,φ N(x,t),t)+
+∇xW S







θ(s − t)[r(s − t) − ¯ r]
 




If, for every i =1 ,...N,t h es t r a t e g yu∗
i = φi(x,t) maximizes, for almost every
t ∈ [0,∞), the right hand term of (16), given the strategies φj(x,t),f o rj  = i,t h e n
(φ1(x,t),...,φ N(x,t)) is a Markov Nash equilibrium for sophisticated agents.
Next, let us illustrate how Markov Nash equilibria can be computed in the case
of the cake-eating problem.
Example 2 (A cake-eating problem. Management of a nonrenewable resource).
Naive agents. Naive t-agents will compute a series of Markovian Nash equilibria,
one for each t ∈ [0,∞). We will search for the symmetric equilibrium, so that

















i = W t
i (x,s). Since we are looking for the symmetric equilibrium, we guess
W t




x and, by substituting in (18) we obtain
lnx[r(s − t)α(s) − α
 (s) − (1 − F(s))] =
= −r(s − t)β(s)+β (s)+( 1− F(s))ln
1 − F(s)
α(s)
− N(1 − F(s)) ,
hence α (s) − r(s − t)α(s)+( 1− F(s)) = 0. Using that lims→∞ α(s) < ∞ we
obtain α(s)=
  ∞
s (1 − F(τ))θ(τ − t)dτ
θ(s − t)
, so the optimal consumption rule from the
viewpoint of the naive t agent is c(s)=
θ(s − t)(1 − F(s))
  ∞
s (1 − F(τ))θ(τ − t)dτ
x and, since the




t (1 − F(τ))θ(τ − t)dτ
x. (19)
Sophisticated agents. The symmetric solution for a sophisticated agent is obtained
by solving the dynamic programming equation






(1 − F(t))lnci +
∂Wi
∂x
[−ci − (N − 1)φ(x,t)]
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for i =1 ,...,N,w h e r eWt
i = W t
i (x,s)a n dKi = Ki(x,t). Equivalently, we can







(1 − F(t))lnci +
∂Wi
∂x







θ(s − t)r(s − t)(1 − F(s))lnci(x,s)ds . (21)
We guess Wt
i = W t = α(s)lnx + β(s). Next, we compute the value of ¯ K.N o t e
that the solution to the state equation ˙ x(s)=−c(s)=−
1 − F(s)
α(s)
x(s)w i t hi n i t i a l











































θ(s − t)r(s − t)(1 − F(s))ds .
By substituting in (20) and following the same steps as in the problem for the naive




















−(1 − F(t))[ln(1 − F(t)) − lnα(t)] + N(1 − F(t)) .
Since the solution to Equation (22) is α(t)=
  ∞
t
(1 − F(τ))θ(τ − t)dτ, then the
solution for the time-consistent sophisticated agent in the log-utility case coincides
with the decision rule for the (in general) time-inconsistent naive agent (19).
4. Cooperative diﬀerential games: time consistency
Let us brieﬂy investigate cooperative diﬀerential games in characteristic form under
non-constant discounting and random duration (for the standard discounting case
see, e.g, Shevkoplyas (2006)). Along this section we will assume that all players are
sophisticated. Consider the cooperative game Γ(x0). The characteristic function for
the grand coalition is v(N,x0)=m a x u
 N
i=1 Ji(x0,u). For the remaining coalitions
S ⊂ N we can consider the value of the zero-sum game between the coalition S
as the ﬁrst player and the coalition NSas the second player. Alternatively, we
can follow the approach introduced in Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003 where left-out
players stick their feedback Nash strategies.278 Jes´ us Mar´ ın-Solano, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas
Let us assume that the players agree in following a particular distribution proce-
dure or optimality principle (OP) C(x0) of total payoﬀs among them. This solution
is time-consistent if, when the game proceeds along a conditionally optimal trajec-
tory, at each instant of time the players are guided by the same optimality principle,
so that they don’t have incentives for deviation from the previously adopted optimal
behaviour throughout the game. Let ξv(x0,0) = (ξv
1(x0,0),...,ξv
N(x0,0)) ∈ C(x0)
(an imputation belonging to the core, the Shapley value,...). A vector function
β0(s)=( β0
1(s),...,β0
N(s)) is called a payoﬀ distribution procedure (PDP) for the
















A PDP determines a rule according to which the payoﬀs are distributed along the
whole interval [0,T], where the random variable T represents the end of the game.
Next, let us consider the cooperative game Γ(x∗
t) beginning at time t.T h e
OP is time-consistent if, for any imputation ξv(x0,0), there exists an IDP β0(s),







θ(s − t)β0(s)dsdFt(τ) ∈ C(x∗
t) .
Alternatively, we can deﬁne an PDP for the cooperative game Γ(x∗
t) as a vector

















Then for the time-consistency of the PDP is required that β0(s)=βt(s). Let β(s)
be a time-consistent PDP. By diﬀerentiating (23) with respect to t we obtain the
















I ft h et e r m i n a lt i m ei sﬁ x e d ,βi(t)=
  T
t
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Abstract The zero-sum diﬀerential search game with prescribed duration
is considered. The evader tries to minimize the probability of detection.
Mixed strategies of the evader is determined using the auxiliary game with
a detail of evaders. For the game with a detail of evaders we construct the
information set for the position of the evaders and study properties and
approximation problems of this information set.
Keywords: diﬀerential search game, information set, mixed strategies.
1. Introduction
In this paper we consider a zero-sum diﬀerential search game with prescribed du-
ration between pursuer P and evader E in the class of mixed strategies with ﬁnite
spectrum (Petrosjan L.A., Tomsky G.V., 1984; Petrosjan L.A. and Zenkevich N.A.,
1987; Petrosjan L.A. and Garnaev A.Yu., 1992; and Mestnikov S.V., 1991) . Each
player has only a priory information on the initial position of the other. The diﬀer-
ential search game is considered for the player E. Using mixed strategies of ﬁnite
spectrum, player E tries to minimize the probability of detection. In this paper we
construct the information set Ω
m,m∗
E (t) for the position of the evaders, if the pursuer
captured m∗ where m∗ ≤ m of a detail. We study properties and approximation
problems of this information set. We construct a set which approximates the infor-
mation set for the case m =2 ,m∗ = 1 if the pure strategy of the pursuer is given.
In the paper (Mestnikov S.V., 1994) is investigated in the case m =1 ,m∗ =1 .
In papers (Mestnikov S.V., 1992; Mestnikov S.V., 2002; Mestnikov S.V., 2005) the
diﬀerential search game is considered for the player P.
2. The dynamics of the game and information
Let the dynamic of the game be described by the following system of vector diﬀer-
ential equations
P: ˙ x = f(t,x,u),u ∈ U, x ∈ Rn, (1)
E: ˙ y = g(t,y,v),v∈ V, y ∈ R
n, (2)
where U (V ) is a compact set in the Euclidean space Rp (Rq), X0 (Y0)i sac o m p a c t
set, t ∈ [t0,T] (Zenkevich N.A. and Mestnikov S.V., 1991).
The vector–function f (g) on the right side of equation (1) ((2) respectively) is
continuous on [t0,T] × Rn × U ([t0,T] × Rn × V ) and satisﬁes the inequality
 f(t,x,u) ≤ λ1(1 +  x )
( g(t,y,v) ≤λ2(1 +  y )), (3)Approximation of the Information Set in a Diﬀerential Search Game 281
on this set; moreover, for any bounded domain G0 ∈ Rn it satisﬁes the Lipschitz
condition with respect to x (y) with constant λ1(G0)( λ2(G0)), i.e., the following
equality holds
 f(t,x1,u) − f(t,x2,u) ≤ λ1(G0) x2 − x1 
( g(t,y1,v) − g(t,y2,v) ≤λ2(G0) y2 − y1 ). (4)
Furthermore, we assume that the set
F(t,x)={ξ|ξ = f(t,x,u),u∈ U}
(G(t,y)={η|η = g(t,y,v),v∈ V })( 5 )
is convex and closed for all (t,x) ∈ [t0,T] × Rn ((t,y) ∈ [t0,T] × Rn). Here λ1, λ2,
λ1(G0), λ2(G0) are constants and  · is the Euclidian norm.
The state of information in the course of the game is as follows. At initial moment
t = t0 Pursuer P (Evader E) knows that y0 ∈ Y0 ∈ Rn (x0 ∈ X0 ∈ Rn)a n d
dynamics (1), (2). Thereafter, he receives no current information about the location
of the opponent.
The set of admissible controls DP (DE)o fP l a y e rP (E) consist of all vector–
functions u = u(t)( v = v(t)) measurable on the segment [t0,T] and satisfying the
geometric constraints u(t) ∈ U (v(t) ∈ V ).
It is well known that, by virtue of continuity of the vector–function f(g)a n d
condition (3) ((4)), for every admissible control u ∈ DP (v ∈ DE)t h e r ee x i s ta
unique solution
x(t)=x(t,t0,x 0,u),x 0 ∈ X0 (y(t)=y(t,t0,y 0,v),y 0 ∈ Y0),t∈ [t0,T]
of for equation (1), ((2)) satisfying the initial condition x0 ∈ X0(y0 ∈ Y0).
Assume that the detection set S(x) of Player P is the open disk of radius l>0
centered at the position of the pursuer
S(x)={z ∈ Rn|  x − z  <l }.
We introduce the function F1(x(t),y(t)) of the states x(t)a n dy(t) as follows
F1(x(t),y(t)) =
 
1, if y(t) ∈ S(x(t)),
0, elsewhere.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that Player E is detected at the time t ∈ [t0,T]b yP u r s u e r
P if F1(x(t),y(t)) = 1.







2 (x(·),y(·)) = max
t∈[t0,τ]
F1(x(t),y(t)),τ ≤ T.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that Player P, moving along the trajectories x(·), detect
Player E (which is moving along the trajectories y(·)) if F2(x(·),y(·)) = 1.282 Semyon V. Mestnikov
The pure strategies of the player P (E) are deﬁned as a =( x0,u(·)), x0 ∈ X0,
u = u(·)) ∈ DP (b =( y0,v(·)), y0 ∈ Y0, v = v(·) ∈ DE). Search game (1), (2) is
considered in the class of open loop strategies a =( x0,u(·)), b =( y0,v(·).
The payoﬀ function K((x0,u(·)),(y0,v(·))) of the player P in the situation
((x0,u(·)),(y0,v(·))) is deﬁned by the rule
K((x0,u(·)),(y0,v(·))) = F2(x(·,t 0,x 0,u),y(·,t 0,y 0,v)).
Thus, we have the normal form zero sum game
Γ =<A,B,K>.
The class of mixed strategies is deﬁned as similar in the paper (Zenkevich N.A.
and Mestnikov S.V., 1991). The mixed strategy µ (ν) of the player P (E)w h i c h
is deﬁned over the set {a1,...,a k}⊂A ({b1,...,b m}⊂B), is deﬁned by the rule
µ =( µ1,...,µ k)( ν =( ν1,...,ν m)), where µi =1 /k, i =1 ,...,k (νi =1 /m,
i =1 ,...,m).
The payoﬀ function M(µ,b)( M(a,ν)) of the player P in the situation (µ,b)








i=1 F2(x(·),y i(·))), (6)
where xi(·),(yi(·)) is the the trajectory of the player P (E).
Note that the payoﬀ of the player P is a probability of detection of player E.
Deﬁnition 3. We say that the mixed strategy µ of the player P guarantees a
probability of detection not less than V if M(µ,b) ≥Vfor any b ∈ B,0≤V≤∞ .
Deﬁnition 4. We say that the mixed strategy ν of the player E guarantees a
probability of detection not more than equal V if M(a,ν) ≤Vfor any a ∈ A.
If the pure strategy of player P (E) guarantees capture of the player E (guaran-
tees escape from player P) (Zenkevich N.A. and Mestnikov S.V., 1991), then V =1
(V =0 ) .
3. The information set in a diﬀerential search game with a team of
evaders
3.1. Deﬁnition of the information set in a diﬀerential search game with
at e a mo fe v a d e r s
We consider an auxiliary game between Pursuer P and some team ¯ E =
{E1,...,E m} of similar evaders acting as one.
The pure strategies of the player P (players Ei,i =1 ,...,m) are deﬁned as
a =( x0,u(·)), x0 ∈ X0, u = u(·)) ∈ DP (¯ b =( ( y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym
0 ,v m(·))), yi
0 ∈ Y0,
vi = vi(·) ∈ DE).
We introduce the function F3(x(t),y 1(t),...,y m(t)) on the states x(t)a n d
yi(t),i=1 ,...,mas follows
F3(x(t),y 1(t),...,y m(t)) =
m  
i=1
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Deﬁnition 5. We say that m∗-evasion happened at the moment t ∈ [t0,T]i np o i n t s
x(t)a n dyi(t),i=1 ,...,m, m∗ ≤ m,i fm∗ evaders of the team avoid capture, or
F3(x(t),y 1(t),...,y m(t)) = m − m∗.
We introduce the functionals on the trajectories x(·)a n dyi(·),i=1 ,...,mthe
following way










Deﬁnition 6. We say that m∗-evasion happened on the trajectories x(·)a n dyi(·),
i =1 ,...,m, m∗ ≤ m,i fm∗ Evaders the team avoid capture, or
F4(x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) = m − m∗.
Deﬁnition 7. We say that the a strategy ¯ b =( ( y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym
0 ,v m(·))) of the
team guarantees m∗-evasion (1 ≤ m∗ ≤ m)i fF4(x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) ≤ m − m∗
for any strategy a =( x0,u(·)) of the player P,w h e r ex(·)=x(·,t 0,x 0,u)a n d
yi(·)=y(·,t 0,yi
0,v i), i =1 ,...,m.
Deﬁnition 8. The information set Ω
m,m∗




E (t,t0,Y 0)) = {y ∈ Rn|∃yi(t) ∈ N(t,t0,yi
0),y i
0 ∈ Y0,i=1 ,...,m,
∀x(·) F t
4(x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) ≤ m − m∗)},
where Y (t,t0,y 0) is a attainability (reachability) set of the player E at the moment
t ∈ [t0,T].
Note that the information set Ω
m,m∗
E (t) is the subset of Rn in which m∗ players
Ei of the team ¯ E can be situated unless are detected till the moment t. In the paper
(Mestnikov S.V., 1994) is investigated the case m =1 ,m∗ =1 .
Property 1. If in the auxiliary game with a team ¯ E the information set Ω
m,m∗
E (T)
is not empty, then there exists a mixed strategy ν =( ν1,...,ν m)( νi =1 /m,
i =1 ,...,m)o ft h et e a m ¯ E given on {(y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym






If a mixed strategy ν =( ν1,...,ν m), (νi =1 /m, i =1 ,...,m)o ft h et e a m ¯ E
given on {(y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym
0 ,v m(·)} guarantees m∗-evasion then the information
set Ω
m,m∗
E (T)i sn o te m p t y .
Proof (property 1). Indeed, if the set Ω
m,m∗
E (t)  = ∅, then from deﬁnition 8 it follows
that exists trajectories y1(·),...,y m(·) such that Ft
4(x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) ≤ m−m∗
for every x(·). From deﬁnition 7 it follows that the strategy ¯ b =( ( y1
0,v 1(·)),...,
(ym
0 ,v m(·)) of the team ¯ E generating trajectories y1(·),...,y m(·) guarantees m∗-
evasion.284 Semyon V. Mestnikov
On the other hand, if the strategy ¯ b =( ( y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym
0 ,v m(·)) of the team ¯ E
generating trajectories y1(·),...,y m(·) guarantees m∗-evasion, then from deﬁnition
7 it follows that the condition F2(x(·),y i(·)) = 1, yi(·)=y(t,t0,yi
0,v i) holds at most
for m − m∗ evaders for any trajectory x(·) of the pursuer P.O r
∀x(·) F T
4 (x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) ≤ m − m∗.
From deﬁnition 8 it follows that Ω
m,m∗
E (T)  = ∅.    
Property 2. If the team ¯ E has the strategy which guarantees m∗-evasion, then
in the search game (1)–(5) player E has the mixed strategy ν which guarantees a
probability of detection not more than equal m−m∗
m .
Proof (property 2). Let the strategy ¯ b =( ( y1
0,v 1(·)),...,(ym
0 ,v m(·)) of the team
¯ E guarantees m∗-evasion. Then from deﬁnition 7 it follows that the condition
F2(x(·),y i(·)) = 1, yi(·)=y(t,t0,yi
0,v i) holds at most for m − m∗ evaders for
any trajectory x(·) of the pursuer P or Ft
4(x(·),y 1(·),...,y m(·)) ≤ m − m∗. The
mixed strategy ν =( ν1 =1 /m,...,ν m =1 /m)o fp l a y e rE deﬁned on the ﬁnite set
(yi




for any strategy of player P.    
3.2. The search game with one pursuer and two evaders
Let m = 2. We consider the case m∗ =1 .
Denote by X(t,t0,X 0)( Y (t,t0,Y 0)) the attainability set of the player P (E)a t
the moment t ∈ [t0,T]f r o mt h es e t sX0 (Y0), and X(·,t 0,X 0)( Y (·,t 0,Y 0)) is the
set all trajectories of the player P (E)f r o mt h es e tX0 (Y0). For the set X∗ ⊂ Rn
deﬁne the initial set of the state X0(t0,t ∗,X ∗) as follows
X0(t0,t ∗,X ∗)={x0 ∈ X0|∃u ∈ Dp,x(t∗,t 0,x 0,u) ∈ X∗}.
For the ﬁxed strategy b =( y0,v(·)) of the player E (one of evader) denote by
ΩP(t,t0,X 0,y 0,v)={x ∈ X(t)|∃x(t)=x,y(t)=y(t,t0,y 0,v) ∈ S(x(t))}
the set in which the player P captures the player E moving along the trajectory
y(·)=y(·,t 0,y 0,v).
Let X0
ΩP(t) = X0(t0,t,Ω P(t)) is the initial set of positions in which may be at
the moment t the set ΩP(t)=ΩP(t,t0,X 0,y 0,v), and XΩP(t)(·) are all admissible
trajectories connecting the two sets X0
ΩP (t) and ΩP(t). For the trajectories x(·) ∈




E (t,t0,Y 0,y 0,v)), as follows
Ω
2,1
E (t,t0,Y 0,y 0,v)) = {y ∈ Y (t)|∃(y∗
0,v∗) ∈ Y0 × DE,y= y(t,t0,y∗
0,v∗),
∀x(·) ∈ XΩP (t)(·),∀τ ∈ [t0,t] y(τ,t0,y
∗
0,v
∗)  ∈ S(x(τ))}. (7)
Let the pursuer P captures the evader E1 moving along the trajectories y(t)=
y(t,t0,y 0,v). Then the set Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v) is the set in which may be the evader E2
at the moment t, if the evader E2 is not detected till moment t. At the momentApproximation of the Information Set in a Diﬀerential Search Game 285
t ∈ [t,T] we consider the attainability set of the player E from Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)o r
the set Y (T,t,Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)). In the paper (Mestnikov S.V., 1994) evasion domains
are deﬁned in diﬀerential search games in the case m = m∗ = 1. At the moment
t ∈ [t0,T] we deﬁne Q(T,t,Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)) from the set Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)) as follows
Q(T,t,Ω
2,1




ΩP(t)),∀τ ∈ [t,T] y(τ)  ∈ S(x(τ))} (8)
For the ﬁxed strategy b =( y0,v(·)) of the player E (one of evader) denote by
tcapt(y0,v)={t ∈ [t0,T]|∃x(t)=x(t,t0,x 0,u),y(t)=y(t,t0,y 0,v) ∈ S(x(t))} (9)
the set of moments where pursuer P may capture the player E moving along the
trajectory y(·)=y(·,t 0,y 0,v).
Deﬁnition 9. The information set Ω
2,1










Note that in the search with one pursuer and two evaders if the information
set Ω
2,1
E (T,y0,v)  = ∅, the second evader has the strategy in which the pursuer not
captures both evader.




1,v 1)  = ∅,
for the strategy (y0
1,v 1) of the ﬁrst evader E1 then the second evader E2 has the
strategy (y0
2,v 2) in which the value of the functional F4(x(·),y 1(·),y 2(·)) ≤ 1 for the
trajectories (y1(·)=y(·,t 0,y0
1,v 1) and y2(·)=y(·,t 0,y0
2,v 2)) for any trajectory x(·)
.
Proof. Consider the strategy (y0
1,v 1) ∈ Y0 × DE of the ﬁrst evader and sup-
pose that for any strategy of (y0
2,v 2) ∈ Y0 × DE of the second evader the pur-
suer has the strategy (x0,u) ∈ (X0,D P) such that the value of the functional
F4(x(·),y 1(·),y 2(·)) = 2. This means that the pursuer P captures both evaders at
the some moments t1,t 2 ∈ [t0,N]. Let for deﬁniteness the player P detect the evader
E1 at the moment t1.
Then the set (the set of evasion) Q(T,t1,Ω
2,1




1,v 1)  = ∅, and it follows from the condition (10). To construct of the
set Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v) (7) we can select the strategy (y0
2,v 2) of the player P such that
y(t1,t 0,y0
2,v 2) ∈ Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v) and pursuer is not detecting the player E2 moving
along of the trajectory y(t1,t 0,y0
2,v 2) until moment t1.
On the other hand, at the moment t1 ∈ [t0,T] the information set
Q(T,t,Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)) is deﬁned as the evasion set from the set Ω
2,1
E (t,y0,v)) (8)
and is not empty. Hence, we may select the strategy (y0
2,v 2) of the evader E2 such
that y(t1,t 0,y0
2,v 2) ∈ Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v) and pursuer not detect the player E2 moving
along of the trajectory y(t,t1,y(t1,t 0,y0
2,v 2),v 2), t ∈ [t0,T].    
We deﬁne the information set Ω
2,1












E (T)  = ∅,
then there exist trajectories y1(·)=y(·,t 0,y0
1,v 1) and y2(·)=y(·,t 0,y0
2,v 2) such
that F4(x(·),y 1(·),y 2(·)) ≤ 1 for any x(·).
Proof. By the deﬁnition of the information set Ω
2,1
E (T) (11) follows that there exist
the strategy (y0,v) ∈ Y0×DE such that the set Ω
2,1
E (T,y1,v)  = ∅. From the theorem
1 follows the proof of the theorem 2.    
3.3. Approximation of the information set in a diﬀerential search game
with a team of evaders
Let a ﬁnite partition be given
ω(n)={tn
k | tn
k = t0 + k(T − t0)/2n,k=0 ,1,...,2n},n =0 ,1,2,....
Let as S(X(t)) open l–neighborhood of the attainability set X(t) of the player
P at the moment t ∈ [t0,T]
S(X(t)) = {z ∈ Rn|∃x ∈ (X(t)),  x − z  <l }.
For the some pure strategy ¯ b =( y0,v(·)) of the player E we consider the set
tcapt(y0,v) (9). Assume that the set tcapt is not empty. We select any moment t1 ∈
tcapt(y0,v). For the state y(t1), t1 ∈ tcapt the nonempty capture set Xy(t1) ⊆ X(t1),
is deﬁned as Xy(t1) = S(y(t1))∩X(t1). We consider the initial set X0
Xy(t1), in which
the pursuer may achieve at the moment t1 the set Xy(t1),a n dl e tXy(t1)(·)b ea l l
trajectories connecting the sets X0
Xy(t1) Xy(t1).





Eω(n)(t,t0,Y 0,y 0,v)), t ∈ [t0,t 1]o ft h es e tΩ
2,1









































Eω(n)(t), t ∈ [t0,t 1],n =0 ,1,2,... such that ω(n) ⊂

















E (t,t0,Y 0,y 0,v))  =  , t ∈ [t0,t 1] for the some
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E (t) it follows that
Ω
2,1
E (t) ⊂ G
2,1
E (t). We show the reverse inclusion. Assume to the contrary that the




E (t) is nonempty. Take an arbitrary point y ∈ W.B yt h e
construction of the set G
2,1
E (t) it follows y ∈ G
2,1
Eω(n)(t) for all n =0 ,1,2,..., i.e. we
conclude that there exist vn and points yn




Eω(n)(τ),τ ∈ [t0,t],y(t) =y. By the condition (1) - (5) it follows that there exist






0 ,v mn) − y(τ,t0,y 0,v)  =0
for the some y0 ∈ G0 = G
2,1
Eω(n)(t0)a n dv ∈ DE. By the condition y = y(t,t0,y 0,v)  ∈
Ω
2,1
E (t) it follows that there exist the moment τ ∈ [t0,t] such that y(τ,t0,y 0,v) ∈
S(x(τ)) for the some trajectory x(·)=x(·,t 0,x 0,u) of the player P.
On the other hand, by the construction of the set G
2,1
E (t) it follows that for all
moments tn




0 ,v mn) / ∈ S(x(tn
k)).
For the partition ω(n) there exist some segment [tn
k,t n
k+1] such that τ ∈
[tn
m,t n
m+1]. From each partition ω(n) we take some moment τ ∈ [tn
m,t n
m+1]. Then
we have the sequence t0 ≤ t1 ≤ ... ≤ tn ≤ ... ≤ τ and by the deﬁnition of the
partition ω(n) it follows that limn→∞ tn = τ. By the condition (1) - (5) it follows









Under our assumption the set S(x(t)) is open for arbitrary t ∈ [t0,t 1]. By the
deﬁnition of the set G
2,1
E (t) it follows that
y(tn)=y(tn,t 0,y
mn
0 ,v mn) / ∈ S(x(tn)),





0 ,v mn) ∈ Y (τ,t0,G 0)\S(x(τ)),




E (t)f o rt ∈ [t0,t 1].    
Let t ∈ [t1,T]. For the any partition ω(n), there exist the segment [tn
k,t n
k+1]s u c h
that t1 ∈ (tn
k1,t n
k1+1] t1  = t0.
We construct the approximation set Qω(n)(T,t1,Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v)) of the evasion
domain Q(T,t1,Ω
2,1









E (t1,y 0,v)))\S(X(t,t1,Xy(t1)(t1))),t = tn
k+1,
where t ∈ [t1,T], k ≥ k1.288 Semyon V. Mestnikov
Let ¯ Q(T,t1,Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v)) be the set
¯ Q(T,t1,Ω
2,1





E (t1,y 0,v)). (13)
Theorem 4. If the set ¯ Q(T,t1,Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v))  =   for the ﬁxed strategy
b =( y0,v(·)) of the player E, than the set ¯ Q(T,t,Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v)) and
Q(T,t,Ω
2,1
E (t1,y 0,v)) (10) coinside.
The proof of the theorem 4 is similar to that of theorem 3.
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Abstract For a ﬁxed undirected connected graph ϕ with a node set N,w e
study generalized kernels and bargaining sets for cooperative games (N,v),
where players are able to cooperate only if they can form a connected sub-
graph in graph ϕ. We consider generalizations of Aumann-Maschler theory
of the bargaining set and the kernel, where objections and counter-objections
are deﬁned between coalitions from a ﬁxed collection of coalitions A.
Two problems are solved in this paper. Necessary and suﬃcient condition
on A, which ensures that each TU-game (N,v) would have a nonempty ϕ-
restricted generalized kernel KA(N,v) is obtained. For two diﬀerent gener-
alizations of bargaining sets, we obtained necessary and suﬃcient conditions
on ϕ, which ensure that each game (N,v) would have nonempty ϕ-restricted
generalized A-bargaining set for each ϕ-permissible collection A.
Keywords: cooperative games, kernel, bargaining set, limited communica-
tion.
1. Introduction
The theory of the bargaining set and the kernel for cooperative TU-games is being
developed for more than forty years (see the survey (Mascler, 1992)). The existence
theorems for the kernel and the bargaining set Mi
1 are well known (Davis and
Maschler, 1963; Maschler and Peleg, 1966; Peleg, 1967).
Naumova (1976) generalized the bargaining set Mi
1. For each family of coalitions
A, she permits objections and counter-objections only between the members of this
family but she permits to use all coalitions for objections and counter-objections.
The resulting A-bargaining set was denoted as Mi
A. In this spirit the A-kernel, KA,
which is contained in Mi
A, was also deﬁned.
If A is the set of all singletons, then Mi
A = Mi
1 and KA coincides with the
kernel.
Suﬃcient condition on A, which guarantee that each TU-game would have a
nonempty KA was described in (Naumova, 1978). It was proved in (Naumova, 2008)
that this condition is also the necessary one. Naumova (2008) obtained suﬃcient
condition on A, which guarantee that each TU-game would have a nonempty Mi
A.
If the number of players is no more than 5, this condition is also the necessary one.
Naumova (2008) also deﬁnes a modiﬁcation of the bargaining set Mi
A,w h e r et h e
deﬁnition of objections is preserved and counter-objections are replaced by strong
counter-objections. Therefore the new bargaining set ¯ Mi
A is contained in Mi
A.T h e
existence results for ¯ Mi
A are similar to that for Mi
A.
In this paper we study generalized kernels and bargaining sets for cooperative
games with limited cooperation possibilities represented by an undirected connected290 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
graph ϕ.T h es e to fn o d e so fϕ is the set of players N. Players in games are able
to cooperate only if they can form a connected subgraph in graph ϕ.G a m e sw i t h
limited cooperation possibilities were introduced by Myerson (1977).
Let B(ϕ) be the set of all connected in ϕ subsets of N.
For A⊂B (ϕ), the ϕ-restricted Mi
A and the ϕ-restricted ¯ Mi
A a r ed e ﬁ n e di na
way similar to Mi
A and ¯ Mi
A respectively, but all mentioned coalitions belong to
B(ϕ). The ϕ-restricted KA is deﬁned similarly.
Two problems are solved in this paper. For ﬁxed undirected connected graph ϕ,
necessary and suﬃcient conditions on A, which guarantee that each TU-game would
have a nonempty ϕ-restricted KA are obtained. Necessary and suﬃcient conditions
on ϕ, which ensure that each TU-game would have nonempty ϕ-restricted Mi
B(ϕ)
and ϕ-restricted ¯ Mi
B(ϕ) are obtained.
The paper is organized as follows. Exact deﬁnitions of ϕ-restricted kernel and
ϕ-restricted bargaining sets are given in Section 2. Section 3 contains the existence
theorem of equilibrium points for open relations, which will be used for existence
proof of ϕ-restricted kernel. A special case of this theorem was proved in (Naumova,
2008). Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for existence of ϕ-restricted kernel are
described in Section 4. Conditions for existence of ϕ-restricted bargaining sets are
contained in Section 5.
2. Deﬁnitions
Let Γ 0 be a set of games (N,v) such that v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and v(S) ≥ 0 for all
S ⊂ N. (Such games are 0-normalizations of games (N,v)w i t h
 
i∈S v({i}) ≤ v(S)
for all S ⊂ N.)
An imputation of (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 is a vector x ∈ R|N| such that xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N
and
 
i∈N xi = v(N).
In what follows, we consider only (N,v) ∈ Γ 0.
Let ϕ be an undirected graph with the node set N, then the set of all connected
in ϕ subsets of N is denoted by B(ϕ).
Let (N,v) be a cooperative TU-game, ϕ be an undirected graph with the node
set N, K,L ∈B (ϕ), x be an imputation of (N,v). A ϕ-restricted objection (or ϕ-
objection) of K against L at x is a pair (C,yC) such that C ∈B (ϕ), K ⊂ C ⊂ N,
L ∩ C = ∅, yC = {yi}i∈C,
 
i∈C yi = v(C), yi >x i for all i ∈ C.
A ϕ-restricted counter-objection (or ϕ-counter-objection) to this objection is a
pair (D,zD) such that D ∈B (ϕ), L ⊂ D, K  ⊂ D,
 
i∈D zi = v(D), zi ≥ xi for all
i ∈ D, zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ C ∩ D.
A strong ϕ-restricted counter-objection to this objection is a pair (D,zD)s u c h
that D ∈B (ϕ), L ⊂ D, K ∩ D = ∅,
 
i∈D zi = v(D), zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ D, zi ≥ yi
for all i ∈ C ∩ D.
A ϕ-objection is ϕ-justiﬁed if there is no ϕ-counter-objection to it.
A ϕ-objection is weakly ϕ-justiﬁed if there is no strong ϕ-counter-objection to
it.
Let A⊂B (ϕ). An imputation x of (N,v) belongs to the ϕ-restricted bargaining
set Mi
A(N,v) (denoted by ϕ-Mi
A(N,v)) if for all K,L ∈Athere are no ϕ-justiﬁed
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Let A⊂B (ϕ). An imputation x of (N,v) belongs to the weak ϕ-restricted
bargaining set ¯ Mi
A(N,v) (denoted by ϕ- ¯ Mi
A(N,v)) if for all K,L ∈Athere are no
strong ϕ-justiﬁed objections of K against L at x.
Note that ϕ- ¯ Mi
A(N,v) ⊂ ϕ-Mi
A(N,v).
Let K,L ∈B (ϕ)a n dx be an imputation of (N,v). Kϕ -outweighs L at x if
K ∩ L = ∅,
 
i∈L xi >v (L), and sK,L(x) >s L,K(x), where
sP,Q(x)=sP,Q(x,v)=m a x {v(S) −
 
i∈S
xi : S ∈B (ϕ),P ⊂ S,Q  ⊂ S}.
Let A⊂B (ϕ). The ϕ-restricted KA(N,v) (denoted by ϕ-KA(N,v)) is the set of
all imputations x of (N,v) such that no K ∈Aϕ-outweighs any L ∈A .
3. Equilibrium Points for General Relations on A
Let N = {1,...,n}, X ⊂ Rn, A be a collection of subsets of N, { x}x∈X be
a collection of binary relations  x deﬁned on A.T h e nx0 ∈ X is an equilibrium
vector on A if K   x0 L for all K,L ∈A .
For b>0, K ∈Adenote
X(b)={x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0,x (N)=b},
FK(b)={x ∈ X(b): L   x K for all L ∈A } .




Let ˆ N ⊂ N,
X ˆ N(b)={x ∈ X(b): xi =0 f o ra l li/ ∈ ˆ N}.
Suﬃcient conditions for existence equilibrium vectors in X(b) were described in
(Naumova, 2008, Theorem 1), here we need a generalization of that result, where
X(b) is replaced by X ˆ N(b). The proof will use the following result of Peleg (1967).
Let P be a partition of the set N, w be a nonnegative function deﬁned on P,
X(P,w)={x ∈ Rn : x(S)=w(S) ∀S ∈P,x i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N}.
Peleg’s Lemma. Let c1,...,c n be nonnegative continuous functions deﬁned on
X(P,w).I ff o re a c hx ∈ X(P,w), S ∈P ,t h e r ee x i s t si0 = i0(x) ∈ S such that
ci0(x) ≥ xi0, then there exists x0 ∈ X(P,w) such that ci(x0) ≥ x0
i for all i ∈ N.
Theorem 1. Let a family of binary relations { x}x∈X(b) on A satisfy the condi-
tions:
1) for all K ∈A ,t h es e tFK(b) is closed;
2) if xi =0for all i ∈ K,t h e nx ∈ FK(b);
3) for each x ∈ X ˆ N(b),t h es e to fc o a l i t i o n s{L ∈A: K  x L for some K ∈A }
does not cover ˆ N.
Then there exists an equilibrum vector x0 ∈ X ˆ N(b) on A.292 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
Proof. If the set of coalitions A does not cover ˆ N, the existence result follows from
condition 2. Let A cover ˆ N.D e n o t eAi = {K ∈A: i ∈ K}, N0 = {i ∈ ˆ N :
∩K∈AiFK(b))  = ∅}.
If x ∈ X ˆ N(b), then by condition 3, there exists i0 = i0(x) ∈ ˆ N such that the set
{L ∈A: K  x L for some K ∈A }
does not cover i0, i.e., x ∈ FK(b) for all K ∈A i0. This implies x ∈∩ K∈Ai0FK(b)
and i0 ∈ N0, hence N0  = ∅.
Let P be the partition of N that consists of N0 and {j} for all j ∈ N \ N0,
w(N0)=b, w({j}) = 0 for all j ∈ N \ N0.T h e n
X(P,w)={x ∈ X(b):xj =0 f o ra l l j ∈ N \ N0}.
Deﬁne functions ci (i ∈ N)o nt h es e tX(P,w)b y
ci(x)=xi − xiρ(x,∩K∈AiFK(b))/b for i ∈ N0,
ci(x)=xi =0o t h e r w i s e ,
where ρ(x,y)=m a x i∈N |xi − yi|, ρ(x,Y )=i n f y∈Y ρ(x,y) for all Y ⊂ Rn.
Then ci are nonnegative continuous functions. Let x ∈ X(P,w), then x ∈ X ˆ N(b)
and, as we proved above, there exists i0 = i0(x) ∈ N0 such that x ∈∩ K∈Ai0FK(b).
Then ci0(x)=xi0. By Peleg’s Lemma, there exists x0 ∈ X(P,w) such that ci(x0) ≥
x0
i for all i ∈ N.
We prove that x0 ∈ FM(b) for all M ∈A .I fx0
i =0f o ra l li ∈ M,t h e n
x0 ∈ FM(b) by condition 2. If x0
j > 0f o rs o m ej ∈ M,t h e nj ∈ N0 and
ρ(x0,∩K∈AjFK(b)) = 0. Since the sets FK(b) are closed by condition 1, x0 ∈ FK(b)
for all K ∈A j and, in particular, x0 ∈ FM(b).    
Corollary 1. Let G be an undirected graph with the set of nodes A and a family
of binary relations { x}x∈X(b) on A satisfy the conditions:
1) for all K ∈A ,t h es e tFK(b) is closed;
2) if xi =0for all i ∈ K,t h e nx ∈ FK(b);
3) for each x ∈ X(b), the relation  x is acyclic;
4) if a single node is taken out from each component of G, then the remaining
elements of A do not cover ˆ N.
Then there exists an equilibrum vector x0 ∈ X ˆ N(b) on A.
Proof. The conditions 3 and 4 of the Corollary imply the condition 3 of Theorem 1.
   
4. Existence Conditions for ϕ-restricted KA
Let an undirected connected graph ϕ be ﬁxed. In this section we describe necessary
and suﬃcient conditions on A⊂B (ϕ), which ensure that ϕ-KA(N,v)  = ∅ for each
(N,v) ∈ Γ 0.
An o d ei is al e a v ei nϕ if i is adjacent with a unique node t(i)i nϕ.
A set of coalitions A generates the undirected graph G = G(A), where A is the
set of nodes and K,L ∈Aare adjacent iﬀ K ∩ L = ∅.
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Lemma 1. Let A⊂B (ϕ), A0 covers N, {i0},{i0,j},Q ∈A 0, Q ⊃{ i0,j}, Q  =
{i0,j}. Then there exists (N,w) ∈ Γ 0 such that ϕ-KA(N,w)=∅.
Proof. Take (N,w) as follows: w({i0,j})=w(N)=1 ,w(S) = 0 otherwise. Assume,
on the contrary, that there exists x ∈ ϕ-KA(N,w). Since Q ∈A 0,t h e r ee x i s t s
T ∈A 0 such that Q ∩ T = ∅, hence {i0,j}∩T = ∅.A ss{i0,j},T(x) ≥ w({i0,j}) −
x({i0,j}) ≥ 0, if x(T) > 0t h e nsT,{i0,j}(x) < 0a n d{i0,j} would ϕ-outweigh T at
x. Hence, x(T)=0 ,t h e nsT,Q(x) ≥ w(T)−x(T)=0 .I fx(Q) > 0, then sQ,T(x) < 0
and T would ϕ-outweigh Q at x.T h u s ,x(Q) = 0 and, in particular, xi0 =0 .
Similarly, if S ∈A 0, i0  ∈ S then either x(S)=0o r{i0} ϕ-outweighs S at x.
If P ∈A 0, i0 ∈ P, P  = {i0,j}, then there exists S ∈A 0 such that S ∩ P = ∅.
As we proved above, x(S) = 0, therefore either S outweighs P or x(P)=0 .
Thus, x(S) = 0 for all S ∈A 0 \{ io,j} and we get x(N) = 0. This contradicts
to x(N)=w(N)=1 .    
Theorem 2. Let N be the set of nodes of connected graph ϕ, |N|≥3, A⊂B (ϕ).
Then ϕ-KA(N,v)  = ∅ for all (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 iﬀ A satisﬁes one of the following 2
conditions.
C0) If a single node is taken out from each connected component of G(A),t h e n
the union of the remaining elements of A does not contain N.
C1) There exists a nonempty subset S0 of the set of leaves of ϕ such that for each
i ∈ S0, {i},{i,t(i)}∈A 0, and the set of coalitions A1 = A0 \{ { i,t(i)} : i ∈ S0} is
a minimal covering of N \{ t(i):i ∈ S0}.
Proof. Let A and ϕ satisfy one of conditions of the theorem. Let C0 be realized,
then the existence result follows from Corollary 1, because the relation ”ϕ-outweighs
at x” is acyclic (see Naumova, 1978).
Let C1 be realized. Let N0 = {t(i):i ∈ S0}.S i n c e|N|≥3, S0 ⊂ N \ N0.L e t
(N,v) ∈ Γ 0,
X0 = {x ∈ Rn : x(N)=v(N),x i ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, xi =0 ∀i ∈ N0}.
By Theorem 1, there exists x0 ∈ X0 such that x0 ∈ ϕ-KA1(N,v).
Let us prove that x0 ∈ ϕ-KA(N,v). Let i ∈ S0, L ∈A , {i,t(i)}∩L = ∅.T h e n






i = v({i}) − x
0
i. (1)
If s{i},L(x0)=v(Q) − x0(Q), Q ∈B (ϕ), {i}⊂Q, L  ⊂ Q, then either Q = {i} or





If P ∈B (ϕ), L ⊂ P, {i,t(i)}  ⊂ P,t h e ni  ∈ P since i is a leave of ϕ, hence
sL,{i,t(i)}(x0)=sL,{i}(x0). (3)
It follows from (2), (3) and x0
t(i) =0t h a t{i,t(i)} ϕ-outweighs L at x0 implies {i}
ϕ-outweighs L at x0,a n dLϕ -outweighs {i,t(i)} at x0 implies Lϕ -outweighs {i}
at x0. Hence x0 ∈ ϕ-KA1(N,v) implies x0 ∈ ϕ-KA(N,v).294 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
Now we shall prove that if each of two conditions does not fulﬁll, then ϕ-
KA(N,w)=∅ for some (N,w) ∈ Γ 0. Suppose that C0 is not fulﬁlled.
Let G(A)h a v ek components. Let S1,...,S k be taken out from all diﬀerent
components of G(A) and the union of the remaining elements of these components
cover N.
We can assume that each Si does not include the other elements of A. Indeed,
let Q ∈A , Q ⊂ Si.T h e r ee x i s t sP ∈Asuch that P ∩ Si = ∅.T h e nP ∩ Q = ∅,
hence Si and Q belong to the same component and it is possible to take Q instead
of Si.
First suppose that |Si| > 1f o ri =1 ,...,k. Then deﬁne (N,w) as follows:
w(N)=w(Si)=1f o ri =1 ,...,k,
w(Q)=0o t h e r w i s e .
Suppose that there exists x ∈K A(N,w). It will be proved that for each i =
1,...,k,i fQ and Si belong to the same connected component, Q  = Si,t h e nx(Q)=
0. This would imply x(N) = 0 and contradict to x(N)=w(N)=1 .
Fix i ≤ k.S i n c ex(Si) ≤ 1=w(Si), w(Si) − x(Si) ≥ 0. Let L ∈A , L ∩ Si = ∅.
Then Sj  ⊃ L for all j =1 ,...,k,s ow(P) − x(P) ≤ 0 for all P ⊃ L, P  = N.
Thus, sSi,L(x) ≥ 0, sL,Si(x) ≤ 0a n dx ∈K A(N,w) implies x(L)=0 .L e tT ∈A ,
T  = Si, T ∩ L = ∅.S i n c ex(L)=0 ,sL,T(x) ≥ 0. Since Sj  ⊃ T for all j =1 ,...,k,
sT,L(x) ≤ 0, therefore x ∈K A(N,w) implies x(T) = 0. Thus by induction on the
distance from Si in G(A)w ep r o v et h a tx(P) = 0 for all P ∈A\{ S1,...,S k}.
Now let there exist {i0},Si0 ∈A 0 such that i0 ∈ Si0, |Si0| > 1. As {i0}∈A 0,
A0 is a component of ϕ. Suppose that C1 is also not fulﬁlled. We consider 3 cases.
Case 1. There exists {i0,j}∈B (ϕ) \A 0. Then deﬁne (N,w) as follows:
w({i0,j})=w(N)=1 ,w(S) = 0 otherwise. Assume that there exists x ∈ ϕ-
KA(N,w).
Let Q ∈A 0, i0  ∈ Q, Q  = {j}.T h e nx(Q) = 0. Indeed, s{i0},Q(x) ≥ w({i0,j})−
x({i0,j}) ≥ 0a n di fx(Q) > 0t h e nsQ,{i0}(x) < 0, hence {i0} ϕ-outweighs Q at x.
Since Si0 ∈A 0,t h e r ee x i s t sT ∈A 0 with T ∩Si0 = ∅.I fT  = {j},t h e nx(T)=0
as we proved above, and sT,Si0(x) ≥ w(T) − x(T)=w(T) ≥ 0. If T = {j},t h e n
sT,Si0(x) ≥ w({i0,j}) − x({i0,j}) ≥ 0. Since {i0,j}  ∈A 0, w(P)=0f o rP ⊃ Si0,
hence sSi0,T(x) < 0a sx(Si0) > 0. Thus, x(Si0) = 0, hence xi0 = 0. Similarly,
x(Q)=0a si0 ∈ Q.
Let {j}∈A 0,t h e ns{i0},{j}(x) ≥ 0−xi0 =0a n dxj > 0 implies s{j},{i0}(x) < 0,
hence xj =0 .T h u s ,x(Q) = 0 for all Q ∈A 0.A sA0 covers N, x(N)=0 .T h i s
contradicts to x(N)=w(N)=1 ,s oϕ-KA(N,w)=∅.
Case 2. There exists i0 ∈ N such that i0 is not a leave of ϕ and {i0,j}∈A 0
as {i0,j}∈B (ϕ). If there exists Si0 ∈A 0 such that i0 ∈ Si0, |Si0| > 2, then, by
Lemma 1, there exists (N,w) ∈ Γ 0 with ϕ-KA(N,w)=∅.
In the remaining case if S ∈A 0, i0 ∈ S,t h e n|S| =2 .L e t{i0,k}∈A 0,
then there exists Q ∈A 0, Q ∩{ i0,k} = ∅. There is a shortest path in ϕ from i0
to Q.L e tT consist of i0, Q, and the nodes of this path. Take (N,w) as follows:
w(N)=w(T)=1 ,w(S) = 0 otherwise. Suppose that x ∈ ϕ-KA(N,w). Consider
two subcases.
Subcase 2.1. k ∈ T.S i n c ei0 is not a leave of ϕ,t h e r ee x i s t sj  = k such that
{i0,j}∈A 0.I fj ∈ T, then the path is not the shortest, hence j  ∈ T.N o t et h a t
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s{i0,j},Q(x) < 0a n dQϕ -outweighs {i0,j} at x.T h u s ,x( i0,j}) = 0 for all j  = k,
{i0,j}∈A 0.I np a r t i c u l a r ,xi0 =0 .
If P ∈A 0, i0  ∈ P,t h e ns{i0},P(x) ≥ w({i0}) − xi0 =0a n dx(P) > 0w o u l d
imply {i0} ϕ-outweighs P at x. Hence x(P) = 0. In particular, x(Q)=0a n d
sQ,{i0,k}(x) ≥ w(Q) − x(Q) = 0. Therefore, if xk > 0, then Qϕ -outweighs {i0,k}
at x.T h u s ,x(S) = 0 for all S ∈A 0, i0 ∈ S, |S| = 2. Hence x(S) = 0 for all S ∈A 0,
so x(N) = 0 and this contradicts x(N)=w(N)=1 .
Subcase 2.2. k  ∈ T.L e tj0  = i0 be the closest to i0 in the path from i0 to
Q.I fj0  ∈ Q, then we come to case 2.1. Let j0 ∈ Q,t h e nT = Q ∪{ i0} and
sQ,{i0,k}(x) ≥ w(T) − x(T)=1− x(T) ≥ 0. If x({i0,k}) > 0, then s{i0,k},Q(x) < 0
and Qϕ -outweighs {i0,k} at x.T h u s ,x({i0,k}) = 0, hence xi0 = 0. Similarly, if
{i0,j}∈A 0, j  ∈ Q,t h e nxj =0 .
If {i0}  ∈ P ∈A 0,t h e ns{i0},P(x) ≥ w({i0}) − 0=0a n dx(P) > 0w o u l d
imply {i0} ϕ-outweighs P at x, hence x(P) = 0 and, in particular, x(Q)=0 .T h u s
if i0 ∈ S ∈A 0, |S| =2 ,t h e nx(S) = 0. This implies x(N) = 0 and contradicts
x(N)=w(N) = 1. Thus, in case 2, ϕ-KA(N,w)=∅ .
Case 3. i0 is a leave of ϕ, {i0,t(i0)}∈A 0.L e t¯ S be the set of leaves i of ϕ such
that {i},{i,t(i)}∈A 0. As C2 is not fulﬁlled, the set A2 = A0 \{{i,t(i)} : i ∈ ¯ S} is
not a minimal covering of N1 = N \{ t(i):i ∈ ¯ S}.A sA0 covers N, A2 covers N1,
hence A2 is a nonminimal coverring of N1.L e tQ be a set that can be deleted from
the covering of N1 and Q is minimal in A2.T h e nA0 \{ Q} is a covering of N.
Suppose that Q is minimal in A0.T h ec a s e|Q| > 1 was considered before. Then
the proof of impossibility is like before. Let Q = {j0}.I fj0 is not a leave, then either
case 1 or case 2 takes place. If j0 is a leave of ϕ, then either case 1 takes place, or
j0 ∈ ¯ S and there exists Sj0 ∈A 0 such that |Sj0| > 2, j0 ∈ Sj0, hence j0 satisﬁes
conditions of Lemma 1.
Let Q be not minimal in A0,t h e nQ ⊃{ i,t(i)} for some i ∈ ¯ S and we can apply
Lemma 1. Thus, in Case 3, there also exists (N,w) ∈ Γ 0 such that ϕ-KA(N,w)=∅.
   
Let us consider Theorem 2 for special graphs ϕ.
Theorem 3. Let |N|≥3, ϕ be a tree, A⊂B (ϕ).T h e nϕ-KA(N,v)  = ∅ for all
(N,v) ∈ Γ 0 iﬀ A satisﬁes one of the following conditions:
C2) either A0 does not cover N or A0 is a minimal covering of N;
C1) there exists a nonempty subset S0 of the set of leaves of ϕ such that for each
i ∈ S0, {i},{i,t(i)}∈A 0, and the set of coalitions A1 = A0 \{ { i,t(i)} : i ∈ S0} is
a minimal covering of N \{ t(i):i ∈ S0}.
Proof. Since ϕ is a tree, the undirected graph G(A) has only one component with
more than one point. Indeed, suppose that there are two components of G(A)t h a t
contain more than one point. Then there exist K,L,T,P ∈Asuch that K ∩L = ∅,
T ∩P = ∅, T ∩K  = ∅, T ∩L  = ∅, P ∩K  = ∅, P ∩L  = ∅.L e ta ∈ K ∩T, b ∈ L∩T,
p ∈ P. Then there is a path from a to b in T and there is another path from a to p
and from p to b.T h u s ,ϕ contains a cycle, but ϕ is a tree.
Therefore, the condition C0 of Theorem 2 turns into the condition C2.    296 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
A line graph is an undirected graph such that the set of its nodes is N =
{1,...,n} and the set of edges is {(i,i +1 ):i =1 ,...,n− 1}.
If ϕ is a line graph, then each S ∈B (ϕ) satisﬁes the condition: if i<k<jand
i,j ∈ S,t h e nk ∈ S. For line graph, Theorem 3 takes the following form.
Theorem 4. Let |N|≥3, ϕ be a line graph, A⊂B (ϕ).T h e nϕ-KA(N,v)  = ∅ for
all (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 iﬀ one of the following conditions takes place.
1. The elements of A0 do not cover N.
2. A0 is a minimal covering of N.
3. {1},{1,2}∈A 0 and A0 \{ 1,2} is a minimal covering of N \{ 2}.
4. {n},{n− 1,n}∈A 0 and A0 \{ n − 1,n} is a minimal covering of N \{ n − 1}.
5. {1},{1,2},{n},{n− 1,n}∈A 0 and
A0 \{ { 1,2},{n− 1,n}} is a minimal covering of N \{ { 2},{n− 1}}.
Example 1. The following A satisfy existence conditions for line graphs.
1. n =3 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{2,3},{3}}.
2. n =4 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{3,4},{4}}.
3. n =4 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{2,3,4}}.
4. n =5 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{2,3},{4,5},{5}}.
Example 2. The following A do not satisfy existence conditions for line graphs.
1. n =3 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{2},{2,3},{3}}.
2. n =4 ,A = {{1},{1,2},{1,2,3},{3,4},{4}}
5. Graphs Issuing Games with Nonempty Bargaining Sets
In this section we describe necessary and suﬃcient conditions on ϕ,w h i c he n s u r e




Deﬁnition 1. Let ϕ be a connected graph with node set N, A⊂B (ϕ). A directed
graph Gr is called ϕA-admissible if A is the set of its nodes and there exists a map f
deﬁned on the set of arcs of Gr, that takes each arc (K,L)t oap a i rf(K,L)=( Q,r)
(Q ∈B (ϕ), r ∈ R1) and satisﬁes the following 3 conditions.
C1. If f(K,L)=( Q,r), then K ⊂ Q, Q ∩ L = ∅, |Q| > 1.
C2. If f(K,L)=( Q,r), f(R,P)=( S,t), L ⊂ S, K  ⊂ S,t h e nQ ∩ S  = ∅.
C3. If f(K,L)=( Q,r), f(R,P)=( S,t), L ⊂ S, K  ⊂ S,t h e nr>t .
Deﬁnition 2. Let ϕ be a connected graph with node set N, A⊂B (ϕ). A directed
graph Gr is called weakly ϕA-admissible if A is the set of its nodes and there exists
am a pg deﬁned on the set of arcs of Gr, that takes each arc (K,L)t oap a i r
g(K,L)=( Q,r)( Q ∈B (ϕ), r ∈ R1) and satisﬁes the following 3 conditions.
C1. If g(K,L)=( Q,r), then K ⊂ Q, Q ∩ L = ∅, |Q| > 1.
C2’. If g(K,L)=( Q,r), g(R,P)=( S,t), L ⊂ S, K ∩ S = ∅,t h e nQ ∩ S  = ∅.
C3’. If g(K,L)=( Q,r), g(R,P)=( S,t), L ⊂ S, K ∩ S = ∅,t h e nr>t .
The next two theorems give suﬃcient conditions on A for existence of ϕA-
bargaining sets. They are simple modiﬁcations of Theorems 3 and 4 in (Naumova,
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Theorem 5. Let ϕ be a connected graph with node set N, A⊂B (ϕ).I ff o re a c h
ϕA-admissible graph the set of the endpoints of its arcs does not cover N,t h e n
ϕ-Mi
A(N,v)  = ∅ for each (N,v) ∈ Γ 0.
Theorem 6. Let ϕ be a connected draph with node set N, A⊂B (ϕ).I ff o re a c h
weakly ϕA-admissible graph the set of the endpoints of its arcs does not cover N,
then ϕ- ¯ Mi
A(N,v)  = ∅ for each (N,v) ∈ Γ 0.
5.1. Auxiliary Lemmas
The next lemmas will be used to get necessary conditions for existence of ϕA-
bargaining sets.
Lemma 2. Let ϕ be a connected graph, K, L ∈B (ϕ), (Q,yQ) be a ϕ-objection of
K against L at x. Let S ∈B (ϕ), L ⊂ S, K  ⊂ S. Then there exists a ϕ-counter-
objection (S,zS) to this objection iﬀ (y − x)(Q ∩ S) ≤ v(S) − x(S).
Proof. The proof coincides with the proof of Lemma 1 in (Naumova, 2008).
For each digraph G we denote the set of its endpoints by End(G).
Deﬁnition 3. A directed graph is a +1-digraph if its diﬀerent arcs have diﬀerent
endpoints.
Let G be a ϕA-admissible +1-digraph and f be a map, deﬁned on the set of
arcs of G.T h e nf o re a c hL ∈ End(G) we deﬁne Q(L) ∈B (ϕ)a n dr(L) ∈ R1 by
(Q(L),r(L)) = f(K,L), where (K,L)i sa na r co fG.
Lemma 3. Let ϕ be an undirected graph with the node set N, A⊂B (ϕ) .I ft h e r e
exists a ϕA-admissible +1-digraph Gr such that the set of the endpoints of its arcs
covers N,a n df o re a c hL ∈ End(Gr)





A(N,v)=∅ for some (N,v) ∈ Γ 0.
Proof. Deﬁne (N,v) as follows: v(N)=1 ,v(Q(L)) = 1 for each L ∈ End(Gr),
v(T)=0o t h e r w i s e .N o t et h a t( N,v) is well deﬁned since |Q(L)| > 1b yC 1 .W e
shall prove that ϕ-Mi
A(N,v)=∅.
Assume, on the contrary, that there exists x0 ∈ ϕ-Mi
A(N,v). We shall prove by
induction on r(L)t h a tx0(L)=0a n dx0(Q(L)) = 1 for all L ∈ End(Gr). Since the
set End(Gr)c o v e r sN, this would imply x0(N) = 0, but x0(N)=v(N)=1 .
Let r(L)=r0 be minimal, (K,L)b ea na r co fGr. Suppose that x0(L) > 0. Then
x0(Q(L)) < 1a n dt h e r ee x i s t saϕ-objection of K against L at x0.T h e r ee x i s t sa
ϕ-counter-objection (D,zD)t ot h i sϕ-objection. Since v(D)=zD(D) ≥ x0(L) > 0,
v(D)=1a n dD = Q(P)f o rs o m eP ∈ End(Gr). By the deﬁnition of ϕ-counter-
objection, L ⊂ D, K  ⊂ D and C3 implies r(P) <r (L)=r0, but r0 is minimal.
Thus, x0(L) = 0 for all L with r(L)=r0 and x0(B(r0) )=0 .I nv i e wo f( 4 ) ,t h i s
implies
x
0(Q(L)) = 1 for all L ∈ End(Gr)w i t h r(L)=r0.298 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
Suppose that x0(L)=0a n dx0(Q(L)) = 1 for r(L) <i .L e tr(L)=i,( K,L)b e
an arc of Gr. Assume that x0(L) > 0, then x0(Q(L)) < 1, v(Q(L)) −x0(Q(L)) > 0
and there is a ϕ-objection (Q(L),y Q(L))o fK against L at x0.T h e r ee x i s t saϕ-
counter-objection (S,zS) to this objection. Since v(S)=zS(S) ≥ x0(L) > 0, v(S)=
1a n dS = Q(T)f o rs o m eT ∈ End(Gr). By the deﬁnition of ϕ-counter-objection,
L ⊂ S, K  ⊂ S and C3 implies r(T) <r (L). By induction assumption, x0(S)=1 ,
hence v(S) − x0(S) = 0. By Lemma 2,
v(S) − x0(S) ≥ yQ(L)(S ∩ Q(L)) − x0(S ∩ Q(L)).
By C2, S ∩ Q(L)  = ∅, and by the deﬁnition of ϕ-objection,
yQ(L)(S ∩ Q(L)) − x
0(S ∩ Q(L)) > 0.
This contradicts to v(S) − x0(S) = 0, hence x0(L)=0 .T h u s
x0(L) = 0 for all L ∈ End(Gr)w i t hr(L)=i.
In view of (4), this implies
x
0(Q(L)) = 1 for all L ∈ End(Gr)w i t h r(L)=i.
   
Lemma 4. Let ϕ be a connected graph with the node set Nϕ, ψ be its connected
subgraph with the node set Nψ, A⊂B (ψ),a n dt h e r ee x i s t s(Nψ,v ψ) ∈ Γ 0 such that
ψ-Mi
A(Nψ,v ψ)=∅.
Then there exists a game (Nϕ,v ϕ) ∈ Γ 0 such that ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(Nϕ,v ϕ)=∅.






vϕ(S)=vψ(S) for any coalition S ∈A ,
vϕ(S) = 0 for remaining coalitions.
Let xϕ be an imputation of (Nϕ,v ϕ). We consider 2 cases.
Case 1. xϕ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ Nϕ \Nψ.L e txψ({i})=xϕ({i}) for all i ∈ Nψ.
Then xψ is an imputation of (Nψ,v ψ).
As well as xψ / ∈ ψ-Mi
A(Nψ,v ψ), there exist K,L ∈Aand a ψ-justiﬁed objection
(Q,yQ)o fK against L at xψ in the game (Nψ,v ψ).
Obviously, K,L ∈B (ϕ), hence (Q,yQ)i saϕ-objection of K against L at xϕ in
the game (Nϕ,v ϕ). Let us prove that this objection is justiﬁed. Assume that there
exists a ϕ-counter-objection (P,zP) to this objection. Then, by Lemma 2,
(y − xϕ)(Q ∩ P) ≤ vϕ(P) − xϕ(P). (5)
Let S = P ∩ Nψ, then either vϕ(P)=vψ(S)o rvϕ(P) = 0, hence
vϕ(P) − xϕ(P)=vϕ(P) − xψ(S) ≤ vψ(S) − xψ(S). (6)
As Q ⊂ Nψ, Q ∩ P = Q ∩ S, therefore,
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It follows from (5), (6), (7) that
(y − xψ)(Q ∩ S) ≤ vψ(S) − xψ(S).
By Lemma 2, (Q,yQ)i sn o taψ-justiﬁed objection of K against L at xψ and we
get a contradiction.
Therefore, xϕ / ∈ ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(Nϕ,v ϕ).
Case 2. There exists i0 ∈ Nϕ \ Nψ such that xϕ({i0}) > 0, then xϕ(Nψ) <
vϕ(Nψ). Thus there exists a ϕ-objection (Nψ,y)o fNψ against {i0} at xϕ.M o r e o v e r ,
vϕ(S)=0 ,xϕ(S) > 0 for any coalition S containing i0, S  = Nψ. Hence, this
objection is justiﬁed by Lemma 2 and xϕ / ∈ ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(Nϕ,v ϕ).    
5.2. Existence Conditions for ϕ-restricted Bargaining Sets
Deﬁnition 4. The distance between two nodes in the connected graph is the mini-
mum number of edges in the path from one node to another.
Deﬁnition 5. The diameter of a connected graph is the maximum distance between
its nodes.
Theorem 7. Let ϕ be a connected graph with the node set N.
1) The set ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v) is nonempty for all (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 iﬀ one of the following
conditions is satisﬁed:




2) The set ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v) is nonempty for each (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 iﬀ ϕ is a tree and
it has a node, which is adjacent to k ≥ (|N|−2) other nodes of ϕ.
Figure1. All possible variants of graph ϕ such that the set ϕ-M
i
B(ϕ)(N,v)i sn o n e m p t y
for any (N,v) ∈ Γ
0
Proof (of theorem). The proof is organized as follows. Step 1. We prove that the
condition (a) implies existence result for the bargaining set ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ). As far as
ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v) ⊂ ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v), this would imply that (a) is suﬃcient for existence
of the bargaining set ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ). Step 2. We prove that (b) is suﬃcient for existence of300 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
the bargaining set ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ). Step 3. After that we prove that under |N| > 3,( a )i s
necessary for existence of the bargaining set ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ), hence it is also necessary for
existence of the bargaining set ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ). Step 4. It remains to prove that if |N|≤3
and (a) is not fulﬁlled, then there exists (N,w) ∈ Γ 0 with ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ)(N,w)=∅.
Step 1. Let (a) be satisﬁed. We shall prove that the suﬃcient condition of Theo-
rem 6 is realized. Assume, on the contrary, there exists a weakly ϕB(ϕ)-admissible
graph G such that the set of the endpoints of its arcs covers N.W ec o n s i d e rt w o
cases.
Case 1.1. Let i be a node in the tree ϕ, which is adjacent to k = |N|−1o t h e r
nodes, (K,L)b ea na r ci nt h eg r a p hG such that i ∈ L, g(K,L)=( Q,r). By
condition C1 of Deﬁnition 2, |Q| > 1, therefore Q ⊂B (ϕ) implies i ∈ Q, but this
contradicts to L ∩ Q = ∅.
Case 1.2. Let i be a node in the tree ϕ, which is adjacent to k = |N|−2n o d e s ,
(K,L) be an arc in graph G such that i ∈ L, g(K,L)=( Q,r). Then by condition
C1 of Deﬁnition 2, Q = {p,q},w h e r ep and q are nodes adjacent to each other, p is
adjacent to i,a n dq is not adjacent to i.
Since p  ∈ L, there is an arc (S,T) such that p ∈ T.L e tg(S,T)=( M,t), then
Q ∩ M = ∅ and i ∈ M due to condition C1 of Deﬁnition 2. If follows from i ∈ M
that T ⊂ Q and S ∩ Q = ∅. By condition C2’ of Deﬁnition 2, Q ∩ M  = ∅, but this
contradicts to Q ∩ M = ∅ .
Thus, for each weakly ϕB(ϕ)-admissible graph Gr the set of the endpoints of
i t sa r c sd o e sn o tc o v e rN,s ot h es e tϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v) is nonempty for each game
(N,v) ∈ Γ 0 by Theorem 6.
Step 2. Suppose now that (b) is satisﬁed. A consideration should be made only
for the case, when |N| =3a n dϕ is a complete graph, because otherwise the
condition (a) is satisﬁed.
The nonemptyness of the set ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v) for any game (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 is proved
in (Naumova, 2008, Example 5).
Step 3. Let graph ϕ does not satisfy the condition (a) and |N| > 3. We show that
ϕ has a subgraph ψ such that for some A⊂B (ψ),t h e r ee x i s t saψA-admissible
graph Gr satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3. This would imply in view of Lem-
mas 3 and 4, that there exists (N,v) ∈ Γ 0 such that N i st h en o d es e to fϕ and
ϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v)=∅.
Case 3.1. Suppose that ϕ is not a tree, then it contains a cycle χ with the set of
nodes Nχ = {i1,..,ik} and the set of edges
 
(ik,i 1),(il−1,i l):l ∈{ 2,..,k}
 
.





, Gr be a digraph, where A is the
set of nodes and
 
({i3},{i1,i 2}),({i1},{i2,i 3}),({i1,i 2},{il}): l =4 ,...,k
 
is the
set of arcs. Then Gr is ψA-admissible. Indeed, consider the following map f deﬁned
on the set of arcs of Gr:
f({i3},{i1,i 2})=( Nχ \{ i1,i 2},1);
f({i1,i 2},{il})=( {i1,i 2,i 3},2), where l ∈ 4,..,k;
f({i1},{i2,i 3})=( Nχ \{ i2,i 3},1).
It is checked directly that f satisﬁes all conditions of Deﬁnition 1, f and Gr
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Subcase 3.1.2. Let k = 3, then there exists a subgraph ψ with the set of nodes
Nψ = {i1,..,i4} and the set of edges
 
(i1,i 2),(i2,i 3),(i3,i 1),(i3,i 4)
 
.W et a k eA,
digraph Gr and the map f the same as in subcase 3.1.1 with k =4 .T h e nf and
Gr satisfy all conditions of Lemma 3 for N = Nψ.
Case 3.2. Let ϕ be a tree. Then there exists a subgraph with the diameter greater
than 2, otherwise ϕ satisﬁes the condition (a).
Subcase 3.2.1. Let the diameter of ϕ b ee q u a lt o3 .A sϕ does not satisfy the
condition (a), there exists a subgraph ψ with the set of nodes {i1,..,i6} and the set
of edges
 





{i2},{i3},{i1,i 2,i 5},{i3,i 4,i 6}
 
, Gr be a digraph, where A is the set
of nodes and
 
({i2},{i3,i 4,i 6}),({i3},{i1,i 2,i 5})
 
is the set of arcs. Consider the
following map f deﬁned on the set of arcs of Gr:
f({i2},{i3,i 4,i 6})=( {i2,i 5},1);
f({i3},{i1,i 2,i 5})=( {i3,i 4},1).
The map f and the digraph Gr satisfy all conditions of Lemma 3.
Subcase 3.2.2. Let the diameter of ϕ be greater than 3, then there exists a




{i1},{i5},{i1,i 2,i 3},{i3,i 4,i 5}
 
, Gr be a digraph, where A is the set
of nodes and
 
({i1},{i3,i 4,i 5}),({i5},{i1,i 2,i 3}
 
is the set of arcs. Consider the
following map f deﬁned on the set of arcs of Gr:
f({i1},{i3,i 4,i 5})=( {i1,i 2},1);
f({i5},{i1,i 2,i 3} =( {i4,i 5},1).
The map f and the digraph Gr satisfy all conditions of Lemma 3.
Step 4. Let |N|≤3 and (a) do not fulﬁlled, then |N| =3a n dϕ is a complete
graph with the node set N. It was proved in (Naumova, 2008, Theorem 6) that for
|N|≤5 and complete graph ϕ, the existence of weakly A-admissible digraph Gr

















It is checked directly that f satisﬁes the conditions C1, C2’, C3’ in the Deﬁni-
tion 2 of weakly admissible graph. Hence, (a) is necessary for existence of ϕ- ¯ Mi
B(ϕ).
   
Corollary 2. Let |N|≤4, ϕ b eat r e ew i t ht h en o d es e tN.T h e nϕ-Mi
B(ϕ)(N,v)  =
∅ for any (N,v) ∈ Γ 0.302 Natalia Naumova, Irina Korman
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Abstract A system of the real estate development optimization and game
theoretic models is described. A basic role in the proposed system is played
by aggregate models of a real estate development company. Those ones are
static optimization models aimed at the deﬁnition of optimal prices with con-
straints on the solvent demand. A natural generalization of the basic model
is possible in two directions: “horizontally” and “vertically”. First, an inter-
action of real estate development companies as equal economic agents may
be considered. In turn, two model approaches are possible in this case. If we
consider competitive relations of development companies without formation
of coalitions then non-cooperative games of n players in normal form arise.
If a cooperation is admissible (common resources, mergers and acquisitions
of development companies) then we get cooperative games. Second, develop-
ment companies have economic relations with organizations of other types.
These relations are hierarchical as a rule, and a development company can
be both a Leader (in relations with its suppliers) and a Follower (in relations
with its investors, credit institutions, administrative agencies). Respectively,
hierarchical game theoretic models arise.
Keywords: game theory, optimization models, real estate development.
1. Introduction
A real estate development (RED) project provides implementation of the whole
cycle of investments in capital construction works. The subject of the activity is a
real estate development company, or developer.
Real estate development objects are subdivided into types and classes. The main
types are urban and suburban residential real estate, commercial real estate, trade
and entertainment centers, stores, industrial buildings. The principal classes are pre-
mium class (A), business class (B), economy class (C), social class (of the residential
real estate as a rule). Intermediate classes as B+ ,B−and so on are also possible.
There are professional classiﬁers which deﬁne the class of an object. The class of an
object determines the productive costs and possible prices. Each RED-object may
be characterized by an index which combines its type and class.
It is evident that there are many developers on each territory. Their “horizontal”
interaction may be considered either from the point of view of competition (supply
of the same product, tenders), either from the point of view of cooperation (com-
mon resources, mergers and acquisitions of development companies). Besides, there
are “vertical” hierarchical relations which have big importance. Those are relations304 Gennady A. Ougolnitsky
between developers and banks, administrative agencies, diﬀerent suppliers (consult-
ing, project, building and other companies). A problem of control of the sustainable
development of the RED-activity has a special interest.
It is rational to use mathematical models for investigation and control of the
RED-activity. There are many publications on project management including math-
ematical models and methods (Goodpasture, 2004; Oberlender, 2000; Walker, 2002).
This paper is dedicated to the system of optimization and game theoretic models
of the RED-activity; its structure is shown in Fig.1.
Figure1. Hierarchical system of mathematical models of the RED-activity
The basic role in the proposed system is played by aggregated models of a RED-
company. First, these are static optimization models which are aimed to determine
optimal prices of the real estate development considering constraints on solvent
demand and credit return. Second, these are dynamic models of search of the optimal
ratio between sales and rentals of a RED-object.
There are two natural directions of generalization of the basic models: “hori-
zontally” and “vertically”. First, it is possible to consider interaction between de-
velopers as equal economic agents. In turn, two modeling variants are possible in
this case. If we consider competitive relations of RED-companies without forma-
tion of coalitions then non-cooperative games of n players in normal form arise. If
a cooperation is admissible (common resources, mergers and acquisitions of RED-
companies) then we get cooperative games. Second, RED-companies have economic
relations with organizations of other types. These relations are hierarchical as a
rule, and a RED-company can be both a Leader (in relations with its suppliers)
and a Follower (in relations with its investors, credit institutions, administrative
agencies). Respectively, hierarchical game theoretic models arise.Optimization and Game Theoretic Modeling of the Real Estate Development 305
2. Optimization Models
A static optimization model of ﬁnding optimal sales price with constraints on non-




[αj(pj)pj − cj]Sj − C → max (1)
N  
j=1
αj(pj)Sj = Smax, 0 ≤ pj ≤ pmax
j ,j =1 ,...,N, (2)
where j is a RED-project index (combination of the RED type and class); N is a
quantity of RED-projects implementing by the developer in the current year; u is
an annual proﬁt of the developer ($); Sj is an annual building volume on the j-th
RED-project (m2); cj is a cost price in the j-th RED-project ($/m2); pj is a sales
price in the j-th RED-project ($/m2); αj(pj)i sas h a r eo ft h es o l dm2 of the total
amount Sj ; are constant expenditures ($); Smax is a maximal solvent demand of
the developer target consumer group (m2); pmax
j is a maximal possible sales price
in the j-th RED-project ($/m2).
Let’s accept the following considerations:
- variables which don’t depend on p may be excepted from the payoﬀ function;
- it is convenient to describe a solvent demand by the parameter β = Smax/Sj,
0 ≤ β ≤ 1;
- index j may be omitted without lost of generality. Then we get
u = α(p)p → max (3)
α(p) ≤ β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, 0 ≤ p ≤ pmax, (4)
where all variables relate to a separate RED-project.
Models (1)-(2) or (3)-(4) are static ones, i.e. they describe an activity of a RED-
company during a year. The key role in the model (3)-(4) is played by the function
α(p) which describe the dependence of sales share from sales prices. A parameteriza-
tion of the function α(p) is based on the following proposals which don’t constraint
a generality:
- α(p) is a decreasing function of sales price, 0 ≤ α(p) ≤ 1;
- α(0) = 1,α (pmax)=0 .
The simplest function which satisﬁes the constraints is a linear function
α(p)=1− p/pmax;( 5 )
The solution of the problem (3)-(4) with (5) gets
p∗ =
 
pmax(1 − β),0 ≤ β<1/2;




β(1 − β)pmax,0 ≤ β<1/2;
pmax/4,1/2 ≤ β ≤ 1.306 Gennady A. Ougolnitsky
So, if β decreases from 1/2 to 0 then the optimal sales price p∗ increases from
pmax/2t opmax but the proﬁt u(p∗) nevertheless decreases from pmax/4t o0 .
The dynamical model of search of the optimal ratio between sales and rentals







(T − t + 1)(1 − αt)βt → max
T  
t=1
βt ≤ 1,β t ≥ 0, 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1.
Here U is a total developer’s proﬁt ($/m2); T implementation period (months); s
is sales price ($/m2); c is cost price ($/m2);
r is rentals rate for a month ($/m2); z is maintenance cost for a month ($/m2);
K1(s,c) is proﬁt from sales considering taxes ($/m2);
K2(r,z) is proﬁt from rentals considering taxes ($/m2);
βt is the total share of m2 s o l da n dr e n t e di nt h em o n t ht;
αt is the share of sold m2 in the month t.
Considering that the payoﬀ function is linear on the controlled variable αt we












(T − t +1 ) βt,
0, otherwise.
For example, if the whole RED-object is sold or rented in the ﬁrst month then
rentals are more proﬁtable than sales if K1(s,c) <T K 2(r,z), and if the object is
sold and rented uniformly during the whole period T then the condition becomes
K1(s,c) < 0.5(T +1 ) K2(r,z).
3. Games in Normal Form
Now let’s consider several RED-companies acting on a territory. Let’s designate
them by an index i =1 ,...,n. Then a competitive interaction of the RED-
companies is described by a n-persons game in normal form
G =< {1,...,n},{X1,...,X n},{u1,...,u n} >, (7)
where payoﬀ functions ui are given by the formula (1) and sets of admissible strate-
gies Xi deﬁned by the constraints of the type (2). The following hypotheses about
the game theoretic model (7) were investigated:
1) αi = αi(pi), 0 ≤ pi ≤ pmax
i ,i =1 ,...,n,
where pmax
i is the maximal admissible sales price, i.e. αi(pmax
i )=0 ;
2) αi = αi(prel
i ),p rel
i = pi/pmax,p max =m a x {p1,...,p n};
3) Xi is determined by constraints αiSi = Smax
i for each RED-company i =
1,...,nindependently;
4) Xi is determined by common constraints
 
αiSi = Smax for the total solvent
demand of the population of the territory.
In all four cases of possible combinations αi and Xi the character of solution (6)
is qualitatively the same.Optimization and Game Theoretic Modeling of the Real Estate Development 307







may be considered as an equilibrium in dominant strategies in the game (7). But
it is important that the players behavior is absolutely independent almost in the
case αi = αi(pi),αiSi ≤ Smax
i . In another three cases the calculation of dominant
strategy requires from a player the knowledge of another players parameters, hence
the solution (8) must be more correctly treated as Nash equilibrium which allows
some informational exchange between players.
4. Cooperative Games
Let’s consider again several RED-companies acting on a territory and designate
them by an index i =1 ,...,n. Let’s suppose that the companies can exchange
information, join the resources and implement common projects. Let Ai be the
amount of actives of the i-th RDE-company.
Then cooperative interaction of the companies may be formalized as a voting









So a coalition is winning if and only if for this coalition
 
Ai ≥ Amin.T h e
threshold value Amin may be treated for example as a deposit necessary for partic-
ipation in a tender or for providing a bank credit.
It is possible to mark the following speciﬁc cases of the game (9):
1) dictator game ∃ i ∈{ 1,...,n} : Ai ≥ Amin,∀j  = iA j <A min .I n
this case the game is non-essential, v(S)=1⇐⇒ i ∈ S, and the only imputa-
tion (0,...,0,1,0,...,0)(xi = 1) exists which forms -core, is the only Neumann-
Morgenstern solution and the Shapley value;




0, otherwise. s = |S|,1 ≤ k ≤ n.
In this case -core of the game is empty, the Shapley value has a form
(1/n,...,1/n), an example of the Neumann-Morgenstern solution is the set
{(xi1,...,x ik,0,...,0) : xi1 ≥ 0,...,x ik ≥ 0;xi1 + .. + xik =1 }.
It is possible to consider cooperative games in general form where a coalition
formation S
 
T means merger (acquisition) of RDE-companies S and T or simply
joining of their resources.
5. Hierarchical Games
Let’s consider as an example the interaction between RED-companies and a bank
(supposing for simplicity that the only bank credits developers on the territory).
The game is based on the following rules.
Stage 1: preparation of credit applications by RED-companies.308 Gennady A. Ougolnitsky
This stage includes for each RED-company i =1 ,...,n: formation of concepts of
the RED projects j =1 ,...,n i ; working out schedules of projecting, construction,
and ﬁnancing for each project; estimating of the actives and cost prices; investigating









Stage 2: decision making by the bank. In this stage the bank analyzes credit
applications K0
1,...,K0
n; estimates credit risks ri for each application; determines
credit rates si = si(ri); makes a decision on credit payments K1,...,K n and corre-
sponding credit rates s1,...,s n; informs RED-companies about the decision.
Stage 3: decision making by developers. In this stage each RED-company
i =1 ,...,n: corrects real volumes of construction works and corresponding sched-
ules based on credit amount Ki and credit rate si; determines the optimal sales
price by solving an optimization problem (3)-(4).
The model of bank decision making is based on the following simplifying hy-
potheses:
- credit risks are estimated as
ri = Ki/Ai,i =1 ,...,n, (10)
where Ai are actives of the i-th developer, Ki are credit amounts. Then the condition
of crediting is given by inequality ri ≤ rmax ,w h e r ermax is a normative of acceptable
risk for the bank;
- credit rate is an increasing linear function of the risk:
si = ari + b = aKi/Ai + b = aiKi + b, i =1 ,...,n.Let’s consider that
0 <s min ≤ si ≤ smax < 1,r min ≤ ri ≤ rmax,s(rmin)=smin,s(rmax)=smax.
Then we get
ai =( smax − smin)/[Ai(rmax − rmin)],b=( sminrmax − smaxrmin)/(rmax − rmin),
i =1 ,...,n.
Considering the accepted propositions the model of bank decision making in







(aiKi + b)Ki → max (11)
n  
i=1
Ki = K, 0 ≤ Ki ≤ Li,i =1 ,...,n, (12)
where is a total capital of the bank in the current year, Li =m i n {K0
i ,A irmax}.
Solving the problem (11)-(12) by Lagrange method we ﬁnd optimal values
K∗






i =[ ( smax − smin)K∗
i + Ai(sminrmax − smaxrmin)]/[Ai(rmax − rmin)],
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The model of developer decision making in stage 3 has a form (3)-(4) with additional
constraint





from where we get optimal values of construction works volume
S∗
i =[ Ai − Ci +( 1− s∗
i)K∗
i ]/ci, (15)
and the corresponding value β∗
i = Smax
i /S∗
i , which has to be substitute in the
formula (6) to calculate the optimal sales price.
Let’s consider the case of interaction of the only RED-company with the bank.
Then we get a hierarchical game “Bank-Developer” in the following form:
u0(K1)=a1K
2
1 + bK1 → max (16)
0 ≤ K1 ≤ min{K,K0
1,A 1rmax} (17)
u1(K1,p 1)=[ α1(p1)p1 − c1][A1 − C1 +( 1− s1)K1]/c1 → max (18)
0 ≤ α1(p1)[A1 − C1 +( 1− s1)K1]/c1 ≤ S
max






1 is calculated by formula (13), and p∗
1 by the
formula (6) after substituting the values s∗
i and S∗
i by formulas (14) and (15) re-
spectively, is the Stackelberg equilibrium in the game (16) – (19).
The problem of control of the sustainable development (Ougolnitsky, 2002) in
the case of RED may be formulated as follows. A tree-like control system is consid-
ered where the upper level is presented by Administration, and the lower level by
Developers designated by index i =1 ,...,n. Each Developer maximizes its proﬁt
(probably with constraints on the solvent demand). Administration solves two prob-
lems. First, it tends to develop the regional construction works complex, or in model
terms to maximize the summary proﬁt of Developers with consideration of control
expenditures. Second, it has to provide sustainable development conditions which
mean in model terms some necessary constraints on social class residential RED
volumes.
In general model of hierarchical control of the sustainable development (Ougol-
nitsky, 2002) the Principal can use control methods of compulsion (administrative
impact), impulsion (economic impact), and conviction (psychological impact). In
the described model of hierarchical control of the sustainable development of the
regional construction works complex Administration can’t use compulsion because
it has no legal possibilities to compel Developers to build social class houses. In re-
turn, it has many economic possibilities of impulsion: warranties of buying of social
class apartments on the previously stated price, state warranties for bank credits,
direct grants and so on. Theoretical possibility of conviction (voluntary cooperation
of Developers with Administration) also exists. The model of hierarchical control
of the sustainable development of the regional construction works complex may be




ui(pi,S i) − f0(p) → max, (20)






ui(pi,S i) → max, (23)
Si ∈ Ωi,i =1 ,...,n. (24)
By the index j = 1 are designated social class RED projects; Sij are volumes of
construction works for the j–h project for the i-th Developer; Smin
1 is the necessary
volume of social class construction works, i.e. inequality (22) reﬂects social require-
ments to the sustainable development of the regional construction works complex;
Si =( Si1,...,S ini), where ni – is total quantity of projects implemented by the
i–th Developer; S =( S1,...,S n); =( p1,...,p n) is a vector of impulsion controls
used by Administration; f0(p) is control expenditures function of Administration;
ui is payoﬀ function of the i-th Developer; Ωi – set of constraints for the i-th De-
veloper. In this model Developer’s strategies are not sales prices but construction







n) ∈ P1 × ...× Pn × Ω1 × ...× Ωn









u0(p1,...,p n,...,S 1,...,S n),
where Ri(pi)={Si ∈ Ωi : ui(pi,S i)=m a x
zi∈Ωi
ui(pi,z i)},i =1 ,...,n,
with the obligatory condition (22).
Now let’s consider a pricing model of hierarchical control of the sustainable
development of the regional construction works complex. It has a form
uL(¯ p,p0,p)=δpα(p) − Mρ(p,p0) → max (25)
0 <p 0 ≤ ¯ p ≤ pmax (26)
uF(¯ p,p0,p)=pα(p)+pξ(p)(1 − α(p)) → max (27)
0 ≤ p ≤ pmax (28)
Here p is sales price; p0 – normative price of social class residential real es-
tate development; ¯ p – limit price of social class residential real estate development;




; δ- Administration bonus param-
eter for social class residential real estate development sales; pmax – ”overlimit” price
of social class residential real estate development (there are no sales if p>p max);
α(p) is share of residential real estate development bought by Administration with
warranty; ξ(p) – share of another residential real estate development successfully
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Variable p is Developer’s strategy, and variables p0 and ¯ p are strategies of Ad-
ministration which tries to satisfy the sustainable development condition
p ≤ p0. (29)
Functions α(p)a n dξ(p) decrease on the segment [0,1] and satisfy the propo-
sitions α(p)=
 
1,0 ≤ p ≤ p0
0,p≥ p0
, ξ(0) = 1,ξ (p)=0 ,p ≥ pmax. Let’s consider as





1,0 ≤ p ≤ p0,
¯ p−p








⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩








pmax, ¯ p ≤ p ≤ pmax,
0,p>p max.
Hence we have:
-w h e n0≤ p ≤ p0 then the maximal value uF achieved by p = p0 and is equal
to p0;
-w h e np0 <p<¯ p ∂uF





2 ; one of the roots is
negative but the positive root is more than ¯ p, hence the maximal value uF achieved




-w h e n¯ p ≤ p ≤ pmax the condition ∂uF
∂p =0g i v e sp∗ =
pmax
2 . If ¯ p<
pmax
2 ,





2 )i ta c h i e v e db yp =¯ p and is equal to ¯ p −
¯ p
2
pmax; let’s gather the found
values in a table.
Values of [0,p 0] [p0, ¯ p] [¯ p,p m a x ]
¯ p ≤
pmax













4 ¯ p −
¯ p2
pmax;312 Gennady A. Ougolnitsky
Note the following:
- closed ranges (segments) of p values may be used, because values of uF on the
ends are equal on each side;






- if limit price of social class residential real estate development is high (¯ p>
pmax
2 )
then the optimal price is bigger than if it is low (¯ p<
pmax
2 ), and the Developer payoﬀ
is less in this case. But it is dangerous for Administration to establish lower limit




the strategy p∗ =
pmax
2 , which may force the sustainable development condition
(29).





2 . Then the strategy p =¯ p is not proﬁtable for Devel-
oper because u(¯ p) <
pmax
4 , and the strategy p =
pmax
2 is not admissible. That’s
why Developer has the only optimal response p = p0 , which satisﬁes (29), and
uF =
pmax
4 ,u L =
δpmax






4 ) is a conviction equilib-
rium.
6. Conclusion
The problem domain of real estate development is conceptualized in terms of op-
timization and game theoretic models. A system of such models is proposed. The
system is based on optimization models of separate RED-companies which are gen-
eralized as games in normal form, cooperative games, and hierarchical games. The
problem of hierarchical control of sustainable development is also adapted for the
RED problem domain. Some examples are driven.
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1. Introduction
This paper continues the series of papers by author (Pechersky, 2007, 2009), where
proportionality of the solutions in bargaining games and NTU games was studied.
In the ﬁrst of these two papers an axiomatic approach was developed to deﬁne
uniquely the proportional excess function on the space of positively generated NTU
games, which generalizes to NTU games the proportional TU excess v(S)/x(S).
The properties of proportional excess and corresponding nucleolus and prenucleolus
were studied. In particular, it was shown that for non-leveled bargaining games
with positive status quo point the nucleolus (and prenucleolus) deﬁnes the Pareto
optimal point of a feasible set proportional to the status quo point. Therefore this
solution was called the status quo-proportional solution (to distinguish it from the
proportional solution due to Kalai (Kalai, 1977)).
It was shown that for the class G of comprehensive (more precisely 0-comprehen-
sive), non-leveled bargaining games (q,Q) with positive status quo points q the status
quo-proportional solution is the unique solution satisfying Pareto optimality, scale
covariance, anonymity and strong monotonicity axioms.
In (Pechersky, 2009) the consistency property of the status quo-proportional
solution was studied, and characterizations of the status quo-proportional solution
via consistency was given.
Our aim in this paper is to deﬁne a consistent extension of the status quo-
proportional bargaining solution to NTU games, and to show its uniqueness.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides deﬁnitions and notations. In
Section 3 we recall some results concerning the status quo-proportional bargaining
solution and its consistency. In Section 4 we deﬁne the consistent proportional
solution, and prove its uniqueness. Section 5 establishes the relation between the
solution deﬁned and symmetric egalitarian solution due to Kalai-Samet.
2. Deﬁnitions and Notations
Let N = {1,2,...,n} be a non-empty ﬁnite set of players. A coalition is a non-
empty subset S of N. For a subset S ⊂ N let IR
S denote |S|-dimensional Euclidean314 Sergei L. Pechersky
space with axes indexed by elements of S.Apayoﬀ vector for S is a vector x ∈ IR
S.
For z ∈ IR
N and S ⊂ N, zS will denote the projection of z on the subspace
IR
[S] = {x ∈ IR
N : xi =0f o ri/ ∈ S},
and zS – the restriction of z on IR
S. To simplify notations, if |S| =1o r|S| =2 ,i .e .
S = {i} or S = {i,j} for some i,j ∈ N,w ew r i t eI R
[i] and IR




Let x,y ∈ IR
N. We will write x ≥ y,i fxi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N; x>y,i fxi >y i
for all i ∈ N.D e n o t e
IR
N
+ = {x ∈ IR
N : x ≥ 0},
IR
N
++ = {x ∈ IR
N : x>0},
where 0=(0,0,...,0). We denote the coordinate-wise product by x ∗ y,i . e .x ∗ y =
(x1y1,...,x nyn).
Let A ⊂ IR
N.I fx ∈ IR
N,t h e nx+A = {x+a : a ∈ A} and λA = {λa : a ∈ A}.
A is comprehensive,i fx ∈ A and x ≥ y imply y ∈ A. A is bounded above,i f
A ∩ (x +I R
N
+) is bounded for every x ∈ IR
N. The boundary of A is denoted by
∂A. The interior of a set A will be denoted by int A, and the relative interior by
rel int A.
A nontransferable utility game (or shortly NTU game)i sap a i r( N,V), where
N is the set of players, and V is the set-valued map that assigns to each coalition
S ⊂ N as e tV (S), that satisﬁes:
(1) V (S) ⊂ IR
[S] = {x ⊂ IR
N : xi =0f o ri/ ∈ S};
(2) V (S) is closed, non-empty, comprehensive and bounded above.
(Usually V (∅)=∅.)
It is often convenient to consider the sets V (S) as subsets of IR
S. We will use
sometimes this notation, too.
3. NTU games, the status quo-proportional bargaining solution and
consistency
In (Pechersky, 2007) the space GN+ of all positively generated NTU games was
considered. Roughly speaking (the formal deﬁnition will be given below) a game V
belongs to GN+,i fe v e r ys e tV (S) is compactly generated, contains 0 =( 0 ,...,0) as
its relatively interior point and coincides with the comprehensive hull of its positive
part V+(S)=V (S) ∩ IR
[S]
+ .
Let us recall the deﬁnition of this space formally. A game V ∈G N+ iﬀ for every
S:
(a) V (S) is positively generated (i.e. V (S)=( V (S) ∩ IR
[S]
+ ) − IR
[S]
+ , and V+(S)=
V (S) ∩ IR
[S]
+ is compact), and every ray Lx = {λx : λ ≥ 0}, x  = 0 does not
intersect the boundary of V (S) more than once;
(b) 0 is an interior point of the set V ∧(S)=V (S)+I R
[N\S].
For S ⊂ N as e tV (S) ⊂ IR
[S] will be called a game subset, if it satisﬁes (a) and
(b). The space consisting of all game subsets satisfying (a) and (b) will be denoted
by GS
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It is often convenient to consider some modiﬁcation of a game (N,V) deﬁned by
the set-valued map V with V (S)=VS(S), where VS(S) is the restriction of V (S)
on IR
S. Clearly V (S)=V (S) × 0N\S
It is clear that if V1,V 2 ∈G N+, then the games V1 ∩ V2 and V1 ∪ V2, deﬁned by
(V1 ∩ V2)(S)=V1(S) ∩ V2(S) , (V1 ∪ V2)(S)=V1(S) ∪ V2(S)
also belong to GN+.
Next, if V (S) ∈G S
N+, A ∈ IR
[S]
++ and A ∗ V (S)={A ∗ y : y ∈ V (S)},t h e n
A ∗ V (S) ∈G S
N+.
The proportional excess for NTU games is deﬁned as follows (for details see
(Pechersky, 2007)).
Let HS be an excess function, i.e. HS : GS
N+ × IR
[S]
+ → IR. Let us impose the
following axioms (we write V instead of V (S)).
Continuity. HS(V,x) is continuous jointly in V and x  = 0.
Scale invariance.I fV ∈G S
N+, A ∈ IR
[S]
++ and A ∗ V = {A ∗ y : y ∈ V },t h e n
HS(A ∗ V,A∗ x)=HS(V,x).
MIN.L e tV1,V 2 ∈G S
N+,t h e n
HS(V1 ∩ V2,x)=m i n {HS(V1,x),H S(V2,x)}.
MAX.L e tV1,V 2 ∈G S
N+,t h e n
HS(V1 ∪ V2,x)=m a x {HS(V1,x),H S(V2,x)}.
Proportionality for TU games.I fV ∈G N+ corresponds to TU game v,i .e .
V (S)={x ∈ IR
[S]




Let V ∈G N+ be an arbitrary game. Deﬁne a function hS : GS
N+ ×IR
N
+ → IR as
follows:
hS(V,x)=1 /γ(V (S),x S), (1)
where γ(W,y)=i n f {λ>0:y ∈ λW} is the gauge (or Minkowski gauge) function
(Rockafellar, 1997).
Theorem 1. There is a unique function HS : GS
N+ × IR
N
+ → IR, satisfying con-
tinuity, scale invariance, MIN, MAX, and proportionality for TU games axioms.
Moreover HS = hS,w h e r ehS is deﬁned by (5).
Remark 1. It is not diﬃcult to prove (Pechersky, 2007) that if a game V is such
that for every S the set V (S) is positively generated, possesses (b) and satisﬁes
traditional non-levelness condition:
x,y ∈ ∂V(S) ∩ IR
[S]
+ ,x ≥ y ⇒ x = y,
then V ∈G N+.316 Sergei L. Pechersky
We restrict our attention in what follows with the space Gnl
N+ of non-leveled
games in GN+.
The following proposition (Pechersky, 2007) gives the basis for deﬁnition of the
status quo-proportional bargaining solution.
Proposition 1. Let V ∈G N+ be a bargaining game, i.e. for some q ∈ IR
N
++
V (S)={x ∈ IR
S : xi ≤ qi for every i ∈ S},




+) be non-leveled. Then
N(V )=PN(V )=λq,w h e r eλ is such that λq ∈ ∂V(N), N(V ) and PN(V )
denote the nucleolus and prenucleolus (corresponding to the proportional excess) of
the game V respectively.
We consider bargaining games (q,Q) with positive status quo points q.M o r e o v e r ,
we suppose that the sets Q possess not only properties (a)–(b) characterizing the
sets V+(S)a n dGN+, but also that they are non-leveled and 0-comprehensive, and
for every bargaining game (q,Q)t h e r ei ss u c hx ∈ Q that x ≥ q.
For a bargaining game (q,Q) deﬁne solution R as follows: let
µ(q,Q)=m a x {t ∈ IR + : tq ∈ Q},
and R(q,Q)=µ(q,Q)q. This solution is called sq-proportional (status quo propor-
tional).
In (Pechersky, 2007) the sq-proportional bargaining solution was characterized
by means of Pareto optimality, Scale covariance, Anonimity and Strong monotonic-
ity axioms.
Theorem 2. SQ-proportional solution is the unique solution satisfying Pareto op-
timality, scale covariance, anonymity and strong monotonicity axioms.
In (Pechersky, 2009) the consistency property of the status quo-proportional
bargaining solution was studied. Let us recall the main result.
We suppose that every bargaining game (q,Q) satisﬁes the following properties:
(a) Q ⊂ IR
N
+ is compact and 0-comprehensive, i.e. x ∈ Q, y ∈ IR
N
+,a n dx ≥ y
imply y ∈ Q;
(b) Q is non-leveled, i.e.
x,y ∈ ∂Q, x ≥ y ⇒ x = y;
(c) q ≥ 0 and there is x ∈ Q such that x>q .
In what follows we keep mostly the notations used by Lensberg (Lensberg, 1988),
who used ﬁrstly the consistency property to characterize the Nash bargaining solu-
tion. Let N be the set of natural numbers and let P be the family of nonempty, ﬁnite
subsets of N.T h em e m b e r so fP will be denoted N,N ,.... N may be thought of
as the set of all potential players, and P is the family of all subsets of those players
that may conceivably become involved in some bargaining problem.
Let N ∈P .D e n o t eb yΩN the family of all bargaining games with the players
set N satisfying the properties (a)–(c).Proportionality in NTU Games: on a Consistent Proportional Solution 317











which associates with each element N ∈Pand each (q,Q) ∈ ΩN a unique point
F(q,Q)o fQ, F(q,Q) being called the solution of bargaining game (q,Q).
Now we address to the axioms, which we formulate in the form suitable for the
case of variable set of players.
Pareto optimality (PO). For every N ∈P , for every (q,Q) ∈ ΩN it follows
from F(q,Q)=x that there is no y ∈ Q such that y ≥ x, y  = x.
For every N,N  ∈Psuch that |N| = |N | let us denote by Γ N,N
 
the family of
one-to-one correspondences γ : N → N . It will be convenient to consider sometimes
γ ∈ Γ N,N
 




, deﬁned by y = γ(x), if yγ(i) = xi for
every i ∈ N. For every (q,Q) ∈ ΩN we deﬁne also γ(q,Q) ≡ (γ(q),γ(Q)).
Anonymity (AN). For every N,N  ∈Psuch that |N| = |N |, for every γ ∈
Γ N,N
 
and every (q,Q) ∈ ΩN
F(γ(q,Q)) = γ(F(q,Q)).





for any λ ∈ ΛN there is such a ∈ IR
N
++ that for every i ∈ N and every x ∈ IR
N
λi(x)=aixi.
It will be convenient to use the following notation for λ ∈ ΛN and (q,Q) ∈ ΩN:
λ(q,Q) ≡ (λ(q),λ(Q)).
Scale covariance (SC). For every N ∈P,e v e r y( q,Q) ∈ ΩN and every λ ∈ ΛN
F(λ(q,Q)) = λ(F(q,Q)).
For every N,N  ∈Psuch that N ⊂ N  and x ∈ IR
N let us denote by Hx
N the
hyperplane in IR
N of the form
H
x
N = {y ∈ IR
N : yN \N = xN \N}.




restriction of x on IR
N by xN.
For Q ⊂ IR
N
 
and x ∈ Q denote by tx
N(Q) the projection of the set Hx
N ∩ Q on
IR
N.
Now we can formulate the consistency axiom which is akin to Lensberg’s axioms
(Lensberg, 1988), but use non-zero status quo points.
Bilateral stability (B.STAB). For every N,N  ∈Psuch that N ⊂ N  and
|N| = 2, for every (q,Q) ∈ ΩN and every (r,R) ∈ ΩN
 
if q = rN and Q = tx
N(R),
where x = F(r,R), then F(q,Q)=xN.
We denote for every N ∈Pby ΩN
+ the family of all bargaining games in ΩN
satisfying properties (a)–(c) with q>0.
The main result of (Pechersky, 2009) is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. As o l u t i o nF on Ω+ =
 
N ΩN
+ satisﬁes PO, AN, SC and B.STAB,
if and only if it is the status quo-proportional solution.318 Sergei L. Pechersky
4. Consistent proportional solution for NTU games
Now turn to the deﬁnition of the consistent NTU solution, which coincides with the
status quo-proportional solution on two-person NTU games.
Firstly we recall the deﬁnition of the reduced game and the consistency (a la
Hart–Mas-Colell) for NTU games (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989).
For every solution function ϕ, a game (N,V), and a subset T ⊂ N, the reduced
game (T,V
ϕ
T ) is deﬁned by
V
ϕ
T (S)={x ∈ IR
S
+ :( x,ϕi(S ∪ (N\T),V)i∈N\T)) ∈ V (S ∪ (N\T))}
for all S ⊂ T.T h u s ,V
ϕ
T (S)i st h eS-section of V (S ∪(N\T)), when the coordinates
of all players outside T are ﬁxed at their solution imputation (in the S ∪ (N\T)
subgame).




for all games (N,V)a n da l lj ∈ T ⊂ N.
Note that B.STAB is, of course, the consistency property of this type.
It is clear that if (N,V) ∈G nl
N+, then the reduced game also belongs to the
corresponding game space.
Let us deﬁne the desired solution P.L e t( N,V) ∈G nl
N+ be an arbitrary game.
We deﬁne P inductively. Deﬁne ﬁrst for every i ∈ N
vi =m a x {x : x ∈ V (i)}.
It is also convenient to put µi =1f o ra l li.
Then for every i,j ∈ N deﬁne
µij =m a x {µ>0: µ(µivi,µ jvj) ∈ V (i,j)},
and wij = µij(µivi,µ jvj) ∈ ∂V(i,j), i.e. wij is the sq-proportional solution of the
bargaining game ((vi,v j),V(i,j)).
Now for every i,j,k ∈ N deﬁne
µijk =m a x {µ>0: µ(µiµijµikvi,µ jµijµjkvj,µ kµikµjkvk) ∈ V (i,j,k)}.
Then
w
ijk = µijk(µiµijµikvi,µ jµijµjkvj,µ kµikµjkvk) ∈ ∂V(i,j,k).
Now for every S ⊂ N deﬁne
µS =m a x {µ>0: µ((
 
T =S:i∈T⊂S
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Proof. It is suﬃcient to check the consistency property for T = N\{m} for an
arbitrary player m ∈ N. In this case the reduced game is deﬁned by
V P
T (S)={x ∈ IR
S
+ :( x,Pm(S ∪{ m},V)) ∈ V (S ∪{ m})}










µKvi)i∈S ∈ V (S ∪{ m}).
But this follows immediately from the deﬁnition of the solution P.    
It is clear that this solution is scale covariant.
Theorem 4. There is a unique consistent solution that is sq-proportional on two-
person NTU games, and it is P.
Proof. The proof follows the same lines as the proof in (Hart and Mas-Colell, 1989)
of Lemma 6.8, where Kalai-Samet egalitarian solution is considered. Let P and R be
two solutions satisfying the hypothesis, and assume by induction that they coincide
for all games of at most n − 1p l a y e r s .L e t( N,V)b ea nn player game, and let
i,j ∈ N,i  = j.
Consider two reduced games ({i,j},VP
{i,j})a n d( {i,j},VR
{i,j}). Denote them for
simplicity of notation by V P and V R. Clearly they coincide for singletons (by in-
duction, since only n − 1 players matter). Therefore, since P is sq-proportional for
two-person games, we have Pi(V P)>
< Pi(V R) if and only if Pj(V P)>
< Pj(V R).
Further, P = R for two-person games, and both P and R are consistent. Hence
Pi(V )=Pi(V P)>
< Pi(V R)=Ri(V R)=Ri(V )
if and only if Pj(V )>
< Rj(V ). This applies to any two players, and both P(V )a n d
R(V ) are Pareto optimal. Then P(V )=R(V ).    
5. Consistent proportional solution and Kalai-Samet solution
In (Pechersky, 2009) we considered some relations between four bargaining solu-
tions: the Nash solution, the sq-proportional solution, the egalitarian solution, and
the utilitarian solution.
It is interesting that the Nash bargaining solution and the sq-proportional solu-
tion can be characterized by the same systems of axioms, but for diﬀerent families
of bargaining games (see the corresponding scheme in (Pechersky, 2009).
It was shown also that under logarithmic transformation of utilities the Nash
bargaining solution transforms, obviously, into the utilitarian solution, and the sq-
proportional solution transforms into the egalitarian solution.
It is not diﬃcult to see that the logarithmic transformation of utilities transforms
the consistent proportional solution into the Kalai-Samet symmetric egalitarian
solution.320 Sergei L. Pechersky
Let now N = {1,2,...,n} be ﬁxed, and x ∈ IR
N
++.D e n o t e
LN(x)=( l n ( x1),ln(x2),...,ln(xn)).
Then for every game (N,V) ∈G nl
N+ we can deﬁne the NTU game LN(V ) as follows:
LN(V )(S)={y ∈ IR
S : ∃x ∈ V++(S):y ≤ LN(x)}.
If we consider the sq-proportional bargaining solution P,t h e ni ti sc l e a r( s e e
(Pechersky, 2009) that
LN(P(q,Q)) = E(LN(q,Q)),
where E is the egalitarian solution deﬁned for a bargaining game (r,R)b y
E(r,R)=r + δeN,
where δ =m a x {t>0: r + teN ∈ R}.
Indeed, let x = P(q,Q). This means that x = µq,w h e r eµ =m a x {t>0: tq ∈
Q}. Then lnxi =l nµ +l nqi for every i. Hence z = LN(x)=LN(q)+δeN,w h e r e
δ =l nµ.
Recall the deﬁnition (see (Kalai and Samet, 1985)) of the symmetric egalitarian
solution E . For a given game V we ﬁrst deﬁne D(V,∅)=0a n dZ(V,∅)=0 .













The following proposition follows immediately from the deﬁnitions of the con-
sistent proportional solution and the symmetric egalitarian solution.
Proposition 3. LN(P(V))=E(LN(V)).
The following properties are the corollaries of the deﬁnition of consistent pro-
portional solution. (They follow also from Proposition 3).
Corollary 1. (1) The consistent proportional solution has the Strong Independence
of Irrelevant Alternative property, i.e., for two games V and W and a coalition
S,i fV (T)=W(T) for each T  = S,W(S) ⊂ V (S),a n dP(S,V ) ∈ W(S),t h e n
P(V )=P(W).
(2) If V (N)=W(N) and for each i ∈ N,P(N\{i},V)=P(N\{i},W),t h e n
P(V )=P(W).Proportionality in NTU Games: on a Consistent Proportional Solution 321
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Abstract In this article we derive necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
the existence of Pareto optimal solutions for an N player cooperative inﬁnite
horizon diﬀerential game. Firstly, we write the problem of ﬁnding Pareto
solutions as solving N constrained optimal control subproblems. We derive
some weak suﬃcient conditions which entail one to ﬁnd all Pareto solutions
by solving a weighted sum optimal control problem. Further, we observe
that these suﬃcient conditions are related to transversality conditions of
the associated subproblems. We consider games deﬁned by nonautonomous
and discounted autonomous systems.
1. Introduction
Cooperative diﬀerential games involve situations where several players decide to
cooperate while trying to realize their individual objectives, with players acting in
a dynamic environment. We consider cooperative games with no side payments and
open loop information structure. The dynamic environment is modelled as:
˙ x(t)=f(t,x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t),···,u N(t)),x (t0)=x0 ∈ R
n (1)
where ui(t) is the control strategy/action of player i,( u1,u 2,···,u N) ∈U ,w i t h
U being the set of admissible controls. Each player tries to minimize the objective
function
Ji(t0,x 0,u 1,u 2 ···,u N)=
  ∞
t0
gi(t,x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t),···,u N(t))dt (2)
for i =1 ,2,···,N. For the above problem to be well-deﬁned we assume that f :
Rn×U →Rn and gi : Rn×U →R, i =1 ,2,···N, are continuous and all the partial
derivatives of f and gi w.r.t x and ui are continuous. Further, we assume that the
integrals involved in the player’s objectives converge.
Pareto optimality plays a central role in analyzing these problems. Due to
cooperation, the cost incurred by a single player cannot be minimized without
increasing the cost incurred by other players. So, we consider (Pareto optimal)
solutions which cannot be improved upon by all the players simultaneously. We
call the controls (u∗
1,u ∗
2,···,u ∗
N) ∈UPareto optimal if the set of inequalities
Ji(u1,u 2,···,u N) ≤ Ji(u∗
1,u ∗
2,···,u ∗
N),i=1 ,2,···,N, (with at least one of the
inequalities being strict) does not allow for any solution in (u1,u 2,···,u N) ∈U.
A well known way to ﬁnd Pareto optimal controls is to solve a pa-
rameterized optimal control problem (Zadeh, 1963; Leitmann, 1974). How-
ever, it is unclear whether all Pareto optimal solutions are obtained us-
ing this procedure. The closest references we could track are (Chang, 1966),Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Pareto Optimality 323
(Blaquiere et al., 1972) and (Vincent et al., 1970). (Vincent et al., 1970) and the
aﬃliated papers (Stalford, 1972) and (Leitmann et al., 1972) discuss necessary con-
ditions for Pareto solutions for dynamic systems where cost functions are just func-
tions of the terminal state. In (Vincent et al., 1970) geometric properties of Pareto
surfaces were used to derive necessary conditions which are also in the spirit of
maximum principle. Some diﬀerence with our work are: they assume that the ad-
missible controls are feedback type and the terminal state should belong to some
n−1 dimensional surface. Recently, (Engwerda, 2009) gives necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for Pareto optimality for ﬁnite horizon cooperative diﬀerential games. In
this work the necessary conditions are in the spirit of the maximum principle.
We follow the same approach as mentioned in (Engwerda, 2009). In section (2)
we present a necessary and suﬃcient characterization of Pareto optimality. In sec-
tion (3) the problem of ﬁnding all Pareto solutions of an N player cooperative
diﬀerential game is transformed as solving N constrained optimal control subprob-
lems. Further, we show that by making an assumption on the transversality con-
ditions (Lagrange multipliers), associated with the subproblems, one can ﬁnd all
the Pareto solutions by solving the weighted sum optimal control problem. The
transversality conditions for the optimal control problems in the ﬁnite horizon, in
general, do not extend naturally to the inﬁnite horizon case. This behavior was ﬁrst
analyzed by (Halkin, 1974) using a counterexample. For optimal control problems,
(Seierstad et al., 1986; Aubin and Clarke, 1979; Mitchel, 1982; Aseev et al., 2004)
give conditions under which the ﬁnite horizon transversality conditions extend nat-
urally to the inﬁnite horizon case. We give some weak suﬃcient conditions under
which these conditions extend naturally within this setting too. These weak suﬃ-
cient conditions are related to growth conditions which naturally extend the ﬁnite
horizon transversality conditions to the inﬁnite horizons. We consider the games
deﬁned by nonautonomous and discounted autonomous systems. For discounted
autonomous systems, (Mitchel, 1982) derives necessary conditions for free endpoint
optimal control problems. We extend these results for the constrained subproblems
and derive weak suﬃcient conditions for the above assumption to hold true. In sec-
tion (4) we derive suﬃcient conditions for Pareto optimality in the similar lines of
Arrow’s suﬃciency results in optimal control.
In section (5) we consider regular indeﬁnite inﬁnite planning horizon linear
quadratic diﬀerential games. That is the linear quadratic case, where the cost in-
volved for the state variable has an arbitrary sign and the use of every control is
quadratically penalized. This problem was recently solved for both a ﬁnite and in-
ﬁnite planning horizon in (Engwerda, 2008) assuming that the problem is a convex
function of the control variables and the initial state is arbitrary. In this article we
concentrate on the general case and where the initial state is ﬁxed. We provide an
algorithm to compute all Pareto optimal solutions when the system is scalar. In
section (6) we give conclusions.
This paper addresses just the issue of ﬁnding Pareto solutions that can be
realized by a grand coalition. We do not discuss about cooperative situations that
can arise while sharing the joint Pareto payoﬀ. For a discussion of some frequently
used cooperative agreements, related to bargaining, one may consult e.g., chapter
6 of (Engwerda, 2005).
Notation: We use the following notation. Let SN = {1,2,···,N} denote324 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda
the grand coalition and let Si
N = SN/{i} denote the coalition of all players
excluding player i.L e tPN denote the N dimensional unit simplex. RN
+ denotes a
cone consisting of N dimensional vectors with nonnegative entries. 1N denotes a
vector in RN with all its entries equal to 1. y  represents the transpose of the vector
y ∈ RN. |x| represents the absolute value of x ∈ R. ||y|| represents the Euclidian
norm of the vector y ∈ RN. |y|i represents the absolute value of the ith entry of
the vector y. |A|(m,n) represents the absolute value of entry (m,n)o ft h em a t r i x
A. A>0 denotes matrix A is strictly positive deﬁnite. fx(.) represents the partial
derivative of the function f(.) w.r.t x. − → ω ∈ RN denotes the vector whose entries wi
are the weights assigned to the cost function of each player. We deﬁne the weighted
sum function G(.) as follows:





In this section we state conditions to characterize Pareto optimal controls. We
borrow the following lemmas from (Engwerda, 2009).
Lemma 1. Let αi ∈ (0,1),w i t h
 N









Then u∗ is Pareto optimal.
The above lemma which involves minimizing the weighted sum is an easy way to
ﬁnd Pareto optimal controls. It is, however, unclear whether we obtain all Pareto
optimal controls in this way. The above approach may not yield any Pareto solutions
even though there exist inﬁnite number of Pareto solutions. The following example
(an inﬁnite horizon counterpart of (see example (2.2), Engwerda, 2009)) illustrates
this point.
Example 1. Consider the following game problem:
(P)m i n J1(x0,u 1,u 2)=
  ∞
0





sub. to ˙ x(t)=
ρ
2
x(t)+u1(t) − u2(t),x (0) = 0,t ∈ [0,∞)
ui(.) ∈U(a bounded set),i =1 ,2. (4)
By construction |x(t)|≤ceρt/2 for some constant c ≥ 0. Taking the transformations
˜ x(t)=e−ρt/2x(t)a n d˜ ui(t)=e−ρt/2ui(t), we transform the game (P)a san e wNecessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Pareto Optimality 325
game ( ˜ P)g i v e nb y :
( ˜ P)m i n J1(x0, ˜ u1, ˜ u2)=
  ∞
0
(˜ u1(t) − ˜ u2(t))dt and
minJ2(x0, ˜ u1, ˜ u2)=
  ∞
0
˜ x2(t)(˜ u2(t) − ˜ u1(t))dt
sub. to ˙ ˜ x(t)=˜ u1(t) − ˜ u2(t), ˜ x(0) = 0,t ∈ [0,∞)( 5 )
˜ ui(t)=e
−ρt/2ui(t),u i(t) ∈U,i =1 ,2.
By construction |x(t)|≤deρt/2 for some constant 0 ≤ d<∞, so limt→∞ |˜ x(t)|
exists. Furthermore, we have Ji(x0,u 1,u 2)=Ji(x0, ˜ u1, ˜ u2),i =1 ,2. The players’
objectives can be simpliﬁed as:
J1(x0, ˜ u1, ˜ u2)=
  ∞
0
(˜ u1(t) − ˜ u2(t))dt = lim
t→∞
˜ x(t)













We notice that J2 = −1
3J3
1 for all (u1,u 2) and choosing diﬀerent values for the
control functions ui(.), every point in the (J1,J 2) plane satisfying J2 = −1
3J1 can
be attained. Moreover, every point on this curve is Pareto optimal. Now consider the
minimization of Jα =( α)J1 +(1−α)J2 subject to (4) with α ∈ (0,1). If we choose





choosing c arbitrarily negative Jα can be made arbitrarily small, i.e., J(α)d o e sn o t
have a minimum.
Lemma (2) mentioned below gives a both necessary and suﬃcient characterization
of Pareto solutions. It states that every player’s Pareto optimal solutions can be
obtained as the solution of a constrained optimization problem. The proof presented
below is along the lines of that for the ﬁnite dimensional case as considered, e.g., in
chapter 22 of (Simon and Blume, 1994).
Lemma 2. u∗ ∈Uis Pareto optimal if and only if for all i, u∗(.) minimizes Ji(u)
on the constrained set
Ui = {u|Jj(u) ≤ Jj(u∗),j=1 ,···,N, j = i}, for i =1 ,···,N. (6)
Proof. ⇒ Suppose u∗ is Pareto optimal. Then u∗ ∈U k, ∀k,s oUk  = ∅.N o w ,i fu∗
does not minimize Jk(u) on the constrained set Uk for some k, then there exists a
u such that Jj(u) ≤ Jj(u∗) for all j  = k and Jk(u) <J k(u∗). This contradicts the
Pareto optimality of ˆ u.
⇐ Suppose u∗ minimizes each Jk(u)o nUk.I fˆ u does not provide a Pareto
optimum, then there exists a u(.) ∈Uand an index k such that Ji(u)  = Ji(u∗)f o r
all i and Jk(u) <J k(u∗). This contradicts the minimality of u∗ for Jk(u)o nUk.
From lemma (2) we give a result, though intuitively simple, which will be helpful to
ﬁnd all Pareto solutions of the co operative game. If the players costs are modiﬁed
as ˜ Ji(u)=Ji(u) − c, c ∈ R, ∀i ∈ SN, then we have the following corollary.326 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda
Corollary 1. The set of Pareto optimal strategies for the games with players ob-
jectives as Ji(u) and ˜ Ji(u), i ∈ SN,i ss a m e .
Proof. The statement of the corollary follows easily by replacing Ji(u)w i t h ˜ Ji(u)
in lemma (2).
We observe that for a ﬁxed player the constrained set Ui deﬁned in (6) depends
on the entries of the Pareto optimal solution that represents the loss of the other
players. Therefore this result mainly serves theoretical purposes, as we will see in
the proof of theorem (2) and theorem (3). Using the above lemma, we next argue
that Pareto optimal controls satisfy the dynamic programming principle.
Corollary 2. If u∗(t) ∈U,t ∈ [0,∞) is a Pareto optimal control for x(0) = x0 in
(1,2), then for any τ>0, u∗ ([τ,∞)) is a Pareto optimal control for x(τ)=x∗(τ)
in (1,2), where x∗(τ)=x(t,0,u ∗([0,τ])) is the value of the state at τ generated by
u∗([0,τ]).




   Jj(x(τ),u) ≤ Jj(x(τ),u ∗ ([τ,∞)),j=1 ,···,N, j = i
 
Consider a control u ∈U i(τ)a n dl e tue ([0,∞)) be a control deﬁned on [0,∞)s u c h
that ue ([0,τ)) = u∗ ([0,τ)) and ue ([τ,∞)) = u,t h e nx(τ,0,u e([0,τ)) = x∗(τ).
Further,


























∗(t)) dt = Jj(0,x 0,u
∗).
The above inequality holds for all j =1 ,···,N, j  = i. Clearly, ue ([0,∞)) ∈U i(0)
i.e., every element u ∈U i(τ) can be viewed as an element ue ∈U i(0) restricted to
t h et i m ei n t e r v a l[ τ,∞). From the dynamic programming principle it follows directly
that u∗ ([τ,∞)) has to minimize Ji(τ,x∗(τ),u)o nUi(τ).
Another result that follows directly from lemma (2) is that if the argument at which
some player’s cost is minimized is unique, then this control is Pareto optimal too
(for the proof see corollary (2.5) in (Engwerda, 2009)).
Corollary 3. Assume J1(u) has a minimum which is uniquely attained at u∗.T h e n
(J1(u∗),J 2(u∗),···,J N(u∗)) is a Pareto solution.
3. Necessary Conditions for the General Case
Let (P)b ea nN person inﬁnite horizon cooperative diﬀerential game deﬁned as
follows:
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Let u∗(t) be a Pareto optimal strategy for the problem (P)a n dx∗(t) be the trajec-
tory generated by u∗(t). Using lemma (2), (P) is equivalent to solving N constrained
optimal control subproblems. Let (Pi) denote a constrained (w.r.t control space) op-






sub. to ˙ x(t)=f(t,x(t),u(t)),x (0) = x0.




















j(0) = 0, lim
t→∞ ˜ x
i
j(t) ≤ ˜ x
i
∗







0 gj(t,x∗(t),u ∗(t))dt. We make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 For each subproblem (Pi), the Lagrange multipliers associated with
the objective function and the terminal state (˜ xi
j) constraints are non negative with
at least one of them strictly positive.
Now we derive necessary conditions for (J1(u∗),J 2(u∗),···,J N(u∗)) to be a Pareto
optimal solution.
Theorem 1. If (J1(u∗),J 2(u∗),···,J N(u∗)) is a Pareto optimal solution for prob-
lem (P) and assumption (1) holds, then there exists an − → α ∈P N,ac o s t a t ef u n c t i o n
λ(t):[ 0 ,∞) → Rn such that with H(− → α,t,x(t),u(t),λ(t)) = λ (t)f(t,x(t),u(t)) +
G(− → α,t,x(t),u(t)), the following conditions are satisﬁed.
H(− → α,t,x
∗(t),u
∗(t),λ(t)) ≤H(− → α,t,x
∗(t),u(t),λ(t)), ∀u(t) ∈U (7a)
H0(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) = min
u(t)∈U
H(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u(t),λ(t))
˙ λ(t)=− H0
x(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) (7b)
˙ x∗(t)=H0
λ(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) s.t x∗(0) = x0 (7c)
(− → α,λ(t))  =0, ∀t ∈ [0,∞), − → α ∈P N. (7d)
Proof. By assumption the objective functions Ji(u),i ∈ SN converge1. We deﬁne
the Hamiltonian associated with (Pi)a s :










1 If the integrals do not converge there exist many notions of optimality
(Seierstad et al., 1986; Grass et al., 2008) and the analysis becomes complicated.328 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda
From Pontryagin’s maximum principle, if the pair (x∗(t),u ∗(t)) is optimal for the
problem (Pi) then there exist a constant λ0
i and (continuous, piecewise continuously
diﬀerentiable) costate functions λi(t) ∈ Rn and µi






j(t))  =( 0 ,0,0),j∈ S
i
N,t ∈ [0,∞) (9a)















j = 0, multipliers associated with the auxiliary variables µi
j(t)a r ec o n -
stants µi









































































λ i,t,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)). (13)











. By assumption (1) we have d>0.
We deﬁne λ(t): =1
d
 











,i ∈ SN and a vector
− → α := (α1,···,α N)
 .N o t i c et h a t− → α ∈P N by assumption (1). Dividing the equation
(12) with d we have:







∗(t))λ(t) − Gx(− → α,t,x
∗(t),u
∗(t)). (15)
Next we deﬁne the modiﬁed Hamiltonian as
H(− → α,t,x(t),u(t),λ(t)) = λ
 (t)f(t,x(t),u(t)) + G(− → α,t,x(t),u(t)).
The above necessary conditions for u∗(t) to be Pareto optimal control can be rewrit-
ten as (7).Necessary and Suﬃcient Conditions for Pareto Optimality 329
Remark 1. Let K be a cone deﬁned as K =
 
α ∈ RN




λ i ∈K , ∀i ∈ SN, then all Pareto solutions of the problem (P) can be obtained by
solving the necessary conditions for optimality associated with the corresponding
weighted sum inﬁnite horizon optimal control problem.
Remark 2. Generally transversality conditions are speciﬁed in addition to equa-
tions (7) to single out optimal trajectories from the set of extremal trajectories
satisfying (7). If the game problem (P) is ﬁnite horizon type, then the transver-
sality conditions associated with the subproblem (Pi)a r eλi(T)=0 ,0 <T<∞
and µi
j ≥ 0f o rj ∈ Si
N,i∈ SN and the maximum principle holds in normal form
i.e., λ0
i =1 ,i∈ SN (refer to proposition 3.16, Grass et al., 2008). The assumption
(1) holds true naturally for the ﬁnite horizon case. So, for ﬁnite horizon games
− →
λi ∈K ,i∈ SN, all Pareto solutions can be obtained by solving the necessary
conditions for optimality associated with the weighted sum ﬁnite horizon optimal
control problem (as shown in Engwerda, 2009). However, the transversality condi-
tions generally do not carry over to the subproblems (Pi) in inﬁnite horizons. Refer
to (Halkin, 1974; Grass et al., 2008; Seierstad et al., 1986; Aseev et al., 2004) for
counter examples to illustrate this behavior. A natural extension of transversal-
ity conditions , in the inﬁnite horizon, can be made by imposing certain restric-
tions on the functions f(.), gi(.),i∈ SN, (see Mitchel, 1982; Aseev et al., 2004;
Seierstad et al., 1986; Halkin, 1974).
It is clear, from the above remarks, that an extension of ﬁnite horizon transversality
conditions to the inﬁnite horizon case is suﬃcient to obtain all Pareto solutions from
the necessary conditions associated with the corresponding weighted sum optimal
control problem. So, for the analysis that follows from now onwards we focus on
the growth conditions which allow such an extension. Towards that end, we ﬁrst
consider non-autonomous systems. From (theorem (3.16), Seierstad et al., 1986) or
(example (10.3), Seierstad, 1999), we have the following corollary:
Corollary 4. Suppose −∞ <
  ∞
0 gi(t,x(t),u(t))dt < ∞,i∈ SN and there exist
non-negative numbers a, b and c with c>Nbsuch that the following conditions are
satisﬁed for t ≥ 0 and all x(t):
(|gix(t,x(t),u(t)|)m ≤ ae−ct,m =1 ,···,N, ∀i ∈ SN (16a)
(|fx(t,x(t),u(t)|)(l,m) ≤ b, l =1 ,···,N, m=1 ,···,N. (16b)
Then assumption (1) is satisﬁed. Consequently, for every Pareto solution the neces-
sary conditions given by (7) hold true and in addition limt→∞ λ(t)=0is satisﬁed.
Proof. If conditions (16) hold true, then by theorem (3.16) of
(Seierstad et al., 1986), the ﬁnite horizon transversality conditions do extend
to the inﬁnite horizon case. As a result, λ0
i =1 ,µ
j
i ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ Si
N and
limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 are satisﬁed for the constrained optimal control problem (Pi)a n d
− →
λ i ∈K , ∀i ∈ SN. Clearly assumption (1) is satisﬁed. So, the necessary conditions
given by (7) hold true and in addition limt→∞ λ(t)=0 .
Example 1 (Necessary Conditions): We consider the game problem ( ˜ P)m e n -
tioned in example (1). It is easily veriﬁed that for ( ˜ P), |f˜ x(.)| =0 ,|g1˜ x(.)| =0 ,330 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda
|g2˜ x(.)|≤2|˜ x(t)||˜ u1(t) − ˜ u2(t)|≤c (there exists a constant c>0). Furthermore,
we see that −∞ <J i(x0, ˜ u1, ˜ u2) < ∞. The growth conditions mentioned in corol-
lary (4) hold true for the game problem ( ˜ P). Then from theorem (1) there exists a
costate function ˜ λ(t), with Hamiltonian deﬁned as
H(.): =˜ λ(t)(˜ u1(t) − ˜ u2(t)) +
 
α − (1 − α)˜ x2(t)
 
(˜ u2(t) − ˜ u1(t)).
Further, H(.) attains a minimum w.r.t ˜ ui(.),i =1 ,2o n l yi f
˜ λ(t)+
 




=0f o ra l lt ∈ [0,∞). (17)
As the growth conditions are satisﬁed we have limt→∞ ˜ λ(t) = 0. The adjoint variable
˜ λ(t) satisﬁes (by diﬀerentiating (17))
˙ ˜ λ(t)=2 ( 1− α)˜ x∗(t)(˜ u2(t) − ˜ u1(t)), ∀t ∈ [0,∞) lim
t→∞
˜ λ(t)=0 .
We see that the necessary condition (7b) also results in the same diﬀerential equation
for ˜ λ(t), ∀ t ∈ [0,∞). Using (17) we can conclude that for arbitrary choices of u1(.)




3.1. Discounted Autonomous systems
Many economic applications/situations can be eﬀectively modeled as discounted
autonomous optimal control problems. The growth conditions given in corollary (4)
ensure that assumption (1) is satisﬁed. However, the conditions (16) are quite strict.
In this section we analyze games deﬁned by autonomous systems with exponentially
discounted player’s costs. The discount factor ρ is assumed to be strictly positive,
i.e., ρ>0. We represent the game problem in this section as (P ρ) and the related
subproblem as (P
ρ
i ). We notice that the subproblem (P
ρ
i ) is a mixed endpoint
constrained optimal control problem. The cost minimizing eﬀorts of players in the
coalition Si
N result in terminal endpoint constraints in (P
ρ
i ). In (Mitchel, 1982)
proves necessary conditions for optimality for free endpoint inﬁnite horizon optimal
control problems. We ﬁrst derive the necessary conditions for optimality for the
mixed endpoint constrained problem (P
ρ
i ) (in similar lines of (Mitchel, 1982)). If
u∗(t) is a Pareto optimal strategy for the game problem (P ρ), then from lemma
(2.2) u∗(t) is optimal for each optimal control problem (P
ρ
i ), i ∈ SN.
(P
ρ






sub. to ˙ x(t)=f(x(t),u(t)),x (0) = x0,u (t) ∈U
˙ ˜ xj(t)=e−ρtgj(x(t),u(t)), ˜ xi
j(0) = 0, lim
t→∞
˜ xi
j(t) ≤ ˜ xi
∗
j , ∀j ∈ Si
N.
Let (x∗(t),u ∗(t)), 0 ≤ t ≤∞be the optimal admissible pair for problem (P
ρ
i ), we




e−ρtgi (x∗(t − z + T),u ∗(t − z + T))dt. (18)
To derive the necessary conditions for optimality of u∗(t), we ﬁrst consider the
following truncated and augmented problem (P
ρ
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(P
ρ









sub. to ˙ Y (t)=v(t)f(Y (t),U(t)),Y (0) = Y0,Y (T)=x∗(T),U (t) ∈U
˙ ˜ Y i
j (t)=v(t)e−ρz(t)gj(Y (t),U(t)),
˜ Y i
j (0) = 0, ˜ Y i
j (T)+hj(z(T) − T) ≤ ˜ xi
∗
j , ∀j ∈ Si
N





Remark 3. In problem (P
ρ
iT), the constraint v(t) ∈ [1/2,∞) can be replaced by
v(t) ∈ [v,∞)f o r0<v<1.
Lemma 3. If (x∗(t),u ∗(t)) is an optimal admissible pair for the problem (P
ρ
i ) then
(x∗(t),t,u ∗(t),1), t ∈ [0,T ], is an optimal admissible pair for the problem (P
ρ
iT).
Proof. We prove the lemma using contradiction. Suppose (x∗(t),t,u ∗(t),1), t ∈
[0,T ] is not optimal for the problem (P
ρ
iT) then there exists an admissible pair
(ˆ Y (t), ˆ z(t), ˆ U(t), ˆ v(t)), t ∈ [0,T ] such that











hj(ˆ z(T) − T)+
  T
0






Since ˆ v(t) ∈ [1/2, ∞), ˆ z(t) is an increasing function deﬁned on [0,T ]s ob yt h e
inverse function theorem ˆ z(t)i si n v e r t i b l eo n[ 0 , ˆ z(T)]. We deﬁne ˆ x(s)=ˆ Y (ˆ z−1(s))
and ˆ u(s)=ˆ U(ˆ z−1(s)) for s ∈ [0, ˆ z(T)] and observe that ˆ x(0) = ˆ Y (ˆ z−1(0)) = x0
and ˆ x(z(T)) = ˆ Y (ˆ z−1(ˆ z(T))) = ˆ Y (T)=x∗(T). Further, we have ˆ x(s) deﬁned on
s ∈ [0, ˆ z(T)] as:
ˆ x(z(t)) = x0 +
  t
0








f(Y (z−1(s)),U(z−1(s)))ds = x0 +
  s
0
f(ˆ x(s), ˆ u(s))ds,
for s ∈ [0, ˆ z(T)]. Since ˆ x(s) satisﬁes the above integral equation we have ˙ ˆ x(s)=
f(ˆ x(s), ˆ u(s)), ˆ x(0) = x0,s ∈ [0, ˆ z(T)]. Next, for s>ˆ z(T), we deﬁne ˆ x(s)=x∗(s −
ˆ z(T)+T)a n dˆ u(s)=u∗(s − ˆ z(T)+T). Then we observe that ˙ x(s)=f(x(s),u(s))







i ) and satisﬁes the following conditions
  ∞
0






e−ρtgi(ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t))dt ≤
  ∞
0
e−ρtgj(x∗(t),u ∗(t))dt, ∀j ∈ Si
N
which clearly violates the optimality of (x∗(t),u ∗(t)) for the problem (P
ρ
i ).332 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda









λ i ∈ RN
+, l0
i ∈ Rn and continuous functions λi(t) ∈ Rn and
γi(t) ∈ R respectively such that
 − →
λ i,λ i(t),γ i(t)
 























λ i,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)), lim
t→∞
γi(t) = 0 (19c)
H(
− →
λ i,t,x ∗(t),u(t),λ(t)) = λ 
i(t)f(x∗(t),u ∗(t)) + e−ρtG(
− →








∗(t),u(t),λ(t)) ∀u(t) ∈U (19d)
H(
− →
λ i,t,x ∗(t),u ∗(t),λ(t)) = −γi(t). (19e)
Proof. (P
ρ
iT) is a mixed endpoint constrained ﬁnite horizon optimal control problem.

















i(t)f(Y (t),U(t)) + v(t)γi(t). (20)
The necessary conditions are: there exists λ0
iT ∈ R+, µi
jT(t) ∈ R, λiT(t) ∈ Rn,
γiT(t) ∈ R such that for almost every t ∈ [0,T] (the partial derivatives of the
Hamiltonian given below are evaluated at the optimal pair ((x∗(t),t),(u∗(t),1))):
˙ λiT(t)=−(HiT)Y
= −f 

























=0 , ∀j ∈ S
i
N











 =( 0 ,···,0).
Since (HiT)˜ xi
j =0 ,w eh a v eµi
jT(t)=µi













.T h e n
− →
λ iT ∈ RN
+. Next we show by contradiction that also









then the necessary conditions give that ˙ λiT(t)=−f 
x(x∗(t),u ∗(t))λiT (t)w h i c hr e -
sults in λiT(t)=0f o rt ∈ [0,T]. Further,
− →
λ iT =0l e a d st oγiT(t)=0f o rt ∈ [0,T]
which violates the necessary condition
 − →
λ iT,λ iT(t),γ iT(t)
 
 =( 0 ,0,0) for all 0 ≤




    









∗(t),u(t)),λ iT(0) = l
0
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whereas γiT(t)s a t i s ﬁ e s
˙ γiT(t)=−(HiT)z = ρG (
− →
λ iT,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)). (22)



















λ iT,x ∗(t),u ∗(t))dt. (23)
The Hamiltonian is linear in v(t) and the minimum w.r.t (U(t),v(t)) on the set
U×[1/2, ∞) is attained at (u∗(t),1). The minimum of the Hamiltonian w.r.t v(t)
for U(t)=u∗(t) is achieved at an interior point of [1/2, ∞), so we have:
e−ρtG(
− →
λ iT,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)) + λ 
iT(t)f(x∗(t),u ∗(t)) + γiT(t)=0 , ∀t ∈ [0,T]. (24)
The minimum of the Hamiltonian w.r.t U(t) is independent of v(t) (positive scaling)
and does not depend on the term γi(t)v(t). So, the minimum of HiT w.r.t U(t)a t
v(t)=1i sa c h i e v e da t




λ iT,t,x ∗(t),z(t)=t,U(t),v(t)=1 ,λ iT(t),γ iT(t))





λ iT,x ∗(t),u(t)) + λ 
iT(t)f(x∗(t),u(t))
 
, ∀t ∈ [0,T].
(25)
Now, consider an increasing sequence {Tk}k∈N such that limk→∞ Tk = ∞.W e
can associate an optimal control problem (PiTk)w i t he a c hTk such that the
















  =1 .W e ,k n o wf r o mt h e
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem that every bounded sequence has a convergent sub-
sequence. Using the same indices for such a subsequence we infer that there exists
− →



















    
  =1 . (26)









λ iT,x ∗(s),u ∗(s))ds, (27)
where Φ−f 
x(t,s) is the fundamental matrix associated with ˙ z(t)=−f 
x(x∗(t),u ∗(t))
z(t). Since the weights of
− →
λ iTk appear linearly in Gx(.)a sk →∞ , λi(t)s a t i s ﬁ e s
the diﬀerential equation (19b). A similar argument holds for γiTk(t), condition (24)
and (25) resulting in (19c), (19e) and (19d) respectively.
Remark 4. Though the approach in lemma (3) and theorem (2) is similar to the
one given in (Mitchel, 1982), the main diﬀerences lie in problem formulation. In334 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda
(Mitchel, 1982), the necessary conditions are obtained for free endpoint uncon-
strained inﬁnite horizon optimal control problem. In our case the problem (P ρ)
is written as N mixed endpoint constrained optimal control subproblems (due to
cost minimizing eﬀorts of players). Furthermore, these constraints have a special
structure, as a result the term G(
− →
λ i,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)), weighted instantaneous undis-
counted cost of the players, appears in all the subproblems (the choice of weights
being Lagrange multipliers associated with the corresponding subproblem).
For autonomous systems (Mitchel, 1982) gives assumptions under which
limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 for the free endpoint case with maximization problem. We show
next, in corollary (5), that these conditions (formulated as assumptions (2) below)
also suﬃce to conclude that in our subproblem (P
ρ
i ) limt→∞ λi(t) = 0. The proof is
similar to the one given in (Mitchel, 1982). We repeat it for the sake of completeness.
Assumption 2 gi(x(t),u(t)), ∀i ∈ SN is non positive or can be made non positive
and there exists a neighborhood V of 0 ∈ Rn which is contained in the set of possible
speeds f(x∗(t),u(t)) for all u(t) ∈Uif t →∞ .
Corollary 5. Let assumption (2) hold true. Then, an optimal solution for the prob-
lem (P
ρ
i ) satisﬁes in addition to the conditions (19), the following transversality
condition: limt→∞ λi(t)=0 .
Proof. From the necessary conditions (19d) and (19e) of theorem (2) we have
e−ρtG(
− →
λ i,x ∗(t),u(t)) + λ 
i(t)f(x∗(t),u(t)) ≥ e−ρtG(
− →





∗(t)) = −γi(t). (28)
By assumption (2) we have λ 




. Since ||q(t)|| ≤ 1 we have limsup
t→∞
||q(t)|| = l.
If l = 0 there is nothing to prove. So assume l>0 and consider a sequence {tn}
converging to inﬁnity such that ||q(tn)|| >l / 2. Since there exists u(t) ∈Usuch
that Bδ>0
2 ⊂ f(x∗(t),u(t)), there exists an  >0 such that 2 
l <δ .S o ,t h e r ee x i s t s
un(tn) ∈Usuch that f(x∗(tn),u n(tn)) = −(2 /l)q(tn). Since, limt→∞ γi(t)=0w e
take the above sequence {tn} such that −l /2 ≤− γ(tn) ≤ l /2. Collecting all the
above we have:
λ 
i(tn)f(x∗(tn),u n(tn)) = −max{1,||λi(tn)||}(2 /l)||q(tn)||2 ≥− γi(tn)
γi(tn) ≥ max{1,||λi(tn)||}(2 /l)||q(tn)||2 >l   / 2.
Clearly, this is a contradiction and thus limt→∞ λ(t)=0 .
Remark 5. a) If the instantaneous undiscounted costs of players
gi(x(t),u(t)),i∈ SN are bounded above for all pairs (x(t),u(t)),t ∈ [0,∞)
then by assigning a new reward ˜ gi(x(t),u(t)) = g(x(t),u(t)) − M with
M =m a x i∈SN supt∈[0,∞) gi(x(t),u(t)) leaves ˜ g(x(t),u(t)) non positive. Now,
by deﬁning a new game ( ˜ P ρ)w i t h˜ g(.) as the instantaneous undiscounted costs
for player i we observe that Pareto optimal controls (if they exist) of (P ρ)a n d
( ˜ P ρ) coincide. We will use this idea in example (2) to ﬁnd the Pareto optimal
controls.
2 Unit ball in R
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b) Notice that the second condition in assumption (2) is identical to the notion
of state reachability when the state dynamics is described by a linear constant
coeﬃcient diﬀerential equation.
We introduce another assumption based on growth conditions
(Seierstad et al., 1986) (Aseev et al., 2004) which ensure the transversality
condition i.e., limt→∞ λi(t)=0a n da sar e s u l t
− →
λ i ∈Kfor the subproblem (P
ρ
i ).
Assumption 3 a) There exist a s ≥ 0 and an r ≥ 0 such that
||gix(x(t),u(t))|| ≤ s(1 + ||x(t)||r) for all x(t) ∈ Rn,u(t) ∈Uand i ∈ SN.
b) There exist nonnegative constants c1, c2, c3 and λ ∈ R, such that for every
admissible pair (x(t),u(t)), one has
||x(t)|| ≤ c1 + c2eλt for all t ≥ 0
||Φfx(t,0)|| ≤ c3eλtfor all t ≥ 0.
c) For every admissible pair (x(t),u(t)) the eigenvalues of fx(x(t),u(t)) are strictly
positive.
Corollary 6. Let the assumption (3) hold true. Then, an optimal solution for the
problem Pi satisﬁes in addition to the conditions (19), the following transversality
condition limt→∞ λi(t)=0if ρ>(1 + r)λ.
Proof. From the assumption (3) there exists constants c4 ≥ 0, c5 ≥ 0, c6 ≥ 0a n d
c7 ≥ 0 such that:
e−ρt|gi(x(t),u(t))|≤e−ρt  
c4 + c5||x(t)||r+1 
≤ c6e−ρt + c7e−(ρ−(r+1)λ)t.
Since ρ>(1 + r)λ, the player’s costs Ji(u) converge for every admissible pair





















































e−ρs  Φfx(s,0)  Gx(x∗(s),u ∗(s)) ds
 




















i is bounded, so there exist a c10 ≥ 0, a c11 ≥ 0a n dc12 ≥ 0) such that
≤
   Φ−f 
x(t,0)
   
 
c10 + c11e−(ρ−λ)t + c12e−(ρ−(1+r)λ)t
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Let φ0(t)a n dφ0(t) denote the largest and smallest eigenvalues of the Hermitian
part3 of −f 
x(x∗(t),u ∗(t)). By assumption −f 
x(x∗(t),u ∗(t)) is bounded and has
strictly negative eigenvalues so we have −∞ <φ 0(t) ≤ φ0(t) < 0, ∀t ≥ 0. From
lemma (4.2) of (Hartman, 1964) we have:
exp









  ≤ exp






Since µ0(s) < 0 for all s ≥ 0w eh a v el i m t→∞
   Φ−f 
x(t,0)
    = 0. By assumption
ρ>(1 + r)λ so limt→∞ λi(t) = 0 follows directly.
Remark 6. a) When the state evolution dynamics is linear and players objec-
tives are convex in the control variable, the growth conditions (a) and (b)
given in assumption (3) are similar to the ones given in (Aseev et al., 2004)
and (Aubin and Clarke, 1979).
b) In (Aseev et al., 2004), the free endpoint inﬁnite horizon optimal control prob-
lem is approximated with a series of free endpoint ﬁnite horizon problems
whereas in the current approach (P
ρ
i ) is approximated with ﬁxed endpoint prob-









appears in the estimate
of ||λi(t)|| and condition (c) has to be included in assumption (3).
Theorem 3. Let assumption (2) or (3) hold true. If (J1(u∗),J 2(u∗),···,J N(u∗))
is a Pareto optimal solution for problem (P) then there exists an − → α ∈P N and a
costate function λ(t):[ 0 ,∞) → Rn such that the following conditions are satisﬁed.
H(− → α,t,x(t),u(t),λ(t)) = λ (t)f(t,x(t),u(t)) + e−ρtG(− → α,x(t),u(t)) (29a)
H(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u ∗(t),λ(t)) ≤ H(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u(t),λ(t)), ∀u(t) ∈U (29b)
H0(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) = min
u(t)∈U
H(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u(t),λ(t))
˙ λ(t)=−H0
x(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)), lim
t→∞
λ(t) = 0 (29c)
˙ x∗(t)= H0
λ(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)),x ∗(0) = x0 (29d)
˙ γ(t)=ρG (− → α,x
∗(t),u
∗(t)), lim
t→∞γ(t) = 0 (29e)
H
0(− → α,t,x
∗(t),λ(t)) = −γ(t) (29f)
(− → α,λ(t))  =0 , ∀t ∈ [0,∞), − → α ∈P N. (29g)






















and a vector − → α =( α1,···,α N)
 .W en o t i c et h a t− → α ∈P N. Taking the summation
of equation (19b) for all i ∈ SN and deﬁning λ(t)=1
d
 
i∈SN λi(t)w eo b s e r v et h a t
conditions (29b) and (29c) are satisﬁed. Taking the summation of equation (19c)
for all i ∈ SN and deﬁning γ(t)=1
d
 
i∈SN γi(t), the conditions (29e) and (29f)
are satisﬁed. Since, − → α ∈P N ⊂Kand limt→∞ λ(t) = 0 we observe that (29g) is
satisﬁed.
We consider the example from (Kamien and Schwartz, 1991) to illustrate usage of
assumption (2) and necessary conditions given in theorem (3).
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Example 2. Consider a ﬁshery game with two players. The evolution of the stock
of ﬁsh, in a particular body of water, is governed by the diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t)=ax(t) − bx(t)lnx(t) − u1(t) − u2(t),x (0) = x0 ≥ 2 (30)
where x(t) refers to the stock of ﬁsh, and a>0,b>0. It is assumed that x(t) ≥
2,t∈ [0,∞). In (30), the stock of ﬁsh x(t) depends upon ax(t)b i r t h s ,bx(t)lnx(t)
deaths and the ﬁshing eﬀorts of player i, ui(t)=wi(t)x(t), at each point in time t.






We assume 0 < ≤ wi(t) < ∞ for the utility to be well deﬁned. By taking the
transformation y(t)=l nx(t) the system (30) is modiﬁed as:
˙ y(t)=a − by(t) − w1(t) − w2(t),y (0) = lnx(0), (31)




e−ρt (y(t)+l nwi(t)) dt. (32)
We notice that the instantaneous undiscounted reward is bounded below, by con-
trollability of the system (31) and remark (5.a) we notice that assumption (2) is
satisﬁed. So all the Pareto solutions can be obtained by solving the necessary con-







e−ρt (y(t)+αlnw1(t)+( 1− α)lnw2(t))dt
 
subject to (31). Deﬁning the Hamiltonian as
H(α,t,y,w1,w 2,λ)=λ(a − by(t) − w1(t) − w2(t))
−e−ρt (y(t)+αlnw1(t)+( 1− α)lnw2(t)).
Taking Hwi =0 ,i=1 ,2g i v e sw1(t)=− α
λ(t)e−ρt and w2(t)=−1−α
λ(t)e−ρt.T h e





and the solution is given as λ(t)=−e
−ρt
ρ+b . The candidates for Pareto optimal strate-









1 − e−bt 













ρlnx0 + a − (ρ + b)
ρ(ρ + b)
+
ln((1 − α)(ρ + b))
ρ
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4. Suﬃcient Conditions for Pareto Optimality
It is well known (Fan et al., 1957) that if the action spaces as well as the play-
ers objective functions are convex then minimization of the weighted sum of the
objectives results in all Pareto solutions. We give the following theorem from
(Engwerda, 2005).
Theorem 4. If U is convex and Ji(u) is convex for all i =1 ,2,···,N then for all
Pareto optimal u∗ there exist α ∈P N, such that u∗ ∈ argminu∈U
 N
i=1 Ji(u).
Recently in (Engwerda, 2008), this property was used to obtain both necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of Pareto optimal solutions for regular con-
vex linear quadratic diﬀerential games. In general it is a diﬃcult task to check if
the players objectives are convex functions of initial state and controls. However,
under some conditions the solutions of (29) result in Pareto optimal strategies. In
this section we derive suﬃcient conditions for a strategy to be Pareto optimal. The
suﬃcient conditions given in the theorem below are inspired by Arrow’s suﬃcient
conditions (Seierstad et al., 1986) in optimal control. Further, these suﬃcient con-
ditions are given for non autonomous systems and they hold true for discounted
autonomous systems as well.
Theorem 5. Assume that there exists − → α ∈P N,ac o s t a t ef u n c t i o nλ(t):[ 0 ,∞) →
Rn satisfying (29c). Introduce the Hamiltonian H(t,− → α,x(t),u(t),λ(t)) := f(t,x(t),
u(t)) + G(− → α,t,x(t),u(t)). Assume that the Hamiltonian has a minimum w.r.t u(t)
for all x(t), denoted by
H
0(− → α,t,x(t),λ(t)) = min
u(t)∈U
H(− → α,t,x(t),u(t),λ(t)).
If H0(− → α,t,x(t),λ(t)) is convex in x(t) and liminft→∞ λ (t)( x∗(t) − x(t)) ≥ 0,t h e n
u∗(t) is Pareto optimal.
Proof. From the convexity of H0(− → α,t,x(t),λ(t)) we have:
H0(− → α,t,x(t),λ(t)) − H0(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) ≥ H0
x(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t))(x(t) − x∗(t))
Since, H(− → α,t,x(t),u(t),λ(t)) ≥ H0(− → α,t,x(t),λ(t)) and
H(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u ∗(t),λ(t)) = H0(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t)) we have:




(− → α,t,x ∗(t),λ(t))(x(t) − x∗(t))
= −˙ λ (t)(x(t) − x∗(t)) (by (29c)).
Using the deﬁnition of Hamiltonian the above inequality can be written as:
λ (t)(f(t,x(t),u(t) − f(t,x∗(t),u ∗(t)))
+G(− → α,t,x(t),u(t)) − G(− → α,t,x ∗(t),u ∗(t)) ≥−˙ λ (t)(x(t) − x∗(t)),





λ (t)(x∗(t) − x(t))
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Taking the integrals on both sides we have
  T
0











As x∗(0) = x(0) = x0 and λ(0) is bounded the above inequality is given as:
  T
0










∗(t) − x(t)) ≥ liminf
t→∞ λ
 (t)(x
∗(t) − x(t)) ≥ 0.
Clearly, by lemma(2.1) u∗ is Pareto optimal.
Example 1 (suﬃcient conditions): We illustrate theorem (5) by considering
example (1) again. First, we notice that H0(t, ˜ x∗, ˜ λ)=0s oH0(t, ˜ x∗, ˜ λ)i sc o n v e xi n
˜ x(t). Next, limt→∞ ˜ x(t) exists and is ﬁnite and limt→∞ ˜ λ(t) = 0, so liminft→∞ ˜ λ(t)
(˜ x∗(t) − ˜ x(t)) = 0. So, by theorem (5) every control (u1,u 2) is Pareto optimal.
Example 2 (suﬃcient conditions): For example (2) the candidates for Pareto
solutions are given by (33). If the model in example (2) satisﬁes the suﬃcient condi-
tions, mentioned in theorem (5), then all Pareto solutions are indeed given by (33).















Clearly, H0(t,y(t),λ(t)) is convex (linear here) in y(t). Since wi(t),i=1 ,2, is
bounded we have |y(t)|≤(c1 + c2e−bt). Further, λ(t)=−e
−ρt
ρ+b ,t h u sw eh a v e
liminft→∞ λ(t)(y∗(t) − y(t)) = 0. The ﬁshery model satisﬁes the suﬃcient con-
ditions as given by theorem (5). So, all the candidates given by (33) are Pareto
solutions. Figure (1(a)) illustrates trajectories of optimal ﬁsh stock x∗(t) and ﬁsh-
ing eﬀorts of the players u∗
1(t)a n du∗
2(t). Figure (1(b)) illustrates the Pareto surface
for α ∈ [0.1714, 0.8266] (Pareto solutions which ensure positive returns for the
players are shown).
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we studied the problem of existence of Pareto solutions of inﬁnite hori-
z o nc o o p e r a t i v ed i ﬀ e r e n t i a lg a m e s .W ea s s u m e da no p e nl o o pi n f o r m a t i o ns t r u c t u r e .
We considered nonautonomous and discounted autonomous systems for the analy-
sis. Firstly, we gave a necessary and suﬃcient characterization of Pareto optimality
which enables to view the problem of ﬁnding Pareto solutions as N constrained
inﬁnite horizon optimal control subproblems. We gave weak suﬃcient conditions
under which all Pareto solutions can be obtained by solving a weighted sum op-
timal control problem. These weak suﬃcient conditions relate to conditions which
extend the ﬁnite horizon transversality conditions to inﬁnite horizons. We gave suf-
ﬁcient conditions for Pareto optimality and provided examples where the necessary
conditions are also suﬃcient to ﬁnd all Pareto solutions.340 Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob Engwerda

















(a) Trajectories of optimal ﬁsh stock x
∗(t) and ﬁsh-















(b) Pareto surface for 0.1714 ≤ α ≤ 0.8266
Figure1. Fishery model with parameters a =1 ,b =0 .2, ρ =0 .05 and x0 =2 .
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Abstract This paper presents an analysis of games in which rationality
is not necessarily mutual knowledge. We argue that a player who faces a
non-rational opponent faces genuine uncertainty that is best captured by
non-additive beliefs. Optimal strategies can then be derived from assump-
tions about the rational player’s attitude towards uncertainty. This paper
investigates the consequences of this view of strategic interaction. We present
an equilibrium concept for normal form games, called Choquet-Nash Equi-
librium, that formalizes this intuition, and study existence and properties
of these equilibria. Our results suggest new robustness concepts for Nash
equilibria.
Keywords: rationality, normal form game, uncertainty aversion, Choquet
expected utility theory, Nash equilibrium, robustness.
1. Introduction
From a classical point of view, game theory is about the question what consti-
tutes rationality in a situation of strategic interaction (von Neumann & Morgen-
stern 1944, particularly sections 2.1 and 4.1). The players are assumed to be
rational in a decision-theoretic sense, i. e. they act as if they possess a utility
function over outcomes and beliefs given by a probability distribution over states,
and maximise (subjective) expected utility (von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
Savage (1954)). Beliefs, in turn, have to be compatible with what the players know.
In particular, players are assumed to know that their opponents are themselves ra-
tional. Under additional assumptions, the equilibrium concept (Nash (1950)) can
then be interpreted as a rationality concept (see, e.g., Tan and Werlang (1988),
Aumann and Brandenburger (1995)).
However, the assumptions that players are rational, and that they know that
their opponents are rational, are restrictive, both from an introspective and an
experimental point of view. This paper addresses the question what constitutes
rationality if rationality is not mutual knowledge. As in Kreps et al. (1982), we
distinguish between rational and non-rational players. However, we argue that the
possibility that the opponent is not rational leads to uncertainty that cannot be
  First version 1999. This paper continues the research presented in Rothe (1996, 2009)
and is based on chapter 2 of my PhD thesis submitted to the University of London
in 1999. I am grateful for ﬁnancial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
(Graduiertenkolleg Bonn), Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, Economic and So-
cial Research Council, the European Doctoral Program and the LSE.Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 343
adequately captured by beliefs that are necessarily representable by a probability
measure. Thus, the analysis of games without mutual knowledge of rationality has
to be based on a weaker deﬁnition of decision-theoretic rationality. In particular,
Choquet-expected utility theory allows more general beliefs. Thus, we combine the
analysis of Kreps et al. (1982) with Choquet-expected utility theory.
Choquet-expected utility theory (henceforth CEU) is due to Schmeidler (1989).
Under Choquet-expected utility theory players are maximising expected utility sub-
ject to their beliefs, but their beliefs do not have to be additive. CEU is closely
related to, but not quite identical with maxmin expected utility theory (Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989)), which allows sets of additive beliefs. Whereas Savage’s subjec-
tive expected utility theory reduces uncertainty to risk, CEU and its variants gives
rise to a qualitative diﬀerence between risk and uncertainty.
This diﬀerence is important in games if we distinguish between rational and
non-rational players as in Kreps et al. (1982). A rational player is one who chooses
his strategy as to maximise utility given his beliefs. A rational player who faces
a rational opponent can anticipate her strategy if he knows her utility function
and can anticipate her beliefs. Consequently, a rational player who faces a rational
opponent faces risk, in the sense that his beliefs are given by objective probabilities
determined by best-reply considerations. Thus his beliefs are necessarily additive.
On the other hand, a rational player who faces a non-rational opponent faces
true uncertainty, if all he knows is that a non-rational player does not necessarily
choose a utility-maximising strategy. Under CEU, a rational player’s beliefs reﬂect
his attitude towards uncertainty. As a result, it becomes possible to base a theory
of rational decisions in games not on a player’s theory about how non-rational
opponents play, but on his attitude towards uncertainty. Since CEU was motivated
by phenomena that can be explained as uncertainty aversion — for instance the
Ellsberg paradox — we also make this assumption.
We present an equilibrium concept, called Choquet-Nash equilibrium, that for-
malizes this intuition and discuss existence and properties of these equilibria in
normal form games. We show that
– in normal form games Choquet-Nash equilibria always exist,
– not every rationalizable strategy is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium, and, conversely,
non-rationalizable strategies may be equilibria,
– strictly dominated strategies are never rational, but elimination of such strate-
gies cannot be iterated,
– robustness with respect to doubts about the rationality of the opponents is not
captured by payoﬀ-dominance or risk-dominance,
– mixed strategies may or may not be robust, depending on the game in question.
On this basis we formulate two equilibrium reﬁnements: A Nash equilibrium is called
strictly uncertainty aversion perfect if it continues to be an equilibrium as long as
the belief in the opponents’ rationality is suﬃciently strong. Such equilibria need
not exist. A Nash equilibrium is called uncertainty aversion perfect if it can be
approximated by equilibria that do not require mutual knowledge of rationality. We
show that such equilibria always exist, and that these reﬁnements diﬀer from those
that are based on ‘trembles’ of otherwise fully rational opponents, i. e. trembling-
hand perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria.
This paper makes three contributions. First, we extend the analysis of Kreps et
al. (1982) (henceforth KMRW). In contrast to KMRW, we do not need to specify344 J¨ orn Rothe
a particular belief about the ‘type’ of an irrational opponent. Due to the absence
of a theory of non-rational decision-making, such a speciﬁcation is necessarily ad
hoc. Moreover, the uniform distribution does not adequately model the ignorance
about an irrational opponent, because it is not invariant under irrelevant changes
of the game, for instance when adding a superﬂuous strategy that is a mere copy
of an existing one. In our approach, ignorance can naturally be expressed as a
non-additive probability.
More fundamentally, two diﬃculties arise with interpreting equilibria as ratio-
nal strategies in the KMRW framework. First, interpreting equilibrium strategies
as rational implicitly deﬁnes all non-equilibrium strategies as non-rational. Thus, a
rational player’s beliefs about an non-rational opponent should be consistent with
this deﬁnition of non-rationality. This means that his beliefs should be consistent
with any non-equilibrium strategy of the opponent. Secondly, a ‘type’ in a game
with incomplete information corresponds to a consistent inﬁnite hierarchy of be-
liefs. Thus, in KMRW the rational player believes that the opponent possesses such
beliefs, even if he is not rational. In contrast, in our analysis an irrational opponent
is a source of genuine uncertainty, and the question what constitutes a rational
strategy is determined by a rational player’s attitude towards uncertainty. Conse-
quently, our analysis applies independently of the question whether the opponent
can be modelled as a type.
The second contribution of this paper consists in a robustness analysis of Nash
equilibria. Applying our solution concept to normal form games allows us to formal-
ize how robust a Nash equilibrium is with respect to doubts about the rationality
of the opponent. This robustness concept diﬀers from existing ones, and shows how
robustness is not a property of an equilibrium concept in general, but rather a
property of speciﬁc equilibria in speciﬁc games.
The third contribution of this paper is that it extends the equilibrium con-
cept to games in which players have non-additive beliefs. Here we extend solu-
tion concepts proposed by Dow and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (1994),
Epstein (1997a), Haller (1995), Hendon et al. (1995), Klibanoﬀ (1993), Lo (1995),
Lo (1996), Marinacci (1994), Mukerji (1994), Ritzberger (1996), and Ryan (1997).
This literature considers games in which players maximise CEU, or some variant
of CEU. These papers show that it is possible to capture strategic phenomena that
cannot be explained when players maximise subjective expected utility, and have
also uncovered the diﬃculties that an extension of the equilibrium concept has to
address. In our analysis we provide an explicit reason for the existence of uncer-
tainty, and on this basis some of these diﬃculties can be avoided. In particular, it is
not necessary to use simple capacities in the deﬁnition of an equilibrium, or to de-
cide between the diﬀerent support concepts that have been proposed for capacities,
or to formulate an independence concept for capacities.1
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we deﬁne the equilibrium concept
for two-player games and prove existence of Choquet-Nash equilibria. In section 3
1 After a ﬁrst version of this paper was completed, I learnt of the related approach of
Sujoy Mukerji (1994). His main concern is the consistent introduction of CEU into
game theory, and he argues that this requires the KMRW framework. We fully agree
with this, in addition we argue in this paper that the converse also holds, i. e. non-
additive beliefs overcome the limitations of the KMRW approach described above. For
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we derive properties of Choquet-Nash equilibria, formulate the two reﬁnements of
Nash equilibria, and compare them with standard solution concepts. In section 4
we discuss the extension to inﬁnitely many strategies and more than two players.
Section 5 compares the equilibrium concept with other equilibrium concepts that
are based on Choquet expected utility and uncertainty aversion. Section 6 presents
an equilibrium concept that allows players to have a strict preference for mixed
strategies. Section 7 concludes.
2. Choquet-Nash Equilibrium
A game in normal form is deﬁned by specifying the set of players N, for each player
a set of strategies Si and each player’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
ui. In particular, players are assumed to be rational: when faced with uncertainty
they maximise subjective expected utility. This concept of rationality has been
axiomatized by Savage (1954).
In a game, rational beliefs must not only satisfy Savage’s axioms, but must in
addition be consistent with what players know about the structure of the game
and about each other’s rationality. In particular, if a player can anticipate which
strategies are rational and if he knows that his opponent is rational, then he can
anticipate his opponent’s play. Precise arguments along this line are developed, e.g.,
in Tan and Werlang (1988) and Aumann and Brandenburger (1995).
If rationality is not mutual knowledge the question thus arises how a rational
player should act if he knew that the opponent is not rational. In that case Savage’s
axioms imply that the rational player should have a belief given by a unique proba-
bility measure over the opponent’s actions. If neither a theory of bounded rationality
nor a stable empirical regularity of non-rational behaviour is available, there seems
to be no foundation for this belief. The idea of this paper is that a weaker rationality
concept allows further assumptions about the rational player from which rational
actions can be derived.
2.1. Uncertainty Aversion
A key axiom in subjective expected utility theory is the independence axiom (Ans-
combe & Aumann 1963, Samuelson1952). Intuitively, the independence axiom says
that if a decision maker prefers one act over another then he should also prefer a
probability mixture of the ﬁrst and a third act over the same mixture of the second
and the third act: Either this probability mixture will reduce to a choice between
the ﬁrst two acts, or not, in which case the decision-maker is left with the third act
in either case.2 The descriptive validity of the independence axiom is questioned by
the Allais paradox, the Ellsberg paradox and similar ﬁndings. Since its consequence
is that a decision maker’s beliefs can be represented by a probability measure, it
also places a high demand on a player’s rationality.
CEU weakens the independence axiom (Schmeidler (1989)). Under CEU, the
independence axiom is not assumed to hold for all acts, but only for acts that are
‘comonotonic’. Two acts3 f,f  are comonotonic if f(ω) >f (ω ) implies f (ω) ≥
2 However, this interpretation equates the probability mixture with a two-stage lot-
tery, i. e. also assumes a version of the ‘reduction of compound lotteries axiom’, see
Kreps (1988)p.50 – 52 for the expected utility case.
3 Here, acts f ∈Fmap states ω ∈ Ω into von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities. The acts
are measurable with respect to events E ∈ Σ ⊆ 2
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f (ω ), i.e. both acts give rise to the same preference ordering over states. In the
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Fig. 2
Restricting the sure-thing principle to comonotonic acts means that if the player





2h, because f,g and h are comonotonic. However, he may, e.g., strictly prefer
1
2f + 1
2h  to 1
2g + 1
2h . The reason is that mixtures of non-comonotonic acts can be
interpreted as “hedging”, i.e. distributing utility across states. Uncertainty aversion
means that players may rationally act as if they hedged against uncertainty. Thus,
in contrast to subjective expected utility theory, CEU allows the introduction of an
additional assumption about rational preferences over acts that characterizes the
player’s attitude towards uncertainty.4
Schmeidler (1989) has shown that behaviour that is rational in this weaker
sense can still be described by expected-utility maximisation. Players do still act
as if they possess a von Neumann - Morgenstern utility function and beliefs, and
take expected values. These beliefs, however, are no longer given by a probability
measure over events, but a capacity, i.e. non-additive measure over events. Formally,
a capacity v maps Σ into [0,1] such that (i) v(∅) = 0, (ii) v(Ω) = 1 and (iii)
E ⊆ E  =⇒ v(E) ≤ v(E ). Property (iii) weakens the ﬁnite-additivity requirement
for ﬁnitely-additive measures: E ∩E  = ∅ =⇒ v(E ∪E )=v(E)+v(E ). Note that
non-additive beliefs still may, but in general need not be additive.
The expectation of a real-valued random variable X with respect to a non-
additive measure v is deﬁned in Choquet (1953). If X takes ﬁnitely many values





v(X ≥ αi) · ∆αi,
where ∆αi := αi − αi+1 and αn+1 := 0.
4 This preference for randomisation argument exploits the structure of the Anscombe-
Aumann model (Eichberger and Kelsey (1996)). Also, comonotonic independence
may be too strong a requirement for uncertainty aversion (Epstein (1997b),
Ghirardato and Marinacci (1997)). In our game-theoretic context these are side issues,
however.
5 As usual, we write v(X ≥ t)f o rv({ω ∈ Ω|X(ω) ≥ t}). The integrals on the right hand
side are extended Riemann integrals. If v is additive this is the usual expectation.Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 347
Formally, uncertainty aversion can be characterized in terms of the capacity
v. The capacity v displays uncertainty aversion iﬀ it is supermodular, i.e. v(E)+
v(E ) ≤ v(E∩E )+v(E∪E ). The ‘probability weights’ v(E) of an uncertainty averse
decision maker do not add up to 1. Maximisation of Choquet expected utility under
uncertainty aversion corresponds to allocating probability residuals to outcomes
that are worst for the player.
2.2. Equilibrium
Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. If player i knew that his
opponent was non-rational, CEU implies that his belief is given by a not necessarily
additive capacity vj over Sj. Moreover, his expected utility from his pure strategy
si is given by the Choquet expectation ui(si,v j): =
 
Sj ui(si,s j) dvj. We deﬁne his
payoﬀ from a mixed strategy σi ∈  Si as ui(σi,v j): =
 
si∈Si σi(si) · ui(si,v j).
In a game in which rationality is not mutual knowledge, player 1 will thus take
both possibilities into account: that the opponent is rational and that he need not
be. If he can anticipate the rational strategies, his overall expected utility will be the
weighted sum of his expected utility from interacting with a rational opponent, and
the Choquet expected utility from interacting with a non-rational opponent. The
weight corresponds to his degree of belief in the opponent’s rationality. In a weak
Choquet-Nash equilibrium, these rational strategies are determined endogenously.
Deﬁnition 1. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤
 1,  2 ≤ 1. Let v1 be a capacity on S1 and v2 be a capacity on S2.T h e nσ∗ is a
weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium iﬀ (if and only if)
σ∗
1 ∈ arg max
σ1∈Σ1
[( 1−  1) · u1(σ1,σ∗
2)+ 1 · u1(σ1,v 2)] ,
σ
∗
2 ∈ arg max
σ2∈Σ2
[( 1−  2) · u2(σ
∗
1,σ 2)+ 2 · u2(v1,σ 2)] .
Note that if  1 =  2 = 1 then each player believes that he faces a non-rational op-
ponent, and thus the question what constitutes a rational strategy is purely decision-
theoretic. On the other hand, if  1 =  2 = 0 then rationality is mutual knowledge.
Note also that this deﬁnition assumes that the rational players know each others
beliefs. Finally, notice that this equilibrium concept makes no assumption about
the players’ attitudes towards uncertainty, in particular, they may be uncertainty
loving.
The diﬀerence between this approach and the ‘crazy type’ approach of Kreps et
al. (1982) is this: In KMRW, the ‘irrational’ players have a diﬀerent utility function
or a diﬀerent strategy set. But they are fully rational as ‘types’ of a game with
incomplete information. The speciﬁcation of the utility function corresponds to a
belief of the rational player about the ‘irrational’ opponent’s play. In contrast, in
the present approach the rational players treat the non-rational players as part of
‘nature’, rather than as ‘types’. The speciﬁcation of the rational players’ ‘beliefs’
reﬂect their own attitude towards uncertainty, rather than an assumption about the
opponent.
In general, when players are not expected utility maximisers, an equilibrium need
not exist (Crawford (1990), Dekel, Safra and Segal (1991)). However, the following
proposition shows that this problem does not arise under CEU.6
6 Note that this existence result also holds under uncertainty love. However, this is due
to the order of integration, see section 6.348 J¨ orn Rothe
Proposition 1. For all  1,  2,v 1 and v2 a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. The proof is the standard argument due to Nash (1950). The best reply
correspondence σ∗
i (σj) = argmaxσi∈Σi [( 1−  i) · ui(σi,σ j)+ i · ui(σi,v j)]m a p s
the (n−1) dimensional unit simplex into itself. Since the objective function is linear
in σi, it is continuous, therefore a maximum exists and the best reply correspondence
is non-empty and convex-valued. Since ui is continuous in σj, it also has a closed
graph. By Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem, (σ∗
1(σ2),σ∗
2(σ1)) has a ﬁxed point,
which is, by deﬁnition, a general Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
In this generality the equilibrium concept is diﬃcult to apply, because the beliefs
 i and vi have to be speciﬁed. We therefore make three simplifying assumptions:
First, we assume that players share a common prior about the degree of mutual
knowledge of rationality. This assumption is for simplicity only, but also has two
useful side eﬀects. It avoids any ad hoc asymmetry, and it makes the assumption that
players know each others beliefs less demanding. Secondly, we assume that players
are totally ignorant about the behaviour of a non-rational opponent. This ignorance
has two reasons: Our solution concept speciﬁes rational strategies only, so it does
not restrict at all the range of non-rational strategies. Thus, complete ignorance
is a consistency requirement. Also, there is no exogenous theory of non-rational
decision making. As a consequence, every assumption about the shape of a rational
player’s beliefs about his non-rational opponent are ad hoc. In addition, a useful
side eﬀect is that the assumption that players know the rational opponent’s beliefs is
less restrictive. Finally, we consider the case that the players are uncertainty averse.
Uncertainty aversion is the natural explanation of behavior observed in the Ellsberg
paradox.
Complete ignorance can naturally be captured by ‘simple capacities’:
vj(Ej)=
 
0, i fEj ⊂ Sj,
1, i fEj = Sj.
If player i holds this belief vj about a non-rational opponent, he is only certain
that the opponent will choose one of his available actions, but is unable to assign
positive probability to any particular set of actions.
The Choquet-expectation of a utility function with respect to a simple capacity
reﬂects uncertainty aversion, since all probability is allocated to the worst realiza-
t i o n ,i .e .  
Sj
ui(si,s j) dvj =m i n
sj∈Sj
ui(si,s j).
A Choquet-Nash equilibrium is a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium with these addi-
tional assumptions.
Deﬁnition 2. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤   ≤
1. Then σ∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium iﬀ7
σ
∗
1 ∈ arg max
σ1∈Σ1








7 In the remaining sections, we also use the notation
 
si∈Si σi(si) ·minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j)=  
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ
∗
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σ∗
2 ∈ arg max
σ2∈Σ2
[( 1−  ) · u2(σ∗






It follows from proposition 1 that in every ﬁnite two-player game in normal form
a Choquet-Nash equilibrium (henceforth CNE) exists. Moreover, every symmetric
game also has a symmetric Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. The game
is symmetric iﬀ Si = Sj and ui(si,s j)=uj(sj,s i). A strategy combination is
symmetric iﬀ si = sj.
Remark 1. For all  , in a symmetric game a symmetric Choquet-Nash equilibrium
exists.
Proof. Again, the proof is standard. The result is proved as in proposition 1, except
that the ﬁxed point argument is applied to the best reply correspondence σ∗
i (σi).
3. Properties of Choquet-Nash Equilibria
The aim of this section is to present the properties of Choquet-Nash equilibria.
Section 3.1 relates them to dominance and rationalizability. In section 3.2, we re-
late Choquet-Nash equilibria to the robustness of Nash equilibria This will lead
to the deﬁnition of two equilibrium reﬁnements (sections 3.3 and 3.4). Section 3.5
compares them with minimax strategies in zero-sum games. Finally, section 3.6
compares them with other equilibrium reﬁnements (trembling-hand perfect, proper
and strictly perfect equilibria).
3.1. Dominance and Rationalizability
The following result implies that, independently of the degree of mutual knowledge
of rationality, no strictly dominated strategy is rational.
Lemma 1. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤   ≤ 1.
Let σ∗ be a Choquet-Nash equilibrium. Then if σ∗
i (si) > 0,t h e nsi is a best response
to σ∗
j and  ,i .e .
si ∈ argmaxsi∈Si [( 1−  ) · ui(si,σ∗
j)+  · minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j)] .
Proof. Again, the proof is standard. If si is not a best response then some other
strategy s 
i gives higher expected utility than si. Thus the player can increase his
overall utility from σ∗




i), ˆ σi(si)=0a n dˆ σi(s  
i )=
σ∗
i (s  
i ) for all other strategies s  
i , which contradicts the assumption that σ∗
i is a best
reply.
It is important to notice, however, that strict dominance cannot be iterated, as





In this game playing L is a strictly dominant strategy for player 2. Consequently,
iterated strict dominance yields T as the unique rational strategy for player 1, if
rationality is mutual knowledge. In particular, (T,L) is the unique equilibrium and
the unique rationalizable strategy proﬁle of the game.
However, (T,L) is not a plausible proﬁle unless player 1 is convinced that player
2 is rational. The CNE in this game depends on  . In every CNE, player 2 will
play L because this is his strictly dominant strategy. However, unless   ≤ 1
100 only
strategy B is rational for player 1.
Note that this shows that non-rationalizable strategies may be CNE-strategies.
The ‘Matching Pennies’ game in ﬁgure 4 shows that, conversely, not every rational-





Note that the best reply correspondence for a Choquet-Nash equilibrium in the
‘Matching Pennies’ game is given by
σ∗
i (σj) = arg max
σi∈Σi
[( 1−  ) · ui(σi,σ j)+ i · (−1) ],
which diﬀers from the Nash best reply correspondence only by a factor and a con-
stant. Consequently, independently of  , only the mixed strategies σ1(T)=σ1(B)=
σ2(L)=σ2(R)=1
2 form a CNE. This is also the unique Nash equilibrium, but every
strategy proﬁle is rationalizable. We have thus established proposition 2:
Proposition 2. Non-rationalizable strategy proﬁles may be Choquet-Nash equilib-
ria. Conversely, not every rationalizable strategy proﬁle is a Choquet-Nash equilib-
rium.
3.2. The Robustness of Nash Equilibria
The deﬁnition of a Choquet-Nash equilibrium collapses to the deﬁnition of Nash
equilibrium if   = 0. So any Nash equilibrium is a CNE for   = 0. We will show
that a given Nash equilibrium may also be a CNE for  >0, and that the highest
such   can be regarded as a measure of robustness of a given Nash equilibrium.8 To
establish this claim, we ﬁrst need the following lemma:
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Lemma 2. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 < ≤ 1.
Let σ∗ be a Choquet-Nash equilibrium. If σ∗ is a Nash equilibrium, then it is also a
Choquet-Nash equilibrium for all 0 ≤    ≤  .




j). Since σ∗ is a CNE for  ,




Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ∗
i ]
≥ (1 −  ) · ui(σi,σ∗
j)+  ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσi ]
for all σi and all i.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,f o ra n yα ∈ [0,1],
α · ui(σ∗
i ,σ∗




Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ∗
i ]
≥ α · ui(σi,σ∗
j)+( 1− α) · [(1 −  ) · ui(σi,σ∗
j)+  ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσi ]
for all σi.S of o rα =1−  
 
  we have α ∈ [0,1] and
(1 −   ) · ui(σ∗
i ,σ∗
j)+   ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ∗
i
≥ (1 −   ) · ui(σi,σ∗
j)+   ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσi
for all σi,a n df o ra l li ∈ I,i .e .σ∗ i sa l s oaC N Ef o r  .
On the basis of lemma 2, we can now deﬁne a measure of robustness of a Nash
equilibrium with respect to doubts about the rationality of the opponent:
Deﬁnition 4. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤
  ≤ 1. Let σ∗ be a Nash equilibrium. Then the degree  (σ∗) of uncertainty aversion
robustness of σ∗ is given by the largest   for which σ∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium.
Note that   exists because the expected utility functions are continuous in  .
As the following game shows, this measure of robustness formalizes a diﬀerent
intuition about robustness than payoﬀ-dominance and risk-dominance. The game





The equilibrium (T,L) dominates the equilibrium (B,R) both with respect to
payoﬀ-dominance and with respect to risk-dominance. However,  (T,L)=4
5,s i n c e
if a rational opponent plays L (respectively T) then it is only rational to play T
(respectively L)a sl o n ga s  ≤ 4
5. On the other hand,  (B,R) = 1, since if a rational
opponent plays R (respectively B) then it is never rational to deviate from B to T
(respectively from R to L).
We next show that strict Nash equilibria are robust with respect to doubts of
the rationality of the opponent:9
9 Note that strict Nash equilibria are pure.352 J¨ orn Rothe
Remark 2. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let s∗ be a
Choquet-Nash equilibrium. If s∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium, then there exists an
 >0 such that s∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium for all 0 ≤   ≤  .













j) − ui(si,s ∗
j)]
Note that αi > 0a n dδi ≥ 0. Deﬁne  i := αi
δi+αi and   := mini∈I  i.N o t et h a t >0.
Then for any i and any si ∈ Si
(1 −  ) · [ui(s∗
i,s ∗
j) − ui(si,s ∗
j)]
≥ (1 −  ) · αi
≥ (1 −  i) · αi
=  i · δi
≥   · δi
≥   · [minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) − minsj∈Sj ui(s∗
i,s j)]
It follows from lemma 1 that only pure strategy deviations are relevant, so s∗ is a
CNE for  , and by lemma 2 for all   ≤  .
The requirement that a Nash equilibrium is strict is suﬃcient for  >0, but it is
not necessary, as the ‘Matching Pennies’ game in ﬁgure 4 shows. The non-strictness
of mixed strategy equilibria is sometimes regarded as a conceptual weakness, be-
cause the players, while having no incentive to deviate, still seem to lack a positive
incentive to choose their equilibrium strategies. This has led to a justiﬁcation of
mixed strategy equilibria by puriﬁcation arguments, i. e. in terms of an embedding
of the original game into a game with (slight) incomplete information.10 However,
both this criticism of mixed equilibria and their defense apply equally to all mixed
strategy equilibria. Next, we show that the robustness measure   formalizes that in












5. Given that the rational opponent plays σ∗
j, a player’s expected
payoﬀ from a rational opponent is independent of his own strategy. Thus a rational
player will only take into account the expected payoﬀ from a non-rational opponent.
This payoﬀ is 0 when he plays T (respectively L) and 7 when he plays B (respectively
10 Note, however, that the justiﬁcation of Nash equilibria given in Aumann and Bran-
denburger (1995) is independent of the question whether the equilibrium is pure or
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R). So a rational player will always deviate to B (respectively R) if he expects a
rational opponent to play according to σ∗ and there is doubt about the opponent’s
rationality, however small it is, unless   =0 .
The stability property of mixed strategy equilibria are given by remark 3:
Remark 3. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗ be
a Nash equilibrium. Let i ∈ I, si,s  
i ∈ Si, σ∗
i (si) > 0a n dσ∗
i (s 
i) > 0. Then if
minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j)  =m i n sj∈Sj ui(s 
i,s j)t h e n (σ∗)=0 .
Proof. If σ∗ is a CNE, both si and s 
i must be best replies to  . However, since σ∗
is also a Nash equilibrium, both si and s 
i are also best replies to σ∗
−i if   =0 .S oi f
 >0w em u s th a v em i n sj∈Sj ui(si,s j)=m i n sj∈Sj ui(s 
i,s j), a contradiction.
The following example shows that even for a genuinely mixed Nash equilibrium11





Consider the mixed equilibrium T and q∗ ≡ Prob(L)=3
4. Then player 1 will
prefer T as long as (1− )2· 3
4 ≥ 1, i. e.   ≤ 1
3. Player 2 is always indiﬀerent between
L and R,s o  = 1
3. Note that for q∗ = 1
2 every p∗ ≡ Prob(T) ∈ [0,1] is also a
Nash equilibrium, however, for any equilibrium with p∗ > 0w eh a v e  =0 ,i .e .
such equilibria are not robust. The reason is that if there is a positive probability,
however small, that player 2 is not rational, player 1 will prefer to play B if a
rational opponent plays q∗ = 1
2.
Note, however, that we cannot have 0 <  <1 for Nash equilibria in 2×2 games
in which both players use genuinely mixed strategies. The following game shows that
0 <  <1 is possible even if both players use genuinely mixed strategies:
LCR
T 4,4 0,0 0,1
C 0,0 4,4 0,1
B 1,0 1,0 1,1
Fig. 8







2.T h i si sa l s oaC N Ea sl o n ga s  ≤   := 1
2,
11 A Nash equilibrium is genuinely mixed if at least one player chooses a non-degenerate
mixed strategy.354 J¨ orn Rothe
because a rational player will receive 2 from a rational opponent whom he meets with
probability (1 −  ), but 0 from a non-rational opponent if he plays the equilibrium
strategy. Deviating to his third pure strategy will give him 1 in either case.
So far, all robust equilibria were quasi-strict. Recall that a Nash equilibrium is
quasi-strict if every pure best reply to the equilibrium strategies of the opponent
is in the support of the equilibrium strategy Harsanyi (1973). We next show that
this is not true in general, i. e. that robustness in our sense neither implies nor is





Consider the Nash equilibrium (T,L) of the game in ﬁgure 9. It is not quasi-
strict, because B is also a best reply to L. Yet it is robust, i. e.   = 1, because
for player 2 L is strictly dominant. Player 1 knows that a rational opponent will
play L, and in case the opponent is non-rational he will strictly prefer T to B.
This shows that robustness does not imply quasi-strictness. Conversely, the mixed
strategy equilibrium in the game in ﬁgure 6 is quasi-strict, yet it is not robust.
We have thus established proposition 3, which shows that our robustness concept
diﬀers from quasi-strictness:
Proposition 3. Robustness and quasi-strictness are unrelated, i.e. Nash equilibria
may be robust and quasi-strict, non-robust and quasi-strict, robust and non-quasi-
strict, or neither.
It remains to consider the most important special case of non-quasi-strict equi-
libria, namely Nash equilibria in weakly dominated strategies. We show that such





The Nash equilibrium (T,L) is payoﬀ-dominant, but involves weakly dominated
strategies and is therefore not quasi-strict. For this equilibrium   =0 ,s oi ti sn o t
robust. However, consider the game in ﬁgure 11:Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 355
LCR
T 2,2 0,0 0,1
B 2,0 0,0 1,1
Fig. 11
Again (T,L) is a payoﬀ-dominant Nash equilibrium in weakly dominated strate-
gies. However, it is indeed robust. For both T and B, a rational player 1 expects
2 from a rational opponent playing his equilibrium strategy L, and 0 from a non-
rational opponent. Player 2, on the other hand, strictly prefers L to R as long as
  ≤ 1
2,s o  = 1
2.
To summarize, we have shown that   can be interpreted as a measure of ro-
bustness of a Nash equilibrium with respect to doubts about the rationality of the
opponent. This robustness concept diﬀers from payoﬀ dominance, risk dominance,
strictness or quasi-strictness. This leadsu st os u g g e s tt w or e ﬁ n e m e n t so fN a s he q u i -
librium.
3.3. Strict Uncertainty Aversion Perfection
So far, we have shown how the concept of Choquet-Nash equilibrium sheds light on
the robustness of Nash equilibria. This suggests to use this robustness analysis as a
basis for equilibrium reﬁnements. Intuitively, Nash equilibria are robust if they can
be approximated by Choquet-Nash equilibria. Since this approximation can take
diﬀerent forms, we deﬁne two equilibrium reﬁnements: strictly uncertainty aversion
perfect equilibria (section 3.3) and uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria (section
3.4).
Deﬁnition 5. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗ be a
strategy combination. Then σ∗ is a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash
equilibrium if and only if there exists a sequence ( k)k∈IN,w i t h0<  k < 1a n d
limk→∞  k = 0, such that σ∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium for every  k.
We ﬁrst note that the strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria are those
with a strictly positive degree of uncertainty aversion robustness:
Lemma 3. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗ be a
Nash equilibrium. Then σ∗ is a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium
if and only if  (σ∗) > 0.
Proof. Necessity (‘only if’) is immediate because   ≥  k > 0. Suﬃciency (‘if’) follows
from lemma 2 by considering the sequence (  
k).
Next, we show that a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium is indeed
a Nash equilibrium. This establishes that this concept is indeed an equilibrium
reﬁnement:
Remark 4. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. A strictly
uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium is indeed a Nash equilibrium.356 J¨ orn Rothe
Proof. Let  k > 0. Since σ∗ is a CNE for  k we have




Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ∗
i ]
≥ (1 −  k) · ui(σi,σ∗
j)+ k ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσi ]
for all σi and all i ∈ I. These expected utility functions are continuous in  k,s ot h e
inequalities also hold in the limit as  k → 0.
We next study the existence question:
Proposition 4. A strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium need not
exist.
Proof. Consider the game in ﬁgure 12:
LCR
T 2,2 2,0 0,1
B 2,0 1,1 1,0
Fig. 12
Let p1 ≡ Prob(T),p 2 ≡ Prob(B),q 1 ≡ Prob(L),q 2 ≡ Prob(C),q 3 ≡ Prob(R).
Any Nash equilibrium of this game takes the form p∗
1 ≥ 1
3,q∗
1 =1 .E a c hs u c h( p∗,q∗)
is an equilibrium, and there can be no equilibrium with p1 =0( e l s eq∗
2 =1a n d
p1  =0 ) ,s oq∗
3 =0 ,a n di fq2 > 0t h e np∗
1 =1a n dq2 = 0, a contradiction.
However, none of these equilibria is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect: Player 1
knows that he can expect 2 from a rational opponent both if he plays T and B, but
from a non-rational opponent he will expect 0 from T and 1 from B.A sl o n ga s
 k > 0, he will play B.
This result suggest to look for existence in a subclass of games. Surprisingly,
not even 2 × 2-games always possess a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash





This game has a unique Nash equilibria in genuinely mixed strategies p∗ ≡
Prob(T)=1
3,q∗ ≡ Prob(L)=2
3. However, if player 1 expects a rational opponent
to play q∗, he will strictly prefer B to T, since he will achieve the same utility from
a rational opponent, but a higher utility in case the opponent is non-rational. So
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Finally, the following remark characterises strictly uncertainty aversion perfect
equilibria. It will be useful when we study zero-sum games and standard equilibrium
reﬁnements in sections 3.5 and 3.6.
Remark 5. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗ be a
Nash equilibrium. Then σ∗ is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect if and only if
  ∃i ∈ I,  ∃si ∈ Si,  ∃s 












Proof. Suppose for some player i ∈ I there exist si and s 





j)a n dm i n sj∈Sj ui(si,s j) > minsj∈Sj ui(s 
i,s j). Then, as long
as  >0, for player i a deviation from σ∗
i to si is proﬁtable, because he will expect
the same utility as σ∗
i from a rational opponent, but a higher utility from a non-
rational opponent. So  (σ∗)=0 ,i .e .σ∗ is not strictly uncertainty aversion perfect.
Conversely, if these conditions hold, player i does not have a proﬁtable deviation.
The following proposition summarizes the above results on the robustness of
Nash equilibria, in case a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium exists:
Proposition 5. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗ be
a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium.
(1) Every strict equilibrium is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect. However,
strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria need not be strict.
(2) Quasi-strict equilibria in general, and mixed strategy equilibria and equilibria
in weakly dominated strategies in particular, may be, but need not be, strictly
uncertainty aversion perfect.
3.4. Uncertainty Aversion Perfection
Because strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibria need not exist, we suggest
the following weaker reﬁnement of Nash equilibria:
Deﬁnition 6. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let σ∗
be a strategy combination. Then σ∗ is an uncertainty aversion perfect Nash
equilibrium if and only if there exists a sequence ( k)k∈IN,w i t h0<  k < 1a n d
limk→∞  k = 0, and a sequence of strategy proﬁles (σ∗
k)k∈IN, such that each σ∗
k is a
Choquet-Nash equilibrium for  k and limk→∞ σ∗
k = σ∗.
Since this deﬁnition allows constant sequences of strategy proﬁles, every strictly
uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium is indeed uncertainty aversion perfect.
Remark 6. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-playergame in normal form. An uncertainty
aversion perfect Nash equilibrium is indeed a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let  k > 0. Since σ∗
k is a CNE for  k we have




Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσ∗
i,k ]
≥ (1 −  k) · ui(σi,σ∗
j,k)+ k ·
 
Si minsj∈Sj ui(si,s j) dσi ]
for all σi and all i ∈ I. These expected utility functions are continuous in  k, σi and
σj, so the inequalities also hold in the limit as  k → 0a n dσ∗
k → σ∗.358 J¨ orn Rothe
Proposition 6. Every ﬁnite two-player game in normal form has at least one un-
certainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider a sequence  k → 0. By proposition 1, there exists a CNE for ev-
ery  k. Since the strategy sets are compact subsets of ﬁnite-dimensional euclidean
spaces, by the Bolzano-Weierstraß Theorem, every sequence of CNEs σ∗
k has a con-
vergent subsequence σ∗
l . Since the associated sequence  l also converges to 0, the
limit of σ∗
l is an uncertainty aversion perfect Nash equilibrium.
We end this section with an example of an equilibrium in pure strategies that
are not weakly dominated that is not uncertainty aversion perfect:
LCR
T 1,1 2,0 0,0
B 1,0 1,0 1,0
Fig. 14
Consider the equilibrium (T,L). The strategy T is undominated, and L is weakly
dominant. Yet (T,L) is not uncertainty aversion perfect: As long as  >0, a rational
player 2 will play L because it is weakly dominant. But given L, player 1 will expect
utility 1 from a rational opponent both if he plays T or B, but since  >0 he will
strictly prefer B.
3.5. Zero-Sum Games
Under complete ignorance, an uncertainty averse player will allocate probability
weight 1 to the outcome that is worst for himself. Intuitively, this suggests a close
relationship of Choquet-Nash equilibria with minimax strategies in zero-sum games.
We next show, however, that this is not the case12. First, consider strictly un-





In the game in ﬁgure 15, the Nash equilibrium is unique, and since the game is
zero-sum the strategies are minimax strategies. However, remark 5 implies that this
equilibrium is not strictly uncertainty aversion perfect. This example also shows
that in even in zero-sum games a strictly uncertainty aversion perfect equilibrium
need not exist.
12 This result is due to a lack of preference for uncertainty, see section 4.Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 359
However, in the previous game the minimax strategies are uncertainty aversion
perfect. The following example shows that not every Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum





The pair of minimax strategies (T,R) is not uncertainty aversion perfect: As
long as  >0, player 2 prefers to play L because L is weakly dominant.
3.6. Equilibrium Reﬁnements
The fact that not all Nash equilibria are robust in the sense of (strict) uncertainty
aversion perfection raises the question whether perfect Nash equilibria are more
robust with respect to doubt about the rationality of the opponent. In this sec-
tion we present the relationship between uncertainty aversion perfection and other
equilibrium reﬁnements.
First, note that the equilibrium (T,L) in ﬁgure 14 is proper, because C and R
are equally costly mistakes for player 2. So for   = 1
k the strategy combinations σk
with Prob(T)=1− 1
k,Prob(B)=1
k,P r o b ( L)= k
k+2,Prob(C)=P r o b ( R)= 1
k+2 is
an  -proper equilibrium, and as k →∞we have   → 0a n dσk → (T,L). However,
as shown above, this equilibrium is not uncertainty aversion perfect. So properness
does not imply uncertainty aversion perfection.
Note also, however,that this equilibrium is not strictly perfect. Our next example





The mixed strategy equilibrium p∗ ≡ Prob(T)=1
3,q∗ ≡ Prob(L)=2
3 is strictly
perfect, because it is completely mixed. But by remark 5, it is not strictly uncertainty
aversion perfect.
The next game shows that strictly perfect equilibria even need not be uncertainty










2. This equilibrium is strictly perfect: Let µT,µ M,µ B,µ L,µ R be any
strictly positive trembles (minimum probabilities). Then the strategy combination
σµ with p1 = 1
2(1 − µB),p 2 = 1
2(1 − µB),p 3 = µB, q1 =
1−2µL
2(1−µL−µR),q 2 =1− q1
is a Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game, and as µL,... → 0w eh a v eσµ → σ∗.
However, the equilibrium is not uncertainty aversion perfect: For player 1, as long
as  >0, strategy T gives 2(1− )q  and strategy M gives 2(1− )(1−q ), where q 
is the strategy of a rational player 2. In order to ﬁnd a sequence of mixed strategies
for player 1 that converges to p = 1
2, he must be willing to mix between T and M,
which implies that in any Choquet-Nash equilibrium q  = 1
2. But then both T and
M yield less than B,s of o r >0 no such equilibrium exists.
Conversely, we can ask whether (strictly) uncertainty averse equilibria also sat-
isfy reﬁnement criteria for Nash equilibria. However, the equilibrium (T,L)i nﬁ g u r e
11 is strictly uncertainty aversion perfect, yet T is weakly dominated for player 1,
and therefore (T,L) is not trembling-hand perfect.
We have thus established a lack of relationships between robustness with re-
spect to lack of mutual knowledge of rationality and equilibrium reﬁnements that
is summarized by the following proposition:
Proposition 7. Neither a proper equilibrium nor a strictly perfect equilibrium need
be uncertainty aversion perfect. Conversely, even a strictly uncertainty aversion
perfect equilibrium need not be trembling-hand perfect.
4. Extensions
So far, we have deﬁned the solution concept only for 2-player games with ﬁnitely
many strategies. Typically, in economic games the strategy spaces are inﬁnite, for
instance if ﬁrms choose prices, quantities, a location, a point in time, or a certain
probability.





v(X ≥ t)dt +
  0
−∞
[v(X ≥ t) − 1]dt.
As before, we deﬁne the expected utility from a non-rational opponent as
ui(si,v j): =
 
Sj ui(si,s j) dvj and the payoﬀ from a mixed strategy σi ∈  Si as
ui(σi,v j): =
 
Si u1(si,v j) dσi.
As before, we can thus deﬁne a weak Choquet-Nash equilibrium for 2-player
games with possibly inﬁnite strategy spaces. Under the assumptions of a common
prior about rationality, complete ignorance about non-rationality and uncertainty
aversion this reduces to:Uncertainty Aversion and Equilibrium in Normal Form Games 361
Deﬁnition 7. Let (I,S,u) be a two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤   ≤ 1.
Then σ∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium iﬀ
σ∗
1 ∈ arg max
σ1∈Σ1






u1(s1,s 2) dσ1 ],
σ∗
2 ∈ arg max
σ2∈Σ2
[( 1−  ) · u2(σ∗





u2(s1,s 2) dσ2 ].
As an example, consider a symmetric duopoly with linear cost and demand curve.
Under Bertrand competition, setting price equal to marginal cost is a Choquet-Nash
equilibrium independently of  . Under Cournot competition, however, the ﬁrms have
an incentive to oﬀer less than the Cournot equilibrium output, and set higher prices,
since for any given production there is a small chance that a non-rational opponent
swamps the market and drives down proﬁts.
The extension to n players is conceptually straightforward. However, it has to
take into account that the events that diﬀerent opponents are non-rational are
independent. For instance, if there are three players, then player 1 should maximise13
max
σ1∈Σ1
[( 1 −  )2 · u1(σ1,σ∗
2,σ∗
3)




















u1(s1,s 2,s 3)] .
In general, we can formulate the solution concept in the following way: Let I
be the player set, and for J ⊆ I let sJ be a strategy proﬁle that speciﬁes a pure
strategy for each player in J.L e tSJ be the set of such proﬁles, i. e. Sj = ×i∈JSi.
Let s−J be a strategy proﬁle that speciﬁes a pure strategy for all players not in J.
Deﬁnition 8. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤   ≤
1. Then σ∗ is a Choquet-Nash equilibrium iﬀ for every player i ∈ I
σ∗
i ∈ arg max
σ1∈Σ1
















where |J| denotes the number of players in J ⊆ I.
13 We continue to make the assumptions for Choquet-Nash equilibria: common priors  ,
complete ignorance and uncertainty aversion.362 J¨ orn Rothe
5. Related Literature
The aim of this section is to argue that our equilibrium concept circumvents some
of the controversial aspects of previous attempts to generalize the equilibrium con-
cept to non-additive beliefs: the deﬁnition of support of a non-additive measure,
the requirement that players’ beliefs are simple capacities, and the deﬁnition of
independence of several non-additive beliefs.
Previous solution concepts — with the exception of Mukerji (1994) and
Lo (1995) — have not distinguished between rational and non-rational players. In
those models, the rational player is allowed to have non-additive beliefs about the
opponent’s play. An equilibrium is then interpreted as an equilibrium in beliefs.
However, since beliefs are non-additive, they cannot be correct, so the weaker con-
sistency requirement that players are not wrong is imposed on equilibrium beliefs.
Following Dow and Werlang (1994), this is formalised as the requirement that the
players anticipate the support of the opponent’s beliefs.14 This raises the question,
however, how the support of a non-additive capacity should be deﬁned, and diﬀer-
ent support concepts give rise to diﬀerent equilibrium concepts. These issues are
surveyed, e.g., in Eichberger and Kelsey (1994) and Haller (1997).
Since deﬁning the support as the smallest set of strategies that has belief 1 un-
der uncertainty aversion does not impose any restriction on the support, Dow and
Werlang (1994) deﬁne the support as the smallest set of strategies whose comple-
ment has belief 0.15 The support, so deﬁned, need not be unique. The approach of
Dow and Werlang (1994) models a situation in which rational players lack logical
omniscience, in that they do not draw the logical conclusions of their knowledge.
The question how to deﬁne the support of a non-additive capacity does not
arise in our model. Here, players have additive beliefs about the rational opponents.
So their expectations can be correct in the usual, literal, sense. Also, the rational
players are assumed to be logically omniscient.
In the Dow and Werlang (1994) model, the support question has a natural an-
swer in the special case, in which the non-additive beliefs are ‘simple capacities’, i.
e. capacities that uniformly distort probabilities
v(E)=
 
α · p(E), E  = Ω,
1, E = Ω,
where uncertainty aversion corresponds to the assumption that α<1. For such
simple capacities, the Choquet-integral of a random variable X takes the form
 
Xd v= α ·
 
Xd p+( 1− α) · min
ω∈Ω
X(ω).
Thus, our concept of Choquet-Nash equilibrium corresponds formally to the case
where16 α =( 1−  ). However, this analogy is purely formal: A weak Choquet-
Nash equilibrium cannot be re-interpreted as a simple capacity, and for non-simple
14 Klibanoﬀ (1993) formalises an equilibrium concept for a more general class of
games on the basis of maxmin expected utility theory with set-valued beliefs
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). There, the weaker consistency requirement is that the
players consider the equilibrium strategies possible.
15 See Marinacci (1994) for an equilibrium concept with a diﬀerent deﬁnition of support.
16 This is the approach taken by Mukerji (1994). In Lo (1995) it is inﬁnitely more likely
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capacities the above decomposition does not hold. We are not requiring that rational
players’ beliefs about the opponents’ play are simple, but that beliefs about rational
opponents are additive, whereas those about non-rational opponents may be non-
additive, but otherwise arbitrary (i. e. non-simple).
Finally, Dow and Werlang (1994) deﬁne their equilibrium concept for 2-player
games. Eichberger and Kelsey (1994) extend their solution concept to n-player
games and allow for the possibility that a rational player beliefs that his opponents
do not act independently. In their approach, imposing such a restriction requires an
independence concept for capacities (see, e.g., Ghirardato (1997) and Hendon et al.
(1996)) ).
In our approach, this issue also does not arise. Since rational players have addi-
tive beliefs about their rational opponents, the usual independence concept applies
and the equilibrium concept for n-player games assumes that rational players be-
lieve that their rational players act independently. This is in line with the underlying
assumption that the game form models a non-cooperative situation and is common
knowledge among the rational players.
6. Preference for Uncertainty
Recall that in section 2 we have deﬁned the expected utility from pure strat-
egy si against a non-rational opponent by the Choquet expectation ui(si,v j): =  
Sj ui(si,s j) dvj. Then we deﬁned his payoﬀ from a mixed strategy σi ∈  Si as
ui(σi,v j): =
 
si∈Si σi(si)·ui(si,v j). As a consequence, the overall expected utility
is linear in the probabilities σi(si). Since vj is non-additive, the order of integra-
tion in ui(σi,v j) is important. In this section we present and analyse an alternative
equilibrium concept in which this order is reversed.
We continue to make the assumptions of a common prior about rationality,
complete ignorance about non-rational play and uncertainty aversion. Note that
then
ui(σi,v j)= m i n
sj∈Sj
















The inequality may be strict.
Proof. For all si and sj
min
sj∈Sj
ui(si,s j) ≤ ui(si,s j).









So this holds in particular for the smallest value of the right-hand side. To see that


















Thus, reversing the order of integration allows players to have a strict preference
for mixed strategies in a game. The ﬁrst equilibrium concept that captures this
phenomenon in strategic interaction is given by Klibanoﬀ (1993), who based it on
maxmin expected utility theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), in which players
have set-valued beliefs. Allowing strict preference for mixed strategies gives rise to
the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 9. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 <
 1 ≤ 1. Then σ∗ is a strong Choquet-Nash equilibrium iﬀ
σ∗
1 ∈ arg max
σ1∈Σ1
[( 1−  1) · u1(σ1,σ∗





2 ∈ arg max
σ2∈Σ2
[( 1−  2) · u2(σ
∗
1,σ 2)+ 2 · min
s1∈S1
u2(s1,σ 2)] .
Under uncertainty aversion, a strong Choquet-Nash equilibrium always exists.
This is essentially the same argument as in proposition 1, except that objective
function is now quasi-concave in the probabilities σi. However, the analogous so-
lution concept for uncertainty love is now no longer guaranteed to exist, since
the objective function need not be quasi-concave. As a consequence, the best-
reply correspondence need not be convex-valued (see, e.g., Crawford (1990) and
Dekel, Safra and Segal (1991)).
The main characteristic of a strong Choquet-Nash equilibrium is that in zero-
sum games, the solution concept coincides with Nash equilibrium: Since it is already
rational to play maxmin strategies against rational opponents, and since this is also
rational against non-rational opponents, it is overall rational. More generally:
Remark 7. Let (I,S,u) be a ﬁnite two-player game in normal form. Let 0 ≤
  ≤ 1. Then every equilibrium in maxmin-strategies is also a strong Choquet-Nash
equilibrium independently of  .
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Since σ∗




i ,s j)= m i n
σj∈Σj
ui(σ∗
i ,σ j) ≥ min
σj∈Σj
ui(σi,σ j)= m i n
sj∈Sj
ui(σi,s j).
Combining both inequalities gives the result.
7. Conclusion
The paper presented equilibrium concepts that formalize the idea that lack of mutual
knowledge of rationality together with a lack of a theory of non-rationality create
genuine uncertainty. However, on the basis of decision theory with non-additive, or
set-valued, beliefs, rational behaviour is still well-deﬁned, if the attitude towards
uncertainty is speciﬁed.
The motivation for developing Choquet expected utility theory were deviations
from subjective expected utility in experiments, as in the Ellsberg paradox. This
behaviour can be parsimoniously explained as uncertainty aversion. Thus we also
formulated the solution concepts under this assumption. To what extent these solu-
tion concepts can model behaviour is an empirical question; this also holds for the
question which solution concept is relevant in a particular situation. For instance,
we see the question whether players have a strict preference for mixed strategies as
an empirical one.
The assumption of extreme uncertainty aversion is rather crude; however, in the
absence of a theory of bounded rationality that imposes restrictions on deviations
from rational play, it seems the only assumption consistent with the fact that only
rational strategies are derived.
Our results suggest robustness concepts for Nash equilibria. In so doing, we
consider mutual knowledge of rationality as a limiting case of lack thereof. This
is entirely analogous to Selten’s (1975, p. 35) view of “complete rationality as a
limiting case of incomplete rationality”. However, we would argue that robustness
with respect to ignorance about non-rational play is more plausible than robustness
with respect to ‘trembles’ of otherwise fully rational players.
The following are suggestions for future research: First, the question arises
whether there are epistemic foundations for Choquet-Nash equilibria in a model
similar to that of Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). Secondly, it will be inter-
esting to study the eﬀects of communication and correlation on a Choquet-Nash
equilibrium in the spirit of Aumann’s (1974) correlated equilibrium. On the other
hand, the equilibrium concepts could also be weakened to rationalizability con-
cepts along the lines of Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984). Finally, combining our
robustness concepts with equilibrium reﬁnements for rational players will further
narrow down the set of equilibria.
Completely new conceptual issues arise in the extension of this approach to
extensive games. There, non-additive beliefs allow the formalisation of the idea that
deviations from the equilibrium path are considered evidence of lack of rationality.
These issues are treated formally in Rothe (1999 a,b).
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Abstract A general method for a description of equilibrium points in games
with ordered outcomes is proposed. This method is based on a construction
of complete family of homomorphisms from a given game with ordered out-
comes into games with payoﬀ functions. Using this method, we obtain a
description of the set of equilibrium points and Nash equilibrium points for
mixed extension of game with vector payoﬀs. The main result is a ﬁnd-
ing of equilibrium points in mixed extension of a ﬁnite game with ordered
outcomes.
Keywords: Equilibrium points, Nash equilibrium, Game with vector pay-
oﬀs, Game with ordered outcomes, Mixed extension of a game with ordered
outcomes.
1. Introduction and Preliminaries
Using a general deﬁnition of a game due to Vorob‘ev (1970), we can consider a
non-cooperative game in the normal form as a system
G =  N, (Xi)i∈N,A ,(ωi)i∈N,F , (1)
where N = {1,...,n} is a set of players, Xi is a set of strategies of player i, A











is called situations in game G. For any two situations x,y ∈ X the condition
F(x)
ωi
  F(y) means that outcome F(x) is less preference than outcome F(y)f o r
player i. Subsystem  (Xi)i∈N,A ,F  forms a realization structure and subsystem
 A, (ωi)i∈N  forms an evaluation structure of game G. In this paper we consider
games with ordered outcomes, that is, games in which preference relations are or-
derings or quasi-orderings.
Recall that an order relation (or partial ordering) on arbitrary set A is called a
binary relation   on A satisfying the following three conditions for any a, b, c ∈ A:
(a) a   a (reﬂexivity);Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 369
(b) a   b, b   c ⇒ a   c (transitivity);
(c) a   b, b   a ⇒ a = b (antisymmetry).
A binary relation is called quasi-order if it satisﬁes the conditions (a)a n d( b).
Note that the linearity condition (that is, a   b or b   a for all a,b ∈ A) in general
case need not be satisﬁed.
Remark 1. It is well known that a problem of construction of a total linear or-
dering for given local linear orderings have certain diﬃculties connected with Arroy
paradox. These diﬃculties take place also for the problem of construction of payoﬀ
function in the case of many criteria. However, if we consider evaluation structure
of some game in the form of orderings or quasi-orderings, these diﬃculties disap-
pear. For example, using Pareto-dominance we always obtain quasi-ordering on set
of outcomes.
It is convenient to study games with ordered outcomes within the framework of
the theory of partially ordered sets (for instance, see Birkhoﬀ (1967)).
Let G be a game with ordered (or quasi-ordered) outcomes. Any situation x ∈ X
can be given in the form x =( xi)i∈N,w h e r exi is the i–th component of x.F o r
x 
i ∈ Xi,w ed e n o t eb yx   x 
i a situation whose i–th component is x 
i and other
components are the same as in x.W ed e n o t eb y< the strict part of order  .
Deﬁnition 1. As i t u a t i o nx ∈ X is called an equilibrium point in game G,i fd o e s
not exist such i ∈ N and x 
i ∈ Xi that the condition





Nash equilibrium point is an equilibrium point x for which the outcomes
F(x   x 
i)a n dF(x) are comparable under order ωi for any i ∈ N.I nt h i sc a s e
it satisﬁes




  F(x). (3)
Remark 2. It is evident that a situation x ∈ X is an equilibrium point if and
only if for every i ∈ N, the outcome F(x) is a maximal element in subset
{F(x   x 
i):x 
i ∈ Xi} under order ωi. If in this assertion ”maximal” is replaced
by ”greatest” then we have a characterization of Nash equilibrium. In the case of
linear orderings of outcomes the concepts of equilibrium point and Nash equilibrium
point are the same.
The aim of this paper is to give a description of equilibrium points and Nash
equilibrium points for games with ordered outcomes of some important classes. Our
method is based on conception of complete family of homomorphisms from given
game G with ordered outcomes into some class of games with payoﬀ functions. First
of all, we introduce the concept of homomorphism for games with ordered outcomes.
Let
G =  N, (Xi)i∈N,A ,(ωi)i∈N,F  and H =  N, (Yi)i∈N,B ,(σi)i∈N,Φ  370 Victor V. Rozen








Suppose that for any i ∈ N a mapping ϕi: Xi → Yi and a mapping ψ: A → B are
given. Deﬁne a mapping ϕ: X → Y by ϕ(x)=( ϕi(xi))i∈N.
Deﬁnition 2. A( n+1) system of mappings h =( ϕ1,...,ϕ n,ψ ) is called a homo-
morphism from game G into game H, if the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
(i) (isotonic condition): for any i ∈ N and a1,a 2 ∈ A
a1
ωi
  a2 =⇒ ψ(a1)
σi
  ψ(a2);
(ii) (commutative condition): ψ ◦ F = Φ ◦ ϕ, that is, ψ(F(x)) = Φ(ϕ(x)).
A homomorphism h =( ϕ1,...,ϕ n,ψ )i ss a i dt ob estrict homomorphism,i fψ is
a strict isotonic mapping; homomorphism ”onto”,i fe a c hϕi (i ∈ N) is a mapping
”onto”; an isomorphism, if for any i ∈ N,ϕi is one-to-one function and mapping ψ is




  a2 ⇐⇒ ψ(a1)
σi
  ψ(a2)( 4 )
holds. Obviously, an isomorphism is a strict and ”onto” homomorphism.
Remark 3. Consider two games G and H with ordered (or quasi-ordered) out-
comes, in which the sets of strategies for all players are the same. Put
G =  N, (Xi)i∈N,A ,(ωi)i∈N,F ,H=  N, (Xi)i∈N,B ,(σi)i∈N,Φ  .
Let ϕi be the identity mapping for each i ∈ N, then the mapping ϕ: X → X is
the identity mapping also and the commutative condition can be given as follows:
ψ ◦ F = Φ. Thus, in this case, a homomorphism from G into H can be deﬁned as a
mapping ψ: A → B satisfying the following two conditions:
(i) (isotonic condition): ψ is an isotonic mapping of the ordered set (A, ωi)i n t o
the ordered set (B, σi)f o re a c hi ∈ N;
(ii) (commutative condition): ψ ◦ F = Φ.
Furthermore, if in the condition (i), for any i ∈ N, ψ is a strict isotonic mapping
(isomorphism), then ψ is a strict homomorphism (isomorphism) from G into H.
Let K and K be two arbitrary classes of games with ordered outcomes. Fix
in these classes certain optimality concepts and let OptG be the set of optimal
solutions of any game G ∈ K,OptHthe set of optimal solutions of any game H ∈K .
If h is a homomorphism from G into H, then a correspondence between outcomes
(and also between strategies and between situations) of these games is given; we
denote this correspondence also by h.
Deﬁnition 3. A homomorphism h is said to be covariant,i fh–image of any optimal
solution in G is an optimal solution in H,t h a ti s ,h(OptG) ⊆ OptH.
A homomorphism h is said to be contravariant,i fh–preimage of any optimal
solution in H is an optimal solution in G,t h a ti s ,h−1(OptH) ⊆ OptG.Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 371
Now suppose that for each s ∈ S a homomorphism hs of game G ∈ Ki n t os o m e
game Hs ∈Kis given.
Deﬁnition 4. A family of homomorphisms (hs)s∈S is said to be covariantly com-
plete if for each x ∈ OptG there exists such index s ∈ S that hs(x) ∈ OptHs.
A family of homomorphisms (hs)s∈S is said to be contravariantly complete if the
condition hs(x) ∈ OptHs for all s ∈ S implies x ∈ OptG.
It is easy to see that the following result is true.
Lemma 1. (α) A family of homomorphisms (hs)s∈S is a covariantly complete fam-






(β) A family of homomorphisms (hs)s∈S is a conravariantly complete family of






Now consider the case when an optimality concept is the concept of equilibrium.
We have
Lemma 2. (α) For equilibrium, strict homomorphisms are contravariant homo-
morphisms.
(β) For Nash equilibrium, homomorphisms ”onto” are covariant homomor-
phisms.
According to lemmas 1 and 2, for a given game with ordered outcomes, a descrip-
tion of the set its equilibrium points can be reduced to ﬁnding of certain covariantly
complete family of strict homomorphisms. In fact, such a manner indirectly was used
by Shapley (1959) for antagonistic games with vector payoﬀs. In the present paper
we apply this method for description of equilibrium points and Nash equilibrium
points of some important classes of games with ordered or quasi-ordered outcomes.
In the second section we get some generalizations of results Shapley (1959) for
mixed extensions of non-cooperative games with vector payoﬀs. In the third section
we study games with ordered outcomes in the normal form. The ﬁrst problem for
games of this class is an extension of order relation to the set of probability mea-
sures. In this paper we use so-called canonical extension introduced by the author
(1976). An eﬀective form of the canonical extension is given in Theorem 4 (see also
corollary 3). The main result of the present work is Theorem 6. This theorem states
that there exists an isomorphism from mixed extension of a given game with ordered
outcomes into mixed extension of some game with vector payoﬀs. Combining this
result with Theorem 1, we obtain a complete description for the set of equilibrium
points of games with ordered outcomes. The last result is illustrated by an example.372 Victor V. Rozen
2. Games with vector payoﬀs
An important subclass of games with ordered outcomes forms class of games with
vector payoﬀs. To introduce this class of games it is necessary, as the ﬁrst step, to
ﬁx a certain order relation on IR
m. In this paper we consider two following orderings
of IR
m :
(u1,...,u m)   (v1,...,vm) ⇐⇒ uk   vk for all k =1 ,...,m;( 7 )
(u1,...,u m) ≤ (v1,...,vm) ⇐⇒ (u1,...,u m)=( v1,...,vm)
or uk <v k for all k =1 ,...,m.
(8)
Formally, a game G with vector payoﬀs can be given as follows. Let N =
{1,...,n} be a set of players, Xi a set of strategies for player i. Suppose mi be
a number of components in vector evaluation of situations by player i. Then the set
of outcomes in game G may be regarded as IR
m1 × ...× IR
mn and the realization













i (x)) ∈ IR
mi. For any i =1 ,...,nand x, y ∈ X put
F(x)  i F(y) ⇐⇒ Fi(x)   Fi(y); (9)
F(x) ≤i F(y) ⇐⇒ Fi(x) ≤ Fi(y). (10)
Remark 4. For a game with vector payoﬀs, we must indicate in the sense of which
ordering (9) or (10) preferences of the players are considered. Note also that formally
any game with vector payoﬀs is a game with quasi-ordered outcomes.
For a ﬁnite game G with vector payoﬀs, its mixed extension G is deﬁned as
mixed extension of each its component. Namely, in game G a set of strategies for
player i is the set   Xi, consisting of probability distributions (or probability vectors)








deﬁned as follows. Given n–tuple of probability distributions
p =( p1,...,p n) ∈
 
i∈N
  Xi;Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 373




















Let G be a ﬁnite game with vector payoﬀs. With arbitrary n–tuple of vectors of
the type





there is associated a numerical game
Gc =  N, (Xi)i∈N, (Fci)i∈N 
where a payoﬀ function for player i =1 ,...,nis deﬁned by Fci(x)=( ci,F i(x)) (we
denote by ( , ) the standard scalar product of two vectors). We say that game is the
convolution of game G by means of n–tuple of vectors c =( c1,...,c n).
Now we state some results for games with vector payoﬀs in which preferences
for players are given by (17). We ﬁrst suppose that for game G the set of optimal
solutions is the set of equilibrium points in its mixed extension and also for numerical
game Gc. We denote by IR
mi
> the set of mi–dimensional vectors with strict positive
components.
Theorem 1. Let G be a ﬁnite game with vector payoﬀs. Then
(1) For any vector














ψc(u)=ψc(u1,...,u n)=( ( c1,u 1),...,(cn,u n)), (11)
is a contravariant homomorphism of mixed extension of game G into mixed exten-
sion of game Gc.
(2) The family of homomorphisms






is covariantly complete.374 Victor V. Rozen
Proof (of theorem 1).
( 1 )W eﬁ r s tp r o v et h a tψc is a strict homomorphism. It is enough to verify
the strict isotonic condition and the commutative condition (see remark 3). Indeed,
assume that for two vectors u =( u1,...,u n)a n dv =( v1,...,v n) ∈ IR
m1×...×IR
mn
u  i v holds. This means that ui   vi, i.e. uk
i   vk
i for all k =1 ,...,m i and uk
i <v k
i
at least once; because all components of vector ci =( c1
i,...,c
mi
i )a r ep o s i t i v e ,w eg e t
(ci,u i) < (ci,v i), that is ψc(u) <i ψc(v). It remains to be shown the commutative
condition, i.e.
ψc ◦ F = Fc, (12)
where F is the realization function in mixed extension of game G and Fc is the










Setting ci =( c1
i,...,c
mi

































which was to be proved. According to Lemma 2(α), we obtain the part (1). The
proof of the part (2) is based on the following geometrical fact.
Lemma 3. Suppose P is a polyhedron in IR
m which contains 0 and does not contain
of semi-positive points (i.e. points u  = 0 with u   0). Then there exists, for P at 0,
a supporting hyperplane with strict positive normal vector.
It easy to reduce the assertion of lemma 3 to analogous fact for closed cones
(see Nikaido (1968), Theorem 3.6). Let us show (7). Let p0 =( p0
1,...,p 0
n)b ea n
equilibrium point in mixed extension of game G. Denote by Si(p0) a polyhedron ge-
nerated by the points of the form p0   xi,x i ∈ Xi : Si(p0)=conv{p0   xi : xi ∈ Xi}.
It is easy to show that Si(p0)={p0   pi : pi ∈   Xi}. Because Fi is a linear mapping
of   X1 × ...×   Xn into IR
mi, it transforms the polyhedron Si(p0)i n t op o l y h e d r o n
Fi(Si(p0)) ⊆ IR
mi. From the deﬁnition 1 and (9) it follows that p0 is an equilibrium
point if and only if polyhedron Fi(Si(p0)) − Fi(p0) does not contain of semi-positive
points. Then, by lemma 3, for polyhedron Fi(Si(p0)) − Fi(p0)a t0, there exists a
supporting hyperplane with strictly positive normal vector ci ∈ IR
mi
> , hence for any
i =1 ,...,n we have (ci, Fi(p0   pi) − Fi(p0))   0 and by commutative conditionEquilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 375
(12), the last inequality is equivalent to Fci(p0   pi)   Fci(p0). Thus, p0 is Nash







which completes the proof of Theorem 1.    
By using lemmas 1(α)a n d2 ( α), we have
Corollary 1. Let Eq(G) be the set of equilibrium points in mixed extension of a
ﬁnite game G with vector payoﬀs, NEq(Gc) be the set of Nash equilibrium points









Note that in the case of an antagonistic game with vector payoﬀs it is the result
of Shapley (1959).
Now we consider a description of the set of Nash equilibrium points in mixed
extension of game G with vector payoﬀs. As above, we suppose that preferences on
vector outcomes are given by (17). We denote by IR
mi
 the set of mi–dimensional
vectors with non-negative components.








the mapping ψc deﬁned by (11) is a covariant homomorphism from mixed extension
of game G into mixed extension of game Gc








Proof (of theorem 2).
A proof of the part (1) is the same as in Theorem 1. To proof the part (2),
assume that the situation in mixed strategies











We have to prove that p is Nash equilibrium in G. Otherwise the
condition F(p   qi)  i F(p) does not hold for some i ∈ N and qi ∈ Xi.
By (17) it follows that Fk
i (p   qi) >F k
i (p)f o rs o m ek =1 ,...,m i holds. Take376 Victor V. Rozen
the vector c =( c1,...,c n) ∈ IR
m1
 × ...× IR
mn
 where ck
i =1 a n d c
j
i =0 f o r
j =1 ,...,m i,j = k. Using commutative condition (12), we obtain
Fci(p   qi)=( ci, Fi(p   qi)) = Fk
i (p   qi) >Fk
i (p)=( ci, Fi(p)) = Fci(p).
The inequality Fci(p   qi) > Fci(p) is in contradiction with our assumption that p
is Nash equilibrium in game Gc. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.    
By using lemmas 1(β)a n d2 ( β), we get
Corollary 2. Let NEq(G) be the set of Nash equilibrium point in game G,









Let us note some results concerning of games with vector payoﬀs in which pref-
erences for players are given by (8).
Theorem 3. Consider a game with vector payoﬀs
G =  N, (Xi)i∈N, IR
m1 × ...× IR
mn, (≤i)i∈I,F .
Suppose the set of optimal solutions for G is the set of equilibrium points in its
mixed extension, the set of optimal solutions for Gc is the set of Nash equilibrium
points in its mixed extension. Then
(1) For any vector






a mapping ψc deﬁned by (11) is a contravariant homomorphism from mixed exten-
sion of game G into mixed extension of game Gc.








The proof of the part (1) is like that in Theorem 1. The proof of the part (2) is
based on the following known result (for instance, see Nikaido (1968), Theorem 3.5):
Lemma 4. Suppose P is a polyhedron in IR
m which contains 0 and does not contain
of positive vectors (i.e., vectors u  = 0 with u ≥ 0). Then, for P at 0, there exists a
supporting hyperplane with non negative normal vector.
3. Games with ordered outcomes
3.1. Canonical extension of order to the set of probability measures
To construct a mixed extension of a game with ordered outcomes, it is necessary the
orders, which represent preferences of the players, to extend on set of probability
measures. Now we consider such a problem in a general case. In this work, we assume
that a set of outcomes A is ﬁnite; put A = {a1,...,a r}, then a probability measure µEquilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 377
over A can be presented as r–dimensional probability vector µ =( µ(a1),...,µ(ar)),
where




We denote by   A the set of all probability vectors over A. Let ω be an order re-
lation on A and C0(ω) be the set of all isotonic mappings from the ordered set
(A, ω)i n t oI R . Each f ∈ C0(ω) also can be presented as r–dimensional vector:
f =( f(a1),...,f(ar)). Given a pair (f, µ), where f ∈ C0(ω)a n dµ ∈   A, deﬁne f(µ)
as scalar product of these vectors: f(µ)=( f, µ). With any subset H ⊆ C0(ω)w e
associate an relation ωH on set   A as follows:
µ  ω
H
ν ⇐⇒ (∀f ∈ H)f(µ)   f(ν). (15)
The relation ωH is said to be an extension of order ω on set of probability mea-
sures by means of subset H. An extension of ω by means of set C0(ω) of all iso-
tonic mappings is called a canonical extension of order ω and will be denoted
by ω: ω = ωC0(ω). Obviously, ω is the smallest extension of the form ωH with
H ⊆ C0(ω). We denote by C2(ω) the set of all isotonic mappings from the ordered
set (A, ω) into two-element set {0, 1}.
Theorem 4. The extensions of order ω by means of the set C2(ω) and by means
of the set C0(ω) are the same, that is, ωC
2(ω) = ωC0(ω) = ω.
The proof of this theorem is based on two following lemmas.
Lemma 5. For any subset H ⊆ C0(ω) the condition ωconeH = ωH holds, where
coneH i st h ec o n v e xc o n i ch u l lo fs u b s e tH.
Indeed, the inclusion ωconeH ⊆ ωH is evident. Let us prove the converse in-
clusion. Assume that for two probability vectors µ, ν ∈   A the condition µ  ω
H
ν
holds. It is necessary to show that inequality f(µ)   f(ν) for any f ∈ coneH holds.


























which was to be proved.
Lemma 6. Let C+(ω) be the set of all non-negative isotonic mappings of the or-
dered set (A, ω) into IR. Then coneC2(ω)=C+(ω).378 Victor V. Rozen
Proof (of lemma 6). Since C+(ω) is an convex cone and C+(ω) ⊇ C2(ω),
we get coneC2(ω) ⊆ C+(ω). To prove the converse inclusion, consider a
function f ∈ C+(ω)a n dl e t0   r1 <r 2 <...<r t be all its values. De-
note by Ak = {a ∈ A: f(a)   rk} and XAk the characteristic function of sub-
set Ak (k =1 ,...,t). It is easy to show that the following decomposition of function
f holds:
f = r1XA1 +( r2 − r1)XA2 + ...+( rt − rt−1)XAt. (16)
Because set Ak satisﬁes the majorant stability condition, XAk ∈ C2(ω) holds, and
using (16), we obtain f ∈ coneC2(ω).    
Let us prove Theorem 4. The inclusion ωC0(ω) ⊆ ωC
2(ω) is trivial. Now as-
sume that µ   ν under order ωC
2(ω). By using lemmas 5 and 6, we ob-
tain that holds µ   ν under order ωC
+(ω), i.e. f(µ)   f(ν) for each non-
negative isotonic mapping f from the ordered set (A, ω)i n t oI R .L e tf0
be arbitrary isotonic mapping from (A, ω) into IR. Then for some pos-
itive constant α>0w eg e t( f0 + α) ∈ C+(ω), hence f0 + α(µ)   f0 + α(ν),
i.e. (f0,µ )+( α, µ)   (f0,ν )+( α, ν). Since (α, µ)=( α, ν)=α, we obtain
f0(µ)   f0(ν). This complete a proof of Theorem 4.
Corollary 3. The condition µ
ω
  ν holds if and only if the inequality µ(B)   ν(B)
satisﬁes for any majorant stable subset B of ordered set (A, ω).
(Recall that a subset B ⊆ A is called majorant stable in ordered set (A, ω)i ft h e
condition: a ∈ B, a    a ⇒ a  ∈ B holds).
For the proof it suﬃces to remark that isotonic mappings of an ordered set (A, ω)
into {0, 1} are exactly the characteristic functions its majorant stable subsets.
3.2. Nash equilibrium points for games with ordered outcomes
Consider a ﬁnite game G with ordered outcomes
G =  N, (Xi)i∈N,A ,(ωi)i∈N,F . (17)
A mixed extension of game G is deﬁned as a game   G of the form
  G =  N, (   Xi)i∈N,   A, (ωi)i∈N,   F  (18)
in which   Xi is the set of probability measures on Xi,   A is the set of probability mea-
sures on A, ωi is the canonical extension of order ωi on   A and realization function
  F is given as follows: for any situation in mixed strategies




we deﬁne a measure   F(p)=Fp as the image of the product p1 × ...× pn under F.







p1(x1) · ...· pn(xn), (19)
where x =( x1,...,x n).Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 379
It is evident that Fp(a) is the probability of appearance of the outcome a in
situation p. Mixed extension of a game with ordered outcomes also is a game with
ordered outcomes.
Let G be a game with ordered outcomes of the form (17); we assume that for any
i ∈ N, a mapping ψi: A → IR is given. Putting ψ =( ψ1,...,ψ n), we can construct
a numerical game Gψ with payoﬀs functions:
Gψ =  N, (Xi)i∈N, (ψi ◦ F)i∈N .
Theorem 5. For any game G with ordered outcomes, the set NEq(   G) of Nash
equilibrium points in its mixed extension can be presented in the form






where C0(ωi) is the set of all isotonic mappings from the ordered set (A, ωi) into IR
and NEq(   G) is the set of Nash equilibrium points in mixed extension of game Gψ.
Lemma 7. Denote by ψi ◦ F the payoﬀ function in mixed extension of game Gψ.
Then for any situation in mixed strategies





ψi ◦ F(p)=ψi(Fp) (21)
holds.




















To prove (21) we note that the condition p0 ∈ NEq(   G) holds if and only if for
any i ∈ N measure Fp0 is a greatest element in subset {Fp0 pi : pi ∈   Xi} under order
ωi, that is ψi(Fp0)   ψi(Fp0 pi) for any ψi ∈ C0(ωi). By lemma 7 this inequality can
be represented in the form ψi ◦ F(p0)   ψi ◦ F(p0   pi). Since ψi ◦ F is the payoﬀ
function for player i in game Gψ, the last inequality means that p0 is an equilibrium
point in Gψ.
Remark 5. It is evident that for any ψi ∈ C0(ωi) function ψi is an isotonic map-
ping of the ordered set (   A, ωi) into IR; since (21), in fact, is the commutative
condition, we conclude that mapping ψ deﬁned by ψ(µ)=( ψ1(µ),...,ψn(µ)) is a
homomorphism of game   G into game Gψ (see Remark 3). From lemmas 1(β)a n d
7 it follows that the family {ψ: ψi ∈ C0(ωi),i∈ N} is a contravariantly complete
family of covariant homomorphisms.380 Victor V. Rozen
3.3. A description of equilibrium points in mixed extension of a game
with ordered outcomes
We shall now prove the main result of this paper, Theorem 6. This theorem states
an important connection between games with ordered outcomes and simple games
with vector payoﬀs (a game with vector payoﬀs is called simple, if the components
of vector valuation of its outcomes are 0 and 1 only) and also between their mixed
extensions. Namely, we prove that mixed extension of a game with ordered outcomes
and mixed extension of some simple game with payoﬀ functions are isomorphic; it
follows that solutions of these games coincide. Since solutions for a game with
vector payoﬀs in the form of equilibrium points in its mixed extension are given by
Theorem 1, we obtain immediately solutions for a game with ordered outcomes.
Consider a ﬁnite game with ordered outcomes of the form (17). For each
i =1 ,...,n let A1
i,...,A
mi
i be a list of all majorant stable subsets in the





i (a)), where θ
j
i is the characteristic function of subset
A
j





1i f a ∈ A
j
i
0o t h e r w i s e .
(22)
Given a game G with ordered outcomes of the form (17), we construct a simple
game Gvect with vector payoﬀs as follows. In game Gvect strategies for player i is








i (F(x))). We suppose that preferences for play-
ers in game Gvect are presented by (17). As above, we denote by   G mixed extension
of game G and by G
vect
mixed extension of game Gvect.
Furthermore, we introduce a notion of convolution of a game. Given a game
with ordered outcomes G =  N, (Xi)i∈N,A ,(ωi)i∈N,F  and an arbitrary n–tuple
of functions ψ =( ψ1,...,ψ n)w h e r eψi: A → IR, we can construct a numerical game
Gψ =  N, (Xi)i∈N, (ψi ◦ F)i∈N , which is called a convolution of game G by means
of n–tuple function ψ. For a game Gvect with vector payoﬀs, its convolution is
deﬁned by means of vector





(see sec. 2); in this case a payoﬀ function of player i is deﬁned as scalar product:
Fci(x)=( ci,F i(x)).
Given a game G with ordered outcomes and a vector ci =( c1
i,...,c
mi
i ) ∈ IR
mi,












i is a list of all majorant stable subsets in the ordered set (A, ωi).Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 381
Theorem 6. Suppose G is a ﬁnite game with ordered outcomes of the form (17).
Let Gvect be a game with vector payoﬀs deﬁned above. Then
(1) The convolution of game Gvect by means of vector









c = Gψc. (25)
Moreover for any vector c =( c1
i,...,c
mi
i ) ∈ IR
mi
> ,f u n c t i o nψci is strict isotonic un-
der order ωi and conversely for any strict isotonic function ψ: A → IR there exists
av e c t o rci ∈ IR
mi
> such that the equality ψ = ψci holds up to a constant.
(2) Mixed extension of game G and mixed extension of game Gvect are isomor-
phic:   G ∼ = G
vect
.
Proof (of theorem 6). (1) Indeed, ψci ◦ F is the payoﬀ function for player i in
game Gψc.D e n o t eb yFvect
ci the payoﬀ function for player i in game Gvect
c .F o r
any situation x ∈ X we have
Fvect
















i = ψci(F(x)) = ψci ◦ F(x).
Thus, Fvect
ci = ψci ◦ F which was to be proved. The ”moreover part” it follows from
lemma:
Lemma 8. Let (A, ω) be an arbitrary ﬁnite ordered set and A1,...,A m be a list
of all its majorant stable subsets. Associate with any vector c ∈ IR
m af u n c t i o n








(a) For arbitrary c ∈ IR
m
>, function ψc is a strict isotonic mapping of the ordered
set (A, ω) into IR;
(b) Any strict isotonic mapping ψ of the ordered set (A, ω) into IR can be rep-
resented up to a constant mapping in the form ψ = ψc for some vector c ∈ IR
m
>.
Proof (of lemma 8).
(a) Suppose a1 <ω a2. Then every majorantstable set containing a1 also contains
element a2 but converse is false; since all components of vector c are positive, we
get ψc(a1) <ψ c(a2).
(b) We ﬁrst consider the case when all values of function ψ are positive. From (16)
it follows that for a vector c ∈ IR
m
 whose components are the coeﬃcients of the cor-
responding XAk, the equality ψ = ψc holds. Let us show that the equality ψ = ψc
∗
holds for some positive vector c∗ ∈ IR
m
>. Put ψ0 = ψc0, where c0 =( 1 ,...,1) ∈ IR
m
>,382 Victor V. Rozen
then there exists δ>0 such that function ψ − δψc0 remains isotonic and posi-
tive. As above, the equality ψ − δψc0 = ψc1 for some vector c1 ∈ IR
m
 holds, hence
ψ = δψc0 + ψc1 = ψ(δc0+c1). It remains to observe that (δc0 + c1) ∈ IR
m
> holds. Thus
we obtain the required statement in the case ψ is positive. In the opposite case
consider a mapping ψ + α, where α =m a x a∈A |ψ(a)|, then we have the required
equality up to a constant.    
The proof of the part (2) is based on the following two lemmas.






i (µ)) is an isomorphism of the ordered set (   A, ωi) into


















by using Corollary 3, we have
µ1  ωi µ2 ⇔ (∀j =1 ,...,m i) µ1(A
j
i)   µ2(A
j
i) ⇔
(∀j =1 ,...,m i) θ
j
i(µ1)   θ
j
i(µ2) ⇔ θi(µ1)   θi(µ2)
which was to be proved.
Lemma 10. Suppose   F is the realization function in game   G, F
vect
is the realiza-
tion function in game G
vect
,t h e n
θ ◦   F = F
vect
. (26)
To prove (26) it suﬃces to verify it for each component i =1 ,...,n.Indeed, for








i ◦   F(p)=θ
j





















Because the last sum is the j–th component of vector F
vect
i (p), we obtain
θi ◦   F(p)=F
vect
i (p), i.e. θi ◦   F = F
vect
i hence θ ◦   F = F
vect
.
To prove the part (2) of Theorem 6, we observe that (26) is, in fact, the com-
mutative condition for mapping θ;t h e nf r o mL e m m a9a n dR e m a r k3i tf o l l o w s
that mapping θ is an isomorphism from game   G into game G
vect
. This complete
the proof of Theorem 6.    Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 383
Corollary 4. Let NEq(G
vect
c ) be the set of Nash equilibrium points in mixed ex-
tension of game Gvect
c . Denote by C(ωi) the set of strict isotonic mapping of the
ordered set (A, ωi) into IR. Then according to Theorem 1 and Theorem 6, the set
Eq(   G) of equilibrium points in mixed extension of game G can be presented as
follows:
















Note that equality (28) was ﬁrst proved by Rozen (1976). The case when G is a
ﬁnite game with linearly ordered outcomes has been settled by Yanovskaya (1974).
It should be noted that statement (28) can be proved also from Theorem A of
Aumann (1964).
4. An example
In this section we consider one example which is an illustration of Theorem 6. We
construct a game G of two players with ordered outcomes in the following way.
Let X = {x1,x 2,x 3} be a set of strategies for player 1, Y = {y1,y 2} be a set of
strategies for player 2 and A = {a, b, c, d} be a set of outcomes. The realization
function F is given by Table 1. The realization structure of game G is represented
by the four of objects  X, Y, A, F . Deﬁne now evaluation structure of game G as
follows. Assume that players evaluate the outcomes under some criteria which they
measure in a certain ordinal scale with marks 2 < 3 < 4 < 5. Suppose player 1 use
criteria p1,p 2, player 2 use criteria q1,q 2 and valuations of outcomes by players 1
and 2 are given in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.
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In general case, preference relations for players are deﬁned by means of certain
decision rules.I nt h i sp a p e r ,w eu s ePareto dominance as a basic decision rule.
Then preferences of players 1 and 2 are order relations ω1,ω 2 represented by their











Figure2. Diagram of order ω2
Thus, the evaluation structure of game G is represented by the three of objects
 A, ω1,ω 2 . We consider the equilibrium points as optimal solutions of game G.Equilibrium Points in Games with Ordered Outcomes 385
Obviously, game G have not equilibrium points in pure strategies. Solutions in
mixed strategies are founded according to Theorem 6. As the ﬁst step, we need to
construct a game with vector payoﬀs Gvect. Using diagrams of orderings ω1 and ω2
(see Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), we ﬁnd all majorant stable subsets in the ordered set (A, ω1)
(see α) and in the ordered set (A, ω2)( s e eβ):
(α): A1
1 = {a, b, c, d},A 2
1 = {b, d},A 3
1 = {c, d},A 4
1 = {d},A 5
1 = {b, c, d}
(β): A
1
2 = {a, b, c},A
2






2 = {a, c},
A6
2 = {a, b, c, d}.
Now we deﬁne a realization function Fvect of game Gvect by Table 4 according
to formula (23).




x1 ((1,0,0,0,0), (1,1,1,0,1,1)) ((1,1,1,1,1), (0,1,0,0,0,1))
x2 ((1,0,1,0,1), (1,1,0,1,1,1)) ((1,1,0,0,1), (1,0,0,0,0,1))
x3 ((1,1,1,1,1), (0,1,0,0,0,1)) ((1,0,1,0,1), (1,1,0,1,1,1))
The convolution of game Gvect by means of a vector











2)) is a game Gvect
c with payoﬀ functions
whose realization function is given by the following Table 5.




























































































c ) be the set of all Nash equilibrium points in the mixed extension
of game Gvect
c (note that NEq(G
vect
c )  = ∅ by Theorem of Nash). According to
Theorem 6, the set of all equilibrium points in mixed extension of game G is the
set-theoretical union of the family NEq(G
vect
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Abstract In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The
main optimality concept for such games is concept of equilibrium. We in-
troduce a notion of homomorphism for games with preference relations and
study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points of games
which are in a homomorphic relation. The main result is ﬁnding covariantly
and contravariantly complete families of homomorphisms.
Keywords: homomorphism, equilibrium points, Nash equilibrium, game
with preference relations.
1. Introduction
In this paper we study games in which a valuation structure by preference relations
is given.
We can consider a n-person game with preference relations as a system of the
form
G =  X1,...,X n,A ,ρ 1,...,ρ n,F  (1)
where Xi is a set of strategies of player i (i =1 ,...,n), A is a set of outcomes,
ρi ⊆ A2 is a preference relation of player i(i =1 ,...,n) and realization function F
is a mapping of set of situations X = X1 × ...× Xn in set of outcomes A.
The main optimality concept for games of this class are various modiﬁcations
of Nash equilibrium. We introduce a concept of equilibrium as a generalization of
Nash equilibrium for games of the form (1). We consider equilibrium and Nash
equilibrium as optimal solutions for games with preference relations. The basic
subject of research in our paper are homomorphisms of certain types. It is important
that homomorphisms preserve optimal solutions of some types. The main results of
the present work are theorems concerning connections between optimal solutions of
games which are in a homomorphic relation.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Basic concepts for preference structures
A preference structure on a set A can be given as a pair  A,ρ  where ρ is arbitrary
reﬂexive binary relation on A.
The condition (a1,a 2) ∈ ρ means that element a1 is less preference than a2.
Given a preference relation ρ ⊆ A2,w ed e n o t eρs = ρ∩ρ−1 its symmetric part and
ρ∗ = ρ\ρs its strict part.
We write388 Tatiana F. Savina
a1
ρ
  a2 instead of (a1,a 2) ∈ ρ,
a1
ρ
∼ a2 instead of (a1,a 2) ∈ ρs,
a1
ρ
<a 2 instead of (a1,a 2) ∈ ρ∗.
Remark 1. Conditions a1
ρ
  a2 and a2
ρ
<a 1 are not compatible.
In this paper we consider some important types of preference structures: tran-
sitive, antisymmetric, linear, acyclic, ordinal.
Deﬁnition 1. A preference structure  A,ρ  is called
– transitive if for any a1,a 2,a 3 ∈ A
(a1,a 2) ∈ ρ ∧ (a2,a 3) ∈ ρ ⇒ (a1,a 3) ∈ ρ;
– antisymmetric if for any a1,a 2 ∈ A
(a1,a 2) ∈ ρ ∧ (a2,a 1) ∈ ρ ⇒ a1 = a2;
– linear if for any a1,a 2 ∈ A
(a1,a 2) ∈ ρ ∨ (a2,a 1) ∈ ρ;
– acyclic if for any n =2 ,3,...and a1,...,a n ∈ A
(a1,a 2) ∈ ρ ∧ ...∧ (an−1,a n) ∈ ρ ∧ (an,a 1) ∈ ρ ⇒ a1 = a2 = ...= an;
– ordinal if axioms of transitivity and antisymmetry hold.
Remark 2. An ordinal preference structure  A,ρ  is a transitive and acyclic one
and the converse is true.
Thus, transitive preference structure and acyclic one are a natural generalization
of ordinal preference structure.
Deﬁnition 2. Let  A,ρ  be a preference structure and ε be an equivalence relation



















2.2. Homomorphisms of preference structures
Let  A,ρ  and  B,σ  be two preference structures.
Deﬁnition 3. A mapping ψ: A → B is called a homomorphism of the ﬁrst struc-
ture into the second one if for any a1,a 2 ∈ A the condition
a1
ρ
  a2 ⇒ ψ(a1)
σ
  ψ(a2)( 2 )
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A homomorphism ψ: A → B is said to be a homomorphism ”onto” if ψ is a
mapping of A onto B.









∼ a2 ⇒ ψ(a1)
σ ∼ ψ(a2). (4)
A homomorphism ψ is called regular if the following two conditions
ψ(a1)
σ




σ ∼ ψ(a2) ⇒ ψ(a1)=ψ(a2). (6)
hold.
Remark 3. For any homomorphism the condition (4) holds. Indeed, let ψ be a
homomorphism from A into B and a1
ρ





  a2 and a2
ρ
  a1. Hence, ψ(a1)
σ
  ψ(a2)a n dψ(a2)
σ
  ψ(a1) hold, i.e.
ψ(a1)
σ ∼ ψ(a2).
Remark 4. Any strict homomorphism is a homomorphism but the converse is
false.
Let  A,ρ  be a preference structure and ε ⊆ A2 an equivalence relation.
Deﬁnition 4. A factor-structure for preference structure  A,ρ  is a pair
 A/ε, ρ/ε  where we denote for any C1,C 2 ∈ A/ε:
(C1,C 2) ∈ ρ/ε
def ⇐⇒ (∃a1 ∈ C1,a 2 ∈ C2)( a1,a 2) ∈ ρ.
Lemma 1 (about homomorphisms of preference structures).
Let  A,ρ  be a preference structure, ε be an equivalence relation on A.
Then
1. a canonical mapping ψ: a → [a]ε is a homomorphism from preference structure
 A,ρ  onto factor-structure  A/ε, ρ/ε ;















  a 
1
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
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  a2. Then according to deﬁnition of factor relation we have
[a1]ε
ρ/ε
  [a2]ε. Hence, ψ is a homomorphism. Since a canonical homomorphism
is a homomorphism ”onto”, we obtain the proof of the part (1) of the Lemma.
2. Let a canonical homomorphism ψ be strict and the implication condition (17)
is satisﬁed. Suppose a1
ρ
<a 2. Since a canonical homomorphism is strict by
condition of the Lemma then [a1]ε
ρ/ε




  a 
1 it follows that [a 
2]ε
ρ/ε
  [a 
1]ε.A s[ a1]ε =[ a 












The last system of conditions cannot be true (because of remark 1). Hence, our
assumption is not true and since a1
ρ
  a2 we get a1
ρ
∼ a2.
Conversely, suppose that the condition (17) holds. We have to prove that a
canonical homomorphism is strict. Indeed, take two elements a1,a 2 for which
a1
ρ
<a 2 takes place, hence a1
ρ
  a2. By the part (1) of this Lemma [a1]ε
ρ/ε
  [a2]ε
holds. We assume that [a2]ε
ρ/ε






≡ a1,a  
2
ε
≡ a2, condition a 
2
ρ
  a 
1 holds. In this case, all assumptions of
condition (17) are satisﬁed and by (17) we have a1
ρ
∼ a2, which is contradictory
to a1
ρ
<a 2.T h u s ,[ a2]ε
ρ/ε
  [a1]ε does not take place and we get [a1]ε
ρ/ε
< [a2]ε.
So, the ﬁrst condition of homomorphism (3) for canonical homomorphism is
satisﬁed. By remark 3 ψ is a strict homomorphism.Homomorphisms and Congruence Relationsfor Games with Preference Relations 391
3. Suﬃce to verify that for regular homomorphism ψ its kernel εψ satisﬁes (8) and
(9). Suppose ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨

















<a 2 it follows that a1
ρ
  a2 then ψ(a1)
σ
  ψ(a2). Assume that
ψ(a1)
σ ∼ ψ(a2); by using (11) we get ψ(a1)=ψ(a2), i.e. a1
εψ
≡ a2 is in contra-
diction with our assumptions. Hence, ψ(a1)
σ









2 which was to be proved.










  ψ(a 
1).
Hence, ψ(a1)





< [a2]ε.T h e n[ a1]ε
ρ/ε
  [a2]ε that is there exist such
elements a 
1,a  
2 that a 
1
ε
≡ a1,a  
2
ε
≡ a2 and a 
1
ρ
  a 
2. The condition a 
2
ρ
  a 
1
does not hold otherwise [a 
2]ε
ρ/ε
  [a 
1]ε, i.e. [a2]ε
ρ/ε
  [a1]ε; it is contradiction








2 does not hold, hence the
conditions ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨

















hold. According to (8) we obtain a1
ρ
<a 2.
Now verify (11). Suppose [a1]ε
ρ/ε
∼ [a2]ε, i.e. there exist elements a 





2,a   
2
ε











  a  
1.




2, i.e. [a1]ε =[ a2]ε, which was to be proved.
   
Lemma 2. Let  A,ρ  be a preference structure, ε be an equivalence relation on A.
Factor-structure of preferences  A/ε, ρ/ε  is transitive if and only if the inclusion
ρ ◦ ε ◦ ρ ⊆ ε ◦ ρ ◦ ε (10)
holds.392 Tatiana F. Savina
Proof (of lemma).
Suppose (a1,a 3) ∈ ρ◦ε◦ρ. According to the deﬁnition of composition of binary
relations, then there exist such elements a2,a  
2 ∈ A that (a1,a 2) ∈ ρ, (a2,a  
2) ∈ ε,
(a 
2,a 3) ∈ ρ hold. Denote by C1 =[ a1]ε,C 2 =[ a2]ε =[ a 
2]ε,C 3 =[ a3]ε. According
to the deﬁnition of factor-relation we have (C1,C 2) ∈ ρ/ε, (C2,C 3) ∈ ρ/ε;s i n c e
the factor-relation is supposed to be transitive then (C1,C 3) ∈ ρ/ε.I tm e a n st h a t
for some a 
1 ∈ C1,a  
3 ∈ C3,( a 
1,a  
3) ∈ ρ is satisﬁed. As a 
1
ε
≡ a1,a  
3
ε
≡ a3 we get
(a1,a 3) ∈ ε ◦ ρ ◦ ε which was to be proved.
Conversely, let the inclusion (10) be held. Let us take three classes C1,C 2,C 3 ∈
A/ε for which (C1,C 2) ∈ ρ/ε, (C2,C 3) ∈ ρ/ε. Then there exist the elements a1 ∈
C1,a 2 ∈ C2,a  
2 ∈ C2,a 3 ∈ C3 such that (a1,a 2) ∈ ρ, (a 




get (a1,a 3) ∈ ρ ◦ ε ◦ ρ. Hence, according to (10), (a1,a 3) ∈ ε ◦ ρ ◦ ε.I tm e a n st h a t
there exist the elements a1, a3 ∈ A such that (a1,a1) ∈ ε,(a1,a3) ∈ ρ,(a3,a 3) ∈ ε.
Then ([a1]ε, [a3]ε) ∈ ρ/ε and as [a3]ε =[ a3]ε = C3, [a1]ε =[ a1]ε = C1 we get
(C1,C 3) ∈ ρ/ε which was to be proved.    
Corollary 1. Let  A,ρ  be a transitive preference structure, ε be an equivalence
relation on A.I fa tl e a s to n eo ft h ec o n d i t i o n sρ◦ε ⊆ ε◦ρ or ε◦ρ ⊆ ρ◦ε or ε ⊆ ρ
holds then factor-structure  A/ε, ρ/ε  is transitive.
Proof (of corollary).
1. Indeed, let for example the ﬁrst inclusion ρ ◦ ε ⊆ ε ◦ ρ be satisﬁed. Then
ρ◦ε◦ρ ⊆ (ρ◦ε) ◦ρ ⊆ (ε◦ρ) ◦ρ = ε◦ρ2 ⊆ ε◦ρ ⊆ ε◦ρ◦ε.A c c o r d i n gt oL e m m a2
factor-structure  A/ε, ρ/ε  is transitive.
2. Now let ε ⊆ ρ be satisﬁed. Multiplying the inclusion ε ⊆ ρ by ρ to the left
we have ρ ◦ ε ⊆ ρ ◦ ρ = ρ2 ⊆ ρ ⊆ ε ◦ ρ. Multiplying initial inclusion ε ⊆ ρ by ρ to
the right we obtain ε ◦ ρ ⊆ ρ ◦ ρ = ρ2 ⊆ ρ ◦ ε. From the inclusions proved we have
ρ ◦ ε = ε ◦ ρ, i.e. relations ρ and ε commute. From part (1) of the proof of this
corollary it follows that  A/ε, ρ/ε  is transitive.    
Lemma 3. Let  A,ρ  be a preference structure, ε be an equivalence relation on A.
Factor-structure  A/ε, ρ/ε  is acyclic if and only if ρ ∪ ε is acyclic under ε.
Proof (of lemma).
Remark 5. It is easy to verify that conditions
a0
ρ∪ε









  a 
0
ρ∪ε
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0
ε








Let the condition of the implication (12) be held. Put C0 =[ a0]ε =[ a 
0]ε,C 1 =
[a1]ε =[ a 
1]ε,...,C n =[ an]ε =[ a 
n]ε. According to the deﬁnition of factor-
relation we have (C0,C 1) ∈ ρ/ε, (C1,C 2) ∈ ρ/ε,...,(Cn,C 0) ∈ ρ/ε. Since factor-







≡ an.Homomorphisms and Congruence Relationsfor Games with Preference Relations 393
Conversely, let (12) be satisﬁed. Let us take classes C0,C 1,...,C n ∈ A/ε,
for which (C0,C 1) ∈ ρ/ε, (C1,C 2) ∈ ρ/ε,...,(Cn,C 0) ∈ ρ/ε. Then there ex-
ist elements a0 ∈ C0,a  
1 ∈ C1,a 1 ∈ C1,a  
2 ∈ C2,...,a n ∈ Cn,a  
0 ∈ C0 such
that (a0,a  
1) ∈ ρ, (a1,a  
2) ∈ ρ,...,(an,a  
0) ∈ ρ;s i n c ea 
i
ε







≡ an.I tm e a n st h a t[ a0]ε =[ a1]ε = ...=[ an]ε.A sC0 =[ a0]ε,C 1 =
[a1]ε,...,C n =[ an]ε we obtain C0 = C1 = ...= Cn. This completes the proof of
Lemma 3.    
3. Games with preference relations
3.1. Homomorphisms of games with preference relations
Consider two games with preference relations for players {1,...,n}:
G =  X1,...,X n,A ,ρ 1,...,ρ n,F  and Γ =  U1,...,U n,B ,σ 1,...,σ n,Φ  .
Deﬁnition 5. A( n + 1) system of mappings f =( ϕ1,...,ϕ n,ψ )w h e r ef o ra n y
i =1 ,...,n,ϕ i: Xi → Ui and ψ: A → B is called a homomorphism from game G
into game Γ if the following two conditions are satisﬁed:
for any i =1 ,...,nand a1,a 2 ∈ A
a1
ρi
  a2 ⇒ ψ(a1)
σi
  ψ(a2), (13)
ψ ◦ F = Φ ◦ (ϕ1...ϕn). (14)
Remark 6. For any situation x =( x1,...,x n) of game G condition (14) means
that ψ(F(x1,...,x n)) = Φ(ϕ1(x1),ϕ 2(x2),...,ϕ n(xn)).
A homomorphism f is said to be strict homomorphism if system of the conditions
a1
ρi
<a 2 ⇒ ψ(a1)
σi
<ψ (a2), (i =1 ,...,n) (15)
a1
ρi ∼ a2 ⇒ ψ(a1)
σi ∼ ψ(a2)( i =1 ,...,n) (16)
holds instead of condition (13).
A homomorphism f is said to be regular homomorphism if for any i =1 ,...,n,
mapping ψ is a regular homomorphism between the preference structures  A,ρi 
and  B,σi , that is the following two conditions
ψ(a1)
σi




σi ∼ ψ(a2) ⇒ ψ(a1)=ψ(a2). (18)
hold.
A homomorphism f is said to be homomorphism ”onto”,i fe a c hϕi(i =1 ,...,n)
is a mapping ”onto”; an isomorphic inclusion map,i fe a c hϕi (i =1 ,...,n)i so n e -
to-one function; an isomorphism, if for any i =1 ,...,n, ϕ i is one-to-one function




  a2 ⇔ ψ(a1)
σi
  ψ(a2) (19)
holds.394 Tatiana F. Savina
Deﬁnition 6. A( n + 1) system of equivalence relations ε =( ε1,...,ε n,ε )w h e r e
εi ⊆ X2
i (i =1 ,...,n),ε⊆ A2 is called congruence in game G if consistency condi-












⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬





≡ F(x1,...,x n). (20)
Congruence ε in game G is said to be str-congruence if consistency condition for















  a 
1
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
⇒ a1
ρi ∼ a2 (21)
holds.
Congruence ε in game G is said to be reg-congruence if the following two condi-
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1
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Deﬁnition 7. Let f =( ϕ1,...,ϕ n,ψ ) be a homomorphism from game G into
game Γ.A( n + 1) system of equivalence relations εf =( εϕ1,...,ε ϕn,ε ψ)w h e r e
for any i =1 ,...,n, εϕi is kernel of ϕi and εψ is kernel of ψ, is called kernel of
homomorphism f.
Theorem 1. Let G be a game with preference relations of the form (1) and ε be
a congruence in game G. Then we can deﬁne a factor-game G/ε with preference
relations by
G/ε =  X1/ε1,...,X n/εn,A /ε, ρ1/ε,...,ρ n/ε, Fε 
where realization function Fε([x1]ε1 ,...,[xn]εn)
df
=[ F(x1,...,x n)]ε .
1. Canonical homomorphism fε =( ϕε1,...,ϕ εn,ψ ε) where for any i =1 ,...,n,
ϕεi : Xi → Xi/εi and ψε: A → A/ε is a homomorphism from game G onto
game G/ε.Homomorphisms and Congruence Relationsfor Games with Preference Relations 395
2. Canonical homomorphism fε is strict if and only if congruence ε is str-congru-
ence.
3. Canonical homomorphism fε is regular if and only if congruence ε is reg-congru-
ence.
The proof of this Theorem is based on Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. Let G and Γ be two games with preference relations and a (n+1)sys-
tem of mappings f =( ϕ1,...,ϕ n,ψ ) be a homomorphism of game G onto game Γ.
Then
1. for a (n +1 ) –tuple of equivalence relations εf =( εϕ1,...,ε ϕn,ε ψ), where εf is
kernel of homomorphism f, consistency condition (20) holds. Hence, we can
construct factor-game G/εf;
2. there exists a (n +1 )system of mappings θ =( θ1,...,θ n,θ ) from game G/εf
into game Γ which is an isomorphic inclusion map from G/εf into Γ.
Proof (of theorem).
1. Let the condition of the implication (20) be held. Since εf is kernel of homo-
morphism f then for any i =1 ,...,n
x 
i
εϕi ≡ xi ⇔ ϕi(x 
i)=ϕi(xi),
a  εψ
≡ a ⇔ ψ(a )=ψ(a)
hold.
Let us prove that the equality ψ(F(x 
1,...,x  
n)) = ψ(F(x1,...,x n)) is true.
Since f is homomorphism, then ψ(F(x 
1,...,x  
n)) = Φ(ϕ1(x 
1),...,ϕ n(x 
n)) and
ψ(F(x1,...,x n)) = Φ(ϕ1(x1),...,ϕ n(xn)).
Thus, the equality Φ(ϕ1(x 
1),...,ϕ n(x 
n)) = Φ(ϕ1(x1),...,ϕ n(xn)) is obvious.
By using Theorem 1 we can construct factor-game G/εf and canonical homo-
morphism is a homomorphism from game G onto game G/εf.
2. We deﬁne isomorphic inclusion map θ =( θ1,...,θ n,θ ) from game G/εf into
game Γ by θi([xi]εϕi)=ϕi(xi) for any i =1 ,...,nand θ([a]εψ)=ψ(a).
First, we prove that all mappings θ1,...,θ n,θare one-to-one functions. For








εϕ1 ≡ x1 ⇔ [x
 
1]εϕ1 =[ x1]εϕ1.





∈ ρi/εψ then there exist a 
1
εψ






2)=ψ(a2)) such that (a 
1,a  
2) ∈ ρi.S i n c ef is a homo-
morphism, it follows that (ψ(a 
1),ψ(a 
2)) ∈ σi,t h a ti s( ψ(a1),ψ(a2)) ∈ σi.B y




∈ σi. Hence, condition of homomor-
phism (13) for θ holds.
Now we verify condition (14). We write
θ(Fε([x1]εϕ1,...,[xn]εϕn)) = θ([F(x1,...,x n)]εψ)=ψ(F(x1,...,x n)).
Since f is a homomorphism then
ψ(F(x1,...,x n)) = Φ(ϕ1(x1),...,ϕ n(xn)) = Φ(θ1([x1]εϕ1),...,θ n([xn]εϕn)).396 Tatiana F. Savina
Thus, θ =( θ1,...,θ n,θ ) is an isomorphic inclusion map from factor-game G/εf
into game Γ. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
   
Theorem 3. Let G be a game with preference relations of the form (1) and ε be
a congruence in game G. A factor-game G/ε is a game with transitive preference
structure if and only if for any i =1 ,...,nthe condition
ρi ◦ ε ◦ ρi ⊆ ε ◦ ρi ◦ ε
holds.
The proof of this Theorem is based on Lemma 2.
Theorem 4. Let G be a game with transitive preference structure, ε be a congru-
ence in game G.I ff o ra n yi =1 ,...,nat least one of the conditions ρi ◦ε ⊆ ε ◦ρi
or ε ◦ ρi ⊆ ρi ◦ ε or ε ⊆ ρi holds then a factor-game G/ε is a game with transitive
preference structure.
The proof of this Theorem is based on Corollary 1 of Lemma 2.
Theorem 5. Let G be a game with preference relations of the form (1) and ε be
a congruence in game G. A factor-game G/ε is a game with acyclic preference


















The proof of this Theorem is based on Lemma 3.
It is easy to see that the following results are true.
Theorem 6. A (n+1)–tuple of equivalence relations ε =( ε1,...,ε n,ε ) in game G
is kernel of some homomorphism from game G into a game with preference relations
if and only if ε is a congruence in game G.
Theorem 7. A (n+1)–tuple of equivalence relations ε =( ε1,...,ε n,ε ) in game G
is kernel of some strict homomorphism from game G into a game with preference
relations if and only if ε is a str-congruence in game G.
Theorem 8. A (n+1)–tuple of equivalence relations ε =( ε1,...,ε n,ε ) in game G
is kernel of some regular homomorphism from game G into a game with preference
relations if and only if ε is a reg-congruence in game G.
3.2. Equilibrium points in games with preference relations
Let G be a game with preference relations of the form (1). Any situation x ∈ X
can be given in the form x =( xi)i=1,...,n,w h e r exi is the i–th component of x.F o r
x 
i ∈ Xi,w ed e n o t eb yx   x 
i a situation whose i–th component is x 
i and other
components are the same as in x.Homomorphisms and Congruence Relationsfor Games with Preference Relations 397
Deﬁnition 8. As i t u a t i o nx ∈ X is called an equilibrium point in game G if such
i =1 ,...,nand x 
i ∈ Xi for which the condition
F(x)
ρi
<F(x   x 
i)
holds do not exist.
Nash equilibrium point is an equilibrium point x for which the outcomes F(x)
and F(x   x 
i) are comparable under preference relation ρi for any i =1 ,...,n.I n
this case it satisﬁes




Let K and K be two arbitrary classes of games with preference relations. Fix
in these classes certain optimality concepts and let OptG be the set of optimal
solutions of any game G ∈ K, OptΓ the set of optimal solutions of any game Γ ∈K .
If f is a homomorphism from G into Γ, then a correspondence between outcomes
(and also between strategies and between situations) of these games is given; we
denote this correspondence also by f.
Deﬁnition 9. A homomorphism f is said to be covariant,i ff–image of any optimal
solution in G is an optimal solution in Γ that is f(OptG) ⊆ OptΓ.
A homomorphism f is said to be contravariant,i ff–preimage of any optimal
solution in Γ is an optimal solution in G that is f−1(OptΓ) ⊆ OptG.
Now suppose that for each j ∈ J a homomorphism fj of game G ∈ Ki n t os o m e
game Γj ∈Kis given.
Deﬁnition 10. A family of homomorphisms (fj)j∈J is said to be covariantly com-
plete if for each x ∈ OptG there exists such index j ∈ J that fj(x) ∈ OptΓj.
A family of homomorphisms (fj)j∈J is said to be contravariantly complete if the
condition fj(x) ∈ OptΓj for all j ∈ J implies x ∈ OptG.
Lemma 4. 1. A family of homomorphisms (fj)j∈J is a covariantly complete fam-







2. A family of homomorphisms (fj)j∈J is a conravariantly complete family of co-








We prove, for example, assertion 1. Since for each j ∈ J, fj is a conravariant
homomorphism then by deﬁnition we get f
−1
j (OptΓj) ⊆ OptG. Hence, for arbitrary





j (OptΓj) ⊆ OptG398 Tatiana F. Savina
is satisﬁed. Since (fj)j∈J is covariantly complete family of homomorphisms then

















It is easy to verify that the converse is true. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.
   
Now consider the case when an optimality concept is the concept of equilibrium.
It is easy to verify that the following result is true.
Theorem 9. 1. For equilibrium any strict homomorphism is a contravariant ho-
momorphism.
2. For equilibrium any regular homomorphism is a covariant homomorphism.
3. For Nash equilibrium any homomorphism ”onto” is a covariant homomorphism.
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Abstract The problem of identiﬁcation of a macroeconomic model is con-
sidered for statistic data given at ﬁxed instants in a time-interval. The model
has the form of two ordinary diﬀerential equations depending of controlling
parameters. A new approach is suggested to solve the identiﬁcation problem
in the framework of optimal control theory. A numerical algorithm based on
characteristics of the Bellman equation is suggested to create and verify the
model. Results of simulations are exposed.
Keywords: nonlinear system, optimal control, dynamic programming, op-
timal feedbacks.
1. Introduction
The paper deals with production activity of single ﬁrms, various branches of in-
dustry or industry and economics of a region. There are records of statistic data
of ﬁrms sending to local statistic oﬃces regularly. A model of macroeconomics is
considered due to works by E.G. Al’brekht (Al’brekht, 2002). The macroeconomic
model has the form of two ordinary diﬀerential equations depending on two con-
trolling parameters. The ﬁrst parameter denotes investigations policy. The second
controlling parameter reﬂects the cost policy. Rates of taxation, refunding rates
and the currency exchange course determine economical conditions for production
activity. All the factors are included implicitly in the cost policy and imply some
natural restrictions on velocities of investments and production costs. Bounds on
admissible errors for approximation of statistic data deﬁne the domain of admissible
motions of the macroeconomic model.
So, our research is concerned on the identiﬁcation problem which consists of two
parts. The ﬁrst part is the determination of coeﬃcients at variables in the diﬀerential
equations of dynamics of macroeconomics. The second part is the reconstruction of
controls generated motions of the system within the admissible domain which are
most compatible with the given statistic data.
A new approach is suggested to solve the reconstruction problem. An optimal
control problem is considered to reconstruct controls generated motions of the model
close to the given statistic data. The pay-oﬀ for motions of the macroeconomic
system is the distance between the motions and the linear interpolations of the
given statistic data. The aim of the optimal control problem is minimization of the
pay-oﬀ.
A generalization of the method of characteristics (Subbotina, 2006) for the Bell-
man equation (Bellman, 1957) is applied to construct the value function of the op-
timal control problem. The construction provides also an optimal synthesis in the
domain of admissible motions. Realizations of the feedback minimize the distance
between motions of the controlled system and the given statistic data.400 Nina N. Subbotina, Timofei B. Tokmantsev
Numerical constructions and veriﬁcations of the macroeconomic models based
on records of statistic data are obtained with the help of the numerical algorithm
(Subbotina and Tokmantsev, 2006) generated a grid optimal synthesis. Results of
simulations are exposed.
Constructions of the suggested grid optimal synthesis can be used also to derive
scenarios of a short-term development of the process and to make a long-term
prediction about a process development in the future.
See (Zhukovskii and Chikrii, 1994; Tarasyev et al., 2002; Petrosyan, 2006) to
compare diﬀerent close approaches to the considered problems.
2. A macroeconomic model
We consider a model of a macroeconomic system, where symbol p denotes the gross
product, q denotes production costs, h denotes proﬁts.
2.1. Data
We have statistical data, namely, a table of parameters p, q, h measured at given
instants ti ∈ [0,T], i =0 ,1,...,N, t0 =0 ,tN = T
p∗(0),p ∗(1),..., p ∗(N),q ∗(0),q ∗(1),..., q∗(N),h ∗(0),h ∗(1),..., h ∗(N).
We assume for simplicity that the proﬁt depends only on the gross product and
production costs. The function
G(p,q)=h
is called the macroeconomic potential of the system.
2.2. A dynamic model of macroeconomics











on a time interval [0,T]. Here u1(t),u 2(t) are controlling parameters, satisﬁed the
geometric restrictions on velocities of investments and production costs
|u1|≤U1, |u2|≤U2, (2)
where U1 > 0, U2 > 0a r ec o n s t a n t s .
2.3. Hypothesis
We consider p and q as two participants of the dynamical market and assume that
they have the unique aim: to maximize the proﬁt:
G(p,q) → max
p
,G (p,q) → min
q
.
It is also natural to consider the function G(p,q) satisﬁed the conditions
G(0,q)=0 ,G (p,0) = 0. (3)
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We assume that the given statistic data are measured with errors and estimations
on admissible errors are known
|p − p
∗(i)|≤∆p, |q − q
∗(i)|≤∆q, |h − h
∗(i)|≤∆h. (5)
3. Veriﬁcation of the model
3.1. Identiﬁcation problem for the structure of G(p,q)
At ﬁrst we consider the identiﬁcation problem for parameters a
j
























f0 + f(1)(p,q)+···+ f(m)(p,q)
 
.
to obtain the best correspondence to the given statistical materials.








3.2. Reconstructions of controls
To reconstruct controls generated motions of the macroeconomic model most close
to the given statistic data, we introduce the following optimal control problem.









t ∈ [0,T],u =( u1,u 2) ∈ P,
(6)
P = {|u1|≤U1, |u2|≤U2,} (7)
The set of admissible controls is deﬁned as the following one
U[0,T] = {∀u(·): [0,T] → P —m e a s u r a b l e }.
















dt, (8)402 Nina N. Subbotina, Timofei B. Tokmantsev
where ε>0 — is a small parameter. The piece-wise linear functions ˜ p∗(·), ˜ q∗(·)







The functions p(·),q (·) are solutions of the dynamical system (6) started at the
initial state
p(t0)=p0,q (t0)=q0
under an admissible control u(·) ∈ U[0,T].
The Optimal Result The aim of the optimal control problem is to minimize the cost
functional.
Deﬁnition 1. The optimal result in the class U[0,T] is equal to








We consider the optimal control problem in the class of feedbacks
[0,T] × R
2(t,p,q)  → u(t,p,q) ∈ P
and allow them to be discontinuous. We use a formalization of discontinuous feed-
backs follow to the approach by N.N. Krasovskii. See, for example, (Krasovskii and
Subbotin, 1988).
4.1. Main Deﬁnitions
Let us recall the main deﬁnitions.
Step-by-step motions Consider a partition Γ = { ti,i=0 ,1,...,N}⊂[t0 =0 ,t N =
T] with the diameter diam (Γ)= m a x
i=1,...,N
(ti − ti−1).
Deﬁnition 2. The step-by-step motion (pΓ(·),q Γ(·)) of the system (6) is deﬁned in
the following way






















∀t ∈ [ti−1,t i); (pΓ(t0),q Γ(t0)) = (p0,q 0).
(10)
The Value of a Feedback The result CΓ
 
t0,p 0,q 0; u(t,p,q)
 
of control of the system
(6) started at the initial state (t0,p 0,q 0) under a feedback u(t,p,q) on the partition
Γ is deﬁned as follows
CΓ
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Deﬁnition 3. The value C
 











t0,p 0,q 0; u(t,p,q)
 
(11)
is called the value of the feedback u(t,p,q) to the system (6) started at the initial
state (t0,p 0,q 0).
Optimal Feedbacks
Deﬁnition 4. A feedback u(t,p,q) satisﬁed the equality
C
 
t0,p 0,q 0; u(t,p,q)
 
= V (t0,p 0,q 0). (12)
is called the optimal feedback at the initial state (t0,p 0,q 0).
Deﬁnition 5. A universal optimal feedback u0(t,p,q) satisﬁed the relations
C
 
t0,p 0,q 0; u(t,p,q)
 
= V (t0,p 0,q 0), ∀(t0,p 0,q 0) ∈ [t0,T] × R2 (13)
is called the optimal synthesis.
4.2. Structure of Optimal Synthesis









)=0 , (t,p,q) ∈ [0,T] × R2, (14)






Here the Hamiltonian H(t,p,q,s1,s 2) has the form
H(t,p,q,s1,s 2)= m i n
(u1,u2)∈P
h(t,p,q,s1,s 2,u 1,u 2), (16)

















It is well known (Subbotin (1995), Crandall and Lions, 1983) that the boundary
problem (14–16) has the unique generalized (minimax or viscosity) solution which
coincides with the value function (1): (t,p,q) → V (t,p,q): [0,T] × R2 → R.T h e
value function is superdiﬀerentiable (Subbotina, 2006), namely the superdiﬀerential
∂V(t,p,q) is not empty everywhere in [0,T] × R2.
To derive an optimal synthesis to the considered problem we apply the method
suggested in the papers (Subbotina and Tokmantsev, 2009). The method is based
on a backward procedure of integrating the characteristic system for the Bellman
equation. The procedure provides the following construction of the optimal synthe-
sis.
Theorem 1. The optimal synthesis (u0
1(t,p,q),u 0
2(t,p,q)) : (t,p,q) → P in the
problem (6)–(8) has the form:
(u0
1(t,p,q),u 0
2(t,p,q)) ∈ Arg min
(u1,u2)∈P
h(t,p,q,s1,s 2,u 1,u 2),
where s1,s 2 satisfy the condition
(−H(t,p,q,s1,s 2),s 1,s 2) ∈ ∂V(t,p,q).404 Nina N. Subbotina, Timofei B. Tokmantsev
4.3. Optimal Grid Synthesis
We apply the numerical procedure (Subbotina and Tokmantsev, 2006) to provide
adaptive grids in the phase space and to deﬁne a grid feedback at nodes of this
grids following the theorem 1. This feedback is called the optimal grid synthesis.
It is proven (Subbotina and Tokmantsev, 2009) that the value of the optimal grid
synthesis (3) is close to the optimal result (1) at all nodes of the mentioned grids.
The step-by-step motions (p0(·),q0(·)) generated by the optimal grid synthesis are
considered to solve the problem of reconstruction of controls for the macroeconomic
model in the strip (5). One can consider the best result of the additional optimization
problem






(p(t) − ˜ p∗(t))




within the strip (5) as the solution of the identiﬁcation problem (6–8).
5. Example
5.1. Data
We consider the report of statistic data on the work of industry of the Ural Region
for the period 1970-1984 (10000 Rubles = 1)
Table1. Statistic data.
Year Gross regional product ˜ p
∗ Casts ˜ q
∗ Proﬁt h
∗
1970 37.88 21.69 6.17
1971 40.63 23.70 6.31
1972 43.25 25.45 6.68
1973 46.00 27.30 6.98
1974 49.33 29.44 7.04
1975 53.04 32.16 7.27
1976 57.03 35.01 7.62
1977 59.85 36.92 8.00
1978 62.72 38.69 8.27
1979 63.45 38.76 8.42
1980 65.74 39.96 8.61
1981 65.90 39.75 8.21
1982 69.22 41.31 9.65
1983 64.52 37.86 9.28
1984 71.03 42.04 10.26
1985 74.69 45.05 10.76
5.2. Second Order Model
We assume that the macroeconomic potential has the form
G(p,q)=pq(a0 + a1p + a2q),a 0,a 1,a 2 are parameters.The Method of Characteristics in Macroeconomic Modeling 405
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5.3. Optimal Control Problem
The macroeconomic model is nonlinear. Dynamics has the form
dp
dt
= u1(t)q(a0 +2 a1p + a2q),
dq
dt
= −u2(t)p(a0 + a1p +2 a2q),
t ∈ [0,T]=[ 0 ,1.5],p (0) = p0,q (0) = q0.






















and solve the problem as was explained above.
The results of simulation are exposed below. The ﬁgures 1–2 are the graphs of
linear interpolations of statistic data for p and q, respectively. The ﬁgures 3–4 are
the graphs of the diﬀerences between the solution (p0(·),q0(·)) of the problem (17)
and the statistic data (˜ p∗(·), ˜ q∗(·)). The diﬀerence is shown in the logarithmic scale.
6. Conclusion
The suggested approach, based on the generalization of the method of characteris-
tics, and constructions of the optimal grid synthesis can be applied to many direc-
tions. Namely:
1. For identiﬁcation and construction of dynamic models of production activity
for single ﬁrms, various branches of industry or industry and economics of a
region
2. For investigations of properties of the examined object406 Nina N. Subbotina, Timofei B. Tokmantsev
Figure1. The graph of linear interpolation ˜ p
∗(·)
Figure2. The graph of linear interpolation ˜ q
∗(·)The Method of Characteristics in Macroeconomic Modeling 407
Figure3. The graph of the diﬀerence between p
0(·)a n d˜ p
∗(·)
Figure4. The graph of the diﬀerence between q
0(·)a n d˜ q
∗(·)408 Nina N. Subbotina, Timofei B. Tokmantsev
3. For a short-term and long-term prediction and analysis of scenarios of the
process development in the future
4. For analysis of plans and construction of feedback controls realizing the plans.
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Abstract The paper deals with the sequential selection problem of the
best object. Interviewers observe applicants or items and may decide to
stop and hire the current applicant. He has some knowledge about the total
number of applicant available. No recall of previously observed candidates
is allowed. Knowledge about current applicant is restricted to his relative
rank among interviewed so far. The graders have to select, each of them,
exactly one item, when it appears, and receives a payoﬀ which is a function
of the unobserved realization of random variable assigned to the item or its
rank. When there is only one grader the optimal strategy for wide class of
payoﬀ functions has a threshold form. It means that in optimal behavior
the decision maker should observe the ﬁxed number of items k*, a learning
sample, and to choose the ﬁrst one after which is better than all those
previously observed. The optimality of the strategy is shown by optimal
stopping methods for the Markov sequences. The experimental results have
shown that the decision makers in problems like choice of partner, the best
real investment, try to accept the reasonable option earlier than the optimal
strategy of mathematical models suggest. The main aim of the research is
to investigate the assumptions of the mathematical model to show their
inﬂuence on the optimal threshold.
Keywords: rank-based selection, mathematical models of choice, secretary
problem, optimal stopping
1. Introduction
In the applied mathematics or the operations research is known the secretary prob-
lem (the beauty contest problem, the dowry problem or the marriage problem). The
classical secretary problem CSP in its simplest form can be formulated following
(Ferguson, 1989):
(i) There is only one secretarial position available.
(ii) The number of applicants, N, is known in advance.
(iii) The applicants are interviewed sequentially in a random order.
(iv) All the applicants can be ranked from the best to the worst without any ties.
Further, the decision to accept or to reject an applicant must be based solely
on the relative ranks of the interviewed applicants.
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(v) An applicant once rejected cannot be recalled later. The employer is satisﬁed
with nothing but the very best. The solicited applicant has no option to reject
the oﬀer.
(vi) The payoﬀ is 1 if the best of the N applicants is chosen and 0 otherwise.
This model can be used as a mathematical description of choice in many decisions
in everyday life, such as buying a car, hiring an employee, or ﬁnding an apartment
(Corbin, 1980). It has appeared as an exercise or funny question in Martin Gardner
column of Scientiﬁc American (Gardner, 1960). The part of research on the prob-
lem has been devoted to modiﬁed version of the problem where some important
assumption of the model has been changed to ﬁt it to the real life context. There
are analysis of decision maker’s aims, decision in a competitive case, an uncertain
employment, an unknown or random number of candidates. It was shown that the
optimal strategy in many of these problems has very simple threshold form. The
items are observed and rejected up to some moments k  (thresholds) after which it
is optimal to accept the ﬁrst candidate with reasonable relative rank which depends
on the payoﬀ function. This strategy is rather intuitive. When the candidates run
low we admit acceptance the lowest rank of chosen item. If the aim is to choose the
second best item then the form of the optimal strategy is not so intuitively obvious
[see (Szajowski, 1982), (Rose, 1982), (M´ ori, 1988)].
There are also experimental research with subjects confronted with
the classical secretary problem [see (Seale and Rappaport, 1997) and
Seale and Rappaport, 2000)]. The optimal strategy of the grader in the clas-
sical secretary problem is to pass k 
N − 1 applicants, where k 
N ∼ = [Ne−1]a n ds t o p
at the ﬁrst j ≥ k 
N which is better that those seen so far. If none exists nothing is
chosen. The experimental study by (Seale and Rappaport, 1997) of this problem
shows that subjects under study have tendency to terminate their search earlier
than in the optimal strategy. These eﬀects are not unexpected if we take into
account that it is diﬃcult to check the analysis scheme of decision makers. When
the above speciﬁed assumption are not taken into account by interviewer then the
optimal strategy will change. Some small departures will not vary the form of the
optimal strategy but the eﬀect will be seen in threshold value. The violation of
assumption will be subject of further investigation.
2. Mathematical formulation of the model
Let us assume that the grader observes a sequence of up to N applicants whose
values are i.i.d. random variables {X1,X 2,...,X N} with uniform distribution on
E =[ 0 ,1]. The values of the applicants are not observed. Let us deﬁne
Rk =# {1 ≤ i ≤ k : Xi ≤ Xk}.
The random variable Rk is called relative rank of k-th candidate with respect of
items investigated to the moment k. The grader can see the relative ranks instead
of the true values. All random variables are deﬁned on a ﬁxed probability space
(Ω,F,P). The observations of random variables Rk, k =1 ,2,...,N, generate the
sequence of σ-ﬁelds Fk = σ{R1,R 2,...,R k}, k ∈ T = {1,2,...,N}. The random
variables Rk are independent and P{Rk = i} = 1
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Denote by MN the set of all Markov moments τ with respect to σ-ﬁelds {Fk}N
k=1.
Let q : T ×§×E →  + be the gain function. Deﬁne
vN =s u p
τ∈MN
Eq(τ,Rτ,X τ). (1)
We are looking for τ∗ ∈ MN such that Eq(τ ,R τ∗,X τ∗)=vN.
Remark 2.1 In CSP there are no assumption that the labels {Xi}N
i=1 come from
known distribution. It is important that they are diﬀerent. The function q() depends
on relative ranks only. The optimal stopping time τ∗ =i n f {k 
N <n≤ N : Rn =1 }.




N =e x p ( −1) ∼ = 0.367879441
Since {q(n,Rn,X n)}N
n=1 is not adapted to the ﬁltration {Fn}N
n=1, the gain function
can be substituted by the conditional expectation of the sequence with respect to the
ﬁltration given. By property of the conditional expectation we have Eq(τ,Rτ,X τ)=
E˜ g(τ,Rτ), where
˜ g(r,Rr)=E[q(r,Rr,X r)|Fr]( 2 )
for r =1 ,2,...,N. On the event {ω : Rr = s} we have ˜ g(r,s)=E[q(r,Rr,X r)|Rr =
s].
3. A rank-based selection with cardinal payoﬀs and a cost of choice
(Bearden, 2006) has considered application the best choice problem to the model
of choice for the trader who makes her selling decision at each point in time solely
on the basis of the rank of the current price with respect to the previous prices,
but, ultimately, derive utility from the true value of the selected observation and
not from its rank. The assumption (vi) is not fulﬁlled in this case. He shows that
i ft h et r u ev a l u e sXj are i.i.d. uniformly distributed on [0,1] then for every N the
optimal strategy is to pass c−1 applicants, and stop with the ﬁrst j ≥ c with rank
1. If none exists, stop at time N. The optimal value of c is either  
√
N  or  
√
N 
This payoﬀ scheme when the i.i.d. Xj’s come from other than the uniform dis-
tribution has been studied by (Samuel-Cahn, 2007). Three diﬀerent families of dis-
tributions, belonging to the three diﬀerent domains of attraction for the maximum,
have been considered and the dependence of the optimal strategy and the optimal
expected payoﬀ has been investigated. The diﬀerent distributions can model various
tendency in perception of the searched items.
For the author it is not obvious if the observed behavior of decision makers
in experimental research allows to expect that the threshold of the optimal strat-
egy should tend to 0 when number of the applicants tend to inﬁnity. This point
of view has been taken into account in search for model with cost of choice [see
(Szajowski, 2009)].
The risk is connected with each decision of the grader. The personal feelings of
the risk are diﬀerent. When the decision process is dynamic we can assume that the
feeling of risk appears randomly at some moment ξ. Its distribution is a model of
concern for correct choice of applicant. It is assumed that ξ has uniform distribution
on {0,1,...,N}.
Remark 3.1 Let us assume that the cost of choice or the measure of stress related
to the decision of acceptance of the applicant is c. It appears when the decision is412 Krzysztof Szajowski
after ξ and its measure will be random process C(t)=cI{ξ≥t}. Based on the observed
process of relative ranks and assuming that there are no acceptance before k we have
c(k,t)=E[C(t)|Fk]=c
N − t +1
N − k +1
. (3)
The applied model is a consequence of observation that the fear of the wrong decision
today is highest than the concern for the consequence of the future decision.
The aim of the grader is to maximize the expected value of applicant chosen and
at the same time to minimize the cost of choice.
In this case the function
q(t,Rt,X t)=
 
(Xt − C(t))I{Rt=1}(Rt)i ft<N,
XN − c otherwise. (4)
We have for t ≥ r that ˜ gc(r,t,Rt)=E[gc(t,Rt,X t)|Fr]=( t
t+1 −
c N−t+1
N−r+1)I{Rt=1}(Rt). The optimal strategy has the threshold form with k 
N ∼ = [Nα]
where α is solution of the equation log(x)=( 1+ 1
2c)(x − 1) in (0,1). For example
for c =0 .1 the limit α ∼ = 0.002516.
4. Imprecise number of objects vs. uncertain selection
The proposed in the subject of this section violation of assumption (ii) and (v) are
logically connected. When the candidates can reject oﬀers the decision maker has
random number of available objects. Such modiﬁcation of CSP was proposed and
solved by (Smith, 1975). He admitted that the interviewer can solicit more than
onces. Let us assume that the probability of rejection of an oﬀer is p.T h eo p t i m a l
strategy is threshold one. The grader should interview some number k  of object
which the number depends on the horizon length and the rejection probability p.I t




Let us assume that grader has no precise knowledge about the number of candi-
dates. One of the natural case is when the number of available candidates is bounded
by some number M, but the exact value of them N has uniform distribution. The
analysis of such modiﬁcation was made by (Rasmussen and Robbins, 1975) and they
showed that the optimal threshold has approximate value k 






∼ = 0.270670566. The uncertainty related to the real number of candi-
dates makes that the decision maker has tendency to accept earlier than in CSP.
Remark 4.1 One can expect that the problem with uncertain selection when p = 1
2
has as level of diﬃculty to select the best applicant as the Rasmussen and Robbins
problem. However, the chance for success in both problem is the same when the




5. Competitive best choice models
When there are m decision makers and each of them has his own stream of N
candidates [see (Sonin, 1976)] the deﬁnition of optimality is understood as behavior
which leads to stability. Let us assume that the each grader observes a sequence of up
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uniform distribution on E =[ 0 ,1]. The values of the applicants are not observed.
Let us Ri
k =# {1 ≤ j ≤ k : Xi
j ≤ Xk}. The player i observes the random variables
Ri





k ∈ T = {1,2,...,N}. The random variables Ri
k are independent and P{Rk = j} =
1
k for j =1 ,2,...,k.
Denote by Mi,N the set of all Markov moments τi with respect to σ-ﬁelds
{Fi
k}N
k=1.L e tqi : T×§×E →  + be the gain function. Deﬁne fN(τ1,τ2,...,τm)=
Eq(τ1 ∧ τ2 ∧ ...∧ τm,R i
τ,Xi
τi). We are looking for τi
∗
























In other words the strategy will give the equilibrium. Taking into account this
deﬁnition of optimality (the Nash equilibrium approach) and assuming that each
player has the same aim it is proved that all players have the same threshold strategy
deﬁned by k 
N ∼ = [Mz 
m]w h e r ez 
m fulﬁlls the equation: mz =1− (1 + z log(z))m.
For two players z 
2 ∼ = 0.295330.
However, if there is m players and only one stream of candidates in the math-
ematical model and in fact the real life rules of assignment should be determine.
Mainly, when more than one player wants to accept the same candidate the rules
of assignment are needed. The reasonable solution is to determine the priority of
the players in deterministic or random manner. Let us report the two person game
model with random assignment which gives the priority to the ﬁrst player with
probability p [see (Szajowski, 1993]. The problem is transformed to the Dynkin’s
game with players payoﬀ similar to those in the uncertain employment version
of the CSP. Both decision makers’ strategies are pairs of stopping times (τi,σ τj),
i,j =1 ,2, j  = i.F o rp ∈ (0,1) there is more than one equilibrium. The stopping
times τ∗
i (p) have threshold form at the equilibrium. For p =0 .5 there are two equi-
libria with stopping times τ∗
i (1





N ) ∼ = ([N exp(−5
4],[N exp(−1)]) ∼ = ([0.2865N],[0.3679N]) (for the second
one ([N exp(−1)],[N exp(−5
4])). This special case of the game has been posed and
solved by (Fushimi, 1981). When the ﬁrst player has priority the thresholds are
([N exp(−1)],[N exp(−3
2]). One of the players should behave more hastily than in
the original secretary problem and should start solicitation at [0.2865N] approxi-
mately.
Various game models with waives from the presented in this section problems
one can ﬁnd in review by (Sakaguchi, 1995) who investigated the topic widely. In
some what similar model has been investigate by (Sakaguchi and Mazalov, 2004)
with the aim to choose the one candidate acceptable for all players. There are
two players that jointly interview a given number n of applicants. The applicants
present in a random order, and each such an order is equally likely. If both players
accept a candidate then she is accepted, if both reject, she is rejected. If their
choices are diﬀerent, then an arbitration comes in and forces them to agree with
the ﬁrst player or the second one with probability p and 1 − p, respectively. The
aim of the players is to minimize his expected payoﬀ. These model of choice is
not analyzed here as well as the voting stopping games [see (Kurano et al., 1980),
(Szajowski and Yasuda, 1996), (Mazalov and Banin, 2003), (Ferguson, 2005)] and
the games where players have more than one eﬀective chance to choose the item
[see e.g. (Szajowski, 2002)].414 Krzysztof Szajowski
The next section is devoted to the games with given priorities. Two cases are
taken into account which diﬀers on knowledge collection during the game. The
priority and information change rapidly perspectives of the decision makers.
6. Privileges vs. information in two person CSP
In this section we present the solution of two kinds of two person nonzero-sum
games, which are based on CSP. The solution of the best choice problem (one player
game) is auxiliary in the solution of these games. With sequential observation of the
applicants some natural probability space (Ω,F,P) is connected. The elementary
events are the permutation of all applicants and the probability measure P is the uni-
form distribution on Ω. The observable sequence of relative ranks Yk, k =1 ,2,...,N
deﬁnes the sequence of the σ-ﬁelds Fk = σ(Y1,...,Y k),k=1 ,2,...,N.T h e
random variables Yk are independent and P(Yk = i)= 1
k.D e n o t eSN the set
of all Markov times τ with respect to the σ-ﬁelds {Fk}N
k=1 bounded by N. The
secretary problem can be formulated as follows: we are searching τ∗ ∈S N that
P{Zτ∗ =1 } =s u p
τ∈SN
P{Zτ =1 }. In the two person games each player wants to get
the best applicant. There is only one stream of candidates and it is the reason why
the assignment system should be deﬁned. It will be formulated as the priority rules
[see (Ravindran and Szajowski, 1992), (Szajowski, 1992)].
The permanent priority scheme is assumed, i.e. Player 1 has highest priority and
Player 2 has lower priority than Player 1. In the section 6.3. the model of priority
properties from (Ramsey and Szajowski, 2001) is used. It means that all players
have the common knowledge about the random sequence observed sequentially. The
nth applicant seen has relative rank i,w h e r e( i ∈{ 1,2,...,n}), if the nth applicant
seen is the i-th best applicant among seen so far. The object of each player is to
obtain the best applicant. Thus, it is assumed that each player obtains a reward of
1 if he obtains the best applicant and 0 in all other cases. In such cases a player
should only accept an applicant, who has relative rank 1. These applicants will be
referred to as candidates. If more than one player wishes to accept a candidate,
then a priority scheme decides which player has priority and hence he employs that
candidate, as previously described. If one player obtains a candidate, then he/she
stops searching. The other players are informed of this and then they are allowed
to continue searching.
The game of the second type assumes the dynamic assignment of knowledge
about the random sequence to the players. It means that the items are presented
to the players according their priority and they make decision about acceptance or
rejection before the item is presented to next player. In case of acceptance of the
observation (an item) by player i-th the player with lower priority has no knowledge
about the accepted state. In a consequence the relative ranks observed after the ﬁrst
acceptance are not taken into account the “hidden observation” and a new, based on
restricted history, relative rank are observed. It is assumed, as in the ﬁrst example,
that the aim is to choose the best applicant. If the new relative rank is 1, then
the it is actually the relatively the ﬁrst or the second and consequently, there is
only 50% chance that the relatively best after the ﬁrst acceptance is the best when
we compare with the common knowledge case. In each case it is assumed that the
number of objects (hereon, called applicants) presented to the players is very large.
It means that the asymptotics of the Nash values and the equilibrium strategy when
N →∞are obtained. This game is the subject of consideration in the section 6.4..Comparison among Some Optimal Policies in Rank-Based Selection Problems 415
6.1. The Markov chain related to the best choice problem
The mathematical model of the secretary problem which is useful for these games
is a some version of the Markov chain with the two dimensional state space [see
(Dynkin and Yushkevich, 1969), (Presman and Sonin, 1975), (Szajowski, 1982)].
Let us deﬁne W0 =( 1 ,Y 1)=( 1 ,1) and put a =m a x ( A), where A ⊂
{1,2,...,N}. γt =i n f {r>γ t−1 : Yr ≤ min(a,r)} (inf ∅ = ∞)a n dWt =( γt,Y γt).
If γt = ∞ then deﬁne Wt =( ∞,∞). Wt is the Markov chain with following one
step transition probabilities [see (Szajowski, 1982)]





s, if r<a , s = r +1 ,
(r)a
(s)a+1, if a ≤ r<s ,
0, if r ≥ s or r<a , s  = r +1 ,
(6)
with p(∞,∞)=1 ,p(r,∞)=1 − a
 N
s=r+1 p(r,s), where (s)a = s(s − 1)(s −
2)...(s − a +1 ) ,( s)0 =1 .L e tGt = σ{W1,W 2,...,W t} and ˜ MN be the set of
stopping times with respect to {Gt}N
t=1.S i n c eγt is increasing, then we can deﬁne
˜ MN
r+1 = {σ ∈ ˜ MN : γσ >r }.
Let P(r,l)(·) be probability measure related to the Markov chain Wt, with trajec-
tory starting in state (r,l)a n dE(r,l)(·) the expected value with respect to P(r,l)(·).
From (6) we can see that the transition probabilities do not depend on relative
ranks, but only on moments r where items with relative rank l ≤ min(a,r)a p p e a r .
Based on the following lemma we can solve the problem (1) with gain function (4)
using the embedded Markov chain {Wt} and the gain function given by (2).
Lemma 1 (see (Szajowski, 1982)).
EwN(s +1 ,Y s+1)=E(s,l)wN(W1) for every l ≤ min(a,r). (7)
Let us deﬁne W1 = 1 and . Deﬁne Wt =i n f {r>W t−1 : Yr =1 },t>1,
(inf ∅ = ∞). (Wt,Ft,P(1,1))N
t=1 is the homogeneous Markov chain with the state
space E = {1,2,...,N}∪{ ∞ } , Ft = σ(W1,W 2,...,Wt) and the following one-step
transition probabilities: p(r,s)=P{Wt+1 = s | Wt = r} = r
s(s−1) if 1 ≤ r<s≤ N,
p(r,∞)=1−
 N
s=r+1 p(r,s), p(∞,∞) = 1 and 0 otherwise. The payoﬀ function for
the problem deﬁned on E has a form f(r)= r
N.
In the games considered in the section 6.3. and the section 6.4. both players stop
at most two times. It will be interesting to compare the values of the games and
the strategies with the solution of the best choice problem with two stops.
6.2. Choosing the best with two stops
The solution of the best choice problems (one player game) with one and two stops
are auxiliary in the solution of the two person game with ﬁxed priority of the player.
Classical best choice problem with one stop Let W1 = 1. Deﬁne Wt =i n f {r>
Wt−1 : Yr =1 },t > 1, (inf ∅ = ∞). (Wt,Ft,P(1,1))N
t=1 is the homogeneous Markov
chain with the state space E = {1,2,...,N}∪{∞}, Ft = σ(W1,W 2,...,Wt)a n dt h e
following one-step transition probabilities: p(r,s)=P{Wt+1 = s | Wt = r} = r
s(s−1)
if 1 ≤ r<s≤ N, p(r,∞)=1−
 N
s=r+1 p(r,s), p(∞,∞)=1a n d0o t h e r w i s e .T h e
payoﬀ function for the problem deﬁned on E has a form f(r)= r
N.416 Krzysztof Szajowski
Denote ˜ c(r)=s u p τ>rP{Zτ =1 }.W eh a v e
˜ c(r)=
 
c1(r)i f ra ≤ r ≤ N










s−1 ≤ 1}.W h e nN →∞such that r
N → x we obtain ˆ c1(x)=
limN→∞ c1(r)=−xlnx, a = limN→∞
ra
N = e−1 ∼ = 0.3679.
Two stopping Let us solve the best choice problem with double stopping. Denote




Pr(min{Xτ1,X τ2} =1 ) .
The general method of solving the double stopping problem leads to conclusion
that ˜ c(2)(r)=Erc(2)(W1), where c(2)(r)=m a x {f(r)+˜ c(r),Erc(2)(W1)}.S o l v i n g
the equation recursively we get c(2)(r). Deﬁne rb =i n f {1 ≤ r ≤ N : c(2)(r)=
f(r)+˜ c(r)}.W eh a v eτ∗
1 =i n f {1 ≤ r ≤ N : r ≥ rb,Y r =1 } and τ∗
2 =i n f {r ≥ ra :
r>τ ∗
1,Y r =1 }.W h e nN →∞such that r











x − xlog(x)i f e−1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
x + e−1 if e− 3
2 ≤ x<e −1,
e−1 + e− 3















2(x)i f e−1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
e−1 − x
2 − xlog(x)i f e− 3
2 ≤ x<e −1,
e−1 + e− 3
2 if 0 <x≤ e− 3
2.
(9)




N = e− 3
2 and
a =e x p ( −1).
6.3. The ﬁxed scheme of priorities and common knowledge
Let us denote by vi(t), i =1 ,2a n dt ∈ (0,1], the i-th Player value of the game
which start at moment t. The player 1 has the highest priority. It means, that he
will use the strategy for the optimal stopping problem for Markov chain presented
in Section 6.1.. We have v1(r)=˜ c(r) given by (8) and when N →∞such that
r
N → x we obtain v1(t)=ˆ c1(t)=−tlogt, a = limN→∞
ra
N = e−1 ∼ = 0.3679. The
strategy of the ﬁrst player at equilibrium is τ 
1 =i n f{ra ≤ r ≤ N : Yr =1 }.
If at moment r ≥ ra the relatively best appears and no player has accepted the
candidate than, according to the strategy of the ﬁrst player, he accepts it and the
second player will take the next relatively best. At the left hand side neighborhood
of ra, taking into account the highest priority of the second vs third player and
t h eh i g h e s ti m m e d i a t ep a y o ﬀt h a nt h ee x p e c t e dv a l u eo ff u t u r ed e c i s i o n ,v2(r)c a n
be get by determining the equilibrium in suitable two person matrix game. Since
v1(ra − 1) >f (ra − 1) and v2(ra − 1) ∼ =
1
2e−1 <f (ra − 1) the strategy (f,s)i si n
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Deﬁne rb =i n f {1 ≤ r ≤ N : v2(r) ≤ f(r)}.W eh a v eτ∗
2 =i n f {1 ≤ r ≤ N : r ≥
rb,Y r =1 ,τ 
1  = r}.W h e nN →∞such that r











2(x)i f e−1 ≤ x ≤ 1,
−xlog(x) − x
2 e− 3
2 ≤ x<e −1,
e− 3
2 if 0 <x≤ e− 3
2.




N = e− 3
2 ∼ =
0.22313.
6.4. Two person best choice game with hidden state
In the second type game introduced at the beginning of the section 6. the items
are presented to the players according their priority and they make decision about
acceptance or rejection before the item is presented to next player. In case of ac-
ceptance of the observation (an item) by player i-th the player with lower priority
has no knowledge about the accepted state. As a consequence the relative ranks ob-
served after the ﬁrst acceptance do not take into account the “hidden observation”
and new relative rank is observed. It is assumed, as in the ﬁrst example, that the
aim is to choose the best applicant. If the new relative rank is 1, then it is the rela-
tively the ﬁrst or the second if the rank is based on all observation and consequently,
there is only 50% chance that the relatively best after the ﬁrst acceptance is the
best when we compare with the common knowledge case. Let us assume that the
number of objects (hereon, called applicants) presented to the players is very large
and the asymptotic of the Nash values and the equilibrium strategy when N →∞
are obtained.
The construction of the Nash value and the equilibrium is made by backward
induction. When game starts at moment r (i.e. no player has chosen the item),
observation Yr = 1 and the ﬁrst player has highest priority then the observation r
is accepted by the ﬁrst player iﬀ r ≥ ra. The value for the ﬁrst player v1(r)i sg i v e n
by the same formula as the value for the ﬁrst player in the game with common
knowledge described in Section 6.3..
If at moment r ≥ ra the relatively best appears and no player has accepted the
candidate than, according to the strategy of the ﬁrst player, he accepts it and the
second player will take the next relatively best. However, the observation chosen
by the ﬁrst player is hidden and unknown for the second player. Player 2 can
assume that the Player 1 is rational and he is not accepting observation which
is not potentially the best. Based on observation Y1,Y 2,...,Y r−1,Y r+1,...,Y s and
taking into account the rationality of Player 1 the relative ranks Sr+1,S r+2,...,S s
means that the unobserved true relative ranks Yr+1,...,Y s take wider set of values
e.g. Sr+1 = 1 implies that Yr+1 ∈{ 1,2}. If the aim is to ﬁnd the best item the




Let us deﬁne Wr =( 1 ,Y 1)=( r,1). Let us deﬁne δt =i n f {r>δ t−1 : Sr =1 }
(inf ∅ = ∞)a n dWt =( δt,Y δt). If δt = ∞ then deﬁne Wt =( ∞,∞). Wt is the
Markov chain with following one step transition probabilities
p(i,j)=P{δt+1 = j|δt = i} =2
i(i − 1)
j(j − 1)(j − 2)
}








N. The equilibrium strategy of Player 2 suggests to418 Krzysztof Szajowski








Let us consider the asymptotic case. When N →∞such that r















At the left hand side neighborhood of rα, taking into account the low priority
of the second player, the expected value of future decision, w2(t) can be get by de-
termining the equilibrium in suitable two person matrix game. The careful analysis










T h es o l u t i o no ft h i se q u a t i o ni n( a,α], taking into account the continuity property at
α gives w2(t)=1
4.F o rt<awe have any restriction for the decision and knowledge
for the second player. If at moment r<r a we have Yr =1a n dr is close to ra
he can get r
N
∼ = e1 by accepting the item which appears at r. If he chooses option
to reject this item his expected gain is approximately w2(a) ∼ =
1
4 <e −1. Then,
he will accept the relatively best in some interval (β,a] and he will play with the
equilibrium strategy after a. His behavior after ra is following: he is waiting for the
choice of item by the ﬁrst player and after the moment of acceptance the item by














− 2 + log(2) − log(t)).
If we compare the expected value of optimal behavior after the rejection of the
relatively best at r such that r
N
∼ = t with the immediate payoﬀ by accepting the




4−3 ∼ = 0.196463.
The asymptotic value of the game, when N →∞such that r









t2 − t − tlog(t)i f α ≤ t ≤ 1,
1
4 + (log(2) − 1)t if a ≤ t<α ,
(e
4 − 2 + log(2))t − tlog(t)i f β ≤ t<a ,
β if 0 ≤ t<β ,
(10)
where α =0 .5, a = e−1 and β =2 e
e
4−3 ∼ = 0.196463.
Remark 6.1 It is worth to emphasize the form of the strategy of the second player.
If he reaches the interval [a,α] without acceptance of any candidate he has to be
silent in this interval and do not accept the candidates if the ﬁrst player has done it
before. His activity comes back when the game reaches the moment asymptotically
later than α.
7. Conclusion
The conclusion from the presented cases is that in the simple best choice problems
the decision maker can imagine various threats. In many real problems one canComparison among Some Optimal Policies in Rank-Based Selection Problems 419
observe that the decision maker hesitates to long and postpones the ﬁnal decision
[see e.g. (Bearden, 2006), (Seale and Rappaport, 1997)]. He rejects relatively best
option too long. It looks that he fears to loss the potential options. The level of
fear can be dependent on the value of the item or independent. The mathematical
models are able to explain the behavior of the decision maker by specifying more
adequate assumptions. The assumption, which makes the model more adequate, are
the consequences of the hidden supposition of the decision maker or his creation
of circumstances. The presented examples do not exhaust all such deviation of the
problem known in literature.
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Abstract Interval cooperative games model situations with cooperation in
which the agents do not know for certain their coalitional payoﬀs, they know
only bounds for the payoﬀs. Cooperative interval games have been intro-
duced and studied in (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs, 2008, Branzei, Tijs
and Alparslan G¨ ok, 2008). Each interval game is deﬁned by two coopera-
tive games – the lower and the upper games – whose characteristic function
values are bounds of the coalitional payoﬀs. Solutions for interval games are
deﬁned also in interval form. A TU game value ϕ generates the interval value
for the corresponding class of interval games if the value of the upper game
dominates the value of the lower game. In (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel and Tijs,
2009) it was shown how some monotonicity properties of some TU game
values provide existence of the corresponding interval values for the class
of convex interval games. However, the nucleolus and the τ-value on this
class do not possess such properties. Thus, in this paper the nucleolus for
the interval values is deﬁned as the result of the lexicographic minimization
of the joint excess vector for upper and lower games. Its existence has been
proved. The existence of the τ-value is proved on the subclass of convex
interval game generated by totally positive upper and lower games.
Keywords: interval cooperative game, convex game, totally positive game,
nucleolus, τ-value.
1. Introduction
There are many real-life situations in which people or businesses are uncertain
about their coalitional payoﬀs. Situations with uncertain payoﬀs in which the agents
cannot await the realizations of their coalition payoﬀs cannot be modeled according
to classical game theory. Several models that are useful to handle uncertain payoﬀs
exist in the game theory literature. We refer here to chance-constrained games
(Charnes and Granot, 2007), cooperative games with stochastic payoﬀs (Suis, Borm,
de Waegenaere and Tijs, 1999) cooperative games with random payoﬀs (Timmer,
Borm and Tijs, 2005). In all these models stochastics plays an important role.
Interval cooperative games are models of cooperation where only bounds for
payoﬀs of coalitions are known with certainty. Such games are called cooperative
interval games. Let I(R) be the set of all compact intervals of the real line R.
Formally, a cooperative interval game in coalitional form (Alparslan G¨ ok, Miquel
and Tijs, 2009) is an ordered pair  N,w  where N = {1,2,...,n} is the set of
players, and w :2 N → I(R) is the characteristic function such that w(∅)=[ 0 ,0],
where I(R) is the set of all nonempty, compact intervals in R.F o re a c hS ∈ 2N,t h e
worth set (or worth interval) w(S) of the coalition S in the interval game  N,w 
is of the form [w(S),w(S) ] .W ed e n o t eb yIGN the family of all interval games422 Elena B. Yanovskaya
with player set N. Note that if all the worth intervals are degenerate intervals,
i.e. w(S)=w(S)f o re a c hS ∈ 2N, then the interval game  N,w  corresponds
in a natural way to the classical cooperative game  N,v  where v(S)=w(S)f o r
all S ∈ 2N. Some classical TU-games associated with an interval game w ∈ IGN
will play a key role, namely the border games  N,w ,  N,w  and the length game
 N,|w| ,w h e r e|w|(S)=w(S) − w(S)f o re a c hS ∈ 2N.N o t et h a tw = w + |w|.
An interval solution concept F on IGN is a map assigning to each interval game
 N,w ∈IGN a subset of I(R)N.
Cooperative interval games are very suitable to describe real-life situations in
which people or ﬁrms that consider cooperation have to sign a contract when they
cannot pin down the attainable coalition payoﬀs, knowing with certainty only their
lower and upper bounds. The contract should specify how the players’ payoﬀ shares
will be obtained when the uncertainty of the worth of the grand coalition is resolved
at an ex post stage.
Note that the agreement on a particular interval allocation (I1,I 2,...,I n)b a s e d
on an interval solution concept merely says that the payoﬀ xi that player i will
receive in the interim or ex post stage is in the interval Ii.T h i si sav e r yw e a k
contract to settle cooperation within the grand coalition. It can be considered as
a ﬁrst step of cooperation, where the following step should transform an interval
allocation into a classical payoﬀ vector. Such procedures are described in (Branzei,
Tijs and Alparslan G¨ ok, 2008).
The study of interval game solutions begins with extensions of classical theory
of cooperative game solutions to interval games. For example, we can apply some
single-valued solution concept to both border games, and in the case when the solu-
tion of the upper game weakly dominates that of the lower game, the corresponding
interval vector could be admitted as the interval solution, generated by a classical
cooperative game solution. Just in this manner the interval Shapley value for convex
interval games was deﬁned in (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs, 2009). The same
approach can be applied to the extension of set-valued solutions as well (Alparslan
G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs, 2008,2009).
Naturally, the problem of existence of such interval solution arises. In fact if for
some interval game  N,w  the characteristic function values of the lower and upper
games on the grand coalition coincide, i.e., w(N)=w(N), then for any single-valued
classical solution ϕ the (vector) inequality ϕ(N,w) ≤ ϕ(N,w) is impossible, and
this approach cannot be applied to the extension of the solution ϕ to the interval
game  N,w .
It is clear that the possibility of the extension of a classical cooperative game
solution to interval games depends both on the class of interval games into consid-
eration and on monotonicity properties of the classical cooperative game solution
itself. Thus, in the paper by (Alparslan G¨ ok, Branzei and Tijs, 2009) the class of
convex interval games was introduced. It turned out that interval games was intro-
duced. It turned out that the most known cooperative game solutions such as the
core, the Shapley value, the Weber set, and are extendable to the class of convex
interval games. At last, in (Yanovskaya, Branzei and Tijs, 2010) it was shown that
the Dutta–Ray solution also can be extended to the interval games.The Nucleolus and the τ-value of Interval Games 423
However, both the prenucleolus and the τ-value are not aggregate monotonic
on the class of convex TU games (Hokari, 2000, Hokari and van Gellekom, 2002)1.
Therefore, interval analogues of these solutions either should be deﬁned by another
manner, or perhaps they exist in some other class of interval games. Both approaches
are used in the paper: the nucleolus of a convex interval game is deﬁned by lexico-
graphical minimization of the lexmin relation on the set of joint excess vectors of
lower and upper games. On the other hand, the τ-value is shown to satisfy extend-
ability condition on a subclass of convex games – on the class of totally positive
convex games.
The interval nucleolus is determined in Section 2, and the proof of existence of
the interval τ-value on the class of interval totally positive games is given in Section
3.
2. The Nucleolus for interval games
An interval game is an ordered triple  N,(w,w) , where N is a ﬁnite set of players,
w,w :2 N → R are the lower and upper characteristic functions satisfying inequal-
ities w(S) ≤ w(S) for each coalition S ⊂ N. Cooperative game with transferable
utilities (TU)  N,w , N,w  are called, respectively,the lower and the upper games
of the interval game  N,(w,w) .
Denote be GN an arbitrary class of TU games with the players’ set N, and by
IGN denote the class of interval games with the players’ set N such that for every
interval game  N,(w,w) ∈IGN both the lower and the upper games  N,w , N,w 
belong to the class GN.
Denote by X(N,w),X(N,w) the sets of feasible payoﬀ vectors of the lower and
the upper games, and by Y (N,w),Y(N,w)–t h es e to feﬃcient payoﬀ vectors:
X(N,w)={x ∈ RN |
 
i∈N xi ≤ w(N)},
X(N,w)={x ∈ RN |
 
i∈N xi ≤ w(N)},
Y (N,w)={x ∈ X(N,w)|
 
i∈N xi = w(N)},
Y (N,w)={x ∈ X(N,w)|
 
i∈N xi = w(N)}.
Deﬁnition 1. A single-valued solution (value) φ for the class IGN of interval games
is a mapping assigning to every interval game  N,(w,w) ∈IGN a pair of payoﬀ
vectors φ(N,(w,w)) = (x,y) ∈ RN×RN, satisfying the conditions x ∈ X(N,w),y∈
X(N,w)a n dx ≤ y.
It is clear that if Nu(N,w) ≤ Nu(N,w), then (Nu(N,w),Nu(N,w)) ∈
INuS(N,(w,w)), and this deﬁnition is well-deﬁned.










Thus, a more precise deﬁnition of the interval nucleoli is necessary to obtain its
uniqueness.
1 Note that on the class of convex TU games the prenucleolus coincides with the nucleolus.
Thus from now upon we will use the term nucleolus.424 Elena B. Yanovskaya





) was fulﬁled independently, in fact, both nucleoli
were calculated under given y∗,x ∗ respectively. Since nucleoli express the idea of
minimization of relative dissatisfaction of players and coalitions, i.e. excess vectors,
in TU games, the interval nucleolus should minimize dissatisfactions at once both
in lower and upper games. Thus, we can try to minimize lexicographically the
vector of excesses of both games. For each pair of payoﬀ vectors (x,y),x≤ y,x ∈
X(N,w),y ∈ X(N,w)d e n o t eb yE(x,y) ∈ R2
n+1−4 the vector of excesses w(S) −
x(S),w(T) −y(T),S,T ⊂ N,S,T  = N,∅, arranged in a weakly decreasing manner.
Then we come to the following
Deﬁnition 2. The interval nucleolus (INu) of an interval game  N,(w,w)  is a
pair (x∗,y∗) of payoﬀ vectors x∗ ∈ X(N,w),y∗ ∈ X(N,w) such that x∗ ≤ y∗)a n d
−E(x
∗,y
∗)  lexmin −E(x,y) for all x ∈ X(N,w),y∈ X(N,w),x≤ y. (1)
Theorem 1. There exists the unique interval nucleolus on the set of convex interval
games.
Proof. The proof of the existence of the interval nucleolus is similar to that of
Schmeidler (1969) of the existence of the nucleolus for TU games.
Let now (x1,y 1) be the solution of the problem (1) without the condition x ≤ y,
i.e.
−E(x1,y 1)  lexmin −E(x,y) for all x ∈ X(N,w),y∈ X(N,w). (2)
Then x1 = N(N,w),y 1 = N(N,w), and there exists a solution of the problem (1).
The uniqueness of the solution follows from convexity of the domain {(x,y)|x ∈
X(N,w),y∈ X(N,w),x≤ y}.
Corollary.The interval nucleolus belongs to the interval core.
Proof. For all (x,y) ∈C (N,(w,w)) we have x ≤ y and
max
S N
(w(S) − x(S)) ≤ 0, max
S N
(w(S) − y(S)) ≤ 0.
Therefore, for each pair of vectors (z,u) / ∈C (N,w,w),z≤ u
−E(x,y)  lexmin −E(z,u),
and the maximum of the lexmin relation cannot be out of the interval core.
For the interval nucleolus an analogue of Kohlberg’s characterization (Kohlberg,
1971) can be proved:
For each vectors x ∈ X(N,w),y∈ X(w)a n dα ∈ R denote
B0(x,y)={i ∈ N |xi = yi},
Bα(x)={S ⊂ N |w(S) − x(S) ≥ α},
Bα(y)={S ⊂ N |w(S) − y(S) ≥ α}.
Theorem 2. Given a convex interval game  N,(w,w)  and a pair of payoﬀ vectors
(x∗,y∗) such that x∗ ≤ y∗ of the lower and upper games respectively such thatThe Nucleolus and the τ-value of Interval Games 425
the collections Bα(x∗),Bα(y∗) are empty or balanced for all α, then (x∗,y∗)=
IPN(N,(w,w)).
If (x∗,y∗)=INu(N,w,w), then for any α the collections Bα(x∗) ∪ B0(x∗,y∗),
Bα(y∗)∪B0(x∗,y∗)} are empty or weakly balanced with positive weights for coalitions
from Bα(x∗),Bα(y∗) respectively.
Proof. Let some pair of payoﬀ vectors (x∗,y∗) of the lower and upper games re-
spectively and satisfying the inequality x∗ ≤ y∗ the collections Bα(x∗),Bα(y∗)a r e
empty or balanced for every α. Then there are no solutions of linear systems
x(S) ≥ x∗(S),S∈ Bα(x∗),
y(T) ≥ y∗(T),T∈ Bβ(y∗)
(3)
for any α,β.
If (x∗,y∗)  = INu(N,(w,w)), then there would exist a pair of payoﬀ vectors of
the lower and upper games (x,y),x≤ y such that
−E(x,y)  lexmin −E(x∗,y∗),
that would contradict unsolvedness of systems (3).
Now let (x∗,y∗)=INu(N,(w,w)). Then, in particular,
−E(x∗,y∗)  lexmin −E(x,y∗) for all x ∈ X(N,w),x≤ y∗, (4)
−E(x
∗,y
∗)  lexmin −E(x
∗,y) for all y ∈ X(N,w),x
∗ ≤ y. (5)
Kohlberg’s theorem (Kohlberg, 1971) and relation (4) imply that for every vector
x ∈ X(N,w) either the collections Bα(x∗) are empty or balanced for all α, or for
some α the collection Bα(x∗) is not balanced but for any payoﬀ vector of the lower
game ˆ x, satisfying
−E(ˆ x,y∗)  lexmin −E(x,y∗) for all x ∈ X(N,w),x≤ y∗,
the inequality ˆ x ≤ y∗ does not hold. The last case means that the system of in-
equalities
x(S) ≥ x∗(S),S∈ Bα(x∗),x j <x ∗
j,j∈ B0(x∗,y∗),x (N)=w(N),x = x∗.
is unsolvable.
This system is equivalent to the following one:
x(S) ≥ x∗(S),S∈ Bα(x∗) ∪ B0(x∗,y∗),x (N)=w(N),x = x∗. (6)
Unsolvedness of system (6) is equivalent to weakly balancedness of the collection
Bα(x∗)∪B0(x∗,y∗) with positive weights for coalitions from the collection Bα(x∗).
Weakly balancedness of the collections Bα ∪B0(x∗,y∗) with positive weights for
coalitions from Bα(y∗) is proved analogously.
Example 1 Let us consider the example of convex TU game from Hokari’s paper
(Hokari, 2000), showing the absence of aggregate monotonicity of its nucleolus.
N = {1,2,3,4},v ({i})=0 ∀i ∈ N,
v({1,3})=0 ,v (S) = 2 for other S,|S| =2 ,
v({1,2,3} =4 ,v (S) = 6 for other S,|S| =3 ,
v(N)=1 0 .
(7)426 Elena B. Yanovskaya
Then the nucleolus Nu(N,v)=( 2 ,2,2,4). Let  N,v   be the game whose charac-
teristic function v  diﬀers from v only on the grand coalition:
v (N)=1 2 ,v (S)=v(S) for other S ⊂ N.
Then the nucleolus Nu(N,v )=( 3 ,3,3,3).



































Remark. It is known that the per capita nucleolus of convex TU games satisﬁes
aggregate monotonicity. However, this property does not provide existence of the
interval per capita nucleolus as the pair of the nucleoli of the lower and upper games.
The example from (Hokari, 2000) shows this fact:
Let us consider the four-person convex game (7). It is easy to show that the per
capita nucleolus for this game Nupc(N,v) coincides with its nucleolus and equals
Nu(N,v)=( 2 ,2,2,4).
Let  N,vs  be the following four-person symmetric game:
vs(S)=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0, for S, |S| =1 ,
2, for S, |S| =2 ,
6, for S, |S| =3 ,
12, for S = N.
In symmetric games the players have equal gains both for the nucleolus and the per
capita nucleolus, i.e. Nupc(N,vs)=( 3 ,3,3,3).
Evidently, the game  N,vs  is convex, and vs(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N. The
diﬀerence game  N,vs − v  is determined by
(vs − v)(S)=
 
2f o r S = {1,3},{1,2,3},N.
0 for other S ⊂ N.
Therefore, this game is also convex, and the triple  N,(v,vs)  is a convex interval
game. However
Nupc(N,v)=( 2 ,2,2,4)  ≤ (3,3,3,3) = Nupc(N,vs).The Nucleolus and the τ-value of Interval Games 427
2. The τ-value
For the class of convex TU games the τ-value is deﬁned as follows. If  N,v ∈G c
then for each i ∈ N
τi(N,v)=λ(v(N) − v(N \{ i})) + (1 − λ)v({i}), (8)




λ(v(N) − v(N \{ j})) + (1 − λ)v({j})
 
= v(N).
Hokari (2000) gave an example of convex seven-person game whose τ-value is




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
10 for S = N,
6f o r |S| =6 ,S  1,
2, for |S| =5 ,S  1,
0o t h e r w i s e .
(9)
Putting these values in (8) we obtain τ1(N,v) = 100/34. If the value v(N)i n c r e a s e s
up to 10.1, and other values v(S),S  = N are not changed, then in the new game
 N,v 
τ1(N,v) = 102.01/34.7 < 100/34 = τ1(N,v).
Note that the diﬀerence game (N,v − v) is also convex. Therefore, the interval τ-
value for the class of convex interval games deﬁned as pair of τ-values of lower and
upper games does not exist. However, it turns out that it exists for a subclass of
interval convex games whose lower and upper games are totally positive. In this
section we prove this result.
Deﬁnition (8) implies that the τ-value for the class of convex TU games is
covariant. Hence, for investigation of the other properties of τ-value we may restrict
ourselves by games in 0-reduced form, i.e. games whose characteristic functions
satisfy equalities v({i}) = 0 for all singletons i ∈ N. Then formula (8) takes the
form
τi(N,v)=
v(N) − v(N \{ i})
 
j∈N(v(N) − v(N \{ j})
· v(N), (10)







v(S)f o r S, |S|≥n − 1,
0 for other S ⊂ N.
(11)
Let us consider the class of totally convex games Gtp :
Gtp = {(N,v)|λS ≥ 0∀S ⊂ N},




λT.428 Elena B. Yanovskaya




Therefore, if for games  N,v , N,v  ∈G tp the inequalities λ 
S ≥ λS ≥ 0 hold for
all S ⊂ N, then  N,(v,v )  is a convex interval game.
It is clear that if a game  N,v  is convex (totally positive ), then the game
 N,v0  (11) is also convex (totally positive), and the dividends of the game  N,v0 












N\{j}, for S = N,
0, for other S ⊂ N.
(12)
Proposition 1 The τ-value of every totally positive game in the form (11) is mono-
tonically increasing for all i ∈ N in v(N),v(N \{ j}),j∈ N.
Proof. Note that if a game  N,v  is totally positive then it remains to be totally pos-
itive when the value v(N) is increasing. Thus, to prove monotonicity of the τ-value
in v(N) it only suﬃces to show non-negativeness of the corresponding derivatives
of τi(N,v) for all i ∈ N.
Formula (10) takes the following form:
τi(N,v)=
v(N) − v(N \{ i})
 
j∈N(v(N) − v(N \{ j})
· v(N), ∀i ∈ N (13)











To know the sign of the fraction
∂τi(N,v)
∂v(N) , it suﬃces only to check the sign of its
numerator, since the denominator is positive.
(v(N) − v(N \{ i}))
  
















j∈N v(N \{ j})=v(N)
 
nλN +( n − 2)
 





j∈N v(N \{ j})).
(15)
Since the game  N,v  is totally positive, the dividends λN,v(N),v(N \{j}) ≥ 0
for all j ∈ N, and expression (15) are non negative for n ≥ 2, and from (15) it
follows that τi(N,v) is non decreasing in v(N) for all i ∈ N.
Now let us calculate the derivative
∂τi(N,v)
∂v(N\{i}). In view of the game  N,v  is
totally positive, the values v(N \{ j}),v(N) are not independent, since v(N)=λN
+
 




j =i v(N \{ j}))(λN +
 
j∈N v(N \{ j}))
nλN +( n − 1)
 







j =i v(N \{ j}))(λN +
 
j∈N v(N \{ j}))
(nλN +( n − 1)
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})2 .




v(N \{ j}))λN ≥ 0.
It remains to ﬁnd the derivatives
∂τi(N,v)







j∈N v(N \{ j})
 
(nλN +( n − 1)
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})
(nλN +( n − 1)
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})2 .
The numerator of this derivative equals
2nλ2
N +2 λN(n − 1)
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})+nλN
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})+
(n − 1)
  




j =i v(N \{ j})+
(n − 1)
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})
 
j =i v(N \{ j}) − (n − 1)λ2
N − λN
 
j =i v(N \{ j})
−(n − 1)
 
j =i v(N \{ j})
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})=
(n +1 ) λ2
N +2 ( n − 1)λN
 
j∈N v(N \{ j})+( n − 1)λN
 
j =i v(N \{ j}) ≥ 0.
,
and in this case we have also obtained the nonnegativeness of the derivative
∂τi(N,v)
∂v(N\{j}),j = i.
Note that the game (9) was not totally positive, since the equalities v(S)=0
for all S,|S| < 5,v (S)=2=λS for S,|S| =5 ,S  1, imply that for S   1,|S| =6
the following equalities hold
v(S)=6=λS +5 λT, where |T| =5 ,1 ∈ T
showing negativeness λS or λT.
Proposition 1 and formula (13) immediately imply
Theorem 3. There exists the interval τ-value for the class of totally positive interval
games.
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Abstract Irrational behavior proof condition for single player was intro-
duced in Yeung, 2006. In his paper the generalization oﬀ this condition for ar-
bitrary coalitions S ⊂ N is proposed. The condition is demonstrated on dif-
ferential cooperative game ﬁrst considered in Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003.
It is shown that the dynamic Shapley Value computed for this game satisﬁes
also the irrational behavior proof condition for coalitions.
Keywords: optimal cooperative trajectory, Nash equilibrium, imputation
distribution procedure, characteristic function, Shapley value.
1. Irrational Behavior Proof Condition
Consider n-person diﬀerential game Γ(x0,t 0) with inﬁnite duration and independent
motions on the time interval [t0,+∞). Let I = {1,...,n} be the set of players. Motion
equations have the form:
˙ xi = fi(xi,u i),u i ∈ Ui ⊂ R
l,x i =( xi1,...,xim) ∈ R
m,









where hi(x,u) is a continuous function and x(τ)={x1(τ),...,xn(τ)} is the solution




is the initial condition.
Each player seeks to decrease his total costs.
Suppose that there exist an n -tuple of open-loop controls ¯ u(t)=(¯ u1(t),..., ¯ un(t))
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The trajectory ¯ x(t)=(¯ x1(t),..., ¯ xn(t)) satisfying (3) is called ”optimal cooper-
ative trajectory”.
Deﬁne the characteristic function V (x0,t 0;S) of cooperative game for S ⊂ I.
The computation of the characteristic function values is not standard (and is similar
to the deﬁnition given in Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003) and therefore it needs to be
discussed. We make the assumption that left-out players (I\S) stick to the feedback
Nash strategies when the characteristic function value is computed for coalition S.
The values of characteristic function V (x0,t 0;S) are called ”the minimal guarantied
cost of coalition S”.
Let L(x0,t 0) be the imputation set, where I = {1,2,...,n}. αi(t) denote the cost
of player i under cooperation over the time interval [t,+∞) along the cooperative






αi(t0) ≤ V (t0,x 0;{i}).
Suppose α ∈ L(x0,t 0). Consider V (¯ x(t),t;S),L(x0,t 0) along the cooperative tra-





We call the function βi(τ),τ ∈ [t0,+∞] imputation distribution procedure
(IDP) (see Petrosyan, 1993 and Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003). Suppose for all t0 ≤
t<∞ now that in some intermediate instant of time the irrational behavior of some
player(or players) will force the other players to leave the cooperative agreement,
then the irrational behavior proof condition (see Yeung, 2006) requires that the
following inequality must be satisﬁed
V (x0,t 0;{i}) ≥
t  
t0
e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)V (¯ x(t);{i}),i ∈ I, (4)
where V (x0,t 0;{i}) is the minimal guarantied cost of player i with the initial
state x0, when he plays individually, V (¯ x(t);{i}) is the similar cost with initial
state ¯ x(t) on the cooperative trajectory. The ﬁrst expression which stands in right
part of condition (4) is the cost of player i which he gets by cooperation on time
[t0,+∞) using cost distribution over time βi(t) along the cooperative trajectory
¯ x(τ). Since the costs are calculated from initial state t0 the second term in right side
of inequality (4) is taken with discounting. The irrational behavior proof condition
means that the minimal guarantied costs of player i calculated at the time t0,
provided that all players act individually has to exceed the minimal guarantied
costs of player i calculated at the time t0 i nt h ec a s ew h e np l a y e ri enters the Grand
coalition I during the time [t0,t] and then the coalition I breaks up at moment t
and all players play individually over the time interval [t,+∞). If the condition (4)
is satisﬁed player i is irrational-behavior-proof (I-B-P) because irrational actionsThe Detalization of the Irrational Behavior Proof Condition 433
leading to the dissolution of cooperative scheme will not bring his resultant costs
below his initial noncooperative costs.
V (x0,t 0;{i}) is constant. If t = t0 the inequality (4) turns into identity. The
suﬃcient condition for realization of inequality (4) is the monotone increase of
the function which stands in the right hand side of inequality (4). The suﬃcient
condition of the monotone increase of function is non-negativity of its derivative.














V (¯ x(t);{i}) − ρe
−ρ(t−t0)V (¯ x(t);{i}).
Then we get the follows suﬃcient condition of realization of inequality (4) for






−ρ(t−t0)V (¯ x(t);{i}),i =1 ,...,n.
(5)




V (¯ x(τ);{i})+ρV (¯ x(t);{i}),i =1 ,...,n. (6)
In (6) V (¯ x(τ);{i}) is the value of the zero-sum game played with coalition I\{i}
as one player and player i with the coalitional payoﬀ equal to [−Hi(¯ x(τ);u1,...,un)].
Suppose that y(t),t ∈ [τ,+∞) is the trajectory of this zero-sum game, when
the saddle point strategies are played. We suppose that for each initial condition
¯ x(τ),τ ∈ [t0,+∞) such saddle point exist (if not we can consider ε -saddle point
in piecewise open loop strategies which for every given ε ≥ 0 exist always, but the
following formulas in this case are to be considered with ε -accuracy).
Substitute the initial state on optimal cooperative trajectory ¯ x(τ) and trajectory






Substitute the value of the zero-sum game V (¯ x(τ);{i}) from (7) to inequality
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Then using the deﬁnition for diﬀerential of a function of several variables and

























































−ρ(t−t0)hi(¯ x(τ);y(t))dt + e











flk(¯ x(τ), ¯ u(τ))dt.
(8)















flk(¯ x(τ), ¯ u(τ))dt.
If α(t) ∈ M(¯ x(t),T − t) ⊂ L(¯ x(t),T − t), where M(¯ x(t),T − t)i ss o m eﬁ x e d
optimality principle (core, NM-solution, Shapley value), and if α(t) can be chosen
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which means also time-consistency of α (see Petrosyan, 1993).








−ρ(t−t0)hi(¯ x(τ);y(t))dt + e











flk(¯ x(τ), ¯ u(τ))dt.
which now guarantees both time-consistency and irrational behavior proof.
2. The Irrational Behavior Proof Condition for Coalitions
In Section 1 we considered the irrational behavior proof condition for player i.W e
can introduce the similar condition for coalitions:





e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)V (¯ x(t);{Sk}), (9)
where Sk is any coalition in n-person diﬀerential game Γ(x0,t 0) and player i is
included in the coalition Sk. V (x0,t 0;{Sk}) is the minimal guarantied cost of coali-
tion Sk with the initial state x0 on the time [t0,+∞)w h e nl e f t - o u tp l a y e r s( I\Sk)
stick to the feedback Nash strategies. V (¯ x(t);{Sk}) is the similar cost with the ini-
tial state on optimal cooperative trajectory ¯ x(t) during the time [t,+∞). The ﬁrst
expression which stands in right hand side of inequality (9) is the sum of costs of
players included in coalition Sk obtained using IDP βi(τ) when players are involved
in Grand coalition.
The condition (9) means that the minimal guarantied costs of coalition Sk cal-
culated at the moment t0 provided that coalition Sk operates individually should be
more than the minimal guarantied costs calculated at moment t0 in the case when
the Grand coalition I breaks up at the moment t and the coalition Sk survived till
the end of the game.
2.1. Example
Consider the game of emission reduction for which the irrational behavior proof
condition for coalitions is satisﬁed. Earlier this the problem was considered by
Kajtala and Pohjola, 1995, Petrosyan and Zaccour (2000).
Problem statement. The dynamics of the model is proposed in Petrosyan and
Zaccour, 2003.
Let I be the set of countries involved in the game of emission reduction: I =
{1,...,n}. The game starts at the instant of time t0 from initial state x0. Emission
of player i,(i =1 ,...,n)a tt i m et,t ∈ [t0;∞), is denoted ui(t). Let x(t)d e n o t et h e
stock of accumulated pollution by time t. The evolution of this stock is governed
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where δ denotes the natural rate of pollution absorption. Let denote ui(t)=ui and
x(t)=x. Ci(ui) will be the emission reduction cost incurred by country i while




(ui(t) − ¯ ui)
2, 0 ≤ ui(t) ≤ ¯ ui,γ > 0.
Di(x(t)) denotes its damage cost:
Di(x)=πx(t),π > 0.
Both functions are continuously diﬀerentiable and convex, with and C 
i(ui) < 0
and D 





−ρ(t−t0) (Ci(ui(t)) + Di(x(t)))dt,
subject to the equation dynamics (10), where u =( u1,...,un)a n dρ is the com-
mon social discount rate. Further check the irrational behavior proof condition for
coalitions for the problem of emission reduction.
Solution of the problem. The irrational behavior proof condition for coalitions






e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(t−t0)V (¯ x(t);{Sk}), (11)
Formulas for a feedback Nash equilibrium uN
i , an optimal cooperative tra-
jectory ¯ x(t), optimal cost of Grand coalition, optimal cost of intermediate coali-
tions, the Shapley value and the value of a time-consistent IDP ﬁrst obtained in
Petrosyan and Zaccour, 2003 we present for completeness.
Since the game is played over the inﬁnite time horizon, we look for stationary
strategies. To obtain a feedback Nash equilibrium, assuming diﬀerentiability of the













From the H-J-B equation we obtain the Nash emission Strategy:
u
N




For this Nash strategies the value of function Fi(x,t) satisﬁes the H-J-B equation
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For computation of cost of Grand coalition we need to solve a standard dynamic














The optimal emission strategy satisﬁes the Bellman equation is calculated as
follows:
uI
i =¯ ui −
nπ
γ(ρ + δ)
, ∀i ∈ I.














To get time representation of accumulated stock of pollution, we insert the
expression of uI






































By a very similar procedure as the one adopted for solving for the Grand coalition


















i =¯ ui −
kπ
γ(ρ + δ)
, ∀i ∈ Sk,k = |Sk|.
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Denote it by φ(V,x,t)=( φ1(V,x,t),...,φn(V,x,t)). As imputation in this ex-












Deﬁne a time-consistent IDP. Allocate to player i, i =1 ,2,...,n, at instant of time





The formula (14) allocates at instant of time t to player i a cost corresponding to
the interest payment (interest rate times his cost-to-go under cooperation given by
his Shapley value) minus the variation over time of this cost-to-go.
The following proposition shows that β(t)=( β1(t),...,βn(t)), as given by (14),
is indeed a time-consistent IDP.
Substituting the Shapley value in (14) leads to:
βi(t)=π¯ x(t)+
n2π2
2γ(ρ + δ)2. (15)
The game of emission reduction is the symmetrical game, so the minimal guarantied










−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ, k = |Sk|.
Rewriting the inequality (11):
V (x0;{Sk}) ≥ k
t  
t0
e−ρ(τ−t0)βi(τ)dτ + e−ρ(τ−t0)V (¯ x(t);{Sk}), (16)
















Substitution the trajectory ¯ x(t) (11) in the value of characteristic function (13)
and multiplication the resulting expression by e−ρ(t−t0) leads to:
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Consider the integral in right hand side of inequality (11). Substitute the IDP





























































































































Substitute values of right and left sides (17) and (18) in inequality (11)
and rewrite the irrational behavior proof condition for coalitions for the problem of







2ργ(ρ + δ)2 −
π2(n − k)k































Cancel same summands in right and left sides of inequality (19). Divide the






























− n + k
 
≤ 0. (21)




2 −n+k ≥ 0.
Let verify that. Multiply this inequality on 2 and simplify it:
(n − k)(n + k − 2) ≥ 0,
hence the inequality (21) is true. Thus we obtain that the irrational behavior
proof condition for coalitions is satisﬁed for the problem of emission cost reduction.
References
Haurie, A. and G. Zaccour (1995). Diﬀerential game models of global environment man-
agement. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games, 2, 3–24.
Kaitala, V. and M. Pohjola (1995). Sustainable international agreements on green house
warming: a game theory study. Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games,
2, 67–88.
Petrosyan, L. (1993). Diﬀerential Games of Pursuit. World Sci. Pbl., 320.
Petrosyan, L. and G. Zaccour (2003). Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution
cost reduction. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27 , 381–398.
Petrosyan, L. and S. Mamkina (2006). Dynamic games with coalitional structures // In-
ternational Game Theory Review, 8(2), 295–307.
Petrosyan, L. and N. Kozlovskaya (2007). Time-consistent Allocation in Coalitional Game
of pollution cost reduction. Computational Economics and Financial and Industrial
Systems, A Preprints Volume of the 11th ifac symposium, IFAC publications Internet
Homepage, http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ifac, 156–160.
Yeung, D.W.K. (2006). An irrational - behavior - proof condition in cooperative diﬀerential
games. Intern. J. of Game Theory Rew., 8, 739–744.Formal Epistemology: A Survey 
Xiaojian Zhao
CDSE, University of Mannheim, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
Tel: +49 621 181 1782
E-mail: xzhao@rumms.uni-mannheim.de
Abstract The paper surveys theoretical developments in formal epistemol-
ogy. We discuss knowledge operator, and its role in game theory. Then we
introduce imperfect knowledge from bounded rationality perspective. Lastly,
we discuss unawareness, and its negative result.
Keywords: epistemology, knowledge, games, unawareness
MSC: 03-01
1. A Formal Theory of Knowledge
The concepts of knowledge and rationality have been widely applied in economics
and game theory. The basics of formal theory of knowledge can be checked in Os-
borne and Rubinstein (1994) and Rubinstein (1998). Furthermore, Geanakoplos
(1992) and especially Dekel and Gul (1997)1 give us an advanced and comprehen-
sive survey of this topic.
An information structure is a collection L≡(Ω,(Fi,p i)i∈N). Ω is the set of
ﬁnite states of nature. Each player i ∈ N,w h e r eN is ﬁnite set of players, has a
possibility correspondence Fi : Ω  −→ 2Ω,w h e r eFi(ω) is the set of states i considers
possible when ω occurs. pi ∈ ∆(Ω)i sap r i o ro fi over Ω. We study two properties
of Fi.
P1 (reﬂexive or nondeluded) ω ∈F i(ω)
It means that i, at least, knows that the true state is possible.
P0 (consistency) ω  ∈F i(ω) ⇒F i(ω )=Fi(ω)
It says that i can use this consistency argument to infer about the state.
Slightly abusing notations, Fi ≡{ Fi ⊆ Ω : Fi = Fi(ω)f o rs o m eω ∈ Ω}.
Theorem 1. Fi is partitional if and only if Fi it satisﬁes [P1] and [P0].
Proof. It is clear that “only if” part directly follows. Suppose Fi satisﬁes [P1] and
[P0]. If Fi(ω )a n dFi(ω) intersect and ω   ∈F i(ω ) ∩F i(ω), by [P2], Fi(ω )=
Fi(ω)=Fi(ω  ). (no overlaps) By [P1], ∪ω∈ΩFi(ω)=Ω. (no gaps) Therefore, Fi is
partitional.    
We say i knows an event A ∈ Ω at ω,i fFi(ω) ⊆ A. The set of states, or event, in
which i knows A is Ki(A) ≡{ ω ∈ Ω : Fi(ω) ⊆ A}. The knowledge operator derived
from any possibility correspondence satisﬁes the following properties.
N: Ki(Ω)=Ω
  I thank Felix Kubler for helpful discussions. All remaining errors are mine. Financial
support from German Science Foundation (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Some references in this survey can be found in Dekel and Gul (1997).442 Xiaojian Zhao
It says i knows something must happen. Since Fi(ω) ⊆ Ω for all ω, obviously,
Ki(Ω)={ω ∈ Ω : Fi(ω) ⊆ Ω} = Ω.
MC: Ki(A) ∩ Ki(B)=Ki(A ∩ B)
It says knowing A and knowing B is equivalent to knowing A and B. Obviously,
Ki(A) ∩ Ki(B)={ω : Fi(ω) ⊆ A}∩{ ω : Fi(ω) ⊆ B} = {ω : Fi(ω) ⊆ A ∩ B} =
Ki(A ∩ B).
Monotonicity: A ⊆ B ⇒ Ki(A) ⊆ Ki(B)
It says if A implies B, then knowing A implies knowing B.
Theorem 2 (MC). implies [Monotonicity].
Proof. Suppose A ⊆ B. A ∩ B = A which implies Ki(A ∩ B)=Ki(A). By [MC],
Ki(A)∩Ki(B)=Ki(A∩B). Thus Ki(A)∩Ki(B)=Ki(A). Hence Ki(A) ⊆ Ki(B).
   
Assume that Fi is partitional for all i ∈ N. We have the following properties of
the knowledge operator:
T (Axiom of Knowledge): Ki(A) ⊆ A
It says if i knows A,t h e nA is true. If ω ∈ Ki(A), then Fi(ω) ⊆ A. By [P1], we
have ω ∈F i(ω) ⊆ A.
4 (Axiom of Transparency): Ki(A) ⊆ Ki(Ki(A))
It says if i knows A,t h e ni knows that i knows A. Ki(A) is a union of elements
in the partition Fi. Since, for all F which is a union of elements in the partition,
we have Ki(F)=F,[ 4] follows.
5 (Axiom of Wisdom):  Ki(A) ⊆ Ki( Ki(A)) where   denotes the complement.
It says if i does not know A,t h e ni knows that i does not know A.S i n c eKi(A)
is a union of elements in the partition Fi,  Ki(A)i sa sw e l l ,a n d[ 5] follows.
Note that if [T] is satisﬁed, [4]a n d[ 5] hold with equality. Furthermore, the
knowledge system satisfying the above axioms is a system S5.2
Theorem 3. (Ω, Image(Ki)) is a topological space.
Proof. By [N], we have that Ω is in Image(Ki). Since Fi is a partition, by deﬁnition
of Ki,w eh a v et h a t∅∈ Image(Ki). By [MC], we have that the intersection of any
two elements in Image(Ki) is also in Image(Ki).
It is left to show that the arbitrary union A = ∪α∈IAα is in Image(Ki)f o r
all Aα ∈Image(Ki). To show it, let Aα = Ki(B)f o rs o m eB.B y[ 4], Ki(Aα)=
Ki(Ki(B)) ⊇ Ki(B)=Aα.B y[ T], Ki(Aα)=Aα.B y[ MC], Ki(Aα)=Ki(Aα ∩
A)=Ki(Aα) ∩ Ki(A) ⊆ Ki(A). Thus Aα ⊆ Ki(A) which implies A ⊆ Ki(A). By
[T], Ki(A)=A.    
Starting from Fi , we derive the properties of Ki. Alternatively, suppose an
arbitrary set operator Ki :2 Ω  −→ 2Ω satisﬁes the properties above. We deﬁne
Fi : Ω  −→ 2Ω by Fi(ω)=∩{A ⊆ Ω : ω ∈ Ki(A)}. Then this Fi can generate the
same Ki derived from Fi.F u r t h e r m o r e ,Ki can generate the same Fi derived from
Ki. Note that only axioms [MC, N] are necessary and suﬃcient condition for the
existence of a possibility correspondence. If, additionally, [T, 4, 5] are satisﬁed, Fi
is partitional.
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Assume Fi is partitional. We say that an event A is self-evident to i if Fi(ω) ⊆ A
for all ω ∈ A.I nw o r d s ,A happens if and only if i knows it happens. In term of
knowledge operator, A is self-evident to i if Ki(A)=A. Put it diﬀerently, A is a
ﬁxed point of the knowledge operator Ki. Finally, let R be the meet of the partitions
Fi for all i ∈ N.T h a ti s ,R is their ﬁnest common coarsening. Denote by R(ω)t h e
element in R that contains ω.N o t et h a tR(ω) is the smallest self-evident event
containing ω for all i.
We denote by Fi(A)=∪ω∈AFi(ω)t h es e to fs t a t e sw h i c hi thinks possible if
some state in A occurs. Thus, at ω, i knows j knows that A occurs iﬀ Fj(Fi(ω)) ⊆ A,
or equivalently, ω ∈ Ki(Kj(A)).
We denote by KM(A) the event A is mutually known among M ⊆ N where
KM(A) ≡∩ i∈MKi(A). The event A is common knowledge among N is CK(A) ≡
∩∞
n=1Kn
N(A)w h e r eKn
N denotes n iterations of the operator KN. Alternatively, it is
equivalent to deﬁne that A is common knowledge among N at ω if R(ω) ⊆ A.
Some theorists argue that [T] is too strong, and replace the knowledge operator
by belief. In addition to Ki, we deﬁne a certainty operator Bi :2 Ω  −→ 2Ω by
Bi(A) ≡{ ω ∈ Ω : pi(A|Fi(ω)) = 1}. It satisﬁes the following properties.
D: Bi(A) ⊆ Bi( A): if i is certain of A,t h e ni is not certain of not A.
MCB: Bi(A) ∩ Bi(B)=Bi(A ∩ B)
NB: Bi(Ω)=Ω
4B: Bi(A) ⊆ Bi(Bi(A))
5B:  Bi(A) ⊆ Bi( Bi(A))
and
BK: Ki(A) ⊆ Bi(A): if i is certain of anything i knows.
4B: Bi(A) ⊆ Ki(Bi(A)): if i is certain of something, i knows that he is certain
of it.
5B:  Ki(A)=Bi( Ki(A))
Similarly, we can deﬁne mutual certainty operator BM and common certainty
operator CB.
2. Knowledge in Games
2.1. Solution Concepts in Normal-Form Games
We deﬁne the normal-form game Γ = {N,(Ai)N
i=1,(ui)N
i=1}
• N is the set of players
• Ai is the set of strategies of player i
• ui : A → R is the utility function which assigns each strategy proﬁle a payoﬀ
for agent i where A ≡× N
i=1Ai
Let Ω be a set of states, each of which fully describes the environment. Player
i’s utility function at ω is ui(ω). The event that i’s utility function is a particular ui
is denoted by [ui] ≡{ ω ∈ Ω : ui(ω)=ui}. the strategy chosen by i at ω is ai(ω).
Similarly, [ai] ≡{ ω ∈ Ω : ai(ω)=ai} is the event that the strategy chosen by i at
ω is ai.
Theorem 4. Suppose at ω, for all i, Fi(ω) ⊆ [a−i(ω)] (i knows other players’
strategies) and ai(ω) is a best response of a−i(ω) (i is rational), then (ai)N
i=1 is a
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This theorem reﬂects that the usual assumption of common knowledge of the
game is not necessary for the epistemic foundation of Nash equilibrium. Further,
even mutual knowledge of the game is not necessary. This theorem shows, to have
Nash equilibrium, it is suﬃcient to assume that each player knows only his own
strategy set and utility.
2.2. Solution Concepts in Extensive-Form Games
• The model and extensive-form rationality
We ﬁrst deﬁne the extensive-form game of perfect information:
Γ = {Y,Z,≺,N,I,A,(ui)N
i=1}
• Y is the set of non-terminal nodes
• Z is the set of terminal nodes
• X ≡ Y ∪ Z is the set of nodes
•≺is a binary relation deﬁned on X which is not complete, transitive, asym-
metric, irreﬂexive and satisﬁes arborescence i.e.(∀x,y,v ∈ X):{[(x ≺ v) ∧ (y ≺
v)] =⇒ [(x ≺ y) ∨ (y ≺ x) ∨ (x = y)]} which means that the graph of this binary
relation is a tree.
• N is the set of players
• Function I : Y → N determines for each non-terminal node in Y the player
who moves at that node
• Correspondence A : Y ⇒ X associates with each non-terminal node in Y a
non-empty set of nodes which associate with actions for the player who moves at
that node
• Strategy si for player i is a complete contingent plan
• Si is the set of all strategies for player i
• s is the strategy proﬁle
• S is the set of all strategy proﬁle
• Function ui : Z → R is the utility function which assigns each terminal node
a payoﬀ for agent i
Given the information structure L≡(Ω,(Fi,p i)i∈N), we could deﬁne the model
M =( Ω,s,(Fi,p i)i∈N,Γ). For each state of the world, there is a game to be played
and a strategy proﬁle to be chosen.
The model with Fi, a partition, generates knowledge and certainty operators
Ki and Bi satisfying Axioms [B K ,T ,4 BK,5 BK,M CM C B]. Conversely, given
Kiand Bi satisfying Axioms [BK, T, 4BK,5 BK,M CM C B], we can also construct
a partition.
For deﬁning rationality in this extensive form game, we need to incorporate
counterfactuals or hypothetical or nearby worlds, since the rationality of a particular
action α of player i is based on the predicted reaction of the opponent’s course of
action β.T h i sβ may not be consistent with rationality. We, the outside analysts,
have to consider the rational course of action α contingent to a surprise as well.
Formally, an event E is said to be a surprise by player i at any state in ¬Ki¬E ∩
Bi¬E. That is, player i assigns probability 1 that the “surprise” event will not
happen but does not know that this event will not happen since knowledge implies
truth by [T]. Alternatively, E is a surprise by player i if E is possible (¬Ki¬E)
but not plausible (Bi¬E) . For example, you toss a coin. You are certain that it is
either head up or tail up, since you assign probability 1 to this event. But you don’t
know that it is either head up or tail up, because it is also possible that the coin
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at most, certain about the strategies of other players but cannot know them. Or an
event in which some strategies occur is, at most, not plausible but not impossible.
From Figure 1, we could see that more intuitively.
Figure1. Surprise, possibility and plausibility
For any model M, we give the following deﬁnitions:
(a) D(si)={E ⊆ Ω|∃β ∈ Si s.t. ui(β,s−i(ω)) >u i(si,s −i(ω))∀ω ∈ E} as the
collection of events in which strategy si is strictly dominated.
(b)¬Rv(si)=[ ( ¬Ki¬[v]) ∩ (∩E∈D(si)Ki([v] → E))] ∩ [(¬Bi¬[v]) ∩
(∩E∈D(si)Bi([v] → E))] is the set of states of the world in which the strategy
si is irrational at a particular node v.T h es t r a t e g ysi is irrational at [v]i f[ v]i s
possible and i knows that si is dominated or [v] is plausible and i is certain that si
is dominated. We could check that ([v] → E) ⇐⇒ (¬([v] ∩¬ E)) ⇐⇒ (¬[v] ∩ E).
Thus, if i knows (or is certain) that v will not be reached, then she is rational at v
no matter what she plans to do there.
(c) Rv = {ω|sI(v)(ω) ∈ Rv(sI(v)(ω))} is set of states of the world in which the
player who moves at v makes a rational strategy at v.
Ri = ∩I(v)=iRv is set of states of the world in which i is rational.
R = ∩iRi is set of states of the world in which all players are rational.
This is the deﬁnition of rationality in extensive-form games.
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In the standard game theory, we rule out some of the Nash equilibria by back-
ward induction procedure to get the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibria in extensive-
form game with perfect information. However, by assuming common knowledge of
rationality, we have no reason to do such reﬁnement work. According to Axiom [T],
knowledge implies truth. Common knowledge of rationality rules out some player
choosing some irrational strategy. Thus there is no room for surprise here. Any Nash
Equilibrium outcome is consistent with common knowledge of rationality.
Theorem 5. Let s be a Nash equilibrium of the perfect information extensive-form
game Γ. Then there exists a model M such that CK[R]=[ s]. Moreover, if Γ is
generic , then for any model M,CK[R] ⊆∩ s∈NE[s] where NE is the set of Nash
equilibrium proﬁles of Γ.
Now we need some additional assumptions to incorporate surprise.
Firstly we deﬁne caution. Caution means that players are never certain that their
opponents will not choose some strategies. The event where this holds, [caution],
is formally ∩i ∩s−i ¬Bi¬[s−i]. The assumption of caution is very strong. On the
event of [caution], very player’s conjecture of the strategies of her opponents has
full support on S−i. It is inconsistent with common knowledge or common certainty
of rationality since there is conﬂict between caution and knowledge, caution and
certainty.
Secondly we deﬁne weak caution. Because the assumption of caution is too
strong, we weaken it to Weak Caution. That is, we allow for certainty but rule
out knowledge of opponents’ strategy. Formally, the event where it holds, WC =
∩i ∩s−i ¬Ki¬[s−i]
• The problematic nature of extensive-form rationality
From the three-stage take-it-or-leave-it game or centipede game by Rosenthal
(1981) in Figure 2, we could recall the well-known standard argument of backward
induction. However, the problem is why II will choose t2 when the node for her
to move is reached? II will choose t2 only if II believe I is rational. But if I is
rational, I will not choose l1. If II knows that I is rational, then this problem
will never happen since knowledge implies truth. Thus the assumption of common
knowledge of rationality does not yield the backward induction prediction. But
certainty doesn’t imply truth. You could still be surprised if you are certain about
something while you will be never surprised if you know something. So we consider
common certainty of rationality.
Theorem 6. If v is not on the unique backward induction path of a generic
extensive-form game and [v] ∩ CB[R]  = ∅ in some standard model of this game
M, then there exists [v ] such that [v ] ∩ CB[R] ∩ (∩iBi¬[v ])  = ∅
Theorem 6 could be examined in Reny (1993). We know that if an extensive-
form game is generic, then backward induction path is unique. If a node v is not
on this unique path, then it is either common certainty that this node will not be
reached or at some node v  which is consistent with common certainty of rationality
(CB[R]), some player is being surprised (∩iBi¬[v ]). Now, by this theorem, we could
construct models for generic games in which [v]∩CB[R] is non-empty even when v
is oﬀ the backward induction path. The notion of surprise plays an important role.Formal Epistemology: A Survey 447
Figure2. Centipede game
• The resolution: weak caution and common certainty of rationality
For any extensive-form game Γ, we deﬁne:
• Σe
i ⊆ Siis the set of strategies of i that are not strongly dominated at any




i is the Cartesian product of Σe
i
• Σ∞ is the set of strategy proﬁles survive inﬁnitely iterative deletion of strongly
dominated strategies
• Re = Σ∞∞Σe is the solution concept by Gul (1995b)
Theorem 7. In any standard model M, WC∩CB[R] ⊆ [Re]. Moreover, for every
extensive-form game of perfect information there exits some standard model M such
that CB[R]=[ Re].
Theorem 7 is related to Ben-Porath (1994) and Gul (1995b).But the solution
concept of Re is still very weak.
• Backward induction revisited
So far, there is no room for backward induction when common knowledge is
present. Now we go back to consider backward induction.
We ﬁrst deﬁne the following notations:
• sM is a sub proﬁle of strategies, one for each i ∈ M ⊆ N.
• SM is the set of all sM
• RM = ∩i∈MRi is set of states of the world in which all players in M are
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• Ψ = {CKM[RM ]:∀M,M ⊆N s.t. M  contains no player who moves at a
predecessor node to some node owned by a player in M}
• s0 is the unique backward induction strategy proﬁle.
Then we give the following deﬁnitions:
• CK[Rnp]=∩E∈ΨE is the common knowledge of non-predecessors of all players
•WCi
p = ∩SM¬Ki¬[sM] is the weak caution regarding predecessors of player i,
where M is the subset of N and each element in M own information set preceding
an information set owned by i.
• WC p = ∩iWCi
p is the weak caution regarding predecessors of all players
Theorem 8. If M is a standard model for a generic extensive-form game in which
each player moves once, then WC p∩CK[Rnp] ⊆ [s0]. Moreover, for any such game,
there exists some standard model such that WC p ∩ CK[Rnp]=[ s0].
Since we have common knowledge of rationality of only non-predecessors and
weak caution of only predecessors, this weakened common knowledge of rationality
yields the backward induction prediction.
3. Imperfect Knowledge
3.1. Weakening the Notion of Certainty: The Bayesian Approach
Before doing the formal analysis, we present an interesting relevant example of email
game by Rubinstein (1989).
There are two players 1 and 2 involved in a coordination problem. There are
two games a and b to be played. The information about which game to be played is
known initially only to 1. If the game is b, then 1 writes an email to 2. We assume
that the email network system is set up to send a conﬁrmation email automatically
if any email is received. If 2 receives it, then a conﬁrmation email is automatically
sent back to 1. If 1 receives the conﬁrmation, then a conﬁrmation of conﬁrmation is
automatically sent as well, and so on so forth. Every email is lost with probability  .
Once an email is lost, the process ends. The players could observe how many emails
they have sent. Note that sending the conﬁrmation email is not a strategic behavior
of players but only an automatic device carried out by email network system.
The set of the state of the world is Ω = {(n,n)}∪{ (n +1 ,n)} for n is non-
negative integer. (a,b) describes the state of the world in which 1 sent a emails and
2s e n tb emails. We could see that Ω is inﬁnite.
If two players exchange inﬁnite number of emails, then two players have common
certainty that the game is b. For any ﬁnite number of email transferred, the players
will not have common certainty that the game is b.
• Notions of almost common certainty
There are diﬀerent versions of almost common certainty.
Firstly, we weaken the notion of common certainty by weakening the number of
iterations.
• Bn
N(E) is the set of states of the world in which all players in N are certain
that... [n times] ... that they are certain about E
• E is said to be n−th order mutual certainty at ω if ω ∈ Bn
N(E)
• E is said to be almost ∞ certain at ω if ω ∈ Bn
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In the email example, at state (n +1 ,n) ∈ Bn
N([b]). That is, if player 1 sent
n + 1 emails and player 2 sent n emails, then the game is b is n−th order mutual
certainty, since 1 or 2 is certain that ... [n times] ... 2 or 1 is certain that the game
is b. If n is large, we say that the game is b is almost ∞ certain.
Secondly, we weaken the notion of common certainty by weakening the degree
of certainty. That is we only require that probability is close to 1 not exactly 1.
• B
q
i(E)={ω : pi(E|Fi(ω)) ≥ q} is the set of states of the world in which i
assigns probability at least q to E
• E is said to be almost certainty at ω if ω ∈ B
q
i (E)a n dq is close to 1







N)n(E) is the set of states of the world in which E is common
q belief
• E is said to be almost common 1 belief at ω if ω ∈ Cq(E)a n dq is close to 1
• E is said to be almost certainly almost common 1 belief at ω if pi(Cq(E)) >q
for all i ∈ N and q close to 1
In the email example, we have that one element in the meet of the two partitions
is an inﬁnite set. If an event E is an almost common 1 belief, E has to include one
element in the meet. If ω  =( ∞,∞), then it is impossible that [b] is almost common
1 belief. The reasoning here is very similar to that of common knowledge.
Below, we will only consider the second version of almost common certainty.
• Introducing caution
Theorem 9. Fix a game G =( S,u).T h e r ei sa¯ q ∈ (0,1) such that given a model
{Ω,(Fi,p i)i∈N,s,u} if q>¯ q then Cq([u] ∩ [rationality]) ⊆ [Σ∞(u)].
At a state ω, the game and rationality are only almost common 1 belief, then, at
this state, all players choose the strategies not strongly dominated under inﬁnitely
iterative deletion.
Theorem 10. Consider a sequence of models, which diﬀer only in the common
prior: {Ω,(Fi,p n
i )i∈N,s,u}∞
n=1. Assume that u is bounded, i.e., u(ω)(s) <b∈ R
for any ω and all s.L e tEn be the event that the payoﬀs are u and the players
are rational in model n.I fpn(En) → 1, then the limit of any convergent subse-
quence of the distribution on actions induced by pn and s is a correlated equilibrium
distribution
This theorem shows that the characterization of correlated equilibrium does not
rely on common certainty of the game and rationality.
Before introducing the following theorem, we deﬁne   Nash equilibrium ﬁrst: For
 >0, a strategy proﬁle s∗ is an   Nash equilibrium if, for each player i and strategy
si: ui(s∗) ≥ ui(si,s ∗
−i) −  .
Theorem 11. Consider a sequence of models {Ω,(Fi,p n
i )i∈N,s,u}∞
n=1. Assume
N = {1,2}, u is bounded and ﬁx an  .T h e r ei saδ such that if the utility function,
rationality, and the conjectures are almost certain at ω, i.e., pi([u] ∩ [s∗
1] ∩ [s∗
2] ∩
[rationality]|Fi(ω)) = 1 − δ,t h e n(s∗
1,s ∗
2) is an   Nash equilibrium in the game
G =( S,u(ω))450 Xiaojian Zhao
3.2. Weakening the Notion of Knowledge: The Syntactic Approach
• Generalized knowledge operators and possibility correspondences
We know that if the knowledge operator satisﬁes all the properties [T, MC, N,
4, 5], we could deﬁne a possibility correspondence Fi,m o r e o v e rFi is a partition. In
fact, the only properties we need for Fi to be a general possibility correspondence
are [MC, N]. The appropriateness of partition for modeling information structure
is questioned. We will see some motivations for it later. Now we discuss some basic
relationship between weakening axioms of knowledge operator and weakening the
partition structure of information.
Firstly, we deﬁne more properties of possibility correspondence Fi:
P2 (nested) For F and F  in Fi,i fF ∩ F   = ∅ then either F ⊆ F  or F ⊆F
Nested could be interpreted as a property of memory. We will discuss this prop-
erty later.
P3 (balanced) For every self-evident E , there exists a function λE : Fi → R
s.t.∀ω ∈ Ω
 
F:ω∈F∈Fi λE(F)=1i fω ∈ E and 0 elsewhere.
P3+ (positive balanced) For every self-evident E, there exists a function λE :
Fi → R+ s.t.∀ω ∈ Ω
 
F:ω∈F∈Fi λE(F)=1i fω ∈ E and 0 elsewhere.
P4 (transitive or knowing that you know (KTYK)) ω   ∈F i(ω )a n dω ∈
Fi(ω)= ⇒ ω   ∈F i(ω)
P5 (Euclidean) ω   ∈F i(ω)a n dω ∈F i(ω)= ⇒ ω   ∈F i(ω )
Figure3.Formal Epistemology: A Survey 451
In Figure 3 a, we could see that property [P5] fails, since ω ∈F i(ω )a n dω ∈
Fi(ω ) but ω ∈F i(ω).
In Figure 3 b, we could see that not only property [P5], [P2] and [P3+] fails as
well, since (Fi(ω)∩Fi(ω  ) / ∈∅ ), but ¬(Fi(ω) ⊆F i(ω  ))∧¬(Fi(ω  ) ⊆F i(ω)). More-
over, let a self-evident E = {ω,ω ,ω  }.F o rω, λE(Fi(ω)) = 1. For ω  , λE(Fi(ω  )) =
1. For ω , λE(Fi(ω))+λE(Fi(ω ))+λE(Fi(ω  )) = 1. Thus λE(Fi(ω )) = −1w h i c h
is negative.
Now we discuss some basic relationships:
Theorem 12. (i) Ki satisﬁes [T] ⇔F i satisﬁes [P1]
(ii) Ki satisﬁes [4] ⇔F i satisﬁes [P4]
(iii) Ki satisﬁes [5] ⇔F i satisﬁes [P5]
(iv) If Fi satisﬁes [P1] and [P2] or [P4] then it satisﬁes [P3]
(v) If Fi satisﬁes [P1 P2 P4] then it satisﬁes [P3+]
(vi) If Fi satisﬁes [P1 P5] then it satisﬁes [P4]
(vii) Fi satisﬁes [P4] ⇔ (ω ∈F i(ω)= ⇒F i(ω ) ⊆F i(ω))
(i) - (iii) are relationship between properties of knowledge operator and pos-
sibility correspondence. (iv) - (vii) are internal relationship among properties of
possibility correspondence.
• An application to single-person decision theory: When is “information” valu-
able?
First of all, we give the following deﬁnitions:
• A single-person decision problem with information is an information structure
{Ω,Fi,p i} and a choice set Si, and a utility function ui : Si × Ω  → R
• The decision rule is a function si : Fi  → Si that is element in Si. By allowing
abusing of notation, si(ω) ≡ si(Fi(ω))








•F i is more informative than F 
i if Fi is a reﬁnement of F 
i i.e., ∀ω ∈ Ω
Fi(ω) ⊆F  
i(ω)
Note that, it is meaningless to deﬁne the expectation of the interim expected
utility function if Fi is not a partition. Since if the agent could calculate her ex-ante
utility, then she knows the information structure, and then she could reﬁne any
non-partition Fi to a partition. For example, in Figure 3 a, if the agent knows the
information structure, then she knows Fi(ω)a n dFi(ω ). The agent knows that ω 
is impossible when ω occurs. So she knows that if ω  is possible then ω will not
occur. Hence, after reasoning, she knows that Fi(ω ) could not include Fi(ω). Thus,
here, we only focus on the true ex-ante utility function that is not calculated by the
agent. True ex-ante utility function works merely for us, the outside analysts, not
the agent involved. Since the agent doesn’t know the information structure at all,
the agent could not calculate true ex-ante utility function as well.452 Xiaojian Zhao
Theorem 13. (Geanakoplos (1989)) If a possibility correspondence Fi satisfying
[P1, P2 and P4] is a reﬁnement of a partition F 
i then Eu(si||Fi) ≥ Eu(si||F 
i).
Moreover, if Fi fails [P1, P2 or P4] then there exists a partition F 
i that is less
informative but yields higher true ex-ante utility
This theorem is very informative. It gives us the suﬃcient and necessary condi-
tion for information to be valuable.
Now we will see an example that Fi fails [P4] and Fi is a reﬁnement of a
partition F 
i but the agent is worse oﬀ with more information. This example is from
Geanakoplos (1994 p. 1491-1493). Suppose that a doctor initially assigns equal
probability to all the four states of the world GG, GB, BG and BB. The doctor
chooses whether to do the operation. If the state is GG, doing the operation will be
successful and, after that, the payoﬀ will be 3. If the state is GB, BG or BB, doing
the operation will be harmful and, after that, the payoﬀ will be -2. If the doctor
gives up the operation, she will always get 0 payoﬀ.
Figure4. Doctor Example
Initially, the information structure is a trivial partition that is F 
i = {{GG,GB,
BG,BB}}
Now the doctor employs a technology to give her a more informative Fi which is
shown in Figure 4. Fi is a reﬁnement of F 
i.B u tEu(si||Fi)=u(si(Fi(GG)),GG)×
pi(GG)+u(si(Fi(GB)),GB)pi(GB)+u(si(Fi(BG)),BG)pi(BG)+u(si(Fi(BB)),
BB)pi(BB)=0 ×1/4+(−2)×1/4+0×1/4+0×1/4=−1/2 < 0=Eu(si||F 
i). SinceFormal Epistemology: A Survey 453
the doctor’s new possibility correspondence is not transitive, i.e., [P4] is violated,
more information is harmful to her.
3.3. Motivations
In this section, we discuss motivations for most of the weakening results above. It is
plausible to weakening knowledge since there are errors in information processing.
Partition is not appropriate for modeling the agents with bounded rationality and
reasoning ability. But why Fi needs not be partition? Which axioms does not Ki
satisfy when agents with limited reasoning ability? Now we will review some of the
motivations for this research.
Provability and complexity: Modeling knowledge as something that agents de-
duce satisﬁes [4] and violates [5]
Geanakoplos (1989) and Shin (1993) independently argue that knowledge comes
from proof. We call such knowledge provable knowledge. Provable knowledge satis-
ﬁes [4]. For example, if you know 1st welfare theorem, it means that you could prove
it, then you could prove that you could prove it, that is, you know that you know
1st welfare theorem. However, if you don’t know 1st welfare theorem, it means that
you could not prove it, but you are not able to prove that you could not prove it,
that is, you could not falsify it. Thus you do not know that you do not know 1st
welfare theorem. Thus provable knowledge violates [5]
Samet (1990) proposes a measure of complexity on language L, comp : L → R+.
We assume that there is a bound M s.t. ∀φ s.t. kφ,w eh a v ecomp(φ) ≤ M
(C1) comp(kφ) ≥ comp(φ)
(C2) comp(¬φ) ≥ comp(φ)
(C3) comp(kkφ)=comp(kφ)
Thus for a sentence p,i fcomp(p) >M ,t h e n¬kp.S i n c ecomp(¬kp) ≥
comp(kp) ≥ comp(p) >M ,w eh a v e¬k¬kp.S o[ 5] is violated. But [4]i sn o t
violated because of (C3).
Forgetfulness: Since people often forget information, the representation of what
they ultimately remember may fail to be a partition.
Nested could be interpreted as a property of memory. Assume that each state of
the world in Ω is a list of n basic statements that can be either true or false. That
is, Ω = {T,F}n which is also called propositional state space. The kth element of
ω, denoted by ω(k), speciﬁes the kth element is true or false. So the set of basic
propositions is X ≡{ ω(k)}n
k=1. ω can be interpreted as an n-tuple of binary digits.
Assume that the possibility correspondence satisﬁes [P1] and that the propositions
are remembered in the ordered sequence. That is, ∀ω, ∃l,s . t .Fi(ω)={ω  : ω(j)=
ω (j),j =0 ,···,l}, assuming that ω(0) = ω (0) for all ω . This is plausible, since
people only remember the facts of relative more recent or important ones. Then
this possibility correspondence Fi satisﬁes [P3] and needs not to be a partition.
Moreover, if Fi satisﬁes [P1] and [P3], then Fi has this memory property.
In Figure 4, we could see a nested Fi that satisﬁes this memory property of
forgetfulness: Fi(GG)={ω  : ω(j)=ω (j),j =0 }, Fi(GB)={ω  : ω(j)=
ω (j),j=0 ,1}, Fi(BG)={ω  : ω(j)=ω (j),j=0 ,1} and Fi(BB)={ω  : ω(j)=
ω (j),j=0 }.
But Fi is not a partition. Moreover, we have shown that information is harmful
for the doctor with this memory problem in the example.454 Xiaojian Zhao
Imperfect information processing: Mistakes in processing information may be
modeled by non-partitions.
Geanakoplos (1989) discusses a situation where selection bias will lead to non-
partitions. Selection bias means individuals select which information to use, e.g.,
ignoring bad news but taking good news into account. Thus what one knows is
partly a matter of choice. For example, when reading newspaper, a smoker will
obtain many diﬀerent reports concerning whether smoking is correlated with lung
cancer. This generates non-partitional information. But the smoker will probably
select the information that smoking is uncorrelated with lung cancer.
However, there is no developed connection between selection bias and properties
of knowledge to be weakened.
4. Unawareness
Unawareness is the most commonly cited argument for dropping [5]. Since people
often have not a complete description of the state of the world, they might not
be aware of some facts, that is, some basic propositions. If a person is unaware of
something, then he doesn’t know it and he doesn’t know that he doesn’t know it
and so on ad inﬁnitum.
Unawareness is a common kind of ignorance of human being. In the ancient
times, people were unaware that the earth is a sphere. In the industrial revolution
period, people were unaware of the future global warming. Several years ago, the
U.S. people were unaware of September 11, 2001 attacks. There is some diﬀerence
between unawareness and simply not knowing, say uncertainty. If people are uncer-
tain of something, they know that they do not know it. In contrast, if someone is
unaware of something, he does not know it and he does not know that he does not
know it.
In this section, we drop the subscripts for all operators, since there is no multi
agents here. By adopting the syntactic approach, we could see some argument for
dropping [P5]. By Modica and Rustichini (1993, 1994), a person is unaware of
proposition φ if she does not know φ and she does not know that she does not know
φ,f o r m a l l y ,w eu s et h es y m b o lU and deﬁne it by U(φ) ≡¬ k(φ)∧¬k(¬k(φ)). Based
on syntactic interpretation of knowledge operator, we could prove that unawareness
implies dropping [P5]: If U(φ) is true, then ¬k(φ)i st r u e .I f[ 5] (which is equivalent
to [P5]) is satisﬁed, then k(¬k(φ)) is true which is contradicted with U(φ).T h u s ,
by assuming unawareness, dropping [P5] is a theorem, i.e.,   [P5]
4.1. Standard State-Space Precludes Unawareness
This section is based on Dekel et. al. (1998). We do not deﬁne the unawareness
operator from knowledge operator, but allow arbitrary operator satisfying certain
axioms.
[Plausibility] For all A ⊆ Ω, U(A) ⊆¬ K(A) ∩¬ K(¬K(A)): if an agent is
unaware of something, he does not know it and he does not know that he does not
know it.
[KU introspection] For all A ⊆ Ω, KU(A)=∅: it is impossible that an agent
knows that he is unaware of some speciﬁc event.
[AU introspection] For all A ⊆ Ω, U(A) ⊆ UU(A): if an agent is unaware of
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Theorem 14. Assume U satisﬁes [Plausibility, KU and AU introspection],
(i)If K satisﬁes [N], then, for all A ⊆ Ω, U(A)=∅.
(ii)If K satisﬁes [MC], then, for all A,B ⊆ Ω, U(A) ⊆¬ K(B).
Proof. By [AU introspection, Plausibility], we have, for all A ⊆ Ω, U(A) ⊆
UU(A) ⊆¬ K(¬K(U(A))).
By [KU introspection], we have, ¬K(U(A)) = Ω.
Thus U(A) ⊆¬ K(Ω).
(i) If K satisﬁes [N], then ¬K(Ω)=∅.T h u sU(A)=∅.
(ii) If K satisﬁes [MC], then K satisﬁes [Monotonicity] as well. Hence, for all
B ⊆ Ω, K(B) ⊆ K(Ω) which implies ¬K(Ω) ⊆¬ K(B). Thus U(A) ⊆¬ K(B).    
Since [N, MC] is the necessary condition that the knowledge operator can be
derived from a possibility correspondence, we cannot model non-trivial unawareness
in the standard state-space.
A Appendix
A1. Logic
This section is based on Hughes and Cresswell (1996). Logic is concerned with truth
and falsity. Modal logic is the logic of possibility and necessity. It is concerned with
truth and falsity in other possible worlds as well as the real one.
A1.1 Propositional Calculus
• The Language of Propositional Calculus (PC)
The primitive symbols of PC is a set of letters: p, q, r, ··· and 4 symbols:  , ∨,
(, ).
An expression is a sequence of symbols. For example, pq(  is an expression.
An expression is a well-formed formula(wﬀ) if it could be derived from the
following formation rules of PC:
FR1 A letter is a wﬀ.
FR2 If α is a wﬀ, so is  α.
FR3 If α and β are wﬀ, so is (α ∨ β).
• Interpretation
The letters are variables whose values are propositions(or statements, assertions)
which are referred to what are stated or asserted. We call them propositional vari-
ables. All propositions are either true or false, and no proposition is both true and
false. Truth and falsity are truth-values of the propositions.
We need proposition-forming operators to make new propositions from old ones
which are called arguments of the operators A monadic is an operator which has only
one argument. A dyadic is an operator which has two arguments. A truth-functional
operator is an operator such that whenever the truth-value of the arguments are
given we could deduce the truth-value of the complex proposition.
The interpretation of   is “not”. It is called negation sign. The interpretation of
∨ is “or”. It is called disjunction sign. Its arguments are called disjuncts.I ti sc l e a r
that   and ∨ are truth-functional operators.
• Further Operators
Now we deﬁne some new operators:456 Xiaojian Zhao
[Def ∧]( α ∧ β)= df  ( α∨ β)
[Def ⊃]( α ⊃ β)= df ( α ∨ β)
[Def ≡]( α ≡ β)= df ((α ⊃ β) ∧ (β ⊃ α))
α and β are any wﬀ of PC and =df is read as “is deﬁned as”. If a wﬀ contains
only the primitive symbols, it is said to be written in primitive notation.
The interpretation of ∧ is “and”. It is called conjunction sign. The interpre-
tation of ⊃ is “implies”. It is called implication sign. The ﬁrst argument is called
antecedent, and the second argument is called consequent. The interpretation of ≡
is “is equivalent to”. It is called equivalence sign. Clearly these new operators are
also truth-functional operators.
• Validity
Aw ﬀi svalid iﬀ it always has the value 1, no matter what truth-values are
assigned to its arguments. A valid wﬀ is also called tautology or PC-tautology.
Aw ﬀi sunsatisﬁable iﬀ it always has the value 0, no matter what truth-values
are assigned to its arguments.
A1.2 Propositional Modal Calculus
• The Language of Propositional Modal Calculus
Primitive symbols:
All propositional variables: p, q, r, ···, 3 operators: L,  , ∨ and 2 other symbols
(, ).
Formation rules:
FR1 A propositional variable is a wﬀ.
FR2 If α is a wﬀ, so are  α and Lα.
FR3 If α and β are wﬀ, so is (α ∨ β).
Deﬁnitions:
[Def ∧], [Def ⊃], [Def ≡] are deﬁned as in PC.
[Def M] Mα=df  L α
The interpretation of L is “necessarily”. It is called necessity sign. The interpre-
tation of M is “possibly”. It is called possibility sign.
• The Systems of Modal Logic
An axiomatic basis for a logical system S consists of
(a) a speciﬁcation of language
(b) axioms: a selected set of wﬀ
(c) a set of transformation rules or inference rules.
The theorems of the system are the wﬀ obtained from the axioms together
with the axioms themselves. A proof of theorem α in system S consists of a ﬁnite
sequence of wﬀ, each of which is either (i) an axiom of S or (ii) a wﬀ derived from
wﬀ occurring earlier in the sequence.
S is sound if every theorem of S is valid. S is complete if every valid wﬀ is a
theorem.
• The System K
Its axioms consist of
PC If α is a valid wﬀ of PC, then α is an axiom.
K L(p ⊃ q) ⊃ (Lp ⊃ Lq)
and three transformation rules
US(The Rule of Uniform Substitution):   α →  α[β1/p1,···,β n/pn]Formal Epistemology: A Survey 457
MP(The Rule of Modus Ponens):   α, α ⊃ β →  β
N(The Rule of Necessitation):   α →  Lα
where   α means α is a theorem. β1/p1 means replacing p1 by β1. → means the
derivation from some wﬀ.
• The System T
It is system K with
T(The Axiom of Necessity): Lp ⊃ p
• The System D
It is system K with
D: Lp ⊃ Mp
where L has a deontic interpretation.
• The System S4
It is system T with
4: Lp ⊃ LLp
• The System S5
It is system T with
5: Mp⊃ LMp
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Abstract This paper studies cooperative games in which distributed utility
consists of indivisible units (discrete games). Such games are considered as
a special subclass of NTU games. Relations between set-valued solutions of
discrete game as well as relations between them and corresponding TU game
solutions are described. Some existence conditions are obtained.
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1. Introduction
Transferable utility game (TU game) is deﬁned by assumptions of transferable util-
ity and side payments. A game with nontransferable utility (NTU game) requires
neither the assumption of side payments nor the assumption of transferable utility.
Intermediate position between TU games and general NTU games have the models
of economic situations in which side payments are allowed, but (because of non-
transferability of utility) some restrictions on them are imposed. For example, if
distributed utility consists of indivisible units then the characteristic function of
game and payoﬀ vectors should be integers.
The literature on this subject started with the monograph by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) studied market game
with one seller, two buyers and one (indivisible) unit of utility and have demon-
strated the eﬀect of requiring indivisibility. Cooperative games with integer side
payments have been called the games with restricted transferability. As it has been
noticed in (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) such games have economic ap-
plications, in particular, allow to construct more identical mathematical model of
such phenomenon as market agreement, but generate some rather speciﬁc diﬃcul-
ties which represent the considerable interest. It is possible to consider the modiﬁed
bankruptcy problem as the other application of such games. Let’s assume, that the
bankrupt ﬁrm produced some production of indivisible type and creditors prefer to
receive ﬁnished goods (which do not suﬃce for all) instead of monetary compensa-
tion, then the classical bankruptcy game (Curiel et al., 1987) becomes discrete.
Cooperative games with integer payoﬀ vectors were investigated in (Morozov and
Azamkhuzhaev, 1991; Azamkhuzhaev, 1991; Zinchenko, 2009; Zinchenko and Mer-
melshtejn, 2007) and other works by the same authors (such games are called dis-
crete). Azamkhuzhaev (1991) obtained the necessary and suﬃcient non-emptiness
conditions for the undominated imputations set of superadditive 3-person discrete
game and for symmetric n-person discrete game. Morozov and Azamkhuzhaev
(1991) have presented algorithm for computation of undominated imputations ofCooperative Side Payments Games with Restricted Transferability 459
discrete game with 5 and 6 players. We shall notice that in (Azamkhuzhaev, 1991;
Morozov and Azamkhuzhaev, 1991) the set of all undominated imputations is called
the core of discrete game. It has led to the contradictions noted in (Zinchenko and
Mermelshtejn, 2007).
In the current paper we consider discrete games as a special subclass of NTU
games for which the generalization of some TU solution concepts, not applicable to
arbitrary NTU games, is possible. The Weber set, core, core cover, dominance core,
dual core and stable set of discrete game are considered. Some relations between
set-valued solution concepts of discrete game, as well as relations between them
and corresponding TU game solutions, are described. Existence conditions of some
solutions are obtained.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we recall the facts from cooperative game theory which are useful
later. A TU game is a pair (N,ν)w h e r eN = {1,...,n} represents the set of players
and ν ∈ GN = {g :2 N → R | g( )=0 } is the characteristic function. Often ν
and (N,ν) will be identiﬁed. A game ν ∈ GN is called convex if ν(S1)+ν(S2) ≤
ν(S1∪S2)+ν(S1∩S2) forallS1,S 2 ⊆ N. A game ν ∈ GN is concave if (−ν) ∈ GN
is convex. A game ν∗ ∈ GN is called dual to ν ∈ GN if ν∗(S)=ν(N) − ν(N \
S) for all S ⊆ N. A game ν ∈ GN is called simple if ν(N)=1a n dν(S) ∈{ 0,1}
for all S ⊆ N.G i v e nx ∈ RN and coalition ∅  = S ⊆ N,w ew r i t ex(S)=
 
i∈S xi.
Let Π(N) be the set of all permutations π : N → N on N.T h eWeber set of
game ν ∈ GN, denoted by W(ν), is the convex hull of all π-marginal vectors, i.e.
W(ν)=conv{m










i = {π1,...,π i},i ∈ N. (1)
For the description of other set-valued solution concepts of game ν ∈ GN is used
the set X(ν)={x ∈ RN | x(N)=ν(N)} of payoﬀ distributions of ν(N)n a m e dt h e
preimputation set and its subsets: the imputation set
I(ν)={x ∈ X(ν) | xi ≥ ν(i),i ∈ N}
and the dual imputation set
I∗(ν)={x ∈ X(ν) | xi ≤ ν∗(i),i ∈ N}.
The core, core cover and dual core of a game ν ∈ GN are deﬁned by
C(ν)={x ∈ I(ν) | x(S) ≥ ν(S),S⊆ N},C C (ν)=I(ν) ∩ I∗(ν),
C∗(ν)={x ∈ X(ν) | x(S) ≤ ν(S),S⊆ N}.
For x,y ∈ I(ν), y is said to dominate x if there is a coalition S ∈ 2N \∅such that:
xi >y i for each player i ∈ S and x(S) ≤ ν(S). For ν ∈ GN and T ⊆ I(ν)d e n o t e
by dom(T) the set of imputations that are dominated by some element in T.T h e
set of all undominated imputations is called D-core, or dominance core, of a game
ν ∈ GN, i.e.
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Note that the Weber set, imputation set, dual imputation set, core, core cover, dual
core and D-core of a game ν ∈ GN are the polytops. Any of these sets, except the
Weber set, may be empty. The stable set R(ν) of a game ν ∈ GN is deﬁned by
conditions
R(ν) ∩ dom(R(ν)) = ∅,I (ν) \ R(ν) ⊆ dom(R(ν)).
It is known that for any game ν ∈ GN: W(ν)  = ∅,
C(ν)=C
∗(ν
∗),C (ν) ⊆ W(ν),C (ν) ⊆ DC(ν), (2)
DC(ν) ⊆ CC(ν). (3)




ν(i) ≤ ν(N),S⊆ N, (4)
are suﬃcient for equality of core C(ν)a n dD-core DC(ν). If C(ν)  = DC(ν)t h e n
C(ν)=∅. DC(ν) is a subset of every stable set R(ν)a n di fDC(ν) is a stable set,
then there is no other stable set. For a convex game ν ∈ GN:
C(ν)=W(ν)=DC(ν)  = ∅





∗)  = ∅.
A NTU game is described as a pair (N,V)w h e r eV is a function which maps
every set of players S ⊆ N i n t oas u b s e tV (S)o fRS, the so-called characteristic
set, satisfying:
1. V (S) is non-empty and closed,
2. V (S) is comprehensive, i.e. if x ∈ V (S), y ∈ RS and x ≥ y,t h e ny ∈ V (S).
Sometimes it is assumed that for all S ⊆ N the sets V (S) are convex.
3. Set-valued solution concepts
Denote by Z the set of integer numbers. Discrete game can be determined as NTU
game (N,VZZ), or simply VZZ, with characteristic sets
VZZ(S)={x ∈ ZS | x(S) ≤ νZ(S)},S⊆ N,
where νZ ∈ GN
Z = {g :2 N → Z | g( )=0 } is integer-valued function. Note that
discrete game VZZ is uniquely determined by integer TU game νZ. To each game
νZ ∈ GN
Z we associate also NTU game (N,VZ)w i t h
VZ(S)={x ∈ RS | x(S) ≤ νZ(S)},S⊆ N.
Denote by GN
ZZ the class of all discrete games with player set N. The NTU game
(N,V ∗
ZZ), or V ∗
ZZ for short, with
V ∗
ZZ(S)={x ∈ ZS | x(S) ≤ ν∗
Z(S)},S⊆ N,
we call the dual to game VZZ ∈ GN
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The basic solution concepts of NTU game theory generalize the solutions deﬁned
on the subclass of cooperative TU games. However, at such generalization there
can be a non-uniqueness and diﬃcult problems connected, for instance, with an
axiomatic characterization of some solutions and a ﬁnding of existence conditions.
On the one side, standard assumptions concerning the characteristic sets of NTU
game are not hold for discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ. But, on the other side, possibility
of numerical comparison players utility in game VZZ allows to deﬁne for it the
solution concepts (Weber set, core cover, dual core) which, as we know, have not
been described for NTU games.
Using the equality VZZ(S)=VZ(S)∩ZS we can deﬁne the Weber set W(VZZ),
imputation set I(VZZ), dual imputation set I∗(VZZ), core C(VZZ), core cover
CC(VZZ)a n ddual core C∗(VZZ) of discrete game VZZ as intersections of corre-
sponding sets of NTU game VZ (or TU game νZ ∈ GN
Z ) and integer lattice ZN:
W(VZZ)=W(νZ) ∩ Z





C(VZZ)=C(νZ)∩ZN,C ∗(VZZ)=C∗(νZ)∩ZN,C C (VZZ)=CC(νZ)∩ZN. (6)
The D-core DC(VZZ) of discrete game VZZ we deﬁne as the set of all undominated
elements in I(VZZ):
DC(VZZ)=I(VZZ) \ dom(I(VZZ)).
The stable set R(VZZ) of discrete game VZZ is deﬁned (von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944) by conditions
R(VZZ) ∩ dom(R(VZZ)) = ∅,I (VZZ) \ R(VZZ) ⊆ dom(R(VZZ)).
Denote by  (VZZ) the collection of all stable sets of discrete game VZZ.
Following two propositions show that the Weber set of any discrete game VZZ
always exists and the imputation set, dual imputation set, core cover of discrete
game exist iﬀ the corresponding sets of TU game νZ are non-empty.
Proposition 1. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ then:
(i) W(VZZ)  = ∅;
(ii) I(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ  
i∈N
νZ(i) ≤ νZ(N); (7)
(iii) I∗(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ  
i∈N
ν∗
Z(i) ≥ νZ(N). (8)
Proof (of proposition). (i) Due to (1) it holds that mπ(νZ) ∈ ZN for all π ∈ Π(N).
Because mπ(νZ) ∈ W(νZ), we have that mπ(νZ) ∈ W(νZ) ∩ ZN. By deﬁnition of
W(VZZ) this implies W(VZZ)  = ∅.
(ii) It is known that (7) is a necessary and suﬃcient non-emptiness condition for
I(νZ). Hence, it is suﬃcient to show that I(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ I(νZ)  = ∅.L e t ’ sa s s u m e ,
that I(VZZ)  = ∅. From the second equality in (5) we have that I(VZZ) ⊆ I(νZ).
So I(νZ)  = ∅. To prove the converse, suppose that I(νZ)  = ∅.T h e nI(νZ)=
conv{fi(νZ) | i ∈ N} where
fi
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Because νZ is integer-valued function, we have that fi(νZ) ∈ ZN ∩ I(νZ). Hence,
fi(νZ) ∈ I(VZZ), i.e. I(VZZ)  = ∅.
(iii) I∗(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ (8) holds. Suppose that I∗(VZZ)  = ∅. From the last equality
i n( 5 )w eh a v et h a tI∗(VZZ) ⊆ I∗(νZ). So I∗(νZ)  = ∅. Let’s assume now, that













Since νZ(S) ∈ Z for all S ⊆ N,w eh a v ehi(νZ) ∈ ZN∩I∗(νZ), i.e. hi(νZ) ∈ I∗(VZZ).
It means that I∗(VZZ)  = ∅.    
It is follows from the proof of proposition 1 that the imputation set I(νZ)a n d
the dual imputation set I∗(νZ) of integer TU game νZ are integer polytopes. In
general the nonempty intersection of integer polytopes can not have any integer
point. However, the core cover of integer game νZ ∈ GN
Z deﬁned as intersection of
I(νZ)a n dI∗(νZ) is also integer polytope (see the proof of proposition 2).
Proposition 2. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ.T h e nCC(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ conditions (7), (8) and
νZ(i) ≤ ν∗
Z(i),i ∈ N, (11)
hold.
Proof (of proposition). Conditions (7), (8) and (11) are the necessary and suﬃcient
for non-emptiness of CC(νZ). Hence, it is suﬃcient to prove that CC(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ
CC(νZ)  = ∅. Let’s assume, that CC(VZZ)  = ∅. From the last equality in (6) we
have CC(VZZ) ⊆ CC(νZ). So CC(νZ)  = ∅. To prove the converse, suppose that
CC(νZ)  = ∅.S i n c eCC(νZ) is determined by system
xi ≥ νZ(i),x i ≤ ν∗
Z(i)),i ∈ N, x(N)=νZ(N) (12)
then this system has a nonempty solution set. Denote by 1n n-dimentional vector
w i t ha l lc o o r d i n a t e se q u a lt o1 .L e tx ∈ RN and A be the n×(2n+2)-matrix with
columns e1,...,e n,−e1,...,−en,1n,−1n where ei ∈ Rn, ei
j =0f o ri  = j and ei
i =1
for each i ∈ N. The linear system (12) can be written down in the form xTA ≥
bT where b =( νZ(1),...,ν Z(n),−ν∗
Z(1),...,−ν∗
Z(n),ν Z(N),−νZ(N)). Core cover
CC(νZ) is a polytope, hence it has at least one extreme point ˜ x.L e t ˜ A be the
basis corresponding to ˜ x. Obviously, det( ˜ A)=±1. Since b is the vector with integer
coordinates then ˜ x ∈ ZN.T h u s˜ x ∈ CC(VZZ). This implies CC(VZZ)  = ∅.    
It is follows from (5) - (6) that for any discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ,a sf o rr e l a t e d
TU game νZ ∈ GN
Z , the core coincides with the dual core of dual game V ∗
ZZ and




ZZ),C (VZZ) ⊆ W(VZZ).
For convex game νZ the core of associated discrete game VZZ is nonempty and
coincides with Weber set
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For concave game νZ the dual core of associated discrete game VZZ is nonempty
and coincides with Weber set of dual game V ∗
ZZ, the dual core of game VZZ also




ZZ)  = ∅.
In propositions 3, 4 (below) other relations between set-valued solution concepts
of discrete game, analogous to the relations (2) between TU game solutions, are
proved. Thus, the core of any discrete game is a subset of its D-core and all stable
sets of any discrete game contain the D-core. The proofs of these propositions is
similar to proof of theorem 2.11 from (Branzei et al., 2005)
Proposition 3. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ.T h e nC(VZZ) ⊆ DC(VZZ).
Proof (of proposition). Suppose that C(VZZ)  = ∅ and take x ∈ C(VZZ). If x/ ∈
DC(VZZ)t h e nx ∈ dom(I(VZZ)), i.e. there exists an y ∈ I(VZZ) which dominate
x. Hence, there exists a coalition ∅  = S ⊂ N for which y(S) ≤ νZ(S)a n dyi ≥ xi
for each player i ∈ S. This yields that x(S) <y (S) ≤ ν(S), i.e. x/ ∈ C(νZ). It is
follows from the deﬁnition of C(VZZ)t h a tC(VZZ) ⊆ C(νZ). Thus, x/ ∈ C(VZZ).
Hence, the assumption x/ ∈ DC(VZZ)i sf a l s e .    
Proposition 4. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ and  (VZZ)  = ∅.T h e n
DC(VZZ) ⊆ R(VZZ) for all R(VZZ) ∈  (VZZ).
Proof (of proposition). Suppose DC(VZZ)  = ∅ and take x ∈ DC(VZZ). Assume
that R(VZZ) ∈  (VZZ)a n dx/ ∈ R(VZZ). From the deﬁnition of stable set this
implies that there exists payoﬀ vector y ∈ R(VZZ) such that y dominate x.S i n c e
R(VZZ) ⊆ I(VZZ)w eh a v ey ∈ I(VZZ). This yields a contradiction x/ ∈ DC(VZZ).
   
Unlike previous statements, propositions 5 and 6 show that some relations be-
tween set-valued solutions of TU game νZ ∈ GN
Z do not hold for corresponding sets
of discrete game VZZ. The convex function νZ satisfy the condition (4) but even
convexity of function νZ is not suﬃcient for the equality of core and D-core of game
VZZ. The core of discrete game VZZ deﬁned by convex function νZ can be not equal
to any stable set R(VZZ) ∈  (VZZ). Unlike (3) the core cover of discrete game can
be own subset of its D-core.
Proposition 5. Let νZ be a convex game. Then there are discrete games VZZ ∈
GN
ZZ for which:
(i) C(VZZ)  = DC(VZZ) and C(VZZ)  = ∅,
(ii) C(VZZ)  = R(VZZ) for every R(VZZ) ∈  (VZZ).
Proof (of proposition). (i) Consider the convex TU game (N,νZ)w i t hN = {1,2,3}
and
νZ(i)=0 ,i ∈ N, νZ(1,2) = 0,ν Z(1,3) = νZ(2,3) = 1,ν Z(N)=2 . (13)
This game deﬁnes discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ with characteristic sets
VZZ(i)={x ∈ Z
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VZZ(1,2) = {x ∈ Z
{1,2} | x1 + x2 ≤ 0},V ZZ(1,3) = {x ∈ Z
{1,3} | x1 + x3 ≤ 1},
VZZ(2,3) = {x ∈ Z
{2,3} | x2 + x3 ≤ 1},V ZZ(N)={x ∈ Z
N| x1 + x2 + x3 ≤ 2}
Discrete game VZZ has non-empty core C(VZZ)={(0,0,2),(1,1,0),(1,0,1),
(0,1,1)} which is not equal to its D-core DC(VZZ)=C(VZZ)∪{(2,0,0),(0,2,0)}.
(ii) Discrete game deﬁned by integer convex 3-person game (13) has a unique
stable set.  (VZZ)={R(VZZ)},w h e r eR(VZZ)=C(VZZ) ∪{ (2,0,0),(0,2,0)}.
Hence, C(VZZ)  = R(VZZ).    
Proposition 6. There are the discrete games VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ for which
CC(VZZ) ⊂ DC(VZZ).
Proof (of proposition). Discrete game deﬁned by integer convex 3-person game (13)
have CC(VZZ)=C(VZZ)={(0,0,2),(1,1,0),(1,0,1),(0,1,1)} and DC(VZZ)=
C(VZZ) ∪{ (2,0,0),(0,2,0)}. Hence, CC(VZZ) ⊂ DC(VZZ).    
In last proposition of this section we show that the intersection of D-core of
game νZ ∈ GN
Z and integer lattice ZN can be unequals the D-core of associated
discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ and the intersection of every stable set of game νZ ∈ GN
Z
and integer lattice ZN can not belongs to family of stable sets of game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ.
Proposition 7. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ then
(i) DC(νZ) ∩ ZN ⊆ DC(VZZ) and it is possible strict inclusion,
(ii) it is possible that R(νZ) ∩ ZN / ∈  (VZZ) for each R(νZ) ∈  (νZ).
Proof (of proposition). (i) The proved inclusion follows from DC(νZ)∩ZN = I(νZ)\
dom(I(νZ)) ∩ ZN ⊆ (I(νZ) ∩ ZN) \ dom(I(νZ) ∩ ZN)=I(VZZ) \ dom(I(VZZ)) =
DC(VZZ). Consider discrete game VZZ deﬁned by symmetric 3-person TU game νZ
with
νZ(i)=0 ,i ∈ N = {1,2,3},ν Z(1,2) = νZ(1,3) = νZ(2,3) = νZ(N)=1 . (14)
Since DC(νZ)=∅ and DC(VZZ)={(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1)} we have DC(νZ) ∩
ZN ⊂ DC(VZZ).




























and three families of stable sets
R
1,c(νZ)={(c, x2, 1 − c − x2) | 0 ≤ x2 ≤ 1 − c},
R
2,c(νZ)={(1 − c − x3,c ,x 3) | 0 ≤ x3 ≤ 1 − c},
R3,c(νZ)={(x1, 1 − c − x1,c ) | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 1 − c},
were c ∈ [0, 1
2). Let’s ﬁnd the intersections of stable sets of game (14) and integer
lattice ZN:
R0(νZ) ≡ R0(νZ) ∩ ZN = ∅,







Discrete game VZZ has the unique stable set:  (VZZ)={R(VZZ)} were R(VZZ)=
{(0,0,1),(0,1,0),(1,0,0)}. Hence, R0(νZ) / ∈  (VZZ)a n d Ri,c(νZ) / ∈  (VZZ)f o r
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4. Balancedness
It is known that integer game νZ ∈ GN
Z (as TU game ν ∈ GN) has a non-empty
core iﬀ it is balanced, i.e.  
S∈Ω
λSνZ(S) ≤ νZ(N) (15)
where Ω =( 2 N \∅)\N,
 
S∈Ω,S i λS =1f o re a c hi ∈ N and λS ≥ 0. It is follows
from inclusion C(VZZ) ⊆ C(νZ) that (15) is a necessary non-emptiness condition for
the core C(VZZ) of discrete game VZZ. Obviously, condition (15) is hot suﬃcient
for the existence of C(VZZ). Next proposition gives the necessary non-emptiness
condition for the D-core of discrete game.
Proposition 8. Let VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ then
(i) condition (15) is not necessary for the existence of D-core of game VZZ,
(ii) a necessary non-emptiness condition for the D-core of game VZZ is bal-
ancedness of TU-game νZ ∈ GN
Z were
νZ(N)=νZ(N), νZ(S)=νZ(S) −| S| +1for all S ∈ Ω.
Proof (of proposition). (i) Let N = {1,2,3}, λ  = {λ 
S}S∈Ω were λ 




2 and λ 
{i} =0f o ri ∈ N. For vector λ  and 3-person game (14) condition
(15) is not holds, i.e. this game is non-balanced. However discrete game VZZ deﬁned
by integer TU game (14) have non-empty D-core: D(VZZ)={(0,0,1),(0,1,0),
(1,0,0)}.
(ii) Let x  = y be two imputations x,y ∈ I(VZZ) of discrete game VZZ.I fy
dominate x then there exists coalition S such that y(S) ≤ νZ(S)a n dyi >x i for
each i ∈ S. It easily be veriﬁed that coalition S satisﬁes the condition 1 < |S| <
n.S i n c ex,y ∈ ZN then for each i ∈ S we have yi ≥ xi + 1. We obtain that
x(S)+|S|≤y(S) ≤ νZ(S). Equivalently, x(S) ≤ νZ(S) −| S|. For integer-valued
function νZ we have that the inequality x(S) <ν Z(S) −| S| + 1 holds. Hence, each
undominated imputation x ∈ DC(VZZ) must satisfy conditions: x(N)=νZ(N),
x(S) ≥ νZ(S) −| S| +1 ,1≤| S| <n .T h u s ,x must be the core payoﬀ vector of TU
game νZ.T h i si m p l i e st h a tC(νZ)  = ∅, i.e. the game νZ is balanced.    
The balancedness conditions for NTU-game: standart balancedness, balanced-
ness for convex games, b-balancedness, (b,<)-balancedness, Π-balancedness, bal-
ancedness with respect to the transfer rate mapping (their description can be found
in (Bonnisseau and Iehle, 2007)) are not applicable to games with discrete char-
acteristic sets VZZ(S). The problem of obtaining the necessary and suﬃcient non-
emptiness conditions for the core of discrete game VZZ is reduced to problem of
existence integer point in polytope C(νZ). This problem, as we know, is not solved
yet in general, however, for simple games balancedness conditions are found simply.
Proposition 9. Let νZ be a simple game. Then C(VZZ)  = ∅ iﬀ
Ve t o (νZ) ≡∩ { S | νZ(S)=1 }  = ∅. (16)
Proof (of proposition). The core of simple game νZ has the following representation
C(νZ)={x ∈ RN |
 
i∈Ve t o (νZ) xi =1and xi =0for i ∈ N \ Ve t o (νZ)}.I ti s
known that C(νZ)  = ∅ iﬀ (16) holds. Since C(νZ) is the convex hull of vectors ei,
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Next proposition gives the suﬃcient non-emptiness conditions for the core of
discrete game, which are satisﬁed for some models of real situations.
Proposition 10. If one of the following conditions holds
(i) there exists i ∈ N such that νZ(S)+
 
k∈N\S νZ(k) ≤ νZ(N) for each S ⊂ N
with i ∈ S,a n dνZ(S) ≤
 
k∈S νZ(k) otherwise;
(ii) there exists i ∈ N such that νZ(S) ≤ (|S|+1−n)νZ(N)+
 
k∈N\S νZ(N \k)
for each S ⊂ N with i ∈ S,a n dνZ(S) ≤| S|νZ(N) −
 
k∈S νZ(N \ k) otherwise;




S  = {π1,...,π i}, i ∈ N;
then the core of discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ is non-empty.
Proof (of proposition). It is easy to check that under maded assumptions vector
fi(νZ) deﬁned by (9) belongs to the core of TU game νZ ∈ GN
Z .S i n c efi(νZ) ∈ ZN
then fi(νZ) ∈ C(VZZ). This means that C(VZZ)  = ∅.
(ii) Under maded assumptions hi(νZ) ∈ C(νZ)w e r ehi(νZ) deﬁned by (10).
Since hi(νZ) ∈ ZN then hi(νZ) ∈ C(VZZ). Hence C(VZZ)  = ∅.




νZ(S)f o rS = Sπ
i , i ∈ N. From maded assumptions follows mπ(νZ) ∈ C(νZ). Since
mπ(νZ) ∈ ZN then mπ(νZ) ∈ C(VZZ). Thus C(VZZ)  = ∅.    
From properties of discrete games follows that a nonempty core have the discrete
analogues of following subclasses of the class of balanced TU games: bankruptcy
games (Curiel et al., 1987), big boss games (Muto et al., 1988) (in particular, holding
games (Tijs et al., 2005)), clan games (Potters et al., 1989), T-simplex (∅  = T ⊆
N) and dual simplex games (Branzei and Tijs, 2001), games satisfying the CoMa-
property (Hamers et al., 2002), k-convex games (k ∈ N).
5. Conclusion
The propositions given before show that for special situations modelled by discrete
games sometimes it is more convenient to work with related integer TU game instead
of describing discrete game as a NTU game. The intersections of integer lattice ZN
and the TU game solution sets determined by linear constraints (Weber set, core,
dual core, core cover) are identical to corresponding sets of discrete game. The
relations between these sets are saved (see propositions 2-4). However, the set-
valued solutions determined by dominance relation (D-core and stable sets) do not
satisfy to similar properties (see proposition 5-7). As it is illustrated before, there
are inﬁnite many stable sets of integer game (14), but associated discrete game VZZ
has a unique stable set containing all integer payoﬀ vectors which belong to stable
sets of TU game νZ.
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced the notion of a kernel of
directed graph as an generalization of their concept of stable set. Let Γ =( U,E)b e
the directed graph with vertex set U corresponding to imputations set I(VZZ)o f
discrete game VZZ ∈ GN
ZZ and let (i,j) ∈ E iﬀ xj ∈ I(VZZ) dominates xi ∈ I(VZZ).
In contrast to TU case, graph Γ is ﬁnite. Any kernel of such graph, obviously, deﬁnes
stable sets of discrete game VZZ. Known existence conditions of kernels of directed
graph give existence conditions of stable sets of discrete game.
For computation of payoﬀ vectors belonging to core, dual core or D-core of
discrete game it is possible to use the integer programming algorithms. For com-
putation of payoﬀ vectors which belong to stable sets we can use the algorithmsCooperative Side Payments Games with Restricted Transferability 467
of graph theory. Thus, the unique kernel in an acyclic directed graph can be con-
structed eﬃciently by ”backward induction” procedure. Note that even in simple
cases it is diﬃcult to calculate all (or only one of) the stable sets TU game and
non-discrete NTU game.
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Abstract In this paper two deﬁnitions of strong equilibrium are consid-
ered: strong equilibrium in broad and narrow senses. The main result of the
paper is suﬃcient conditions for strong equilibrium existence in diﬀerential
games. A special technique based on scalarization of vector criteria is used
to construct strong equilibrium in broad sense. This approach is tested on
example of the diﬀerential game with three players.
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, dynamic programming.
1. Strong equilibrium deﬁnition
Consider the diﬀerential game Γ(x0,T−t0) with initial state x0 and ﬁnite duration
T − t0, where t0 ≥ 0,T≥ t0 (Isaacs, 1965; Zenkevich et al., 2009). Denote set of
players as N = {1,...,i,...,n}.
The dynamics of the game has the following form:
˙ x(t)=f [t,x(t),u 1(t),...,u n(t)],x (t0)=x0, (1)
where x(t) ∈ R, ui(t), t ∈ [t0,T] – control function of player i ∈ N,t,ui(t) ∈ Ui ⊂ R,
n  
i=1
Ui = UN ⊂ Rn. Suppose, that for function f [t,x(t),u 1(t),...,u n(t)] conditions
for existing and uniqueness on [t0,T] × R × UN are hold.
The payoﬀ of player i ∈ N is deﬁned as:
Ji(x0,u 1(·),u 2(·),...u n(·)) =
T  
t0
gi [t,x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t),...,u n(t)]dt + qi [x(T)],
where ui(·) is continuous function ui(t),t∈ [t0,T].
Suppose, that functions gi [t,x(t),u 1(t),u 2(t),...,u n(t)],t∈ [t0,T]a n dqi [x(T)]
are diﬀerentiable for i ∈ N and every player i tends to maximize
Ji(x0,u 1(·),...,u i(·),...u n(·))
on ui(·).
Let S ⊆ N is a coalition in the game Γ(x0). Denote strategy of the coalition S
as uS(·)={ui(·)}i∈S. A strategy of additional coalition N\S denote as uN\S(·)o r
u−S(·).
  This work was supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Researches under grant
No.08-01-00301-a.Strong Equilibrium in Diﬀerential Games 469




n(·)) is said to con-
stitute a strong equilibrium in broad sense for diﬀerential game Γ(x0,T − t0)i f
























dt + qi [x∗(T)] = Ji(x0,u ∗
M(t),u ∗
−M(t))














































˙ x∗(t)=f [t,x∗(t),u ∗
1(t),...,u ∗
n(t)],x ∗(t0)=x0.
The set of all strong equilibrium situations in road sense in the game Γ(x0,T−t0)
we deﬁne as SME(Γ(x0,T− t0)).













j =0 ,j = iλ
[n,i]
i =1 .




n(·)) provides strong equi-





n(·)) ∈ SME(Γ(x0,T− t0)),
if for any coalition S ⊆ N there exists such number iS
0 ∈ S, that for any strategy of
the coalition uS(·)  = u∗














i Ji(x0,u S(·),u ∗
−S(·)). (2)470 Andrey V. Zyatchin






is not a strong equilibrium in broad sense. Then there exists a coalition M and its
strategy uM(·),s u c ht h a t :
 
Ji(x0,u M(·),u ∗
−M(·)) ≥ Ji(x0,u ∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·)), ∀i ∈ M,
∃i0 ∈ M, Ji0(x0,u M(·),u ∗
−M(·)) >J i0(x0,u ∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·)). (3)
According to lemma 1, inequality (2) takes place for any coalition S ⊂ N,
including M. Therefore one can ﬁnd such number iM
0 ∈ M , that the inequality 2















i Ji(x0,u M(·),u ∗
−M(·)). (4)
From the deﬁnition of vector λ[n,i
M





0 (x0,u M(·),u ∗
−M(·)). (5)
Note that iM
0 ∈ M, then inequalities (3) and (5) are incompatible. Therefore the




n(·)) / ∈ SME(Γ(x0,T− t0)) -
must be false, then lemma 1 is proved.    
Remark 1. The set of players N is ﬁnite, therefore we can ﬁnd number iS
0 by
testing vectors λ[n,i],i=1 ,2,...,nfor any coalition S ⊆ N. The strict inequality in










0 (x0,u N(·)),i S
0 ∈ S is unique.
Consider the following designation:








The next deﬁnition is based on a concept, suggested by L.A. Petrosyan (Grauer
and Petrosyan, 2002).




n(·)) is said to consti-
tute a strong equilibrium in narrow sense for diﬀerential game Γ(x0,T− t0)i ft h e



































˙ x∗(t)=f [t,x∗(t),u ∗
1(t),...,u ∗
n(t)],x ∗(t0)=x0.





















∀ S ⊂ N, S  = ∅, ∀uS(·).
The set of all strong equilibrium situations in narrow sense in the game Γ(x0,T−
t0) we deﬁne as SPE(Γ(x0,T− t0)).
Lemma 2.
SPE(Γ(x0,T− t0)) ⊂ SME(Γ(x0,T− t0)).










n(·)) / ∈ SME(Γ(x0,T− t0)).
Then there exists a coalition M ⊆ N and its strategy u∗∗
M(·) such that:
 
∀i ∈ MJ i(x0,u ∗∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·)) ≥ Ji(x0,u ∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·))
∃i0 ∈ MJ i0(x0,u ∗∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·)) >J i0(x0,u ∗
M(·),u ∗
−M(·))















n(·)) / ∈ SPE(Γ(x0,T− t0)) and the initial




n(·)) ∈ SPE(Γ(x0,T− t0)) – is false.
So the lemma 2 is proved.    
Let formulate and prove the following theorem using dynamic programming
technique.472 Andrey V. Zyatchin
Theorem 1. If for any coalition S ⊆ N, S  = ∅ in a game Γ(x0,T − t0) exists a
number iS
0 ∈ S and continuously diﬀerentiable on [0,T]×R solution of the following
system of diﬀerential equations
V
[S]

































































where for all S ⊆ N maximum in LHS is a unique couple
{φ∗
i (t,x(t)) ∈ Ui,i∈ N, t ∈ [t0,T]},
where φ∗
i (t,x(t)) ∈ Ui,i∈ N are continuous on [t0,T]×R functions, then the couple
{u∗
i(t)=φ∗
i (t,x(t)) ∈ Ui,i∈ N, t ∈ [t0,T]} is strong equilibrium in broad sense in
the game Γ(x0,T− t0).
Proof. a) Suppose, that conditions of the theorem are satisﬁed for grand coalition
N. Then there exists a number iN

















Suppose we are given another set of strategies uN(·) ∈ UN , with the corre-
sponding trajectory x(t). Then the theorem 1 implies:
V
[N]








i gi [t,x,uN(t)] < 0( 7 )













N(t,x)] = 0 (8)
˙ x∗(t)=f [t,x∗,φ ∗
N(t,x∗)],x ∗(t0)=x0


















































dt + V [N](T,x(T)) − V [N](t0,x(t0)).









































































i Ji [x0,u N(·)]. (9)
b) Suppose, that conditions of the theorem hold for a coalition S ⊂ N, S  = N.
Then there exists a number iS




























where the function φ∗
−S(t,x) is found in a).
Suppose we are given another set of strategies uS(·) ∈ US diﬀerent from φ∗
S(t,x)






,x [S](t0)=x0.474 Andrey V. Zyatchin











































˙ x∗(t)=f [t,x∗,φ ∗
N(t,x)],x ∗(t0)=x0




































































+V [S](T,x[S](T)) − V [S](t0,x [S](t0)).

































































































From the expressions (9) and (12) we have that for any coalition S ⊆ N , S  = ∅ ,
there exists such number iS
0 ∈ S , that for any strategy uS(·)  = u∗
S(·) of the coalition
















i Ji(x0,u S(·),u ∗
−S(·)).
B yl e m m a1ac o u p l eu∗
N(·) constitutes strong equilibrium SPE(Γ(x0,T− t0)).
   
2. Strong equilibrium in a diﬀerential game with linear dynamics














+ r(t) = 0 (13)
V (T,x)=η3x,
where a , b , η1 , η2 , η3 are known constants, b  = η2 , r(t) – continuously diﬀeren-
tiable function on [t0,T].











Rewrite (13) with respect to (14):






q =1+( 2 η1q + η2x + ae
bt)
2  =0476 Andrey V. Zyatchin
Consider the following parameterization for the bound condition V (T,x)=η3x :
T = t0(τ)=const, x = x0(τ)=τ,
V (T,x)=V (T,x0(τ)) = V0(τ)=η3τ, (16)
p = p0(τ),q = q0(τ).
As a result we’ve obtained Cauchy problem (15) - (16), where p0(τ)a n dq0(τ)
satisﬁes the following conditions:
 












q0(τ)=η3,p 0(τ)=−aebTη3 − η1η2
3 − η2η3τ − r(T).












2η1q0 + η2τ + ae
bT 
· 0=1 =0 ,
therefore problem (15)-(17) has a unique solution.
To solve (15)-(17) consider a system of characteristic equations:
dt
dt
= Fp =1 ,
dx
dt
= Fq =2 η1q + η2x + aebt, (19)
dV
dt
= pFp + qFq = p +2 η1q2 + η2qx+ aebtq, (20)
dp
dt
= −(pFV + Ft)=−abebtq − r (t), (21)
dq
dt
= −(qFV + Fx)=−η2q
with boundary conditions:
T = t0(τ)=const, x = x0(τ)=τ, V(T,x0(T)) = V0(τ)=η3τ,
p0(τ)=−aebTη3 − r(T) − η1η2
3 − η2η3τ, q0(τ)=η3.
Then
q = η3e
η2(T−t). (22)Strong Equilibrium in Diﬀerential Games 477
Substituting (22) into (19), we obtain the following ODE:
dx
dt
= η2x +2 η1η3eη2(T−t) + aebt,x (T)=x0(τ)=τ,


















Substituting (22) into (21), we obtain the following ODE:
dp
dt
= −abebtη3eη2(T−t) − r (t)=−r (t) − abη3ebteη2(T−t),
where
p(T)=p0(τ)=−aebTη3 − r(T) − η1η2
3 − η2η3τ.
It has the following solution:







3 − η2η3τ. (24)






























ebt − ebTe−η2(T−t) 













Eliminating parameter τ, we have:




































lemma 3 is proved.    478 Andrey V. Zyatchin
Consider an example of diﬀerential game, where strong equilibrium in broad
sense exists.
Example 1. Consider the game Γ(x0,T − t0),w h e r eN = {1,2,3} , n = 3 ,with
state dynamics:
˙ x(t)=ax + b1u1 + b2u2 + b3u3,x (t0)=x0. (27)
Player 1 ∈ N tends to maximize the following functional:













dt + x(T), (28)
the aim of player 2 ∈ N is functional J{2} [x0,u 1,u 2,u 3]:













dt + x(T), (29)
and the aim of player 3 ∈ N is functional J{2} [x0,u 1,u 2,u 3]:













dt + x(T), (30)
where r[1](t),r[2](t),r[3](t),t ∈ [t0,T] – continuously diﬀerentiable functions.
In the game (27)-(30) we will ﬁnd strong equilibrium SME. According to the
theorem 1, it is necessary for any coalition S ⊆ N , S  = 0 to ﬁnd such number
iS
0 ∈ S and continuously diﬀerentiable function V [S](t,x), that equations (6) and
corresponding equations for state variable have a unique solution.




















Then expression (6) has the form:
V
[N]
t (t,x)+ m a x
(u1,u2,u3)
 



























































































































Obviously, the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
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3  =0 .
(35)
























































































































Suppose that player 3 uses the strategy φ∗













































































































































































Obviously, the second order conditions are satisﬁed.























































































































































































2  =0 . (42)



























































Considering the cases of coalitions S = {1,3} and S = {2,3} proceeds similar


























































3  =0 . (45)















































































































































3  =0 , (48)






































































































Suppose that players 2 and 3 use the strategies φ123
2 (t,x)a n dφ123
3 (t,x)c o r -
respondly. From the deﬁnition of vector λ[n,i
S









3 =0 . Then expression (6) has the form:
V
[S]
t (t,x)+m a x
u1
 











































































































































































1 < 0. (52)














































































































































1 r[1](t)=0 , (53)































































































Considering the cases of coalitions S = {2} and S = {3} proceeds similar to one























































































































































































Consider the following vectors:
λ[n,i
N
0 ] =( 1 ,0,0) , λ[n,i
{1,2}
0 ] =( 1 ,0,0) , λ[n,i
{1,3}
0 ] =( 1 ,0,0) , λ[n,i
{2,3}
0 ] =( 0 ,1,0)
, λ[n,i
{1}
0 ] =( 1 ,0,0) , λ[n,i
{2}
0 ] =( 0 ,1,0) , λ[n,i
{3}
0 ] =( 0 ,0,1) .
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0 = 3 , then by the theorem 1. φ∗(t,x) ∈ SME in the game (27)-(30).
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